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TO 
MIS MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY 
GEORGE IV. 
SIRE, 
Al\-IONGST the many distinguished honours 
your Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer 
on one of your most devoted subjects, none was 
more deeply appreciated than your appointment of 
him to the colonelcy of that regiment which your 
Majesty so long commanded in persono It is from 
a constant and everlasting sense of this military 
distínction, that he has ventured most humbly to 
lay at your Majesty's feet a short narrative of 
those campaigns in the Península in which he 
had the honour and good fortune to be engaged. 
With the profoundest respect and devotion, the 
writer begs permission to subscribe himself, 
y our Majesty's 
Most dutiful Subject and Servant, 
VANE LONDONDERRY, Lieut.-Genl. 
COL. lOTII ROyL. HUSSARS. 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
TliESE Reminiscences of some years of an active 
professional life were never íntended to meet the 
public eye. They were written alwáys in great 
. has te, sometimes at long intervals, ahd sometimes 
when fatigue entirely oppressed the· body, and 
when the frame courted sleep rather than the 
most trifling occupation. But the great motive 
which prorripted the first committal to paper of 
the imperfect details which these sheets embrace, 
was the affectionate and indulgent spirit with 
which they were received by him to whom they 
were addressed. They would probably have 
remairted buried with the object of that unbounded 
aUachment and devotion which gave them birth, 
had not the circumstances attending the late events 
Vl ADVER'fISEMEN'f. 
m Portugal recalled the former scenes passed 
m that country, where British soldiers had en-
joyed so many triumphs, and where the deepest 
¡nterest had been blended with their career, by 
their Iearning, practically, under the greatest 
Master of this or any former age, tha! profession 
in which their destinies were involved. 
When a new force was equipped, and, launched 
under new auspices, was about to sail for that 
quarter, it occurred to me that these hasty 
sketches of a former period, however light and 
imperfect, might, not be wholly uninteresting to 
those l1rave brother soldiers, who were embarking 
again for that land where so many laurels had 
been already gathered. 
1 therefore determined to a:range, with a friend, 
my letters a~d memoranda in the form of a narra-
tive. Their deficiency, in many respects, is 
frankly acknowledged; and it is hoped that, being 
composed under the circumstances of const~nt 
fatigue and activity, the Author may meet with 
indulgence. On another _point also he has to 
claim consideration from his' brother officers. 
They know, as well as himself, how impossible it 
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IS for any individual to render justice to the 
meritorious deeds of every division and corps in a 
long campaign; to describe all parts of a field of 
batt1e; to enter into the various views tbat are 
taken; or lastly, to detail the heroism 01' the 
several officers in tbe performance of their duties 
and exploits. Happily, the task of a eulogist or a 
critic belongs to higher powers. The following 
sheets have been compiled for other purposes; 
1f they stimulate young officers to record the 
events ofthe moment as it fiies, and the interesting 
scenes they may engage in, for the Ínformation of 
parents and friends at a distance, their publication 
will accomplish one useful purpose ;and if they 
enlivenone leisure hour, in camp or quarters. 
of the brother soldiers of tbe author, bis object js 
more than gained. 
V, L. 
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THE memorable struggle in which, during fifteen . 
or sixteen years, England had been engaged, 
may be said, up to the year 1807, orráther 1808, 
to have be en a mere war of defence. Whilst her 
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fleets swept the seas in each quarter of the globe, 
crushing, wherever they came in contact with it, 
the naval strength ofthe enemy, her armies either 
rested idly upon har own. shotes, or were scattered 
in detachments among her colonies, or at best 
found themselves from time to time called upon 
to bear a part in some petty expedition, the object 
of which was usually as unprofitable, as the means 
employed for its attainment were insignificant. If 
we except the short campaign of Egypt, and the 
still shorter though hardly less brilliant affair of 
Maida, the entire period, from 1793 down to the 
commencement of the Peninsular war, presents us 
with no single record of deeds performed, worthy 
of the ancient rrÍilitary renown of Great Britain; 
for neither the capture of a few islands in the W.€st 
Indies, nor the seizure aild súbseqtient abandon-
ttiertt of Tóulon, llor ihe coíitests in Flanders and 
at the Texel, nor even the reduction of Copen-
hagen, can with any justice or propriety be referred 
to, as adding much to the lasting reputation of this 
country. 
But though the case \vas so, abd government 
appeared aH ihis while unaccountablyanxious to 
avoid bringing its l.and forces fairly into contact 
with those of France, it was by no means indif .. 
ferent either as to tlie numencal strength or to the 
internal discipEne and organisation of the atmy. 
The threat of ah invasion, followeu up as it was by 
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the assembIy ofn~merou,s bodies oftroops aIong the 
French ~oast, infuse<\ \fttq \lIe peopIe of EngIand 
a military spirit, ol which, for many generations 
hack, they had known nothing; and the minister 
of the day was far tooprudent not to turn it to a 
right account. Every encourageII1ent was given 
to the enrolment of corps of vol~nteers; and these 
corps ofvolunteel's. as well as the regiments of mi-
litia, all served as ~o many nurseries fQr the lineo 
Men who had Qnc~bQr!W ~rm~, ~ve,n though they 
carried them in sport, pegan to feel their objections 
to the Jife of a soldier graduaIly abate; and many 
an individual who put on a uniform with no other 
design than that of protecting the peace of the 
country, b~came, before long, a member of the 
regular army. The vi<;tory of Trafalgar, likewise, 
as it left us !lO epem.ief:¡ with whom ~ C9I!teU(~ at 
sea, naturally enough tqme<\ tll~ views of the brave 
and the enterprising to the land sel'vice. From 
an these causes, recruits, both in officers and men, 
presented themselves as rapidly as thlJ; most warlik~ 
administration could have desired ; insoJlluch, that 
on t4e 1st of ,J"aPlJa.ry, ¡SQS, t~fe w~re en~oll~<! 
under the British stand~.f(l, of regul~ infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery, exclusive offoreign mercena-
ries, little shart of three hundred tllOusand J.ll~ll. 
Of the discipline which perva.ded thjs Pf{)q.j-
gious mass, it is not necessary to sa, mnch; 
even oul' enemies-those !tt least who were our 
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enemies, and who still entertain towards us a 
degree of rancorous jealousy for which no good 
cause can be, assigned-allow that the discipline of 
the British army was, and is superior to that of 
any other army in Europe. Under the wise and 
paternal management of the late venerated Com-
mander~in-Chief, acode, stern enough in theory,. 
but mild though firm in practice, had been esta-
blished. ~ ·Promotion too, which in former times 
had proceeded without any regard whatever to 
the fitness of individuals, was rendered as equita-
ole as it ever can be, under a system which adinits 
of advancement by purchase. Boys were no 
longer permitted to hold commissions, w hilst they 
were yet acquiring the first elements of educa-
tion; nor was it any more in the power of the mi-
nister of the day, to reward the favourite who had 
proved in any manner useful to himself, by bestow-
ing 'upon him the command of a regimento A re-
gular scale was drawn up, in accordance with 
which no man was permitted to hold an ensign's 
commission till he had attained the age of sixteen. 
Three years' service was requisite to qualify him 
for the 'rank of captain, seven years for that of 
major. Nor were, other and equalIy important 
matters left in the condition in which they once 
stood. In former times, each colonel or command-
ing officer of a regiment was in the habit of ma-
nreuvring his corps in any way or upon any plan 
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which to himself inight appear most convenient. 
The consequence was, that in the British army 
there were almost as many systems of fieId move· 
ment as there were regiments of cavalry and infan-
try; and, that hardly any two could, when called 
upon to act together, act to any purpose. This 
disadvantageous mode of proceeding was abolished. 
Oneuniform and consistent system was drawn up 
for the infantry; another for the cavalry; and aH 
regiments were expected to. render themselves 
perfect in these, before they attempted to learn 
any thing besides. Such changes, together with 
the establishment of hospitals for the wounded and 
disabled soldiers, and for the education of children 
whose parents had fallen in the defence of their 
country, cou1d not fail of producing the most be-
neficialeffect upon the morale of the British army ; 
which, from being an object of something Iike 
abhorrence to ¡ts own countrymen, and of con-
tempt to the troops of other nations, rose to com-
mand, as well as to deserve, the esteem of the 
former, and the respect and aclmiration of the 
Iatter. 
There were, however, one or two considerations, 
which, notwithstanding these acknowledged im-
.provements, longcontinued to keep alive a disincli-
nation on the part of the ministry, to commit the 
British army on the great freId of continental 
warfare. In the frrst place it was doubtcd whe-
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ther, among out own generaIs, !líeré could be 
found any, capable of opposing the experienced 
and skilful warriors of France. We had never 
been accustomed to carry on war upona large 
scal~ except in India; and in India, it was be-
lieved that, for the successful conduct ofa .cam-
.paign, talents of the first order "\Vere hardly 
'required. In the next place, itwas not'considered 
either prudtmt or just topus'h a handful of British 
troops into theheart of Europe; where, at a dis-
tance from the sea, and cut off from an communi-
eation with their own country, they might be com-
promised at, any moment, either through the im-
'becility or treachery of OUl' aUy. EngIand, it was 
imagined, ought not to take part in a continental 
war, unless she could do so on somepoint not very 
remote fromher, own shores, and covered by an 
extensive line of coast; because, in spite of the 
magnitude of her army in the mass, she could 
never, it was asserted, pretend to bring more 
than thirty or fotty thousand men into the field. 
These considerations, it ishardly necessary to add, 
prevented a British army from appearing in lthe 
neld at Austerlitz and Jena,or taking ashare in 
any of the 'previous armaments which from time 
-to time rendered' Germany ,the theatre of war. 
'Butthelatter objection to the employment-of our 
own troops, 'the mad ambition of:theFrallch ruler 
at length removed; whilst it only requiredthe ex~ 
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perience of ·~single c~paign \0 demonstrate, that 
in the for~er th~r~ had never ,been any solid 
grounds oI c~~>son. 
By the treaty of rilsit, N apoleon BUOllfl,parte 
was left ma~:1;er of the cOl~tinent of Ellrope; tp,e 
greater part being actually in \lis possession, :;lnd 
the rest entirely lInder his controL Over t4e Ger-
manic body he exercised an ~ut,hprity mqre l."eal 
and mOre absolute' tha.n JIad ev;~r been. e~eI:Ciliied 
by ihe tnqstpo~eI~l of ~W ~~l'Qts. ',Switzer-
l~d sub~tted to call him h~r prQtector, obeyed 
his edicts, andfil1ed up his ranks with meno 
Holding France, Flanders, and Italy forhimself, 
l1e had placed one brother upqn the throne ofNa-
pIes, another upon t}:lat of Holla)1d, whilst Jor a 
third a kingdoOl waserected in theheart of 
Germ:,¡;ny, withterritories ~aken indis,crimin,ately 
froID frien,d and (oe. Joa~mMurat,the hus-
band of his sister, possessed a principality, with 
the title of Grand Duke of Berg; Eugene Beall-
harnois, his wife's son, was, married to a princess 
of the b,o,l,lse ,OfJ3,avaria, ~nd governed I,taly as his 
vicer.oy ; ,;Whil~~ .. l+e :wasprepare,d, upon ~he 1;lext 
vacancy, to place ~~uncle, 9f!-rWllal ~~sche, upon 
t,he papal tbrone. N ot s~t~sfied with thus enrich-
ing and loading with honours the mewbers of .his 
.own faroily, ~e ¡port,ioned out. ClIlloug hi~ marshals 
and compa1).ions. in arUlS, ,kiJlgdQms and princi-
palities w~rn by the sword; and D.ukes Qf Istria, 
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and Dalmatia, and Ragusa, and Dantzic, were 
numbered among the new nobility of France. His 
own reputation moreover, political as well as mili-
tary, had risen to a height quite unprecedented; 
for it is not going too far to affirm that the whole 
civilised world, dazzled by the splendour of his 
achievements, lay, with the solitary exception of 
Great Britain, at his feet. 
An empire acquired as had be en that of Napo-
leon, can nevereven for a moment be said to rest 
upon asure foundation. ' One error in poIitics, 
one failure in war, may suddenly excite a storm 
which all the vigour of its chief will not be able to 
surmount; and of this trúth the Emperor of the 
French was doomed to furnish a memorable exam-
pIe. N ór will it readily cease to afford matter of 
astonishment tó the reflecting mind, that thefirst 
and most decisive blow to his power, should have 
come froID a quarter where, aboye all others, he 
believed himself, and had just ground to believe 
himself, the most secure. 
When the sovereigns of Europe deemed it 
expedient to arm for the purpose of opposing the 
progre ss Df the French Revolution, the courts both 
of Madrid and Lisbon entered, with apparent cor-
diality, into the general league. Spain sent an 
army across the Pyrenees, to which a few batta-
lions of Portuguese attached themselves; whilst 
Portugal despatched nine sail of the line to follow 
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the fortunes of the British Heet. The war in the 
south of France was not conducted either with 
skill or vigour. For a time indeed, that is to say, 
as long as the Directory found· itself too busy to 
pay much attention to the state of affairs in that 
quarter, the allies obtained a few successes, but 
they in no instance followed them up with the 
slightest intrepidity; and they had hardly been 
opposed by moderate forces, when the ti de of for-
tune turned against them. They not only lost 
the little ground which they had gained, but 
their be aten coJumns were pursued across the 
frontier; Catalonia was overrun, and Madrid itself 
threatened. An imbecile prince, and no less im;. 
becile fa~ourite, alarmed by the progress which the 
victorious republicans were making, hastened to 
put an end to a disastrous war, by a disgraceful 
peace. lt was concluded in 1795, by the treaty 
of Basle, which, at the distance of ayear after, 
was succeeded by a league offensive and defen,.. 
-sive, entered into at St. Ildefonso. . 
From that moment Spain became, in point of 
faet, nothing more than a mere appendage to 
France. The family compaet, as it was nowab-
surdly termed, having been renewed with the 
Directory, it was not to be expected that it would 
cease to operate when the democratical form of 
government gave place to the imperial; or that the 
Emperor of the Freneh would be les s ready to avail 
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himsélf of it. !han had been the rulen; of the re-
publico .Al ~he i~tigation oC Buonaparte, Spain 
declared war against England; am;l acontest be-
g!ln" which could hardly fail of bringing upon her 
tM ~aviest disasters. During ita progtess, her 
marine, which Charles III had taken .the utmost 
care to fOlSt~r, was destroyed; her coU!merce re· 
ceived a ~tQ.l blow; the iI?-tercourse with her Souta 
AD;lerican <!pIonies was interrupted, and the way 
"paved fOl' ibat ijepa,rati()fi whi~b. h1'U! since occur-
.red; her finan~.s bec.ame every day morea1;ld more 
embarrassed; and public credit sank to the Iowest 
ebb. HerarJUY, likewise, w~s drafted away to 
1ight the b&,ttl#s of her 1wd.ly ally in the most 
distant partsofEurope; and she was left in a 
situation as helpless and pitiable as has eN'er 
heen filled by a nation. 
ltis hardly necesaary:to state that, at this 
period, and forsome time previous, Spain was 
governed by an individual on whose head fortune 
appeared t~ ha~e taken delight in :showering the 
rich{\~t of her favours. Manuel Godoy,aman 
.4.oosc,"re bir$, who or.ig~nally~Ued no higher 
.station th~n tbat qf~ pr·iv:ate in the royal body-
guards, having attracted the notice of the Queen, 
,was by her influence raiaed to th~highest dignities 
in the state ;andcaIlle at last to possess an au:-
thority more <;lecid~d-:j¡\lan thatofthe weak master 
whom he professed to serve. Godoy was, at the 
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breaking out of the French Revolution4 commallder-
ill-chief of the armies, and lord high admiral 
of the Heets of Spain; and at the close of 1792, 
he was appointed to the important 0ffice which 
Florida Blanca had filIed under Charles 111, that 
of President of the Councils. He it was, who, 
after conducting the war with so little abrlity, 
accepted peace, upon terms which laid Spain at 
the feet of her neighbour; and he received, as the 
reward of his 'sernces on that OCcasiÓlll, the title 
of Prince of thePeace. Godoy appears to have 
been a strange compound of weakness with genius, 
and of numerous vices, with a few virtues. That he 
willingly and knowingly betrayed his country, there 
is no reason for supposing; but like all upstarts, 
he considered thegeneral good as a matter to 
be postponed on every occasion.to .his private be-
nefit; and heun-questionably broughtabout the 
downfall of the Spanish monarchy in the vain 
attempt to uphold his own power. Godoy was 
not disposed to favour the 'Prench, for heboth 
feared and hated their ruler; but, like ,his sove-
,reign,he fearedthatextraordinary man more than 
he hatedhim, and .therefore sttbmitted to receive 
his yoke. When the peace of Amiens was broken, 
N apoleon, in virtue of the treaty of Sto Ildefonso, 
called upon Spain to join ;11im with herlleets and 
armies; hut Godoy was desirous of ,evading the 
request; and he even succeeded, for a short time, 
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in purchasing an insecure neutrality, by the pay-
ment of forty. thousand pounds per month into 
the imperial treasury. At last, however, Spain 
was hurried into the war, which brought so many 
.and sueh severe calamities upon her; from the 
effects of which she has not yet recovered, and 
probably never will recover. 
Whilst Spain was thus acting the part of a 
province of Franee, Portugal, faithful to the terms 
of her aneient allianee with England, eontinued to 
maintain a hostile attitude towards the eommon 
.enemy. N ot that she aeted thus either willingly 
or eonfidentIy. DepFived by the treaty of St. 
Ildefonso of a barrier against French invasion, upon 
which she had been accustomed to count, Portu-
gal could .not but feel that, in striving, even with 
the aid of England, to assert her independence, 
she was attempting that which neither the con-
dition of her defences, nor the numerical strength 
of her population, authorised her to attempt. But 
she was well aware that no peace would be granted 
to her on any other terms besides the shutting of 
her ports against English vessels; and she felt 
that a rupture with England must speedily reduce 
her to the lowest extremities of distress. Under 
. these circumstances, the eourt of Lisbon issued 
orders for the enrolment of large bodies oftroops. 
The arsenals were filled with warlike instru-
ments; the forts and towns on the frontier were 
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put in a state of repair; and the Qrdinances, or 
levies en masse, received instructions to repair, 
each company to its accustomed place of rendez.;. 
vous, on the first alarm of an enemy. 
It is not necessary to detail at length the parti-
culars of the war which ensued. For a time no 
event occurred of greater importance than the 
occasional capture of a Portuguese merchant-man 
by one of the French privateers, which, in great 
numbers, found shelter in· the ports of Spain. 
An invasion was indeed threatened; Buonaparte, 
when in Egypt, declared to his troops, that .. a 
time would come, when the Portuguese nation 
should pay with tears ofblood for the insult which 
it had offered to the republic," by despatching a 
squadron to act in conjunction with· the British 
fleet in the Mediterranean. But the continental 
. ,var which broke out in 1799, delayed the execution 
ofthat threat; nor was it till1801, that any serious 
movements were made for carrying it into effect. 
Then, however, the fate of Germany being de~ 
cided, and peace dictated to the rest of Europe, 
the FirstConsul began seriously to turn his atten-
tion towards the accomplishment ofhis prophecy; 
under the persuasion that, in detaching Portugal 
from England, he would be striking· a blow at 
the power of the latter empire, in what he was 
pleased to term the most accessible part of her 
~dominions. 
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A convéntion was, accordingly entered into at 
Madrid, between the French republic and his 
Catholic Majesty,. which had for its object the 
forcible deliverance of Portugal froro the alliance of 
EngIand. It was foUoweds 00 the 27th of Fe-
bruary, by a declar,ation of war by Spain, for 
the prosecution of which her troops were already 
in motion; whilst a Freneh corps of fifteen thou-
sand men pa.ssed tbe Pyrenees, and took up its 
quarters in tha vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, for 
the purpose of supporting the Spanish army, to 
which the task of invading Portugal was assigned. 
To oppose this attack, tbe Duk.e de Lafoes, 
prime minister of Portugal, oceupied both sides 
of theTagus with a eorps of thirty thousand meno 
They were miserably armed, wretchedly equipped, 
and neithet· paid nor fed; and the only British 
force at hand to support tbem, eonsisted of a bri- -
gade of foreign regiments, a detachment of the 20th 
light dragoons, and a few can non, under General 
Fraser. The campaign was, as might be ex-
pected, unfavourable to the Portuguese, tbough by 
neither side was much aetivity or talent displayed ; 
and before the middle of J une, peace was signed 
between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz. But 
.with the terms of that peace, though they in-
cIuded the shutting of the Portuguese ports against 
all intercourse with England, the First Consul 
was not satisfied; nor was it till the 29th ()f the 
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following, Septembet that the court of Lisbon 
succeeded in obtaininghis approbation. of the 
treaty. To secure this, Portugal was content to 
pay one million sterling to the French govern-
ment; besides consenting to other arrangemen.ts, 
both commereial and territorial, all of them in the 
highestdegree prejudieial to her own interests. 
The peace of Amiens suspended for a while 
the operation of that article in tha treaty which 
closed tha pom of Lisbon ,and oporto against 
English merchandise, and the old commercial 
intercourse between the two nations was re-
newed; but the rupture, whieh so soon followed, 
again placed Portugal in a diffieult situation. 
At fil'st, Buonaparte insisted upon the necessity 
of reeurring to the prohibitory system, and ap-
peared bent upon allowing no modification of ¡ts 
operations; but a variety of considerations Ied him 
at last to change his tone. The war in which 
Spain by his dictation had engaged, unavoidably 
produced an interruption in the arrival of those 
treasures from South Ameriea whieh he fOUlld so 
useful to himself in the prosecution of his schemes 
of eonquest: it was necessary thatsome harbour 
should be left open for their reeeption. On this 
aceount, and on condition of securing,. during the 
continuanee of the maritime war, a monthly tri-
bute of forty or fifty thousand pounds, Buonaparte 
consented that Portu al should continue to main-
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tain a íriendly intercourse with Great Britain; and 
she became, in consequence, the only neutral state 
in the south of Europe. 
In this condition both Spain and Portugal re-
mained, from 1803 up to 1807; the one suffering 
a1l the misery attendant upon a compuIsory alliance 
with a power which exhausted her revenues, and 
ruined her commerce; the other writhing under 
too pain of aheavy contribution, and exposed every 
day to fresh vexations, which she possessed not the 
means oí resisting. N or were the internal affairs 
of either kingdom in a more prosperous state than 
their external connexions. In Spain, the nobility 
were suilk to the lowest pitch of degradation; the 
clergy, avaricious and domineering, ruled the peo-
pIe with a rod of iron; and the King, was not 
ashamed to appear as a tool' in the hands oí the 
very man, who, to an appearance, was living in a 
state of adultery with his wife. Every depart-
ment of the state was mismanaged. The towns, 
deserted by their inhabitants, presented a melan-
cboIy picture of what a nation must come to, 
whose rulers are possessed' neither of energy of 
mind nor honesty of character ; and the very fields 
were in many place s left uncultivated, for want 
of sufficient hands to till tbem. In like manner, 
the Spanish army, which, under the Emperors 
Charles V and Philip, had been the admiration 
of Europe, was nowa thing of no name,--a very 
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by-word of derision and contempt to the troops of 
other nations. The few soldiers that remained in 
the country were without ray, 01' clothing, or even 
arms; tlle officers, taken from the lowest dasses, 
were not ashamed to wait, as servants, in their 
uniforms, behind the chairs of the grandees. AH 
the arsenal s were empty. There were not provi-
sions or stores of any kind, in any of the fortresses, 
s~fficient for a month' s consumption of the wretched: 
garrisons which held them; and the very foun-
dries had ceased to work, except at remote inter-
vals. 
Yet wasthe spirit of Spain far from beingwholly 
broken. Driven from the higher and prouder 
circles, it took refuge among the peasantry; nor 
would it be easy to point out, in any quarter ofthe 
world, a nobler or finer race of men than those 
who cultivated the vine on the banks of the Ebro, . 
or led their long lines of mules from one q uarter oí 
the kingdom to another. These men had partaken 
in no degree of the degeneracy of their superiors. 
The memory of their country's former greatness 
was kept alive in them by those traditionary bal .. 
lads whichSpaniards, more tha~ the inhabitants 
of any othe1' European state, delight in repeating; 
and they never failed to contrast it with the humi-
liating attitude which the imbecility of their pre-
sent g'overnment condemned them to aSSllme. Had 
there been in Charles sufficient firmness to desire ~ 
VOL. I. BiÍ;." ji!' ' 
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an emancipation from foreign thraldom, he might 
have foused, in one day, the whole male popula-
tion of Spain abouthim. But there was no- such 
fj.rmness in that weak monareh. The dupe of 
Godoy on the one hand, and of his own fears on 
the other, he eontinued to hug the chain which 
bound him, as long as i1 was possible so to do; 
nor, when that ehain was burst at last, did the 
sDlallest credit attach either to him or to his 
worthless minis"ter. 
In Portugal, the sarue, or nearly the same,order 
of things prevailed. The Regent, a weak and-su-
perstitious prinee, was not, indeed, like his father-
in-Iaw, under the influenee of a favourite minister, 
but he was as eompletely theslave of his eon-
fessor, as, Charles was the slave of Godoy. As 
long as it was permitted him to attend religious 
processions; as long as the ehurch seemed to 
flourish in its primitive grandeur; he cared not 
how other departments of his kingdom were guid-
ed, or in what plight his people dragged on exis-
tenee. N or were the nobles who surro~nded him 
more patriotie or more respectable than those who 
surrounded the tbrone oí Spain. In Portugal, as 
in tbe neigbbouring country, all tbat bad ever be en 
admirable in the mitional character could be found 
only among the peasantry; who, in spite of the 
corrupting influence oftheir superiors, eontinued to 
the last a high.;.spirited, brave, and obedient race. 
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It has been said that Godoy cannot with truth 
be aecused of submitting wilfully and knowingly 
to the yoke which France had placed upon the 
neck of his country. Like the ;roass of the people, 
he writhed painfully under ii; and as it afterwards 
appeared, nothing but an overwhe1ming dread of 
the consequences had deterred him from making a 
vigorous attempt to cast it off. At last, however, 
the general feeling on that subject became so 
strong, that he determined to do something for the 
purpOse of indulging it. The plan which he de-
vised, and the method which he pursued in matur-
ing it, are already well knownto the public; but 
since to these the whole series of events which 
followed may be traced back, as to their immediate 
canses, it may not be amiss to offer here a brief 
recapitulation of the .leading circumstances which 
attended them. 
The overthrow of tbe Bourbon dynasty in N a-
pIes. had sensibly alarmed the court of Madrid; 
and the prospect of that rupture with Prussia 
which ended in the peace of Tilsit, struck Godoy 
as fumishing a favourable opportunity of stil'ring up 
all Eurape against aman· whose ambition seemed 
to be without bounds. A secret alTangement was 
accotdingly entered into between him and the 
ambassador Strogonoff, into which the Portuguese 
Envoy was admitted, that the two kingdoms of 
Spain and Portugal should iustantly arm, for the 
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purpose of attacking France at a moment when 
her troops should be called away to oppose the 
;Emperor of Russia in the n01'th. These prepara-
tions were to begin in Portugal; with the ostensi-
ble view of overawing which, Spain was next to 
increase her armies; whilst expeditions being 
fitted out in the English ports, a combined force 
was to invade the south of Franee, which, it was 
pelieved, would not be in a fit state to offer any 
efficient opposition. ~uch were the plans of Go-
doy, in proposing which so much secreey wa~ 
preserved, that no other agent of the government 
either at home or abroad was made aequainted 
with what was pending; but they were destined 
neyer to be carried into effect. Before a single 
step had been taken either in Spain or Portugal; 
before any direct c()mmunication had been opened 
with England, there suddenly appearad a procla-
mation of the Prince of the Peace, ealling upon all 
good Spaniards to arm, and to assist in delivering 
their eountry froro the perils whieh roenaeed it. 
This proc1amation was given to the world at a time 
when Buonaparte was absent on the Prussian 
campaign ;and its tenor was sueh as no person 
could possibly misunderstand. 1t produced a very 
powerful effect; but the effect was directly the 
reverse in kind from that which it was intended to 
produce. 
Baron Strogonoff and the Portuguese Ambassa-
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dor, equally startled at the great imprudence of 
the step which had been taken, lost no time in 
disavowing all participation in a· project which 
they now equally pretended to condemn~ So 
fearful, indeed, was the court of Lisbon of being 
supposed to be a partner in the conspiracy, that it 
compelled Ear! Sto Vincent to withdraw, with his 
fleet, from the Tagus. Godoy instaritly . saw the 
folly of the act into which his natural precipitanéy 
had hurried him. He hastened. to bifer snch ex'" 
planations to tbe French Ambassador as he judged 
most likely to aIlay the anger of N apoleon~ and he 
instructed his private agent, Don Eugenio Izquier-
do, to make the most abject submissions in his 
name to N apoleon in persono Paragraphs like-
wise appeared in the Madrid newspapers, sorne of 
tbem ascribing late events to an apprehensiOll of 
an invasionby .the Emperor~of Moroe~o; :otbers 
oifering rewards for thedetection of the miscreant 
who had forged a circular letter to the intendants 
of provinces in the name of the Prince of the 
Peace; whilst the motives of the proclamation, of 
which tbe authenticity could notbe denied, .were 
industriously pronounced to be a sense of duty 
towards Franee, and an over-anxiety to oppose the 
projects of England. . 
Buonaparte received the documents aboye al-
luded to subsequent to the battle of Jena;· and he 
read in the palace of the King of Prussia a corres-
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pondence which placed the íntended revoltofSpain 
beyond a doubt. He vowed at the moment to 
take revenge, but it suited his policy to utter the 
vow in secret; and he affected to have cordially 
forgiven the fauIt Ínto which his aliy, the King of 
Spain, had been drawn. Itis now, however, per-
fectIy ascertained that this disclosure of the feel;;. 
ings of the Peninsular nations towards him, opened 
his eyes fully to the danger to which his power 
must always be exposed whilst these nations con-
tinued to be governed by their present royal fami-
lies. He determined, on the instant, that ihe 
houses both of Bourbon and Braganza should 
cease to reign, and that their places should be 
supplied by those upon whose subserviency to his 
own views and wishes he IDight have better reason 
to dependo 
Had Buonaparte, al!! 800n as the designs ofSpain 
became known to him, directed his viCtorious ]e~ 
gíons upon Madrid, the dethronement of Charles 
would have been viewed by the rest of Europe as 
an arrangement dictated by self-defence; whilst it 
is not improbable that the war never would have 
assumed the character whicl1 his future proceed-
ings gave to it. But it was not in the nature of 
the Freneh Emperor to aet, in any case, either 
with openness {)f candour. Though a passionate 
lover of war, he never effected that by force of 
arms, which he bélieved it practicable to effect by 
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diplomacy; and the principIe which guided him 
in other cases failed not to operate heteo There 
were, however, other reasons for the system which 
he pursued, and these deserve to. be recorded. 
There are few states in which the favourite of 
the reigning monarch becomes not, sooner or later, 
an object of hatred to the heir apparent, and, as a 
necessary consequence, to aU who are disposed to 
worship the risingwn rather than the sun in its 
meridian. This was peculiarl y the case at· the 
court of Madrid. Godoy was, and had long been, 
at variance with Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias; 
and so bitter was the feeling of animosity which 
subsisted between them, that the bare adoption by 
Godoy of one line of policy, was sufficient to guide 
Ferdinand to the adoption of its opposite. As 
soon, therefore, as GOdoy'lil hostility to the French 
hecame known, Ferdinand made hMte toO declare 
himself a suppórter of the French interests. He 
even went so far as to address a private letter to 
N apoleon, in which he entreated him to deliver his 
father and mother from the influence of an artful 
favourite; to free Spain from the thraldom of an 
upstart; and to honour himselfby granting him an 
allianee with a princess of the imperial blood. 
Whether Buonaparte e\'er entertailled ally serious 
intention of complyillg with these requests, it wei'e 
diffieult to determine; but this much is known, 
that he answered Ferdinand's letter kindly, and 
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that he readily consented to become the arbiter in 
the disputes which divided the royal family of 
Spain. -Howhis arbitration was conducted, Spain 
and Europe will not soon cease to remember. 
In the mean while however, under the pretext 
of standing in need of their services, Buonaparte 
required that a corps of sixteen thousand Spa-
niards under Romana should proceed to join his 
armies on the shores of the Baltic. To these were 
added a division of six thousand men, which, with 
General O'Farrel at their head, had previously 
served in Tus~any; and thus almost all the regu-
lar troops on which the government could depend, 
wereremoved to so great a distance from Spain as 
to be perfectIy useless. But N apoleon's duplicity 
ended not here. At the very moment when he 
was giving Ferdinand assurances of his regard and 
protectiQn, he induced the weak Charles to heap 
upon Godoy án additional10ad of favours, till both 
the king and his favourite beca me intoxicated, the 
one with joy, the other with vanity. By this 
means,by appearing to each party inc1ined to 
countenance it in its projectsand wishes, he not only 
kept alive, but widened the breach which already 
existed withinthe court of Madrid, and put mat-
ters in a train for that issue which, in all probabi-
lit y , he had already determined to bring about. 
Thepeace of Tilsit having restored him victori-
ous to his capital, Buonaparte began to make im-
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mediate preparations to support a war of diplomacy 
by one of vi?lence. Withoutany reasonable ex-
cuse having been assigned for the measure, a rorps 
·of twenty-fh·e thousand infantry and three 1ho\.\-
sand cavalry was seen to asseroble in the month 
of August, 1807, at the base of the Pyrenees, 
which assumed the somewhat enigmatical appel-
lation of the Corps of Observa:tion of the Gironde. 
Whilst this force was organising itself under th~ 
directions of Marshal Junot, the Spanish roinister 
at Paris was entering into a secret treaty; tlle 
object of wllicll was nothing less than tlle erasure 
of Portugal froro the list of nations. By the terms 
of that tre.aty, since become illustrious as the "se-
cret treaty of Fontainbleau," it was agreed tllat 
J unot's army should enter Portugal at once, aided 
by three divisions of Spanish troops; that a se-
cond army, of forty thousand French soldiers, 
should assemble in Gascony, ready to support the 
first, should it meet with any serious opposition; 
and that Portugal, being subdued, should be di-
. vided into tllree parts, of wllicll the following dis-
tribution was to be made. The province of Entre 
Minho e Douro, with :the city of Oporto as its 
capital, was to be erected into a kingdom, under 
tlle title of N orthern Lusitania, and· given to the 
King of Etruria, in exchange for his Italian pos.;... 
sessions, which he ceded iIi full and entire sove:-
reignty to Buonaparte. In like manner, Alentejq 
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and Algarve were to be given to Godoy, who was to 
assume the style and title of Prince of the Algarves; 
and the remaining Portuguese provinces wer~ to 
be held by Napoleon himself, till a general pacifica-
tion should enable him to restore them to the house 
of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, 
and the other Spanish colonies which the English 
had conquered. These three sovereignties were, 
however, to be held by investiture from the King 
of Spain; and their princes were to owe to him 
the same sort of obedience which, in the feudal 
times, the holder of a fief owed to his sovereign 
lord. The colonial possessions of Portugal, again, 
were to be equally divided between the crowns of 
Franee and Spain; and the Emperor of the French 
was, as soon as it should be convenient, to acknow-
ledge his Catholic Majesty as emperor of the two 
Americas. 
Though nothing officially transpired indicative 
of the object which the army of observation was 
intended to effect, Europe was not so short-sighted 
as to remain for one instant in doubt as to the ulti-
mate field of its operations. In the ftrst place, the 
officer who wasplaced atits head had long filled, 
and still continued in name at least to fill, the sta-
tion of ambassador·at the court of Lisbon from the 
imperial cabinet. It is true that, on the opening 
of the Austrian campaign, Junot had quitted the 
seat of his diplomatic c;luties, that he might exe-
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cute the more congenial offices whicn devolved 
upon him as aide-de-camp to tbe Emperor; but 
he had done so by tbe express permission of his 
master; and instead of his place being supplied by 
anotber commissioned representative, the business 
of the miss ion was intrusted, as in the case of 
other temporary absences of tbe principal, to the 
chief secretary, M. de Rayneval. This circum-
stance was of itself sufficient to create a suspicion 
that something prejudicial to the interests of Por-
tugal was'intended; and if tbere were any who at 
first appeared wiIling to doubt on tbe subJect, 
their doubts were not permitted long to existo 
The treaty of Fontainbleau was hardly. signed, 
when the ministers, both of France and Spain, 
presented a strong remonstrance to the Prince 
Regent, requiring that the Berlín and Milan de-
crees should be strictly enforced at every harbour 
of Portugal; and it was further required, on threat 
of the immediate commencement of hostilities, 
that all the British subjects then resident in the 
kingdom sbould be seízed, and all tbe British pro-
,perty connscated. 
Tbe conduct of theRegent of Portugal under 
circumstances so trying, was not very different 
from that which might ha ve been expected at bis 
hands. He dared not refuse obedience to the first 
mandate, and he remonstrated against the second 
only in the mildest and most submissive terms. 
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But tbe powers with whom he had to deal enter-
tainedno wish.that he should pay to tbeir relJlon-
stranees a. prompt attention; they were pleased, 
rather tban the reverse, at every appearance of 
~issatisfaction wbich he happened toexhibit. Find-
ing that "his sense of religion, and. the regard 
which he had for existing treaties," would not per-
mit bim at once to commit so flagrant an act of 
jnjUs~ice, the French and Spanish ministers de-
manded theirpasspofts; and before either these 
could be given, or the unhappy Prince was ena-
bled to appeal through his own ambassadors to the 
generosity of his neighbours, the troops destined 
to overrun Portugal were .in motion. 
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CHAPTÉR Il. 
March of Junot's armyacross the frontier~i:t p.rriveil at Sala~ 
tnanca,passes Alcantara, ana enters Portugal-Itssufferings 
by the way-Alarm of the court of Lisbon-,-Proposal toeúlÍ~ 
grata to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and 
Sir Sydney Smith-The court gives its consent, appoints a 
regency, and emharks-Junot reaches Lisbon-His measures 
for the preservation of puhlic tranquillity-Hishehaviour, at 
first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical-The tri.coloured 
flag hoisted-The regeney abolished-Junot assumes su-
preme power--The Portuguese army disbatíded, and a heavy 
fine imposed upon the people-General diseontent of aH 
c1asses-Numerous broils and arbitrary punishments-The 
Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection~Exertions 
of Junot to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against 
the English. 
THE treaty of Fontainbleau was not yet signed¡ 
when on the 17th of October, 1807, Junot received 
orders to put his troops in motion within twenty-
four hours. At daybreak on the 18th the first 
division of the ármy of observation of the Gironde 
crossed the Bidassoa; it was followed on the 19th 
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by the second; and the whole army, marching in 
six columns, each at the interval of one day from 
that whicn had preceded it, entered Spain. About 
the same time, three corps of Spanish troops be-
gan to take the road towards Portugal, by diffe-
rent routes. One of these, which was appointed 
to act under the immediate orders of the French 
Marshal, was directed to assemble at Alcantara, 
on the Tagus. . It consisted of eight battalions of 
infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, one troop of 
horse artillery, and two companies of sappers and 
miners; and it was commanded by Don Juan Ca-
raffa, captain-general of the province of Estrema-
dura. Another, destined to act by itself, for the 
occupation of N orthern Lusitania, mustered four-
teen battalions, six squadrons, and one company 
offoot artillery, and was placed under the direc-
tion of Don FranciBcu TaTanco y Plano, captain-
general of Gallicia: its point of rendezvous was 
Tuy, on the borders of Minho. A third, at the 
head of which was Don Francisco Solano, marquis 
del Socorro, and captain-general of Andalusia, 
was composed of eight battalions, five squadrons, 
ahd a troop oí hone artillery,and received instruc-
tions to collect in the vicinity of Badajoz. In 
order to complete these corpa, it is scarcely neces-
S3Ty to !ltate that everydis:posable soIdier in the 
Spanisb army was put in requisition; thateven 
the King's body-guard furnished its quota; and 
PENINSULAR W AR. 31 
that in the capital itself there remained, after their 
departure, a garrison made up of skeletons only, 
and the depots of regiments. 
The French army was every where received, 
during its progress through Spain, with the utmost 
cordiality; it was supported at the expenseof the 
government, and it reached Salamanca, where the 
General expected to winter, before the middle of 
November. But the last division had not come in 
when a courier arrived at head-quarters, bringing 
the most urgent amI imperative directions that 
no halt should be made between the Bidassoa and 
Lisbon. Junot had accordingly no alternative sub-
mitted to him. Without having had time to make 
the slightest preparation forsuch a march, he set 
forward in the dead of winter, to pursue a route 
along which no depots of provisions or stores of 
any kind were established; where it was at least 
doubtful whether he would not meet with a formi-
dable opposition from a peasantry brave to a pro-
verb, and proverbially jéalous of the appearance of 
foreigners among them; and where, at aU events, 
he was quite sure of having the serious obstacles 
to overcome, which a mountainous district, lntel'-
sected in every direction by rapid rivers and moun-
tain streams, would not fail to throw in his way. 
The apprehension, however, that an English army 
migh.t arrive at Lisbon before him, was quite suf-
ficient to make aH these' difficulties appear light. 
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He pushed on, and with the leading brigade of his 
army, reached Alcantara on the 15th. 
In this place he found General Caraffa with his 
corps of Spaniards; but there was a woful scarcity 
of means by which to recrui t the vigour of his own 
battalions, worn out by long marches through a 
difficult country, and in tremendous weather. It 
was with the utrnost difficulty that the French 
sóldiers could be supplied, each with rations for 
twó days. Still the Ernperor's orders rnust be 
obeyed; and on the 19th; after having circulated 
proclarnations in which the Portuguese were 'as-
sured of protection froni insult in the event of their 
reinaining <i uiet, and threatened with the rnost 
terrible puníshmerit if they should in any way irn-
pede the progress of ttoops which carne only to 
deliver them froro the yoke of England., the allied 
arroies were mice niore put in motion. 
It is not necessary tó follow the movel.llents of 
Junot's corps very minutely. It is sufficient to 
observe that, though the peasantry in general 
either rested peaceably in their cottages, 01' at the 
most fied toO the mountains and left their hornes 
desolate,"thé routa of the invaders rnight be traced, 
by gard.ens devastated, houses ruined, and whole 
villages burned to' the ground. Notwithstanding 
this was the case, and though not á. gun was fired 
from the day whén the head of the first French 
colurnn passed the front¡er, till the ar1'ival of its 
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rear-guard in Lisbon, the march was far from 
being a tour of pleasure to those who performed it. 
The seasonchanced to be particularly stormy and 
inclemenL The rain feH in torrents, cutting up 
the indistinct paths which traversed the moun-
tains, and swelling into formidable rivers, streams 
whichmight usually be crossed without apprehen-
sion, either by man or beast. The reader is doubt-
less aware that the road, if such it deserves to be 
termed, which leads from Alcantara to Lisbon, by 
way of Castello Brarico and Abrantes, passes over 
the summits of a ridge of rocks, and through a 
coulltry as desert and unfruitful as any which tl}e 
European traveller is in the habit of visiting. 1 t 
was by this track that J unot thought fit to pro-
ceed; and the fatigue and privations which his 
troops were in consequence condemned to endure, 
are represented to have been more terrible than 
generaIly fall to thelot of a retreating army. As 
a matter of course, neither wintry torrents nor per-
manent rivers were, in that wild district, supplied 
with bridges; the soldiers were consequently ob-
liged to cross as they best could, whenever such 
obstacles carne in their' way; 'and such was the 
rapidity of the streams in many places, that whole 
companies of men, and whole troops oí horses, 
were swept away and destroyed.A march throúgh 
defiles like these could not long- be conducted 
with order or regularity.· The artillery was soon 
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left behind; of the cava1ry, only the best mounted 
were enabled to keep up; and even the infantry 
lost its ranks, and straggled, for many miles, over 
the face of the country. Long before the towers 
of Abrantes rose upon their view, the French co-
lumns may . be said to have dissolved themselves ; 
for there were not aboye five thousand men who 
followed the General that were in any condition, 
either from bodily strength or local situation, to 
oppose an enemy. 
But though fully aware of this, and of the risk 
which he'ran by disregarding it, Junot feltthat 
other and still stronger reasons forbade his paus-
ing, even though a pause of a few days might bring 
back to their standards the thousands whom wea-
riness and famine had left by the wayside. At 
Abrantes, intelligence reached him of the line of 
conduet which thePortuguese government was 
preparing to pursue; and it was with him an 
object of the first importance to reach the capi-
tal, if possible, in time to interpose for its pre-
vention. 
The treaty of Fontainbleau had not been kept 
so secret, but that the English government obtained 
information of its object; and that information it 
lost no time in communicating to the cabinet of 
Lisbon. England had given her assent to the pro-
position made by the Regent of Portugal, of shut-
ting· the ports of his kingdom against· her mer-
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chants; she was aware that her aneient ally, in so 
doing, aeted only by compulsion; and she there-
fore connived at the transaction. But it was im-
possible for her to forgive the next step which his 
timid poliey indueed him to take; and when he 
proceeded, in obedienee to the mandate of Franee, 
to arrest all British subjeets, and confiseate all 
British property, Lord Strangford, the ambassador, 
could do no otherwise tban retire on board of one 
of the. ships of tbe squadron, which,under the com-
mand·of SirSidney Smith, lay at that time at 
anchor in tbe Tagus. As soon, however, as the 
details ofthe secret treachery reached them, both 
the Ambassador and the Admiral requested and 
obtained an audience of the Prince Regent. In 
this they laid before him the particulars ·of the ae-
counts which they had received; and in the mast 
foreible terms urged him to adopt sorne means for 
the preservation of his own persan, and the safety 
of the royal family. The great question, however, 
was, of what nature these means were to be. He 
had hesitated too long to permit any idea of open 
resistance being entertained; besides, neither the 
army, nor tbe fortresses, nor the: general state of 
the nation, was such as to inspire any hope of 
resisting successfulIy. It was then that the Bri-
tisb functionaries pressed upon him the wisdom of 
removing with his court and family to the Brazils, 
and fixing there tbe seat of his government, till 
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the troubles of the present times should pass away. 
This was a terrible alternative; nor can it surprise 
any one, that the Regent of Portugal should have 
wavered long, and frequently changed his de ter-
niinations, before he could muster sufficient cou-
rage to adopt it. But, at last, the famousarticle in 
the Moniteur was shown to him, in which it was 
openly announced that the house of Braganza had 
ceased to reign. AH ground of hesitation was now 
removed. The British subjects who had been ar-
rested were set at liberty; the British property 
which had been seized was restored to ¡ts rightful 
owners; and the royal family of Portugal made 
every preparation for quitting the ancient seat of 
its sovereignty under the protection of the British 
flag. These resolutions had been formed, and 
these preparations were in a state of forwardness, 
when Junot reached Abrantes; and it was the no-
tice which he received of the intended emigration, 
which induced him, without pausing to refresh his 
followers, or collect those who lagged behind, to 
press on towards the capital. 
The consterriation and anxiety which were 
evinced by the inhabitants of Lisbon, as soon as a 
rumour of the intended departure of the Prince 
got abroad, beggar all attempt at description. 
Devotedly attached both by nature and habit to 
the persons of their sovereigns, the Iower orders 
beheld, in the proposed ellligration, a certain pre-
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lude to national ruin and individual misery; whilst 
the higher classes, such at least as r,easoned at aH, 
carne to the conclusion that, as surely as the royal 
family shouId abandon the paIace of their ances-
tors, so surely would the prophetic declaration in 
the Moniteur receive its accomplishment. N or 
was this the only circumstance which tended to 
excite general alarm, independently of the im-
pending approach of the French troops. As if he 
had come thither, by appointment, Junot's army 
hadhardly crossed the frontier, when the Russian 
admiraI Siniavin entered the Tagus, with nine 
ships of the line and two frigates. Such a coinci-
dence could not fail deeply to affect men already 
agitated by a thousand fears and doubts; ror 
though his 'arrival was purely accidental, ít ap-
peared to the ill-fated Portuguese tha! a plan of 
ca· operation between the French General and the 
Russian Admiral had been laid; and that the lat-
ter had come, at thís critical juncture, to render 
assistance to the former in the subjugation of the 
kingdom. 
, _ In the mean while, great preparations were 
making by the court for its' iritended emigration. 
The royal treasury was emptied;' much of the 
pIate, both ofthe Prince and of the courtiers who 
designed to follow him, was packed up and made 
ready for removal on board of ship ;and fillaIly, a 
proclamation appeared, assigning as the motive for 
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a step so decisive, the conviction which rested 
upon the mind of the Regent, that his person, and 
not the oppression of tbe Portuguese people, was 
the desjgn of the p:resent invasion. A regency 
was likewise nominated, to consist of four indivi-
duals; namely, the Marquess de Abrantes; Lieu-
tenant-general Francisco da Cunba de' Menezes~ 
regidor das justi~as, principal castro of tbe royal 
conncil; Don Pedro de Millo Breyner, likewise of 
the council; and Don Francisco de N oronha, lieu-
tenant-general, and president of the board of con-
science. In case any of these should refuse to act r 
the Conde Monteiro Mor was nominated to take 
his place; and the same nobleman was appointed 
president of the Senado da Camara, having the 
Conde Sampaio, or Don Miguel Periera Forjaz, 
and Joam Anthonio Salter de Mendon~a, as his 
secretaries. These functionaries were instructed 
to use every exertion for the. preservation of the 
general peace of the kingdom; they were to admi-
nister the laws in every respect as if the Regent 
bimself were present; and aboye aH, they were 
themselves to receive, and to instruct aU good 
Portuguese to receive~ the French troops as friends. 
Upon tbis point the proclamation was the nlore 
explicit, inasmuch as both the English Admiral, 
and the inhabitants of Lisbon, had manifested a 
strong desire to defend the city to the last; and 
as the Regent was satisfied that aH resistan ce 
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must be fruitless, he positively forbade any to be 
offered. 
Whilst matters were in this train on the banks 
of the Tagus, J unot was moving, as rapidly as the 
state of the weather and the disordered condition 
of his troops would allow, upon the capital. He 
had assembled together as many soldiers of every 
corps and division as appeared capable of bearing 
the fatigue of a renewed march, and he caused 
large vessels to beconstructed for the conveyance, 
down the stream, of those multitudes whom disease 
or weariness rendered incapable of proceeding 
further. General Caraffa, with a portion of the 
Spanish corps, was. detached to Thomar for the 
purpose of collecting provisions, and keeping that 
part of thecountry in awe. The Teserve of artil-
lery and the heavy baggage, which had been left 
behind, received instructions to follow by the road 
which passes Alcantara and Badajoz; whilst the 
guns attached to the divisions in advance, were 
most of them conveyed by water carriage. Having 
. completed these arrangements, he found that it 
was possible for him tomove forward at the head 
of six or eight thousand men; and he 10st no time 
in putting them in motion. 
On the 26th of N ovember, the advanced guard, 
consisting of four chosen battalions and a regiment 
of Spanish hussars, reached Punhete. On the 
following morning it pas~ed the Zezere in boats; 
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and J unot, who accompanied it, was met on the 
opposite bank by Jose Oliveira de Barreto, com-
mandant of Aranjo. This officer was desirous that 
the march· of the French troops should be sus-
pended; and that sorne confidential person should 
be sent forward, for the purpose of arranging all 
the details of oécupation with the proper authori-
tieso But as .he accompanied his request with an 
enunciation of the proposed departure of the royal 
family, Junot would on no acc()unt accede to it. 
The troops continued their marcho . 
The rains had fallen so heavi1y, that the whole 
plain of Golega was inundated, and the advanced 
guard which traversed it found the water· cover 
their knees; the rest of the troops, by turning 
off in the direction ofTorres Novas and Pernes, 
escaped ·that inconvenience. Buí no obstacles 
impedéd them. They reached Santarem in due 
time, and found ít in a state of great order and 
prosperity. N one of the inhabitants had aban-
doned their homes, and all received the invaders 
with kiridn-ess; they were repaid for this conduct 
by the sack and ruin of the town. 
At last Sacavem, a· vi-llage situated abont two 
leagues from Lisbon, was gained; the head of the 
colurnn reaching it at an early hour on the 29th. 
Here the French general was met by deputations 
fl'om the supreme council, from the city, and from 
the mel'chants ofLisbon, who carne to congratulate 
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him on his arrival, in the names of these bodies; 
and here he was informed of too embarkation and 
actual departure of the royal famny. At the same 
time the representatives of the .regency~ Lieute-
nant-general Martinho de Souza e Albuquerque, 
and Brigadier-general Francisco de Borga Gar~ao 
Stockler, warned him of the state of violent ex-
citation into which the inhabitants of the capital 
were thrown. They assured him that an English 
fleet was at the mouth of the rivet, evidentIy 
waiting for a falr wind to carry it up; and that, 
unless the greatest pl'ecautions were used, it would 
be a hard matter to preserve that amity between 
the French and the Portuguese, which not pru-
dence only, but the express orders of the Prince 
Regent, required them to preserve. Junot heard 
them to an end, and then dismissed thein with 
a declaration, that he would hold the regencyre-
sponsible for the peace of the city: To the other 
deputations, again, he recommended diligenee and 
zeal in calming the spirits of their fellow-citizens ; 
and he sent forward numerous copies of a proc1a-
mation, to be posted in the most conspicuous parts 
of Lisbon, declaratory of the good-will of the Em-
peror towards the Portuguese natioll. This done, 
he made ready to pursue his journey. 
But though he thus affected to hold the perils of 
his situation in contempt, it was not possible for 
J unot to feel himself really at his ease. Of the 
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twenty-eight thousand men whom he had led 
across tlle Pyrenees, scarcely six thousand were at 
this moment !n a condition to acto The rest were 
se.attered over the line "ofmarch in one long column, 
.dividedhere and there by impassable torrents, or no 
less impassable inundations. The division nearest 
to his advanced guard was that of General Dela-
borde, which had as yet penetrated no further 
than t-o Santarem. Of the cavalry and artillery 
which had fallli!n into the rear soon after the army 
began to move from Alcantara, no intelligence had 
reached him; and he was quite ignorant whether 
or not the Spanish corps, which had been directed 
to move by Alentejo and Entre-Douro-e-Minho, 
had yet begun their march. Thus situated, and 
with a large and populous city before him, in which 
at least ten thousand regular. troops were in gar-
rison, JunotcoulQ. not but look forward to the 
event with serious apprehension. But he was 
aware that any appearance of doubt or misgiving 
would now prove fatal to him. He accordingly 
got together as many men as could be collected, 
and on the following day entered Lisbon. 
It is hardly necessary to remind the reader, 
that whilst the French Marshal was thus per-
forming his painful journey, the royal family of 
Portugal were hurrying their arrangements for 
the abandonment of their country. The morning 
of the 27th had been fixed upon for their embar-
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kation; and on that day, amidst the tears and 
regrets of many thousand spectators, they as-
cended the vesseIs appointed to convey them. 
But the wind proved not only adverse. but bois-
terous: it blewa perfect hurricane, and the fleet 
was unable to move. At last, however, a favour-
able breeze sprang up, and at daybreak on the 
29th the anchors were lifted. It was well that 
the storm ceased when it did; for the ships were 
scarcely across the bar when the French entered 
the city. 
For sorne little time after the arrival of Junot,. 
all things went on, or appeared to go on, in the 
Portuguese capital, as they had be en accustomed 
to do. The French soldiers coming in by small 
detachments, were conducted by the native ma-
gistracy, and by the native troops, to their quar-
ters; -and both they and their officers possessed 
sufficient prudence to conduct themselves with 
decency and decorum. But the stragglers were 
scarcely collected, and the strength of the weary 
restored, when French domination began to show 
itself in its . true colours; and a blow was struck 
at the national pride of the Portuguese, such as 
they found it difficuIt even at the moment to 
bear. 
As soon as he found himself sufficiently strong 
to act with a high hand, J unot gave orders that 
Lisbon and all the ports in the Tagus should 
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be evacuated by the Portuguese troops; whose 
pIaces were to be supplied by French divisions. 
Delaborde was nominated governor of the capital; 
and his soldiers were quartered~ not in barracks 
or .public-houses, but in the convents. General 
Loison with his division occupied Cintra, Mafra, 
and the sea·coast as far as the mouth of the Mon-
dego; one brigade, under General Thomieres, 
being q uartered in .the castle and península of 
Penniche. . To the third division, at the head of 
which was General Travot, was intrusted the 
defence of the entrance of the Tagus. Its héad-
quarters were at Ocyras, and it had garri~ons in 
the forts St. Julien and Cascaes on the right 
bank; whilst on the left, two battalions were 
encamped upon the heights of Mafarem. The 
cavalry and artillery were kept éntire in Lisbon; 
there were detachments of infantry in Santarem 
and Abrantes; and a Swiss battalion had the 
garrison of Almeida. Such was the disposition 
of theFrench troops; the Spaniards were ar-
ranged as follows ;-
. The division ofGeneral Caraffa having recalled 
its detachmentfrom Thomar, took up its quarters 
in Lisbon, and was intermixed with the French 
corps; Solano, again, w ho had presented himself 
before . Elvas on the 2nd of December, and to 
whom that important place opened its gates, 
having disposed three battalions in the fort, es-
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tablished his own head-quarters at Setubal. From 
that point he sent out parties, which occupied the 
casUes and towers of the Alentejo and Algarve, 
and completed the subjugation of the new prin-
cipality; whilst Taranco was in like manner 
spreading his force over the northern provinces. 
The last officer having secured Valen~a, a place 
of considerable importance as commanding the 
passages of Minho and the Lima, threw a garrison 
into the chateaux oí Sant lago j and on the 13th 
took possession of Oporto, where he fixed his 
head -q uarters. 
Having ascertained that, of the arrangements 
just described, sorne were already complete, and 
the rest hurrying to their completion, Junot pro-
~eeded to impress upon the minds· of the Por-
tuguese by decided proofs that they were a con.,. 
quered people. 011 the 13th of December, a grand 
review of all the troops in the capital was an-
nounced. The soldiers assembled in the principal 
streets and squares, the infantry in battalion~, the 
cavalry in squadrons, and the artillery limbered 
up and in order for service; and the whole popu-
lation of the place flócked from their houses in 
order to witness the spectacle. They were gazing 
with deep interest at the scene before them, when 
a salute of artillery from the walls of the Moorish 
fort attracted their attention. AH eyes. were. 
instanUy turned thither, and they beheld the . 
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aneient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon 
which the tri-coloured standard of France was 
mounted. It was a sight which seemed to affect 
them with emotions too deep for utterance. At 
first a solemn silence prevailed, broken onIy by 
the rattle of the soIdiers' arms, or the voices of 
their commanders; but by and by a murmur arose, 
l'esembling rather the roar of the ocean upon its 
bed of sand, than any other sound in nature. The 
people were grievously agitated. Cries of "Por-
tugal for ever! Death to the French !" were heard 
on every side; and it appeared that sorne mighty 
popular convulsion was inevitable. But Junot 
had taken care to secure the persons of the re-
gency, and of the principal men of the city, whose 
heads might pay the forfeit of any act of insurrec-
tion; and the mob, without leaders and without· 
arms, gradually" melted away. The rest of that 
day, and the whole of the night, were spent in a 
state of feverish agitation, which, without leading 
to any immediate results, gave sure indication of 
a spirit of discontent abroad; and which, sooner or 
later, must bring about sorne dangerous convul-
SIOn. 
In spite, however, of this flagrant attack upon 
their dignity as an independent nation, the Portu-
guese continued for some time to bear their fate, 
if not in absolute quiet, at all events without giving 
vent to their feelings in a way calculated to excite 
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the senous alarm of their conqueror. Private 
quarrels, ending even in bloodshed, between indi-
viduals of the garrison and the inhabitants, were 
by no means unfrequent; but in public, that is to 
say, on a great scale, events appeared to flow on 
in their usual channel. Junot made no other 
change in the form of the government, than by ad-
ding to the list of regency one or two creatures of 
his own; and the laws continued to be adminis-
tered in the name oí the legitimáte sovereign as 
heretofore. Above an things, J unot was extremely 
cautious in concealing, as far as he could, the terms 
ofthe treaty ofFontainbleau. So far fromdivulging 
these, he took care .on all occasions to make it 
known that the Emperor was particularIy desirous 
of preserving the integrity of the kingdom of Por-
tugal; till at last the idea began to be entertained, 
that at the worst the Portuguese might apprehend 
only a change of dynasty. 
The same line of conduct which he pursued 
himself, the general s in eommand of the Spanish 
corps had been pointedly requested to adopt; but 
to the wishes of their chief they paid, in this 
respect, very Httle attention. Taranco, indeed~ 
went no further than to insinuate to the authori-
ties of Oporto, that they ought from thenceforth to 
regard their city as attached to the monarchy of 
Spain; but Solano, the personal friend of Godoy, 
went mueh further. He appointed a grand judge, 
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anda superintendent of finan ces, in . the na me of 
Emmanuel, prince of the AIgarves; and he caused 
certain pieces of money to be coined, bearing upan 
them the arms of that minion, with a suitable in-
scription. Except in these particulars, however, 
Solano did nothing very offensive to the prej ud ices 
of the Portuguese, by whom, on the contrary, he 
seems to have been highly, and not undeservedly, 
esteemed. 
Matters continued in this state, Junot directing 
the principal share of his attention to the sea-side, 
and making every exertion to oppose anyatterripts 
which might be made by the English against him, 
up to tJ1e 1st of February, 1808. On that day, 
however, he published a decree, which had issued 
from his master whilst at Milan, and bore date 
the 23rd of the preceding December. It dissolved . 
. for ever the· council of regencyappointed by the 
Prince of the 'Brazils, and directed Marshal J unot, 
duke of Abrantes, to govern Portugal alone, in the 
name of the Emperor· N apoleon. It required that 
a chosen body ofPortuguese troops should be sent, 
with as little delay as possible, into Franee. It 
éhaIíged the appella.tion of the corps now stationed 
about Lisbon, from that of the army of observation 
of the Gironde, to· that of the army of Portugal; 
and it condemned the Portuguesenation to pay, 
as the price of the protection of their private pro-
perty, a fine of one hundred millions of francs~ 
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Such were the orders of N apoloon; and these the 
Duke of Abrantes proceeded, without the slightest 
compunction, to enforce. 
The effect produced by the promulgation of this 
decree, and by the changes in every department of 
the state which arose out of it, was such as it 
were no easy matter to pourtray. It was felt, not 
in the capital only, but through every part of the 
mosi' remo te provinces. The army, already in 
a state of disorganisation, disbaiided itself, and 
those who had carried arms as soldiers, continued 
to bear them as robbers and plunderers. The pea-
santry, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow 
their fields with corno The higher classes, whose 
usual place of residence was Lisbon, fled in dismay 
from their homes, till the city presented the ap-
pearance of a place lately visited by the plague. 
True, indeed, there were traitors to their country, 
who continued to surround the throne of the in-
truder, and to flatter his vanity, or that of his 
master, by addresses the most fulsome and degra-
ding; but the mass of the nation felt keenly the 
insults and wrongs to which they were subjected, 
and seemed to wait only for the proper momen!" to 
take revenge. . 
It was not long before the offended pride of the 
Portuguese began to vent itself in acts of violence, 
for which the growing insolence of the French fur-
nished ample grounds, but which were invariably 
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followed by punishments the most terrible and the 
most arbitrary. At Mafra, because the popuIace 
had uttered cries indicative of the state of their 
feelings,one citizen was condemned to death by 
sentence of a military commission, and publicly 
executed. A few days afterwards, a quarrel arose 
at the village of Caldas de Ranha, between certain 
of the French troops quartered there, and sorne 
soldiers of the 2nd regiment of Oporto. The affair 
was represented to Junot as a seditious commo-
tion; upon which not only was the regimentbroke 
unde.r circumstances to it the most ignominious, 
but six peaceable inhabitants of theplace, who 
had taken no part in the disturbance, were shot. 
Similar scenes occurred in almost every city, 
townJ village, and hamlet in Portugal, tiU the 
minds of the people were wrought up to dare as 
well as to endure every thing. 
As soon as J unot perceived the state of feeling 
to which the Portuguese in general were brought, 
he 10st no time in fulfilling another of N apoleon's 
directions, by disbanding the whole of the army, 
except those regiments onIy which he had ap-
pointed to proceed into France. Previous to the 
present invasion, .the standing army of Portugal 
amounted to thirty-seven regiments of horse and 
foot.' Junot permitted no more than six regiments 
of infantry and three of cavalry to remain. with 
their colourso The rest were dismissed to their 
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homes; al1d even this paltry force reeeived posi-
tive orders to mareh, under the guidal1ce of the 
Marquis de Alorna, towards Bayonne. The militia 
had long ago been relieved from the fatigues of 
military serviee; and now to complete his mea-
sures, an ediet was given out, requiring every 
Portuguese to surrel1der up to eertain constituted 
authorities his fire-arms; and prohibiting even 
swords from being worn in the streets or public 
ways. 
Things continued in this state from the month 
of February till summer had considerably ad-
vanced. In every part of the eountry. sueh pie-
tures, carved devices, or emblems of any sort, as 
had a tendency to keep alive a recollection of past 
national independence, were removed or defaced. 
The royal arms were pulled down from over the 
gateways of the palaces; the Quinas, or old 'Por-
tuguese standard, was universally displaced, to 
make way for the imperial eagle; and even 
justice was now administered according to the 
French code, and in the name of the French Em-
peror. Yet were there occurring froID time to 
time events which might have served to satisfy 
any reasonable person that matters had been 
pushed too faro Not to dweIl at Iength upon the 
tumults and massacres which here and there took 
place, it soon became evident that the Spanish 
troops who had accompanied the French, were 
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allies only in name. The chiefs, disgusted 
and 
dissatisfied with so flagrant a violation of 
the 
treáty of Fontainbleau as the recent acts of Ju
not 
presented, hardly affected to eoneeal their e
ha,.. 
grin; whilst pieces of information began gradu
ally 
to circulate among the eommon soldiers, wh
ich 
stirred up in thero a disposition the reverse
 of 
friendly towards their nominal comrades. At 
last, 
an order arrived froro Madrid, aeeoropanied by
 an 
humble request on the part of Godoy, addres
sed 
personally to Marshal J unot, for the return o
f the 
several corps into their OWll eountry. Aeq
uies-
eehce with it was of course refused, where
ver 
J unot possessed the power oí refusal; and 
the 
divisions of Caraffa and Taranco remained at t
heir 
stations. But Solano's corps actually took
 its 
départure, with the exeeption of four battali
ons, 
which continued to garrison Setubal. Junot 
was 
alarmed by this movement, and despatehed K
el-
lerman with his brigade to Elvas, for the purp
ose. 
of watching its results. In the same disposit
ion, 
he ordered General Quesnel, a Freneh officer, to 
proceed to Oporto, and take the cornmand of
 the 
Spanish troops there, whoro the death of Tara
nco 
had deprived of a leader; and he particul
arly 
directed him to overawe the Portuguese by
 the 
presence of the Spaniards, and to keep the S
pa-
niards to their duty by exciting in them a dr
ead 
of the Portuguese. N 01' was he reroiss in
 the 
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adoption of other expedients for tne preservation 
of public peace. Whilst his emissaries were 
busily employed in all quarters collecting a 
tribute oppressive beyond endurance, he gave 
every encouragement to those worthless Portu-
guese, who judged it a ·prudent measure to ap-
proach the imperial throne with their petitions, 
and to draw up the forms of a new constitution, 
to be administered by sorne prince of the Em-
peror's choice. To the state of the marine, like-
wise, he paid considerable attention. Through 
the exertions of M. Majendie, a captain in the 
French navy, he fitted out and armed two ships 
of the line, 'of74 guns each, three frigates, and 
seven smaller vessels; besides several hulks, in 
which it had be en customary to confine prisoners. 
It is true that none of these were rendered effec-
tive; ·but they at all events served the purposes 
of floating batteries; and they promised to prove 
of considerable utility in case an English squadron 
should endeavour to force the passage of the bar. 
AH Junot's dispositions, however, were of no avail. 
A doud had already collected in another part of 
thehorizon, which there was no reason to expect 
would dissolve without a storm; and the storm no 
suoner began to rage, than it extended its influ':' 
ence to every part of his insecure vice-royalty. 
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CHAPTER III. 
Entrance of fresh armies into Spain-Seizure of the frontier 
fortresses, and advance of Murat upon Madrid- Conster-
nation of Charles and Godoy- Preparations for escape to 
South America defeated by the mob-Godoy draggéd to 
prison-Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king 
-Murat alTives in the capital-Departure of the royal family 
for Bayonne-Tumult of thc 2nd of May~Resignation of 
the rights of the house of Bourbon-Secret instructions of 
Ferdinand to the regency-Measures adopted by Murat to 
preserve public tranquillity. 
THE sixth article of the treaty of Fontainbleau 
had stipulated, "that a corps of forty thousand 
French troops should assemble at Bayonne, on or 
about the 20th of N ovember, for the purpose of 
supporting the force previously sentinto Portugal, 
in case the English should oppose its progress, or 
menace it with an attack;" but it was expressly 
specified that the latter corps should make no 
movement in advance until the two high Contract-
ing parties had come to a perfect understanding 
on the subject. 
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In accordance with the tenorof this arrange-
ment, Junot's corps had hardly commenced its 
march, when the army destined to aupport it be-
gan to be formed. Earl y in N ovem ber there were 
twenty-four thousand infantry, between three and 
four thousand cava1ry, and thirty-eight pieces of 
artillery, in the camp; and by the 22nd of the 
same month, the whole, under the orders of Ge-
neral Dupont, crossed the Pyrenees. For this 
movement the assent of the Spanish comt was 
neither obtained nor requested. Buonaparte felt 
himself already too strong to stand in need of it ; 
and the corps pressed forward without opposition 
of any sortto Valladolid. Here the head-quarters 
were established; the troops being cantoned in 
the villages along the COUfse of the Douro, whilst 
detachments were pushed on as far as.Salamanca, 
in order that a persuasion might be generaUy 
created that its ultimate destination was Lisbon. 
N ot satisfied with having thus introduced two 
armies into the hcart of nations professedly in a 
state of profound peace with his government, N a-
poleon caused a third to form itself where the two 
former had been stationed, and a fourth· to be 
organised at Perpignan, in the very opposite ex-
tremity of the Pyrenees. N o great while elapsed 
before both the one and the other penetrated into 
Spain. The former, under Marshal Moncey, con-
sisting of twenty-five thousand infantry, three 
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thousand cavalry, and forty pie ces of cannon, 
passed the Bidassoa on the 9th of January, OCCU"" 
pying the th~ee provinces of Biscay, and extending 
as far as Castile; the latter, which amounted in 
all to about fifteen thousand men, and was headed 
by Duhesme, made its movement about a month 
latero The progress of both was marked by deeds 
oftreachery, ofwhich a few words will suffice to re-
call the particulars to the recollection of the reader. 
As soon as N apoleon had fully determined upon 
the proceedings which he afterwards adopted with 
respect to Spain, it became to him a matter of the 
first importan ce to be put in possession of the dif-
ferent fortresses and strong-holds which covered 
its .northern frontier, and protected it against 
French. invasion. These, it is probably needless 
to add, are St. Sebastiari, in Biscay; Pampeluna, 
in N avarre; and San Fernando de Figueres, and 
Barcelona, in Catalonia. Whoever may happen 
to command these four cities, may be said to com-
mand the four great passes of the Pyrenees; and 
to obtain the command of them at any cost and 
by any means, was the last and most urgent order 
given by their chief to the French generals. 
The methods which these severally adopted. to 
carry their master's projects into effect, are too well 
known to require a very minute repetition. San 
Fernando, feebly garrisoned, and more feebly go-
verned, opened its gates to the brigade of General 
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Nicolas, as soon as that officer demanded permis-
sion to lodge his soldiers in the citadel for the 
night; and the troops which thus obtained an en-
trance, rewarded the hospitality of tbeir allies, 
by turning them out of the place, and keeping pos-
session of it themselves. At Barcelona, a little 
more of cunning was requisite by the general-in-
chief Duhesme. Having obtained quarters for his 
men in the town, be feH upon the fol1owing strata-
gem, for the purposeof introducing them into the 
two castles,-the Citadel, and Fort Mon Jouich, 
.:-which, at opposite extremities, hold the city in 
subjection. On the 16th of February, the troops 
were ordered to assemble on the glacis of the cita-
del~ under the pretext of being reviewed previous 
to their departure. Lecchi, an Italian officer, 
commanded on that occasion; and the soldiers 
who acted their part in the busines's so cleverly, 
were aH Italians. Whilst the Spanish garrison-
the guard upon duty at the gate not excepted-
were intently occupied in watching the progress 
of the inspection, two companies upon the right of 
the line suddenly feH to the rear, and throwing off 
their knapsacks, ran with great speed towards 
the drawbridge. This they covered, before there 
was time given to raise it; and General Lecchi 
following with the whole of his staff, and exclaim-
ing that he only came to pay La visit to the Go-
verno~, two battalions were enabled to make 
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good their entrance, whilst the Spaniards were 
yet wondering at the cause of the sudden tumulto 
As soon as his object had been so far effected, 
Duhesme proceeded to attempt the reduction of 
Fort Mon Jouich by a process somewhat different. 
He boldly demanded, in the name of N apoleon, 
that it should be surrendered to him, threatening, 
in . case of refusal, an instant declaration of war ; 
and the Governor was too timid, or too faithless, 
to resist such an appeal. 
The most important, however, of an the frontier 
towns is Pampeluna; and the task of obtaining 
possession of it devolved upon General Darmagnac. 
Pampeluna, like the other places already occu-
pied, lies wholly at the merey of its citadel; and 
though Darmagnac's troops were very readily ad-
mitted into the town, the Governor, an old and 
faithful Spaniard, took every precaution to hinder 
them from making a lodgment in the castle. With 
this view he would admit no greater number than 
sixty or seventy French soldiers within the walIs 
at a time, who carne only to receive their daily 
rations; and behind whom, as soon as they had 
entered, the draw-bridge was carefully drawn up. 
1t required some management to deceive an officer 
possessed of so great a degree of caution; but Dar-
magnac's mind was fruitful in resources, and he 
contri ved at last tooutwit his wary antagonist. 
The French General had taken up his abode in 
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a house which stood upon the esplanade, midway 
between the town and the castle;, into which, 
during the night of the 15th February, he intro-
duced a hundred grenadiers, well armed, and 
amply supplied with ammunition, one by one, and 
in profound silence. On the morning of the 16th, 
a fatigue party of sixty men proceeded, according 
to custom, to receive their rations in the citad el ; 
but they were aH rnen of tried courage, and at 
their head was an officer of valour and known 
judgment, M. Robert, chef de battalion of the 
70th regiment. Under the pretext of being be-
fore theirtime, and of waiting for the arrival of 
lhe quarter-master, sorne of them remained stand-
ing upon the draw-bridge, whilst the rest took 
shelter against;; a passing shower, in the guard-
room. At a given signal they rose upon the 
Spanish guardo The sentinels were disarmed, 
and the rnuskets of those who were not on duty, 
and with which the French soldiers had pre-
tended to arnuse thernselves, were suddenly 
turned against their owners. The hundred grena-
diers now advanced at a run; and two battalions, 
which had been for sorne time formed in expecta-
tion of the event, showed themselves on the glacis. 
In spite of all his vigilance, Don Francisco Cer-
nero saw that his post was carried, and he sub-
rnitted. 
The manner in which Sto Sebastian, again, 
60 NARRATIVE OF THE 
changed its masters, was even more simple than 
any of the preceding. General Thouvenot having 
been sent thither with the ostensible view of 
forming a depot, for the assembling of stragglers 
from different regiments in advance, and forward-
ing them to their respective stations, took care to 
increase the number of his detachments so largely, 
that they becarne at last too many for the Spanish 
garrison; and the garrison was in consequence 
marched out, t6 make way for a corps of French 
troops. 
Having thus succeeded, almost beyond his ex-
pectations, in opening a way into the very heart of 
Spain, Napoleon no longer deemed it necessary to 
affect concealment as to his ultimate purposes. 
Column after coiumn poured across the Pyrenees, 
till the whole line of road from the Bidassoa to the 
Douro was covered with French soldiers. In 
Catalonia again, fresh reinforcements daily ar-
rived, ti11 Marshal Bessieres, to whom the chief 
command in that district was assigned, found 
hirnself at the head of twenty-five thousand men, 
including six thousand of the infantry, cavalry, 
and artillery, of the imperial guardo But it was 
to Murat, grand duke of Berg, that the important 
task of subjugating' Spaill was committed. He 
was recalled from Madrid, where for sorne time 
back he had acted ostensibly as arnbassador, 
though in reality as the promoter of internal dis-
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cord in the bosom of the court; and being ap-
pointed lieutenant to the Emperor, proceeded to 
take command of the grand army. 
In the mean while, events hado occurred in the 
Spanish capital, such as to draw upon the actors 
in them the attention, not o.f Spain only, but ofthe 
whole of Europe. First of aH, the inhabitants of 
Madrid were astonished by the sudden appearance 
of a royal' proclamation; in which it was an-
nounced that Ferdinand, prince of Asturias, had 
been detected in a conspiracy to. dethrone and 
murder his father, and was arrested. This was 
folIowed in a few days by a second proclama-
tion, which informed the public that the Prince, 
having confessed his guilt, and given up the names 
of his associates, had been pardoned, " the voiee 
of nature prevailing over that of strict justiee," and 
admitted once more into the royal favour. The 
surprise excited by proceedings so extraordinary 
had not subsided, when intelligence ofthe opera-
. tions of the French armies on the frontier, and 
their rapid advance. into the heart of the country, 
excited in a much more forcible and natural 
degree the consternation of all classes. Godoy, 
alarmed not so much for the probable fate of the 
nation, as for the destiny which might befall him-
self, thought at one moment of recalling the Spa-
nish troops from Portugal, and keeping them in 
readiness to act as circumstances might require; 
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and an order wa,s actually issued to that effect. 
At other times he urged the King to forward a 
scheme, to whích he had formerly opposed himself 
with all his influence, namely, the procuring a 
wife for Ferdinand from among the princesses of 
the imperial blood. ;N ext, he threw out hints 
as to the propriety of abdicating the crown, as 
soon as the proposed marriage should be com-
pleted; whilst for himself, an asylumsomewhere 
in the heart of France appeared to 1101d out the 
best hopes of protection against the violence of his 
enemies. 
J n the midst of these deliberations arrived two 
announcements, of which it would be difficult to 
determine whether the former or the latter struck 
th is imbecile court wi th the greater degre'e of horror. 
A letter from N apoleon himself, accompanying 
certain presents of beautiful horses, informed the 
King of Spain that it was the Emperor's intention 
to visit Madrid, and there to settle with him, 
upon a solid foundation, the affairs both of Spain 
and Portugal. Such an arrival was by no means 
desired either by Charles or his favourite; but 
whilst they were yet hesitating how to act, Don 
Eugenio Izquierdo, who had long resided at París 
as the tool of Godoy, suddenly made his appear-
ance in the Escurial, and communicated the fol-
lowing details. The Emperor, he said, had 
determined to seize Portugal for himself, and to 
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exchange it with the crown of Spain for the pro-
vinces north of the Ebro. N ew treaties of COffi-
merce and of alliance, offensive and defensive, 
such as tbe safety of his empire required, were 
about to be drawn up. Tbe title of Emperor of 
the Indies would be assigned to the King of Spain, 
whose son, the Prince of Asturias, should receive 
the hand of the Emperor's niece; but the marriage 
must be the subject of an especial negociation, 
an.d might be deferred till other arrangements were 
complete. In addition to this oflicial intelligence, 
Izquierdo took care to inform his master of the 
suspicions which he himself entertained touching 
the Emperor's real designs; and the statement 
threw all parties affected by it into the most se-
rious alarmo 
lt was now that the wisdom of following the 
example set by the Regent of Portugal, and re-
moving the court to its South American posses-
sions, suggested itself to the mind of Godoy. His 
dreams of sovereignty were by this time wholly 
dispelled, and his highest ambition was to secure a 
place of retreat for himself, whatever might be the 
fate of Spain; nor did he find Charles in a mood 
at all different [rom his own. The plan was no 
sooner proposed than it was agreed too The King 
and Queen both professed their willingness to fly; 
and preparations were instantIy set on foot fol' se-
curing a safe embarkation. 
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With this view the corps of General Solano was 
recalled from Alentejo, and ordered to occupy the 
mountains of Guadarrama. Detachments of infan-
try, cavalry, and artillery, were directed to cover 
the road from Madrid to Seville ; whilst the body-
guard, nine squadrons of the royal carabiniers, the 
battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and 
the regiments of national infantry and cavalry 
which composed the ordinary garrison of Madrid, 
were marched from the capital to Aranjuez, where 
thecourt was then resident. AH things,.in short, 
were already in a state of forwardness, when an 
unexpected tumult frustrated at once the inten-
tions both of Godoy and the King. 
Though - the greatest precautions had been 
adopted. to keep secret the object of these prepa-
rations, it .waf? not possible to hinder a rumour of 
the intended emigration from spreading abroad. 
The Spaniards were deeply affiicted at the pros-
pect of being abandoned by their King; and as it 
was understood that Ferdinand had expressed the 
strongest aversion to the measure, the whole was 
attributed to the selfish and wicked councils of the 
Prince of the Peace. The consequence was, that 
the hatred which had long been harboured towards 
Godoy, now increased with tenfold violence; and 
in this general feeling the soldiers fully partici-
pated with the multitude. To such a height, in-
deed, was this universal discontent carried, that 
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Charles found himselfunder the necessity of aban-
doning his design jand he issued a proclamation, 
in which he as,sured his belovedsubjects that no 
consideration whatever should ,induce him to 
leave them. This appeared on the 16th, and on 
the . 17th the preparations for departurewere 
ágain renewed. But popular indignation was now 
excited to its highest pitch. A mob hastening to 
Aranjuez, found a cavalcade of carriages ready,to 
proceed. They instantly cut the traces, andthén 
turning their fury against Godoy, ran, in a tumul-
tuous manner, to assault his house. Of the sol-
diers whom he called in to his assistance, aH, ex-
cept his own body-guard, deserted him j and he 
with difficultyescaped to a place of concea,lment 
for the night. 
- N ext day Ferdinal1d shoWed himself to the peo-
pIe, and the tumult was appeased. The .houses, 
indeed, of Godoy, and of his nearest relatives and 
most abject dependents, were levelled to the 
ground; whilst he himself, dragged from his hi-
ding-place, was with difficu1ty conveyed toa 
public pl'ison ; but this done, the mob immediately 
returned to their duty. Charles, however, ha~ 
learned a lesson, such as he had no desire tÍ> Jearn 
again. The burden of sovereignty, he said, had 
become too heavy for him; aQd it was, in the 
existing circumstances of the country, highly im- . 
proper that an old and infirm man should endea;~;' 
E. /%:>'t' \'OL. J. 
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vour to bear it any longer. He therefore, of his 
own free will, abdicated the throne, and named as 
his successor his eldest and beloved son, Ferdi-
nand, prince of Asturias. 
The joy of the people of Madrid, when this re-
solution was made known to them, is represented to 
have known no bounds. AH ranks and degrees of 
men partook in it. The houses were decorated du-
ringthe day with flowers and green boughs; and at 
night, one vast illumination extended from sq uare 
to square, and from street to street. Ferdinand 
was hailed, wherever he appeared, as the' pre-
server of his country; and for the moment, at 
least, both the advance of the French troops,and 
the fears which their approach had so lately occa· 
sioned, were forgotten. But this state of general 
satisfaction was not destined to be of long conti:-
nuance. 
It has be en stated that Ferdinand, instigated 
perhaps by personal hatred towards Godoy as much 
as byany other motive, aH along dec1ared him-
self friendly to the wishes of France; and the line 
ofpolitics which'he had pursued whilst a subject, 
he did not think it necessary to abandon after he 
became a sovereign. Though aware of the ap-
proach of Murafs army, the first use which he 
made of power, was to order 801ano's corps back 
to its former quarters in Portugal; to countermand 
the return of the divisions of Caraffa and Taranco;· 
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and to dismiss the whole body oftroops which late 
events had drawn around the capital, to their 
original stations. Madrid was thus left almost 
without a garrison, and the very heart of the 
kingdom laid open to the will of the Frencn 
MarshaI. 
In the mean while the Grand Duke of Berg 
was leading his numerous armies, by columns of 
brigades and divisions, towards Madrid. The 
columns marched as through an enemy's country, 
bivouacking every night, and taking all the pre-
cautions to secure themselves which are usually 
taken in a .state of war, until they made them-
selves masters of the chain of mountains which 
separate Old froID N ew Ca~tile. The officers in 
eommand, likewise, having received instructions 
to that effect, delayed the posts at all the stations. 
and arrested su eh bodies of Spanish soldiers as 
they anywhere met by the way; whilst they in-
dustriously gave out, at every town or village 
through which they passed, that their final des-
tination was the camp of Saint Roche, before 
Gibraltar. 
Proceeding in this order, the advanced.,.guard 
. reached Boytrajo, where intelligence of the late 
commotions in the Spanish capital met them. 
Murat instantly set forward. He took with him 
only a numerous and brilliant staff, besides one 
division of the imperial guard, and arrived just in 
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time to be an eye-witness of Ferdinand's trillm~ 
phal entry into Madrid. The spectacle was not 
without its effect upon the mind of the French 
Marshal. He saw that the feelings of the peopIe 
were all in favour of their new prince; and he 
probably anticipated, even then, the occurrence of 
sorne such events as in a few days afterwards 
carne to pass. 
Beauharnois. filled, at this time, the office of 
ambassadorto the court of Spain. It was but 
natural that Ferdinand should appeaI both to him 
and to the Ernperor's lieutenant for a recognítion 
of his new title; but neither Beauharnois nor 
Murat had received any instructions on the sub-
ject. No sooner, however, was a sufficient body 
of French troops at hand, than both the one and 
the other began to give evidence that their master. 
was by no means prepared to view with a friendly 
eye the revolution which had just occurred. Fer-
dinand was neither visited nor alluded to by them 
under any other title than that of Prince of As-
turias. A correspondence in the country was 
opened with his father and mother, whose per-
sonal safety was provided for by die substitution 
of a French guard at Aranjuez, in lieu of the 
Spanish troops which had hitherto done duty 
there. These proceedings on the part of the 
French . diplomatists could not but alarm Ferdi-
lland; but his alal'm was grievously augmented, 
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when day after day passed by, and no answer 
arrived to the letters whieh he had addressed to 
N apoleon, informing him of the ehanges which 
had placed him upon the thron,e of Spain. At 
last it was eommunicated to him that the Em,. 
peror in person was on his way to ,Madrid, for the 
purpose of aetillg as an arbiter in the divisions 
whiéh unhappily reigned within the bosom of his 
family; and the eommunieation was aceomp~nied 
by sug'gestions, a too ready compliance witlI which 
broughí. matters to an issue. 
The sword of Franeis 1, whieh had hung in the 
.armoria real sinee the date of the battle of Pavia, 
was demanded by Murat, in the name of the Em-
peror his master. Ferdinand was not sorry to 
have found so good an opportunity of evincing his 
deferenee to the wishes of the man on whose pro-
teetio,n he relied; and he gave up the weapon at 
once, with a suitable compliment, to its new owner. 
Then followed a recommendation that the Infant 
Don Carlos, his brother, should proceed a few 
days' journey towards the frontier, to meet the 
Emperor. To that hint, likewise, the most prompt 
attention was paid. But the next implied a 
measure, of whieh even Ferdinand doubted the 
wisdom; ana it required more than an. ordinary 
degree ofpersuasion to ove reo me his reluetance to 
its adoption. The ambassador B~auharnois repre-
sented that it would be particularIy agreeable to 
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his master, if Ferdinand would consent to go as 
far as Burgos lo receive him. Ferdinand wavered 
long, between the dictates of his hopes and his 
fears; and it was only when the arrival of a new 
actor on the stage turnoo the balancey that he gave 
a reluctant consent. Assured by General Savary, 
who professed to be little else than an avant cou-
rier to the Emperor, that N apoleon was actually 
on the road ; that he had left him so near Bayonne 
as to render his arrival at Burgos by this time 
certain; and, that if Ferdinand entertained any 
hopes of being recognised as King of Spain, he 
must take care to give the most satisfaetory proofs 
of his desire to obey the wishes of the man in 
whose hands his destiny lay ;-assured of aH this, 
he judged it imprudent any longer to hesitate; 
and inspite of the remonstrances and entreaties of 
his own most faithful counsellorsy the memorable 
journey was determined upon. It began on the 
10th of April, and it ended ón the 20th; leaving 
this ill-fated prince a prisoner in Bayonne. 
Previous to his departure, Ferdinand had ap-
pointed a supreme junta, to direet the affairs of 
the nation during his absence; at the head of 
which was his uncle, the Infant Don Antonio. He 
was hardly gone~ when Murat addressed to this 
body a requisition, that the Prinee of the Peace 
should be set at liberty. The junta, afraid either 
to refuse or grant the request, referred him to the 
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sovereign. Murat was indignant at the reply. He 
threatened to force the prison, and to put the 
troops who guarded it to the sword, in case they 
should presume to offer any opposition to his will ; 
and the junta felt that they possessed no means of 
hindering that threat from being carried into exe-
cution. Godoy was given up to the French, and, 
like his rival Ferdinand, conveyed to Bayonne. 
The next removals which took place were of the 
old sovereigns, whom it required no very urgent 
entreaties, nor any depth of policy, to expatriate. 
Charles had already protested against his abdica-
tion, as having been effected by compulsion; and 
thrown himself upon the justice and honour of 
Napoleon for redress. He was advised to seek 
the Emperor himself, and to plead his cause be-
fore him in person; and he readily adopted the 
suggestion. Charles and the Queen arrived at 
Bayonne exactly ten days later than their son. 
Of the extraordinary and disgraceful scenes 
which followed these extraordinary movements, 
it is not necessary in this place to enter into a par-
ticular account. The world will not readily forget 
transactions which were marked by the most 
shameless violation of all laws, human and divine, 
in every individual who took a part in them. A 
mother demanding the death of her own son, and 
proclaiming her own infamy in hatred to her-child, 
is a spectacle which has not often been presented 
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before the eyes of the public; nor has it frequently 
be en called uPQn to witness duplicity carried to 
the length to which it was carried by N apoleon 
and his agents. Such things stand in no need of 
being detailed frequently. 
In the mean while, affairs were every day as-
suming a more alarming aspect in Spain. Though 
there was not, as yet, open insurrection in any 
quarter, cases of individual quarrels were very 
frequent between the inhabitants and the French 
soldiery; and no trifling q uantity of blood was 
shed on the one side as well as on the other. The 
French, no longer caring to coneeal that the claims 
of Ferdinand would never be recognised by their 
master, only provoked the Spaniards to indulge 
the more frequently in cries of "Ferdinand for 
ever!" till the adherents of that prince carne to re-
gard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as 
the personal enemies of the intruders. To so great 
lengths were these feelings earried at Toledo, that 
a general commotion seemed at hand, and nothing 
but the prompt arrival of Dupont, with a strong 
division of troops from Aranjuez, preserved the 
public tranquillity. But events were by this time 
in rapid progress, which brought in their train 
that universal opposition to French influence, 
which no efforts were ever afterwards able to over-
come. 
There remained iü Madrid, towards the end of 
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April, no other members of the royal fatnily, ex-
cept the Queen of Etruria, her children, her bro-
ther the lnfant Don Francisco de PauIo, and Don 
Antonio, the head of regency;. and the Grand 
Due of Bel'g received a letter from Charles IV, 
desiring that they likewise should be forwiuded to 
Bayonne. When this letter arrived, the people of 
Madrid were in a state of the most violent excite-
ment, brought on by certain rumours of the pro'-
ceedings of the congress at Bayonne, which not 
aU' the vigilance of N apoleon or his servants could 
hinder from getting abroad. Men, women, and 
children, might daily be seen in crowds about the 
post-office, anxiously waiting for so me fresh intel:-
ligence; and ir the courier chanced, on any occa-
sion, to be delayed, the symptoms of dissatisfac-
tion exhibited on all sides were of the most appal-
lingkind. The inhabitants of Madrid were in this 
frame of mind, when the determination of Murat 
with respect to the Regent and his relatives ·was 
cornmunicated to thern. The people protested 
that Don Antonio should not be taken from them; 
but in spite of these appearances the preparations 
for his departure continued to go on.. lt was now 
the 1st of May, and for the last two days no post 
had arrived. On the 2nd, a similar reply met 
those who again assembled at the post-office; whilst 
it was rumoured that the royal carriages were 
already harnessed, and that the princes were rre.-
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paring to set out. The people ran to the palace, 
cut the traces by which the horses were fastened, 
and forced back the carriages into the stable-yard ; 
and an aide-de-camp of Murat happening to pass 
at the moment, they loaded him with insults and 
execrations. The aide-de- camp resented this treat-
ment, and words were instantly followed by blows. 
And now began a tragedy which Spain willlong 
retain in her recollection, not onIy because of the 
blood of her citizens which was shed, but because 
of the results which sprang out of it, and the ar-
duous struggle of which it was the forerunner. 
But this, like the transactions at Bayonne, is too 
generalIy known to stand in need of minute rela-
tion. Jt is sufficient to observe that the firing 
{!ontinued for nearly three hours, with considera-
ble slaughter on both sides; that it was not till 
after the most strenuous exertions of the authori-
tíes, both Spanish and French, that order was re-
stored; and that it proved by no means the least 
distressing thing to the people of Madrid, that a 
combat which had aIread y cost thus dear, should 
be followed by a multitude of indiscriminate mili-
tary executions. 
The imlllediate effect of the operations of this 
bloody day was tó strike with a momentary terror 
the inmates of the 'capital; a sensation of which 
the French failed not to make the most, by circu-
lating proclamations that spoke a language of 
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mingled threatening and conciliation. The Jnfant 
Don Francisco departed, as soon as order was 
restored, for Bayonne; and he was followed within 
four-and-twenty hours by Don Antonio. The lat-
ter, indeed, voluntarily expressed a wish to share 
the fortvnes oI tbe King .bjs nep.bew; beca use he 
felt that, for the management of affair~ so perilous 
as those which were around him, he was totally 
unfitted. His departure was followed by the ad-
mission of the Grand Duke of Berg as a member 
into the councíl of regency; and a few days after-
wards the same Grand Duke was, by a decree of 
Charles IV, nominated to fill the office of presi-
dento 
The news of the insurrection at Madrid reached 
Bayonne, at a moment when the Emperor ap-
peared to be busily engaged in an attempt to 
reconcile Ferdinand to his parents, and his parents 
to him. He gladly availed himself of it, for the 
purpose of precipitating the designs which he had 
long ago formed. As might be expected, the 
amount of lives sacrificed was magnified greatly, 
as well by the terror of the Spaniards, as by the 
policy of the French; and to these exaggerated 
accounts N apoleon offered no contradiction. On 
the contrary, he made ofthem a handle for loading 
Ferdinand with maledictions. He accused him of 
being the cause of all this bloodshed, and insisted 
that he should instantly restore the crown to hfS 
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father, from whom he had impiously usurped it. 
Ferainand, who at first had displayed sorne symp-
toms oC courage, sank at last under the invectives 
of N apoleon. He not only obeyed the mandate, 
but, in his capacity of Prince of Asturias, affixed 
his signature to the deed by which Charles IV in his 
own name, and in the name of his family, resigned 
the sovereignty of Spain into the hands of the 
Emperor of the French. A similar proceeding 
was followed by the rest of the princes. They 
gave up their rights for ever, and declared, in a 
published document, that the Spanish nation could 
not evince its affection for their race in a manller 
more satisfactory, than by paying a ready obedience 
to the sovereign, whoever he might be, that should 
be appointed to succeed them. 
Whether Ferdinand had foreseen the lengths to 
which matters would be carried, or whether he 
only expected to be detained for a time in cap-
tivity in Franee, does not appear; but imme-
diately previous to the grand catastrophe, he 
wrote; and despatched by a trust y messenger, a 
letter of instructions to the council of regency~ 
In it he declared that his actions ",ere no longer 
free, and that it was impossible for him, situated 
as he was, to atteJ1.d to the honour of the throne, 
or the welfare of the country; He therefore 
granted to the junta unlimited powers, permIttmg 
it to remove whithersoever it would, and in his 
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name to exerciseall the authority of the sove-
reign. He recommended that a general cortes 
should assemble ,,,ith as little delay as possible, 
for the purpose of adopting su eh measures as 
might appear most eondueive to the publie good; 
and he positively required that the removal of his 
person into the interior of France, should be the 
signal for the commencement of hostilities. That 
letter was conveyed by one who, for greater se-
curity, performed the bulk of his journey on foot. 
It was faithfully delivered to the junta; but as it 
reached its destination two days later than the 
official account of Ferdinand's resignation, the 
junta decreed that :they were not a~thorised in 
paying' to it any obedienee. On the contrary, 
they showed themselves to be the ready and 
willing tools of the Emperor's lieutenant, who ae-
cordingly proeeeded to order all things in the 
kingdom as he judged most conducive to his mas-
ter's interests. 
The first and great object to be attained in his 
view of affairs was, to seatter the Spanish army 
so as to render it ineffeetive, and to seeure the 
fidelity of the great and important cities of Ca~i~ 
and Valencia. For this purpose, the two Swiss regi-
ments eantoned near Madrid, were ineorporated 
with the eorps of General Dupont; the body. 
guards, with four battalions of Spanish and Wal-
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loon guards, were placed under the orders of 
Marshal Moncey; directions were given to pre-
pare an expedition of three thousand men, which 
might embark without delay for Buenos Ayres; 
and the Mediterranean fleet, at that time laid up 
in Port Mahon, was required to proceed at once to 
Toulon, for the purpose of joining the French squa-
dron. Many changes were likewise ordcred in the 
different garrisons scattered through Catalonia and 
elsewhere. General Solano, for example, was 
enjoined to proceed 10 Cadiz, there to execute his 
original functions as captain-general of Andalusia; 
whilst the most strenuous exertions were made to 
attach to the new order of things General Casta-
nos, whose situation as commandant of the camp 
at San Roche, furnished him with powerful means 
either of advancing or thwarting the views of the . 
French Émperor. Nor were other andhardly 
less important matters neglected. Every maga-
zine of arms and stores throughout the country-
every magazine at least which lay within their 
reach,was seized and appropriated by tbe French 
authorities. Preparations were made to fortify 
and victual the heights of the Retiro~ that they 
might serve as a citadel, to keep the inhabitants 
of the capital in order; whilst a regular chain of 
posts between it and the frontier was established. 
N othing, in short. was left undone, which ap-
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peared in the most remote degree calculated to 
secure the ahsolute subjection of Spain; and it 
was even hinted that, as 800n as that great end 
should have been attained, other and equalIy 
gigantic projects would be undertaken. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Gf'neral insurrection of tIte Spanish provinces, and forroation of 
juntas-The junta of Seville peculiarly vigorous alld or-
derly-It assumes tbe title of Supreme Junta of Spain and 
the Indies-Reduction of the French Heet in the haroour of 
Cadiz-Expeditions against Seville and V álencia under 
Dupont and Moncey-Actions at Alcolia and Baylen, and 
surrender of Dupont's corps-Moncey repulsed froro before 
Valencia-Proceedings at Bayonne, and procIaroation of 
King Joseph-He enters Spain-Battle of Medino del Rio· 
Seco; and arrival of Joseph in Madrid-His flight in conse-
quence of Dupont's capture-A n expedition fitted out at 
Cork sails for the Peninsula-Sir Arthur WelIesley arrives 
at Cornnna, and directs his course towards Portugal-Pro-
ceedings in that country-Mutiny of the Spanish garrison of 
Oporto-Seizure of General Quesnel, and the standard ofin-
dependence raised-Junot's mea¡¡ures to suppress the revolt. 
1 T has been stated that the details of the event-
fuI 2nd of May reached Bayonne on the 10th; 
they were not more tardy in making their way 
through all parts of Spain; and the effect pro-
duced by them, from one end of the kingdol11 to 
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another, was the same. From the mountains of 
Arragon to the pillars of Hercules, and from Va-
lencia to Cape Finisterre, t~ere arose one loud and 
simultaneous shout, "Long live King Ferdinand-
Death to the French!" The people thought not of 
the defenceless state of the country, its frontier 
towns in the occupation of the enemy, its soldiers 
dispersed, and its arsenals and treasures plun-
dered. They saw only the degradation to which 
they were reduced; and they ran to arms with 
the alacrity of men determined to regain their 
freedom, or to perish. 
Whilst in other provinces a general rising took 
place, distinguished more by the zeal of those who 
followed, than by the prudence of, its leaders, 
a regular form of government, such at least as the 
state of the times would admit of, was almost in-
stantaneously organized at Seville. On the very 
dayafter the insurrection broke out, a junta con-
sisting of twenty-three members, chosen from the 
principal men of the province, from the nobility, 
the higher clergy, the general officers and me m-
bers of the .municipal body, met together, and 
assumed the title of Junta, and Supreme Govern-
ment of Spain and the Indies. Acti:p.g in this 
capacity, the Supreme Junta proceeded to give 
directions, that in every town or village which 
should contain two thousand householders, juntas 
of six persons should be formed, whose business 
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it should be to enlist under the national standard 
aH males between the ages of sixteen and forty-
five. Messengers were líkewise despatched to the 
captain-general of Cadiz, to General Castanos, 
commandant of the camps at San Roche; to the 
eities of Cordova, Grenada, and Jaen; and to all 
the towns and villages near, to acquaint them with 
the resolution which had been formed of deliver-
ing Spain, and to entreat their best assistance in 
so just a cause. Light vessels were fitted out and 
sailed both for the Canaries and South America; 
eommissioners has tened to AIgarves and Alentejo. 
to request the co-operation of the Portuguese; 
and war, an interminable war, was solemnly 
declared against France and N apoleon. At the 
same time, proclamations were circulated, inviting 
aH· Italians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, andother fo-. 
reigners, to abandon tbe French standard, and 
promising tbem the best treatment in the event of 
their taking service in the armies of Spain. In 
a word, every thing was done promptIy, actively. 
and vigorously, whilst the most perfect order was 
preserved; and tbe new government showed itself 
not unworthy of the style which it employed, and 
which by the juntas it was permitted to employ. 
Wherever the emissaries of the Supreme Junta 
appeared, they failed not to stir up among the 
people a spirit in. every respect accordant to that 
which animated themselves. In Cadiz, the niul-
l'ENINSULAIt W AR. 83 
titude rose upon Solano, whose attachment 1'0 
Godoy and the French continued unabated; and 
having dragged bim from tbe bouse ofMr. Strange, 
an Irish banker, with whom he had taken shelter, 
they put him to death in a manner the most igno-
minious and cruel. Similar scenes were acted in 
different towns of Spain, whilst as yet the fervour 
of patriotism was too violent to be guided by rea-
son; and not a few, both of Frenchmen and tbeir 
adberents, fell a sacrifice to popular fury. But to 
tbe bonour of Spain be it remembered, tbat sbe 
had suffered long and grievously under her op-
pressors; and that tbose wbo feH the effects of 
tbe first effervescence of her wrath, were tewer by 
far in number, tban fell in one day under the re-
gulated fusilade of tbe Frencb garrison of Madrid. 
It was, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for 
Spain, that the first great operations in which ber 
patriot forces embarked, proved most of them suc-
cessfuL At Cadiz, a French fleet of five sail of 
tbe line and three frigates, was compelled, after 
a lengtbened cannonade, to surrender atdiscretion. 
Two expeditions, simultaneously undertaken-one 
under General Dupont, for the purpose of securing 
the obedience of Andalusia; another under Marshal 
Moncey, designed to establish the new govern-
ment in Valencia-were defeated; the latter with 
the 10ss of a .large proportion, the former at the 
expense of the wbole body of troops engaged in it. 
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As these were among the most brilliant services 
performed by the Spaniards during the whole of 
the war, and as they operated powerfullyupon its 
results in other quarters, and in after campaigns, it 
may not be ami ss to give a brief and conuected 
sketch, both of the oue and the other. 
N othing had as yet occurred to attract the at-
tention of the conquerors, beyond the murmurs 
and complaints'which resounded from one end of 
Spain to the other, when General Dupont, at the 
head of six thousand infantry of the line, five 
hundred marines of the imperial guard, two S\viss 
regiments in the service of Spain, about three 
thousand cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of can-
non, all well appointed and equipped, set out 
from Toledo, where, for a month back, he had 
established his head-quarters. He was directed 
to rally under his standard as many Spanish troops 
as he should chance to meet by the way; and he 
was to be joined at Seville by a brigade of three 
thousand men detached from the army ofPortugal. 
General Dupont knew of no reason why he should 
entertain a doubt of the final success of his enter-
prise: he was ignorant that he was about to enter 
a country everywhere hostile to him; he there-
fore moved on WitilOut much circumspection, and 
had no scruple about encumbering hiscolumns 
with a long train of waggons and cars. 
The road from Toledo to Cadiz, the extreme 
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point which Dupont had been. commanded to 
reach, runs through the plains of La Mancha, over 
the ridges of. the Sierra Morena. There is a 
bridge upon the Guadalquivir at Andujar, which 
the traveller passes, and then keeping close, to the 
stream for a considerable distance, he recrosses 
the same stream at Venta de Alcolia. Abont a 
day's journey from this point lies the town of 
Cordova, on the same side of the river as Andujar; 
and at a sÍmilar distance from it, on the other 
side, is the town of Jaen. Cordova is built upon 
the direct road, as well as Cremona and Seville; 
but as the French army never succeeded in pene-
trating beyond' the first of these places, it will not 
be necessary to describe, with great minuteness, 
the topography of the others. 
Dupont traversed the plains, and reached the 
vilIage of Carolina in the mountains, before any 
symptoms of the kind of reception which awaited 
him were exhibited. Carolina was almost en-
til'ely deserted; and from the reports üf the few 
stragglers who still clung to their houses, it ap-
peared that the men had withdrawn with arms in 
their hands. Dupont, however, contihued his 
journey: he arrived at Andujar on the second 
day; and there his doubts, if indeed he enter-
tained any, as to the accuracy of the report which 
had been made to him, were dispelled. The 
spirited resolutions of the junta of Seville were 
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here made known to him; and he was given to 
understand that his entrance into Cordova would 
be disputed by the whole of the mal e population 
of the province. 
Startled, but not intimidated by this intelli-
gence, Dupont held his course; causing the sol-
diers to march with greater circumspection, and 
covering his front and tlanks with skirmishers. He 
crossed the Guadalquivir without opposition; but 
as he approached Alcolia, the point where it be-
hoved him to cross again; he found it occupied in 
considerable force by the Spaniards. A levy en 
masse had . been formed, of which the command 
was intrusted to Don Pedro Agostino de Echever-
ria, lieutenant-colonel, and president of the mili-
tary council of Cordova, for the suppression of 
smuggling and other crimes in the Sietra Morena; 
and supported by three or four thousand soldiers 
of the line, it was now prepared to dispute with 
Dupont's army the passage of the river. 
The main body ofthe Spaniards was drawn up 
along the right bank, so as to cover the bridge, 
which they had neglected to break down; but a 
considerable division, of which sorne part was 
cavalry, remained .on the left bank for· the purpose 
of taking the enemy in reverse. 1 t is hardly ne-
cessary to state that these dispositions, neither 
justifiable in themselves, nor at all such as the 
nature of the force employed might have sug-
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gested, proved useless. The isolated corps twice 
attempted to charge, but it was each time re-
pulsed with 10ss ;whilst the bridge and village 
were . both carried at a rush, and the undisciplined 
peasantry dispersed in every direction. Echever-
ria, however, rallied his regular troops as soon as 
they had cleared the village, and began his retreat 
in tolerable order; but the French cavalry speed,.. 
ily broke in upon them, and the rout became 
general. 
Dupont lost no time in following up the success 
which he had obtained. He reached Cordova that 
night; and finding the gates shut, and prepara-
tions apparentIy making for defence, he gave or-
ders that it should be carried by assault. These 
orders were promptly obeyed. One round from 
the artillery sufficed to burst the gates, and th.e 
troops rushing in pell-mell, swept the streets with 
a fire of musketry. This was,"perhaps, one of the 
most wantonly cruel acts of violence committed 
during the war; for the people offered no resis-
tance, only a few random shots having been fired 
from sorne of the windows. But it was deemed 
prudent, in the present condition of affairs, to 
excite, as far as might be, the terror of the Spa;-
niards; and on this principIe Cordova was given 
up to pillage. 
Though he had so far succeeded in his under-
taking, Dupont was by no means disposed tú con-
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sider his present situation as an enviable one. 
Bands of armed peasantry soon began to gather 
together, till they hemmed him in on every side ; 
and such was their audacity, that it became im-
possible for individuals or even smaH parties to 
stray to a moderate distance from the camp, with-
out running the risk of being killed or taken. On 
endeavouring likewise to open a correspondence 
with Madrid, he found that all means of communi-
cation between himself and that city were cut off. 
1 t is true that his patrols of cavaIry, though pushed 
as far as Carlota on the road to Seville, encoun-
tered no enemy; but rumours of numerous masses 
in motion, of the advance of one corps from the 
camp of San Roche, of another from Grenada, and 
of a third already forming at Ecija, taught him 
that one such victory as that of AlcoJia, was not 
sufficient to secure the submission of a large and 
populous province. Under these circumstances 
he determined, at least for the present, to give up 
aH idea of further conquest, and to establish him-
se1f at some point which should at once enable 
him to re-open his communications with his rear, 
and place him in a situation to renew, at his own 
pleasure, offensive .operations. 
With this view he evacuated Cordova at an 
early hour on the morning of the 16th of June, and 
reached Andujar without molestation on the 19th. 
His next measure was to attempt the dispersion of 
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a band of armed peasants, who had assembled at 
Jaen; and who, more than any others, pressed 
upon his out-posts, and harassed his foraging par-
tieso The troops employed upon that service 
found no great difficulty in accomplishing it; for 
the insurgents were poorly organised, and gave 
way as soon as attacked; but the conquerors went 
much further than their chief intended them to go, 
in punishing what they chose to designate as re-
bellion. General Dupont was desirous that the 
town of Jaen should pay dearly for its patriotism; 
but he was still more desirous that it should be 
left uninjured as a place ofshelter, in case of need, 
to his own army. The victorious detachment 
committed in it the most horrible excesses, wan-
tonly destroying every morsel of food and every 
cask of wine, which ought to have gone towards 
the -sustenance of themselyes and their comrades. 
Bythese movements Dupont so far bettered his 
condition, that he was enabled to receive a strong 
reinforcement under Generals Videl and Gobert, 
and, to a certain extent, to re-open his communica-
tions with the capital; but he was still as far as 
ever from being safe. The rumours which had 
alarmed him whilst at Cordova were repeated, 
with even greater semblance of truth, till he 
reac~ed Andujar. It was soon ascertained that 
levies were assembling in every direction around 
him; and that, unless the passes of the Sierra Mo-
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reria were occupied in force, he would be entirély 
separated from every other corps of French troops 
in the Peninsula. To occupy these passes, how-
ever, by detachments from his own army, was a 
me asure upon which he was afraid to venture; he 
considered himself barel y strong enough to main-
tain his present pqsition-to divide his strength 
would be ruinous; but he despatched message 
after message to Madrid, entreating that he might 
not be abandoned, and stating, in the plainest lan-
guage, both the difficulties under which he then 
Iaboured, and his apprehensions respecting the 
future. Of these despatches a few only reached 
the place of their destination, the remainder being 
intercepted and carried to the Spanish generals ; 
and as an opinion widely different from bis own 
prevailed at head-quarters respecting the means 
alreadyat his disposa1, no efforts were made to 
comply with his wishes. It was, at the same 
time, broadly hinted to him, that to abandon the 
enterprise on which he had set out, would prove 
extremely mischievous to the cause, and,as 
a necessary consequence, bring down upon him-
self the displeasure of his master. 
Dupont had acquired considerable reputation in 
the wars of Italy and Germany, as a general of 
division; but never acted before as commander-in-
chief of an army. Though the junction of Videl's 
division increased the strength of his corps to full 
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sixteen thousand men, he persisted in keeping it 
in a state of unaccountable inactivity. Ha:d he 
moved at once either to the front or to the rear, it is 
probable he would have carried.every thing before 
him; for it was not till towards the middle of July, 
that the junta of Seville succeeded in bringing to-
gether a force capable of opposing him; but he 
was unwilling to advance' before a furthe;r rein-
forcement, for which he had applied to Marshal 
J unot, should have come in; whilst to retreat, 
would be to íncur the censure of which he had 
been already forewarned, and of which he enter-
. tained at least an adequate degree of apprehen-
SlOn. He accordingly contented himself with the 
destruction of the . bridges over the Guadalquivir, 
and the erectionof a redoubt here and there along 
its banks; whilst by occupying Baylen in his rear,. 
ando keeping a garrison in the tete-du-pont at 
Mengibar, he persuaded himself that his position 
would be amply secured against any attempts 
which the insurgents could make against i1:. 
Whilst he was thus 'Yasting time, the Spanish 
government strained every nerve for the purpose 
of bringing into the field a force adequate, both by 
its numbers and its discipline, to act on the offen-
sive. EarIy in July, about thirty thousand..men, 
the greater part of w hom were old soldiers, 
moved towards Andujar. They were commanded 
by Castanos, who had been recalled for the pur-
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pose from the camp at San Roche; and they num-
bered among their generals of division two of the 
most distinguished officers in the Spanish service," 
General Reding and the Marquis de la Coupigny. 
Part of this force encountered at Jaen a French 
brigade under General Cassagne, which had pro-
ceeded thither as a sort of advanced-guard from 
the main army, and after a sanguinary conflict, 
compelled it to retire. A position was next taken 
up within cannon-shot of Dupont's lines; and 
there a plan was ente red into, of which the success 
proved to be even more complete than the most 
sanguine could have possibly anticipated. 
It was agreed that Castanos with one division 
should temain where he was, to keep the attention 
of Dupont, as far as might be practicable, fixed 
upon a single point. In the mean while General 
Reding, at the head of eight thousand men, was to 
force the tete-du-pont at Mengibar, to march upon 
Baylen, and attack the enemy there; and he was 
to be supported by the Marquis de la Coupigny, 
who, from La Heguerita and Villaneuva, -was to 
straighten the left of the French army; whilst a 
corps of two thousand men, under Don Juan de la 
Cruz, was to push for the Sierra Morena, and 
block up every line of retreat in that direction. 
The plan was carried into execution on the 16th 
of July. Reding assaulted and reduced the re-
doubt at Mengibar, crossed the Guadalquivir, and 
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drove in the French posts upon Baylen; but find-
ing that Coupigny had not come up, he fell back 
again after dark, and repassed the river. As soon 
as Baylen 'was known to be in danger, General 
Videl, with six thousand men, hastened to cover 
it. He arrived there that night, but he found in 
it neither friend nor foe; because the Spaniards 
had already executed their retrograde movement, 
and General Dufour, who on the fall of Gohert suc-
ceeded to the command of the French, had evacu-
ated the place as no longer tenahle. Videl was 
naturally a good deal alarmed at this; and his 
alarm hecame greatIy increased when it was re-
ported to him that the sound of firing had been 
heard in the direction of the Sierra Morena. 
He made up his mind in a moment that Dufour 
had be en driven back upon Carolina, and that, 
unless he hastened to support him, the retreat 
upon Madrid would he entirely cut off. Under 
this persuasion he lost no time in despatching a 
messenger to Dupont, informing him of what he 
meant to do, and then proceeded, without allowing 
his troops a moment to rest, in search of Dufour. 
General Vid el reached Carolina on the 17th; 
and on the same day Reding and Coupigny hav-
ing formed their junction, returned to Baylen. 
They took peaceable possession of it, and instantly 
sending to make Castanos aware of their success, 
desired to be instructedas to their future move.., 
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ments. They were ordered to march forthwith 
upon Andujar, against which the united efforts of 
the whole Spanish army were now about to be 
turned. 
The troops had hardly taken their stations on 
the morning of the 19th, preparatory to this move-
ment, when they found themselves in presence of 
the advanced-guard of Dupont's corps, which was 
now in full retreat towards the Sierra Morena. 
The arrival of Videl's despatch had at length 
opened the eyes of the French General to the real 
perils of his situation. He saw that the póint 
from which he had hitherto apprehended an attack, 
was, comparatively speaking, one of slight impor-
tance, and that it was from the rear that danger, 
if it came at all, was to be apprehended; and he 
reluctantly determined to abandon Andujar, and 
to retreat as fir at least as La Carolina, from 
whence other operations could at his leisure be 
undertaken, either offensively or defensively, as 
circumstances might point out. 
With this design he moved from the town soon 
after night-fall on the 18th; but as he carried 
alon~ with him vast multitudes of carriages and 
waggons, his march was necessarily rendered both 
slow andstraggling. Though the head of his co-
lumn quitted its ground aboutten o'clock, dawn 
was beginning to appear before the last sections 
moved off; and when the momerit of trial carne, 
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the former were found to be at the distance of 
nearly three leagues from the latter. It was well 
for the Spaniards under Reding, that Dupont had 
deemed it expedient to bestow so much care upon 
the preservation of his plunder. Had the French 
moved in compact order, so as to bring the whole 
of their force into action at once, their enemies, 
however brave and resolute, could have hardly 
withstood the shock; for there was no great dis-
parity in point of numbers between them, andthe 
advantages of discipline and experience were aH 
in favour of the French; but this they were not 
able to effect. On the contrary, regiment after 
regiment, and gun after gun, were hurried into fire 
as fast as they carne up; the French fought as an 
army always fights which is taken in detail; and 
one part was utterly and irretrievably destroyed 
before another could render it the smal1est as-
sistance. 
It might be about three o'c1ock on the morning 
of the 19th, when the scouts of the French army 
suddenly feIl in with the advance of General Re-
ding's corps. By neither party was thé meeting 
anticipated; but both sides made every disposi-
tion which their relative situation and the exigen-
ces of the moment seemed to require •. Dupont 
felt that, unless he made good his passage at once 
through the force opposed to him, his rear would 
he assailed by Castanos; and he therefore directed 
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the leading division to charge the Spaniards, with-· 
out waiting for the arrival of their comrades. The 
attack was bravely made, but it was no less bravely 
resisted; and the affair, after a warm and deter-
mined struggle, ended in thé repulse of the assail-
ants on aH points. Very shortly, fresh troops ar-
rived, inc1uding a battalion of the marines of the 
imperial guard, who renewed the contest with the 
utmost gallantry; but neither their numbers nor 
their pbysical strengh, worn down by a night-
march, and still further diminished by the rapidity 
of their advance to the front, were competent to 
carry them successfully through. The Spaniards 
were superior to them in every respect, in num-
bers, in position, and in the quantity and weight 
of their cannon; and though the French performed 
prodigies of valour, they were foiled in every effort. 
At last it was felt by all the officers present that 
their case was a hopeless one; and just as Casta-
nos arrived upon their rear, and Don Juan de la 
Cruz took his ground upon their flank, it was de-
termined to request a suspension of arms. The 
request was immediately complied with. In spite 
of the arrival of General Videl's corps, which, as 
soon as the firing was heard, had hastened from 
Carolina to the assistance of their comrades, the 
negociation continued; and it ended in the sur-
render of the whole French army, to the amount 
of fourteen thousand men, as prisoners of war. 
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The entire course of the Spanish campaigns 
produced novictory so decisive, or so ,influential 
in its con sequen ces, as this. Not only was An-
dalusia freed frOln the presence -of the enemy, but 
a degree of confidence was communicated to the 
patriots in other quarters, such as they had not 
previously experienced; and many an individual, 
who up t~ that moment had wavered between his 
duty and his interests, ceased to waver any 
longer. At ,Madrid, again, the newsof the vic-
tory produced a verypowerfuleffect, as well upon 
the French as upon the patriot party. The latter, 
who for some time backh-ad dissembled their 
sentiments, began again to give them vent in na-
tional cries and acts of petty disturban ce ; whilst 
the former exhibited the líveliest symptoms of 
alarrn, lest the conquerors 'should follow up thar 
success by marching at once upon thecapital. 
At this time Joseph Napoleon was resid,ent in the 
eity; he had entered it only two days previously, 
and had scarcely begun to exereÍse the functions 
of royalty, when. the intelligence carne \1pon him 
like a thunderb01t; and ,though eom:;cious of the 
evils which' must necessarily attend the step, he 
. determined t@ retire for thepresent upon hi8 re-
sources. He quitted Madrid on the 3Jst, and 
issulng orders that all his scattered divisions' 
should follow him, that the siege ,o{ Saragoza, 
. then in progress, should he raised~ and further 
VOL. J~ 
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attempts upon Valencia abandoned, he fell back, 
with the utmostprecipitation, beyond the Ebro. 
In the mean while the expedition against Va.,. 
leneia was conducted by Marshal Moncey under 
circumstances not very dissimilar to those which 
attended the progress of Dupont's operations. 
When he quitted Madrid on the 4th of lune, 
Moncey was indeed aware that his object was 
not likely to be accomplished without opposition; 
and he took his measures, as an able officer might 
be expected to do when setting out upon an un-
dertaking of doubtfulissue. The force which im-
mediately followed his own, amounted to sorne 
eight or nine thousand men of all arms; there 
were in quarters,along his line of march, two 
battalions of Spanish and Walloon guards, and 
three companies of the king's body-gUards, whom 
he ordered to join him; and he requested, and 
obtained a promise, that General Chabran's divi-
sion, which consisted of five thousand men, and 
which was then stationed at Barcelona, should be 
erdered round to Tortosa, and placed at his dis-
posal. With sueh a force he naturally concluded 
that any resistance 'Y hich an armed peasantry 
€ould offer, would. be easily overcome; and per-
haps, had the whole of the force assembled undet 
his standard, these expectations would not have 
proved groundless.· 
Moncey reached Cuenca on the . 11th, where> 
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instead of a strong brigade of Spanish troops, 'he 
found only the skeletons of a few companies, the 
rest having deserted to join ,the cause of the in-
surgents. He was; as might be expected, both 
alarmed and disappointed at the event; and he 
wrote instantly to Madrid, to request that a 
column might move from that place upon Albacete, 
in order to cover his right. N ot satisfied with 
this, he despatched an aide-de-camp to General 
Chabran, to request that he would'instantly proceed 
to Castellar de la Plana, that he would there take 
under his orders the corps of General Requena, 
and hurry forward to reinforce his own corps. This 
done, he halted for eight days, not more to collect 
his own resources, than to enable his messengers 
to reach their several points of destination; aod 
thenhe renewed his march, which was conducted 
throughout with the utmostcaution and circlim-
spection. 
Theinsurrection at Valencia had been attended 
by ciréumstances of fearful crue1ty, hundreds oC 
innoeent French inhabitants falling a sacrifice tJ 
the fury of tbe mOD. 'But it wa-s not in this casé 
as in most others, that they who exhibit the 
greatest ferocity against people uilable to defend 
themselves, are the fitst to turn their backs,upen 
danger. The Valencians entered zealously irito 
the national cause; insomuch tlíat, not content to 
await the approach of the Prehch, they marched 
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forwarq to meet them. The first encounter took 
place at the bridge of Pajazo over the Cabriel, and 
it ended, as might have been antiéipated, in the 
defeat of the patriots. A second stand was. made 
among the mountains, in the gorge of the principal 
defile between Siete Aguas and Venta de Bunol. 
This position was occupied by two thousand regu-
lar infantry, six or seven thousand armed peasants; 
and twelve pieces of cannon; who did not give 
way without offering a resolute and lengthened 
resistance; nor was it till after he had a third 
time beaten his enemies in the field, that Marshal 
Moncey found himself in a situation to summon 
Valencia. Bu! his summons was disregarded. 
Thepeople were determined to bury themselves 
';1nder the ruins' of their city; and it consequently 
Decame' necessary to carry the place by assault. ' 
, Valencia contained, at that time, a population 
little short of one hundred thousand souIs. It 
was ,surrounded by a low stone wall, well flanked 
by towers and angles, and covered with a ditch, 
into which, fromacanal hanL 'Qy. water couldat 
any moment be admitted. There was an arsenal 
in it filled with muskets, swords, and other wea-
pons; and there were a considerable number of 
heavy cannon mounted upon the. ramparts. The 
easy rate at which Moncey had advanced, enabled 
the authorities to turn these advantages to a good 
account; and when' theFrench appeared,' the 
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city was in aÍl excellent condition to receive arid 
repelan assault. Of aH this the French were, oí 
course, ignorant; and expeéting that no serious 
ópposition would be attempted, they advanced, at 
three o'cIock in the afterÍloon of the 28th, in 
columns of attack. 
The Spaniards were now in that sítuation which 
they have invariably shown themselves best calcu-
lated to tm. Coveredby their walls, and amply 
supplied with ammuriition, they poured upon the 
assailants an incessant and heavy shower ofmusket 
and cannon balls, which swept down whole com~ 
panies of rilen, and disabled the few light pieces' 
which were opposed to it. The French dashed 
boldly up to the edge of the ditch; some of them 
even forced their way within the gates; butthe 
fire was so tremendous, and the obstacles th,rown 
in their way so insurmoun"table, that their disci-
pliried valour availed them nothing. Having kept 
their ground, under shelter of the houses in the" 
suburbs, till dark, they fell back to their camp, 
leaving behind them upwards of two thousand men, 
in killed, wounded, and missing. 
The result of this day's operations was sufficient 
to convince Marshal Moncey that any further 
attempts, with his present force, upon Valencia, 
would end only in his own destruction. He ac-
cordingly determined on a retreat; which, after 
having manreuvl'ed during the 29th so as to keep 
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the Spaniards in doubt as to his inteniions, Ile 
caTried, on the 30th, into effect. lt was high time 
for him to. adopt this measure. Several corps, 
composed partIy of regular troops, partly of .armed 
peasantry, were forming in his rear; nor was it 
tiU he had overthrown sorne of these, first on the 
han ks of the Xucar, and afterwards in the vicinity 
ofAlmanza, that he made good his entrance inta 
Albacéte. 
N ot less gratifying· to the friends of freedom was 
the defence which, much about the same time, th.e 
eity of Saragoza offered to the attempts of General 
Le Febvre ;and ha,d tt not beeu for the fatal dis-
eomfiture at Medina del Rio Seco, the Spaniards 
would have had no cause to speak with regret oí 
the issues of theÍr first campaign. But that defeat 
was asevere hlowupon the patriot cause; not 
only because it opened 3; way to Madrid to the 
sovereign whom Buonaparte had appointed, but 
because it contributed to prevent a British army 
from appearing in the field at a moment ahd 
uuder eircumstanees whieh would have rendered 
. its appearance peculiarly fortunate. It will be 
nccessary, however, before enteriJilg at all inta the 
narrative of that battle, to give, in few words,. an 
abstract of the transactions which, both iu Eng-
]und and at Bayonne,. wel'e going on with reference 
to the mighty con test. 
The Spaniards had no 800ner raised the standard 
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of independence, than they felt the necessity of 
applying to England for aid. The first deputies 
who arrived for that purpose,. were desp(i.tched by 
the. principality of the Asturias; and they-were 
followed by a successíon of envoys from other 
provinces, including -that of Seville, where the 
Supreme Junta had established itself. Their re-
ception was such as the nature of the business on 
w hich they came, and the disposition of the people 
to whom they weresuitors, might have authorised 
them to expect. AH ranks and classes of men 
appeared eager to evince their respect for the 
representatives of a nation engaged in a struggle, 
sacred, in the eyes of Englishmen, as the object 
which it sought to attain; and not the government 
only, but corporate bodies and private individuals, 
made haste to mark the sense which they enter-
tainéd of the gallantry and devotion already dis-. 
played in the contesto 
Subscriptions were opened in most of the large 
towns in the kingdom, from which considerable 
sums were realised, and applied to the service 
oí the patriots. AH the Spanish prisoners taken 
during the late war were set at liberty; and 
being armed, clothed, and equipped, they were 
transported to their native shores, that they might 
assist in the great work of liberating their count~y. 
Nor did the efforts of Great Britain end there. 
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"Large quantities of inuskéts, of cannon;balls, -p6w-
der, and othe}; military stores, were- conveyed to 
different ports of the Peninsula, for the purpose oí 
at:m'ing a population which professed to stand in 
need only of arms to instue success; whilst the 
admirals on the station, as well as the Governor of 
Gibraltar, received orders to comrnunicate with 
the Spanish autlÍorities as often as need be, and tó 
lend every assistance which the latter might re-
quire,. or the former might be able to afford. 
The Spanish deputies, acting in accordance with 
their instructions,.. had taken care to assure the 
British. government that Spain required no troops 
trpm this country> because every Spálliard capable 
9f wielding a musket was anxious" to take the field 
against the invaders. N otwithstanding these de-
clarations, the British government was too much 
alive to the important results which hung upon the 
issues of the struggle, to leavethe maintenance of 
it altogether to the undisciplined valor of the 
patriots; it determined to support them with an 
army ofBEitish soldiers;and it resolvedthat the 
force employed $hould be such as, without alarm-
ing the jealousy or wounding the pride of the pa-
triots, IDight constitute an efficient nucleus round 
which larger armies might gather. 
The first British force which showed itself UpOIl--
t)le theatre of war; consiBted of a small diviBion óf 
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infantry and artillery, detached, rinder the ordeÍ's 
ofMajor-g.eneraISpencer, from the fortress of 
Gibraltar. 
It has been stated that the authorities at horne; 
as soon as they were made aware of the state of 
public feeling in the nations of the Peninsula, 
issued orders for the cordial co-operation of the 
governor of that place, as well as the British ad~ 
mirals on the station, in any movernents against 
the French force s which might hold out.a P!o"spéct 
of success. Neithel' Admiral Collingwood, how-
ever, nor Sir Hew Dalrymple, had judged it ne-
cessary to wait the arrival of these orders. From 
the first cornmencement of disturbances iti the 
province of Seville, a constant intercourse had 
been kept up by both, with the chiefs and leaders 
of the Spanish mSllrgents; and as soon as the 
disposition rnanifested on the part of thé people 
of Cadiz became known, an armament both of 
ships and troops was prepared to support it. 
Major-general Spencer, with several English and 
two Sicilian regirnents, arnounting in aH.to about 
five thousand men, embarked on, board of a fleet 
of transports, and covered 'by the squadron of Lord 
Collingwood, set sail for Cadiz. The jointpropo..; 
sal of these officers to assist in the subjúgation of 
the French Heet was indeed declined, the Spa-
niards being confident in their (>wn resources, and 
perhaps entertaining sorne apprehension· lest the 
106 NARRATIVE OE THE 
views of the allies might extendfurther than to the 
aid proposed; but General Morla gladly av~iled 
himself of the presence of the British corps to 
cover the rear of Castanos's 'army, and to secure it 
against any attack from the side of Alentejo, whilst 
prosecuting the plan of operations on which it had 
embarked. General Spencer accordingly landed 
his division at Ayamonte, on the Guadiana. By 
this movement he caused certain reinforcements, 
which pupont had earnestly requested froro Junot, 
and which had begun their march for the pur-
pose of joining him, to fall back with precipi-
tation upoQ Lisbon; and. though he steadily re-
fu sed to' commit himselfwith the Spanish columns, 
which were gradualIy enclosing the French troops 
at Baylen, he nevertheless gave aH the additional 
vigour to theircouncils, which arose froro the' 
knowledge that, in case of any reverse, there was 
a point behind them on which they could safe)y 
faH back. 
Whilst the naval and military commanders in 
the Mediterranean were thus exerting themselves, 
an effort was made in the north, and made with 
the most complete success, to restore to the ser-
vice of his country one of the ablest officers of 
which Spain could at that time boast.One oí 
Buonaparte's first measures, when meditating the 
subjugation ofthe Peninsula, was to demand from 
S pain a corps of sixteen thousand veteran troops, 
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whom, under the Marquess de la Romana, he em-
ployed for a time upon the banks of the Vistula, 
and 'afterwards removed to tbe shores of the Great 
Belt; They were distributed at different points in 
that district, when the standard of independence 
was raised; and one of tbe earliest rneasures of 
the Supreme Junta was to issue a proclamation, 
calling upon them, in the name of their country,. 
to return to its defence. This was necessarily 
consigned to the care of the British cruisers'; and 
it was not given to thern in vain. A scherne for its 
delivery, as well as for the removal of the soldiers,. 
should they, as it was believed they would, desire 
to cornply with its terms, was immediately devised 
in London ; and the execution of it was committed 
to Vice-admiral Keats,. an officer· well worthy of 
t\le trust. lt succeeded to admiration; and seven 
tho1J$3.nd ,men, with Romana at their head,wert} 
transferred from the ranks of the enemy, and 
éldded, at a moment of peculiar interest, to those-
oí the patriot army. 
It wasnot, however, by such assistance alone,. 
that the cause of Spain and of Europe could be; 
effectually forwarded ; and to such a$sÍsta,nce. the 
Britü;h government was not disposed to limit itself. 
The wÜldom, or rather the necessity under which 
England lay, of striking a great blow, now that the-
very field of action which she had so long desired 
was opened to her, could not escape the penetra-
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tion of the most obtuse-minded; and preparations-
begari to be made for carrying on hostilities by 
land, on a"scale which had never beforebeen at-
témpted since the commericement of tbe war. 
lri tbe eiuly part óf the summer, and before any 
expectation had arisen of the events which after-
wards occurred, a corps of nine thousand men had 
assembled at Cork, under the orders of Lieutenant-
ge"neral Sir Arthmi Wellesley. Of General Wel-
lesley' s ear]y services, and of the reputation which 
he had already earned fo"r himself, it is not neces': 
sary in this place to take any notice. It is suffi-
cient to observe that there was not an officer in the 
ármy, to whom both the profession and the nation 
at large would have more readily intrusted the" 
~om!lland of a force which required courage of the 
highest order, and ability in the most extensive 
sen se of the tern:, in its direction; and that his 
past conduct, both in Europe and in India," fully 
justified all classes in the opinion which they had 
formed; whilst his nomination and selection im.., 
mortalised the judgment ofthat minister whó laid 
his name before the King for~ tlle cornmand. 
With what view the corps in question began to 
concentrate itself, was not, at the moment, accu-
rately known. By some, an attack upon" Cuba 
was spoken of as in meditation; by others, a fresh-
attempt upon Buenos Ayres was represented as 
more probable; but whatever the object might 
PENINSU LA R W A R. 109 
be which the armament was originalIy intended to 
serve, of that object the recént events in Spain 
caused an immediate abandonlI1ent. General 
Wellesley was directed t{) proeeed without 'delay 
to the assistanee of England's new ally; and as the 
northern provinces held out, in m~ny respects, the 
greatest facilities for a British force to aet with ~f­
fect, the port of Corunna was specified as a conve-
niElOt point from which to commence his opera-
tions. 
In the mean while, N apoleon was following up, 
with all the vigour of mind which so peculiarly 
distinguished him, the first steps which he had 
taken towards the, establishment of a princeof his 
own blood upon the throne of Spain. The abdi-
cation of Charles IV, and the résignation of the 
rights' of his family, weré speedily proclaimed to 
Spain, and to the world; and it was further ao-
nounced that the Emperor, anxious to iusure the 
glory and integrity of the Spanish monarchy, had 
determined to waive his own pretensions in favoÜi. 
of Joseph. King of Naples. But Napoleon was 
desirous. not only that his, brother should reig'n, 
but that he should have the appearance of reigúirig" 
over a free aÍld a conteRted people; and the cortes 
w'as, in consequence, invited to assemble. for the 
purpose of framing a constitution which might 
mSure to lhe Spaniards the' blessing' of just laws 
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and an equitable administration of thero, among all 
ranks and classes of meno 
The proeeedings of the body which, under the 
appellation of an Assembly of Notables, met toge-
tUer' in obedienee to the summons of Buonaparte, 
have been so often laid before the poblie, that to 
. repeat them here would be to waste time for very 
little putpose. Let it suffice to state that, towards 
the éndof May, and during the first days of June, 
there arrived in Bayonne upwards of ninety per-
sons, all that eould be eollected together out of 
ane hundred and sixty who had been deputed; 
that they were, with few exeeptions, men distin-
guished for their rank, their talents, or for the 
stake whieh they held in the eountry; and that, 
. llfter many moek sittings and delibel'ations, they 
aeeepted Joseph as their sovereign, and dtew up 
the charter whiehwas to form the basis of his sys-
tem of government. This done, Joseph was pro-
claimed King of Spain and the lndies in due formo 
He nominated his ministers, appointing tooffiee 
110t only those Upon whose fidelity 11e felt that he 
might depend,but· many' oIi whose aequiescenee 
in the new arrangements he tiad no right to caI-
eulate, but whom he trusted, by this show~ of 
clemency and eonsideration to gain over to his 
party; and on the 10th of JuIy, surrounded by the 
members of his eouneil, he passed the Bidassoa. 
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At the moment when Joseph. eommenced his 
journey towards Madrid, the' armies of Marshal 
Bessieres on the one hand, andofCuesta and Blake 
on the other, were executing that series of move-
ments and manreuvres which ended in the dis-
astrous battIe of Medina del Río SeGo. For some 
time previous, the northern provinces of Spain 
had been the scene of numerous skirmishes and 
encounters, to enter into arninute detail of which 
would be altogether foreign to the design of the 
present work. In the course of these, the usual 
quantity of enormities were comrnitted on both 
sides. As' often as a fewstragglers frorn the 
French army, or the French inhabitants of a 
Spanish town, feH into the hands of an enraged 
peasantry, they were put to death with circum-
stances of peculiar cruelty.; whilst tbe French 
failed' not to avenge these excesses, by giving up 
to plunder, and levelling with tbe ground, every 
town or village which ventured to oppose their 
progress. On the Iatter principIe, because a few 
hundred half-armed men presumed to defend it, 
Logrono' was severely visited; Torquemada was 
destroyed; and Palencia escaped a similar fate, 
only by.tbe haste of its dignitaries in giving 1ft 
their submission. The focus of the insurrection, 
however, was kno",n to be Valladolid, a city 
which contained upwards of twenty-five thousand 
inhabitants; and .against it Bessieres, whose head-
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quarters were established at Burgos, gave orders 
that an expedition sftould be fOl'med, 
Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, an old, brave, but 
headstrong officer,commanded, at this time, an 
assemblage of undisciplined peasantry, with whom 
he seemed determined to make a stand in defence 
of Valladolid, He was one of those who, at the 
commencement of the troubles, not only gave no 
éncouragenient to the feelings of the people, but 
exerted himself to allay them ; eitber pecause he 
was satisfied that successful resistan ce would be 
impracticable, or that in the changes which a re-
volution could not fail to bring about, many sub-
stantial benefits would accrue to the nation ¡¡.t 
large. As soon, bowever, as he became satisfied 
that it was the nation which had risen in. arms, he 
hasteried to make amends fol' his former back-
~ardness, a,nd entered heartily into the cause, 
which he now regarded as thatof his country. It 
was somewhat remarkable that Cuesta was among 
the number of those who held office both under 
Ferdinand and under Joseph. By the former he 
had been appointed captain-general of Castile and 
Leon, an authority which he actually exercised; 
whilst by the lattel' hewas nominated to the vice-
royalty of Mexieo, at the very moment w,hen his 
~ettel' judgment led him to draw the sword against 
the power which desired to promote him. 
General Cuesta, with bis half-armed rabble. 
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took up a position at Cabezon, about two leagues 
from Valladolid. He was attacked there on the 
12th of JUlle by two divisions of the Frencharmy, 
011e under General Lassalle, the' other under Ge-
neral MerIe; and after a short but warm con test, 
was dislodged and overthrown, with the loss of an 
his cannon, and nearly one thousand meno The 
immediate consequences of this victory were, not 
only the submission of Valladolid to the conque-
rors, but the occupation of Santander; the latter 
being a place of which they were peculiarly jea-
IDus, because of its excellent harbour. But 
Cuesta,thóugh defeated, was far from heing dis-
couraged. He withdrew with the remains of his 
force to Benevente; where he employed himself 
in raising new levies, and in giving sorne appear~ 
ance of organisation to tllose which were already 
enroI¡ed under his standard. 
It was not long before intelligence reached 
Bessieres, not only that Cuesta's troops were re-
assembling, but that a considerable army which 
had been formed under Blake, in the province of 
Gallicia, was about to advance against him. Bes.;. 
sieres issued orders for the concentration of an his 
forces at Palencia, with the exception of three 
battalions, which were left to protect Santander, 
and a like number af Vittoriá, to keep open the 
communication with France. . He himself, like-
wise, prepared to take the field; and having 
VOL. l. H 
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learned that Cuesta and Blake were actua11y in 
conjunction, and that they had taken up a posi-
tion at Medina del Rio Seco, he set out, on the 
13th of July, for· the purpose of bringing them to 
action. 
The battle of Medina del Río Seco was fought 
on tbe 14th of July. It ended, as the reader 
knows, in the utter rout of the Spaniards; over 
whom, however, the victory was not won, till all 
the energies of the conquerors had be en brought 
into play, and a heavy 1088 sustained, in killed and 
wounded, on both sides. Tbe Spaniards appear, 
even by the confession of their enem}es, to have 
fought well on, tbat day; and their defeat may be . 
attributed, rather to a want of judgment in their 
1eaders, than to any absence of courage among the 
troops. Yet were the issues of the struggle of 
the most disastrous nature. Fifteen pieces of 
cannon, and upwards of six thousand men, were 
1eft upon the fie1d; wbilst the road was coro-
plete1y laid open to the invaders as far as the capital. 
But even these, though heavy calamities, were not 
a11 which may be traced back to the defeat at Rio 
Seco. It was at this unlucky moment that the 
British army, destined to support the patriot cause, 
set sail froro the harbour of Cork; and its General 
reached Corunna only in time to be told that there 
was no longer a fleld fol' its operations in the north 
of Spain. 
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The army in q uestion having completed its ar 
rangements, put to sea on the 12th of July. Afte 
continuing with the fleet only a few hours, Si 
Arthur Wellesley, who was embarked in a fast 
sailing frigate, hastened on, and arrived at Co· 
runna on the 20th. He lost no time in opening ! 
correspondence wíth the junta of Gallicia, fron 
whom he reeeived the distressing intelligence o 
the overthrow of their army; and by whom hf 
was assured that, the enemy being now in pos· 
session of the course of the' Douro, all communica· 
tion between that provine e and those to thE: 
south and east, was cut off. There is reason te 
believe that in this dilemma, and because the~ 
still persisted in believing that Spain stood in n<J 
need of men, but of arms and money only, they 
recommended to him the propriety of effeeting a 
debarkation somewhere in Portugal, and aeting in 
conjunction with the insurgents there against the 
corps of Marshal Junot; and as the advice ac-
corded perfectIy with the tenor of his instructions j 
as well perhaps as with his own views, Sir Arthur 
prepared to adopt it. Having supplied the Galli· 
cians with 200,000l. in money, and assured thero 
of the speedyarrival of a large quantity of military 
stores, he once more put to sea; and directing hi~ 
own fleet to follow him thither, made at once fOl 
the harbour of Oporto. 
Of the polítical condition in which Portugal 
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then stood, a few words will suffice to convey to 
the mind of the readei- a tolerably accurate idea. 
The discontent which has been represented in a 
former'chapter, as prevailing among aH ranks of 
men, increased in violence every day, till it be-
carne manifest to every observer that a general 
insurrection was at hand. It was not, however, 
till the whole of Spain was in arms, nor indeed 
till the Spanishtroops which accompanied Junot's 
army had set them the example, thatthe Portu-
gu~se ventured to raise the standard ofrevolt; but 
when it was raised, the same spirit of persevérance 
-the same determination to live or die in free-
dorri, which was already in the full exercise of its 
energies among their neighbours, appeared every-
where to animate them. 
N otwithstanding the numerous .private quarrels 
which arose in parts of the kingdom, and the' occa-
sional bursts of hatred against the intruders which 
from time to time showed themselves both in the 
capital and elsewhere, J unot persisted in repre-
seriting-perhaps in believing-that the Portu-
guese were brought completely into subjection, 
till the delusion became suddenly dispelled ina 
manner which w~s far from being satisfactory. 
In the' month of June two detachments, to consist 
of four thousand men each, were demanded from 
the army of Portugal; one for the purpose of 
supporting Bessieres by the occupation of Ciudad 
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Rodrigo; the other to co-op~rate with Dupont in 
taking possession of Andalúsia. The first of these, 
under Loison, having advanced as far as Rodrigo, 
and finding the whole country in arms, and the 
gates of the place shut, suspended its operations, 
and fell back; the second under Avril, was not 
more fortunate in its undertakings. Badajoz had 
declared for King Ferdinand; the whole of the 
frontier was in arms; and the Spaniards and Por-
tuguese, ofwhom a considerable number were at~ 
tached to his division, deserted by ",hole compa-
nies. Besides, General Spencer, with his five 
thousand English, lay between him and the point 
which he had been ordered to reach, and General 
Avril abandoned his enterprise. Bufsuch misfor-
tunes were trifling when compared to others which 
shortIy followed. 
N () great while ehipsed before the agents of the 
Supreme Junta found means to communicate both 
to the Spanish corps, which, Ululer Quesnel, occu-
pied Oporto, and to Caraffa'sdivision in Lisbon, 
the course which events had taken both at Ba-
yonne and Madrid. The intelligence was received 
by the troops with the utmost indignation. In 
Oporto, they rose at once upon the General; ar-
rested him with his staff and his escort; and hav-
ing given up the city into the hands of the munici-
pal authorities, marched away to join their coun-
trymen in Gallicia. ,In Lisbon they were only 
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prevented from adopting a similar course by the 
promptitude and decision of J unot. InstantIy on 
the news froro Oporto being reported tohim, he 
caused the whole of Caraffa's corps to be arrested 
and disarmed; and putting them on board of cer-
. tain hulks which lay at anchor in the· Tagus, he 
kept them there as prisoners. But the ímpetus 
to a general revolt was given; the match was al-
ready laid to the train, and no exertions on the 
part of the French functionaries could hinder it 
from exploding. 
On the first impulse of the moment, the autho-
rities at Oporto cast Quesnel into prison, tore 
down the French flag, and hoisted the national 
standard in ¡ts place. By degrees, however, they 
became alarmed at. the boldness of their own pro-
ceedings; and seeing themselves deserted by the 
Spaniards, they began to devise schemes for avert-
ing the vengeance of the French General. Don 
Luiz d'Oliveira, ¡nto whose hands the temporary 
power had been intrusted, betrayed that trust so 
far as to write, in terms unworthy of a Portuguese, 
to Junot, and to· restore the tri-coloured flag to its 
former position; whilst he endeavoured, by various 
acts of kindness . towards the French, to make 
amends for the violence which they had suffered 
a few days before. But a spirit had gone abroad 
in other quarters, which soon renewed in the in-
habitants of Oporto that hatred of their oppressors 
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of which they had already given sorne proof; and 
the cry of " Death to the French-Long live the 
Regent!" resounded through the streets. These 
cries were speedily followed by a second decla-
ration ofindependence. Oliveira was put to death; 
and a junta having formed itself, in imitation of 
ihat of Seville, proceeded, with the venerable 
bishop at its head, to issue proclamations, and to 
call upon all good Portuguese to unite against the 
common enemy. 
The appeal of the junta was heard through ... 
out the whole kingdom; and it was everywhere 
obeyed. The students at the University of Coim-
bra were among" the first to take up arms; the 
peasantry of Tras os Montes were not less on the 
alert; Algarves was in open revolt, and the Alen-
tejo ripe for insurrection. That which he had long 
apprehended, Junot saw at length in progress, and 
proceeding with a violence and energy which 
threatened to set all endeavours to suppress it at 
defiance; but Junot was not aman to succumb 
under difficulties, however imminent. He set 
himself vigorously to the task of allaying the 
. general ferment; and he applied to that object 
not force alone, but all the expedients of flattering 
harangues and conciliatory measures. 
Bis first act ",as to remit what had not heen 
paid of the contribution formerly imposed upon 
the people. He next affected to take the Portu-
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guese troops under his especial care, augmenting 
thcir pay, discharging their arrears, and appearing 
to place the utmost reliance upon their fidelity 
andvalour; and hedid his best to amuse the in-
habitantsof Lisbon," by a renewal of the proces-
sions and religious festivals to which they had in 
former tim€s be en accUstomed. Butwhilst he 
pursued this course in h:is more general measures, 
he was not.· unmindful .of the policy of striking 
terror by particular examples; and he set on foot 
a rnultitude of separate expeditions, with the view 
of crushing the rebeHion in each of the towns or 
districts where it rnjght appear to rage with the 
greatest violence. On that errand Loison, who 
had returned to Lisbon, was despatched against 
Oporto, at the head of three battalions of infantry 
and several squadrons of horse; Thornieres was . 
directed to reduce Fort N azareth; whilst Keller-
man . was sent to insure the obedience of Villa 
Franca, Alcoentre, and Alcoba~a. These are but 
a few of the expeditions which the Duke of Abran-
tes found it necessary to fit out,.of which sorne 
were áttended with mornentary. success, whilst 
others entirely failed. But even the successes of 
the French proved of little solid utility to thero. 
As long as an arrned force was at hand, to oppose 
which no rneans existed, a town, or village, or 
even a district, would remain quiet,-the ver y 
next instant aner the troops were withdrawn, aH 
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became again tumult and commotion. Junot saw 
and felt his embarrassments keenly; but the 
moment was now rapidly approaching which pro-
mised to bring these difficulties to a head. Ru-
rnours were in hourly circulation of the coming of 
a British arrny, and at last it was officially corn- . 
municated that a British arrny had landed. 
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CHAPTER V. 
ArrivaI of Sir Arthúr Wellesley at Oporto-His cOllferencc 
with the junta-The transports assemble off Mondego,and 
the troops are landed- Strange conduct of General Freire 
and the Portuguese army-Junot takes measures to oppose 
the progress of the English, and calls in his detachments-
Delaborde retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley-Battle of 
Loris:a-Arrival of General Anstruther on the coast-March 
of the British army toVimiero-Sir Harry Burrard arrives 
in the offing-Is visited by General Wellesley; but refuses 
to sanction an advance~The British attacked by Junot's 
army-Bat~le of Vimiero. 
SIR AR'fHUR W ELLESLEY, as soon as he had c1osE'd. 
his corresponden ce with the junta of Gallicia, and 
directed the transports which conveyed his troops 
to rendezvous at the rnouth of the Mondego, pro-
ceeded in person to Oporto, for the purpose of 
arranging sorne plan of campaign with the govern-
ment of that place, or, as it then termed itself, the 
Suprerne Junta of Portugal. He was received by 
the bishop, as head of the body, with every ap-
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pearance of cordiality; and all the supplies of dif-
ferent kinds of which he stood in need, including 
draft cattle of various descriptions, were readily 
promised to him; but when he proposed to effect 
a landing there, and to co-operate with the gar-
rison in a movement upon the capital, a variety of 
objections were started to the measure. lt was 
suggested that, by landing on sorne part of the 
coast nearer to Lisbon, Junot might be attacked 
beforeall or even most of his detachments, at that 
moment scattered through the country, could be 
called in; whilst the Portuguese in Oporto would 
be ready to intercept his retreat, in case .he should 
endeavour to make any movement towards Gal-
licia. How far Sir Arthur was swayed by this 
reasoning, it would be presuming to pronounce; a 
communication from Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, 
it is' believed, determined him to seek a point of 
landing elsewhere; and he followed his transports 
to the appointed place of meeting in Mondego 
Bay. 
On his arrival there, he found that important 
despatches from England were waiting for him. 
By these, he was informed that fresh troops 
might be expected to join bis army every moment; 
one division being aIread y embarked at Ramsgate 
under Brigadier-general Anstruther, whilst ano-
ther was assembling at Harwich; but it was at 
the same time intimated to him that Sir Hew 
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Dalrymple had received orders to proceed from 
Gibraltar in the character of commander-in-chief ; 
Sir Harry Burrard had been nominated as second ; 
and Sir Jobn Moore, who had just returned" from 
the Baltic with a corps of ten thousand men, was 
likewise to serve in Portugal. In spite of these 
arrangements, however, Sir Arthur was enjoined 
to make good his landing, whenever a favourable 
opportunity should offei-, and to enter at once 
upon any series of operations, for the successful 
accomplishment of which he might judge himself 
sufficiently strong. 
In obedience to these instructions; and having 
conferred with Sir Charles Cotton, General Wel-
les ley issued orders for the immediate disembark-
ation of his "corps at the mouth of the Mondego. 
A fast-sailingvessel was" at the same time des-
patched, to require the immediate junction of 
General Spencer and his division;" and every 
arrangement háving been made, the landing 
began. A strong west wind and a violent surf 
rendered this both a tedious aúd "a perilous opera-
tion, several boats being swamped, and sorne men, 
both sailors and soldiers~ perishing among the 
breakers; but after fourdays of severe fatigue, 
the force was diseníbarked', incIuding the" division 
of General Spencer, which arrived just as thelast 
divisit)U began to"leave their" transports. The 
whol€ British ar"niy, amounting; to rather more 
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than thirteen thousand men, bivouacked on the 
8th of August on the beach. 
Whilst the British force was thus employed, 
General Bernardin Freire arrived. at Coimbra with 
about seven thousand infantry and six hundred 
cavalry of the Portuguese army, for the purpose 
of joining and co-operating with Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley. These were, for the most part, wretchedly 
armed, and their discipline had attained to no 
higher degree of excellence, than usually attends 
raw levies suddenly called out, and as snddenly 
embodied; they were not therefore likely to add 
much to the real strength, whilst they would draw 
heavily upon the supplies of the invaders. N e-
vertheless, as it was advisable upon political 
grounds that the Portuguese should accompany 
the English in their present undertaking, it was 
arranged between the Generals, that both .corps 
should move in the direction of the capital, and 
that they should form a junction on the 11th or 
12th at the town of I. .. eira. 
In ¡lccordance with this arrangement, the ad-
vanced-guard of Sir Arthur's army began its 
march on the 9th of August. It consisted of 
some companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th 
regiments, supported by the brigades of Major-
general Hill and Major-general Ferguson; and it 
was followed on the day after by the ",hole of the 
corps. The men marched with sixty rounds of 
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arnmunition in their cartouch-boxes, and provi-
sions of meat, biscuit, &c. in their haversacks, 
sufficient for the consumption of three days; and 
the column was followed by a string of mules, 
bearing stOl'es of every kind. N o troops ever took 
the field in higher spirits, or in a state of moré 
perfect discipline. Confident in their leader, 
likewise, and no less confident in thernselves, 
th~y desired nothing more ardently than to behold 
their enemy: for even thus early in the war, it 
was the custom of a British soldier to admit of no 
apprehensions as to the issue of a battle. The 
entire strength of the corps made up barely thir-
teen thousand three hundred men; there were 
attached to it two hundred cavalry of the 20th" 
1ight dragoons; and -its artillery muste red in aH 
eighteen pieces. 
The troops arrived in Leira, without having met 
with any opposition, on the 11th and 12th, and 
they were received by the inhabitants with enthu-
siastic rapture, as by persons who had long groaned 
under oppression, and at last beheld their de-
liverers. On the same day, General Freire's corps 
made its appearance; but the General himself had 
lost that zeal for sharing in the glorious enterprise 
before them, which seemed to animate him during 
his late conference with Sir Arthur Wellesley; 
He begao by doubting whether it would be prac-
ticable to find supplies for both armies 00 the same 
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1ine of march; and he ended by requiring, as the 
pl'ice of his adherence to the British standard, that 
Sir Arthur Wellesley should subsist hiro ando his 
troops from the stores of the English commissary. 
This was a dernand with which the English Gene-
ral could not, of course, comply. He represented 
that his army, fresh from a voyage, and Hable to 
be separated at any moment from its ships, instead 
of being able to furnish provisions to the troops 
of the country, ,would, in all probability, be com-
pelled to draw upon the country for its own sup-
pIies; and he expressed his astonishment that any 
such unreasonable expectation should have be en 
formed. The discussion was maintained for sorne 
time with much forbearance on the side of Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, and with a degree oí obstinacy 
on that of Freire, for which it was not very easy to 
account; and it ended at length in the latter de-
cIaring his determination to withdraw himself en-
tirely from all share in the intended series of 
operations. With sorne difficulty he was prevailed 
upon to leave a brigade of infantry and two hun-
dred and fifty horse with the British army; but 
the remainder he positively prohibited froro moving. 
N otwithstanding this exhibition of the kind of 
aid which he roight expect from his allies, Sir Ar-
thur determined to lose no time in prosecuting the 
undertaking which he had begun. From all ap-
prehensions on the side of Spain, the inteIligence 
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of the vietory of Baylen, and of the consequent 
flight of Joseph from Madrid, completely freed 
him; and he still hoped, notwithstanding the well-
known activity of the Freneh generals, that he 
might be enabled to engage J unot before Loison 
should have had time to join him. U nder this 
persuasion, he renewed his march on the 13th, and 
on the 14th reached Alcoba~a, the enemy having 
evacuated it during the preceding night; and on 
the 15th his head-quarters were established at 
Caldas. 
It has be en said that, at the moment when in-
telligence of the landing of the British army 
reaehed Marshal J unot, his troops were scattered 
o'Ver many districts of Portugal. with the view of 
extin"guishing, as fast as they appeared, the first 
spal."ks of rebellion, and putting in a state of de-
fence such fortified posts as remained in the hands 
of the Freneh. Among other generals, Loison and 
ThomieresJ each with his division, had departed 
from Lisbon-the former, for the purpose of quiet-
ing the Alentejo, and relieving Elvas, already 
blockaded by the Spaniards; the latter, to over-
a'Ve Coimbra, and reduce Fort Nazareth. Of 
these, Thomieres was illstantly recalled; and his 
brigade being added to that of General Delaborde, 
the latter officer was directed to ad vanee towards 
Mondego, that he might watch the movements of 
the English, and, as far as he was able, retard 
PENINSULAR WAlt. 129 
their progress. General Loison was likewise 
called in, Junot urging him by letter, when pro-
posing to bombard Badajoz, " to abandon all 
his projects, and to hasten, without delay, to 
Abrantes." But though he made every possible 
exertion, leaving behind him multitudes of sick 
and weary' whom he found it impossible to drago 
along, he failed in joining Delaborde in sufficient 
time to prove of any essential service; for Dela-
borde, in obedience to the orders of his chíef, 
marched down at the head of five or six thousand 
men towards the coast. As the English advanced, 
he gradually feH back, manifesting, however, no 
disinc1ination to risk an action, whenever the 
nature of the ground should authorise the measure; 
and it was not long before a fitting opportunity 
presented itself. lt was the rear-guard of his 
coluinn which retired from Caldas on the evening 
preceding the day of Sir Arthur Wellesley's al':" 
rival; and on the following morning the two 
armies were in sight of one another. 
A trifling skirmish had occurred at Obidos on 
the 15th, between four companies of British rifle-
men and the French outposts, in which sorne lives 
were lost on both sides, and no very deeided ad-
vantage obtained on either. On the 16th, again, 
all was quiet; Sir Arthur devoting that day to thé 
arrangement of his own plans, and to the institu-
tion of striet and aeeurate inquiries as to the 
,"OL. I. I 
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situatioll of General Loison. He likewise recon· 
noitred the position which General Delaborde had 
assumed, and found it to be one of extraordinary 
strength and diffieu1ty; indeed, its seleetion re-
Hected the highest eredit upon the military talents 
ofthat officer, as the following tolerably ac(mrate 
deseription of its-loeality may serve to proveo 
The villages of Caldas and Rolj~a are built 
110rth and south from eaeh other, at the opposite 
extremities of an immense valley, which opens out 
largely towards the west; and midway betweeu 
them stand s the littJe town of Obidos, with its 
splendid aqueduct and its Moorish castle. Rolip 
itself erowns an eminenee, which again is Hanked 
on the oue hand by a range of hilIs, on the other 
by rugged mountains; by the very mountains,. in-
deed, which bend round to girdle in the vale 01' 
basin, of which notice has just been taken. lm-
mediately in front of it there is a sandy plain, not, 
perhaps, in the strictest meaning of the term, 
woody, but studded with low firs and other 
shrubs; and in its real' are four 01' five passes, 
which lead through the mountains. This was the 
situation in which Delaborde saw fit to await 
the approaeh of th~ English army. His outposts, 
driven in from Obid08, extended now along the 
plain to the hi118 on both sides of the valley; and 
bis line was Cormed on the high ground in front of 
the village, so as that both its flanks might rest, 
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one upon the mountains, the. other upon a steep 
eminence. Of his force it is not easy to speak 
with confidence, the writers of different nations 
having made different estimates.of it; but by Sir 
Arthur Wellesley it was computed at six thousand 
men; and there i8 no reasan to believe that his 
judgment was formed on mistaken grounds. Be 
this, however, as it may, there it stood presenting 
a bold front to its enemies; and' covering the 
" passes by which, in· case of a reverse, its retreat 
might at any moment be made good, or a new 
position seized in the mountains. 
Every necessary ordér having been iEsued, and 
every man made aware on the evening of the 16th 
of the business in which he was about to be em-
ployed, the troops on the following morning stood 
to their arms; and just as day began to dawn, 
marched from the bivouac in three columns of 
attack. 'rhe !'ight column, which consisted of 
twelve hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Por-
tuguese horse, was directed to make a considera-
ble detour, and to penetrate into the mountain8~ 
for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; it was 
then to wheel up, and bear down with all its 
weight upon the real' of Delaborde's lineo The 
. left column again, consisting of two brigades of 
British infantry-those of Major.general Ferguson 
and Brigadier-general Bowes; three companies 
of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, twenty 
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B,ritísh and twenty Portuguese horse, reeeived 
orders to ascend the hilIs at Obidos, to drive in all 
the enemy's posts on that side of the valley, and to 
turn his right to Roli~a. It was at the same time 
directed to watch the motions of General Loison, 
of whose arrival at Rio Major, on the preceding 
nÍght, intelligence had been obtained; and in. case 
he should come up, to engage him before he should 
have had an opportunity of communicatíng with 
Delaborde. The centre colurnn again, which was 
composed of four brigades, namely, Major-general 
Hill's, Brigadier-general Crawford's, Brigadier-
general Nightingale's, and Brigadier-general Fane's, 
together with four hUlldred Portuguese light infan-
try, the remainder of the British and Portuguese 
cavalry, a brigade of nine and a brigade of six-
pounders, had it in charge to attack the enemy in 
front. 
As the distance between Caldas and Roli~a falls 
not short of three leagues, the morning was consi-
tlerably advanced before the troops arrived witbin 
musket-shot of the French outposts. N othing 
could exceed the orderly and gallant style in 
which they traversed the intervening space. The 
day chanced to be .remarkabl y fine, and the scenery 
through which the columns passed was varied and 
striking; but they were themselves by fat the 
most striking feature in tbe whole panorama. 
'Whcl'ever any broken piece of ground 01' other 
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natural obstacle carne in the way, the head of the 
column having passed it, would pause till the rear 
had recovered its order, and resumed its station ; 
and then the whole would press forward with the 
same attention to distances, and the same orderly 
silence, which are usually preserved at a review. 
At last, however, the enemy's line became visible, 
and in a few minutes afterwards the skirmishers 
were engaged. The centre divisioll now broke 
into different eolumns of battalions; that on the 
left pressed on with a quick pace, whilst the rifle-
men on the fight drove in, with great gallantryand 
in rapid style, the tirailleurs who were opposed to 
them. At this moment General Ferguson's column 
was seen descending the hills, and moving rapídly 
in a directioll to cut off the enemy's retreat. But 
Delaborde was not !'lO incautious as to permit that. 
The"posts which covered his position 011 the plain 
beiug all carried, he lost no time in abandoning it, 
and withdrew his troops, in excellent order, and 
with great celerity, into the passes. It was 
evident, indeed, that to the gorges of these passes 
he had an along looked, as furnishing him with 
the most advantageous battle-ground; for he in-
stantly assumed a new position there, and pre-
sented a front more formidable than ever, because 
more than ever protected by the inequalities of the 
ground froro the approach of the assailants. 
U nder these circurnstances, it became nece"s-
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sary, in some degree, to alter the plan of attack. 
Five separate columns were now formed, to each 
of which was committed the task of carrying a 
pass; but as the ground was peculiarly difficult, 
and the openings extremely narrow, no more than 
five British battalions, a few companies of British 
1ight infantry, and the brigade of Portuguese, 
could be brought into play. The following lS 
the order in which this second assault was ar-
ranged :-
The Portuguese infantry were directed to move 
up a pass on the right of the whole line, through 
the pass next on the right to which the light com-
panies of General Hill's brigade, supported by the 
5th regiment, were commanded to penetrate. The 
office of forcing the third pass was committed to 
the 29th- and 9th regiments; the fourth became 
the province of the 45th regiment; aud the fifth 
fell to the lot of the 82nd. Than these passes, it 
is not easy to imagine any ground capable of pre-
senting more serious obstacles to an assault, ol' 
more easy of a desperate defence. They were not 
only overhung on either hand by rocks and groves,. 
among which skirmishers might lie secure, and do 
terrible execution with their fire; but as the troops 
advanced, they carne upon spaces rough with myr-
tles and other shrubs; which unavoidably .de-
ranged . their order, at the same time that they fur-
nlshed admirable cover to the enemy. This was 
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particularly the case in that pass which the 29th 
and 9th regiments had been directed to carry; and 
the enemy were not remiss in making the most of 
their advantages. Having permitted the column 
to go on, almost unmolested, till the leading com-
panies wel'e within a few yards of the myrtle grove, 
the French suddenly opened a fire~ both from the 
front and flanks, which nothing but the most de-
termined bravery on the partof .the British troops 
could have resisted. As may be imagined, the 
advanceofthe column was for a moment checked; 
but it was only for a momento Colonel Lake, who 
led the attack, waving his 'hat in his hand, called ·on 
the men to follow; they answered the call with a 
spirit-stirring cheer, and dashed on. But the 
enemy were full ofconfidence in themsel ves and 
in their position, andthey disputed every inch,of 
grotind; nor was it till after a considerable los8 
had been sustained, ineluding the gallant officer 
who had so far conducted them to victory, that the 
29th succeeded in crowning the plateau. 
Thei were not yet formed in line, and the 9th 
was still entangled in the pass, when a French 
battalion advanced boldly tocharg'e them. The 
enemy were met with the same spirit which they 
themselves exhibited, and the slaughter was ver y 
reat . on both sides; but the charge was re-
pulsed. It was renewed in a few minutes after 
hy' increased numbers; fol' the columns which 
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were ascending the other passes being fal' in the 
rear, the Fr~nch were enabled to bring the great 
mass of their force to bear upon this point; but the 
gallant 9th was now at hand to aid their com-
rades; and the enemy were again driven back 
with much slaughter. Nor was an opportunity 
afforded them of repeating their efforts; for the 
heads of different columns began to show them-
selves, and tbe position was carried at an points. 
The enemy accordingly drew off his troops, and 
began to retire, though in excellent order. Se~'e­
ral efforts were made to harass him as he feH 
back, as well by the ligbt infantry as by the 
cavalry; but his superiority in the latter arm, as 
well as the nature of the country, rendered these 
of little avail. He made good his retreat, leaving 
behind him three pieces of cannon, and about a 
thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing. 
Sir Arthur Wellesley having followed the ene-
rny as fal' as Villa Verde, on the road to Torres 
Vedras, halted for the night. On the following 
morning the pursuit was about to be renewed, 
and it seemed as if no check would be given to 
the ardour of the troops, ti11 they should have won 
a second victory, and established themselves in 
Lisbon, when the arrival of a messenger at head-
, 
quarters caused a suspension of the orders already 
issued. This person was the bearer of despatches 
from Brigadier-general Anstruther, who, with a 
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Iarge fleet of store-ships, and a reinforcement of 
troops, was now at anchor off the townof Pe-
niche. As it was no doubt a matter of the first 
importance to bring these reinforcements into the 
line without delay, Sir Arthur resolved to move 
in such a direction as would at 'once insure their 
landing, and facilitate their ready junction with 
his corps. With this view he directed the head 
of his column towards Lourinho, which· place he 
reached that evening, and on the following day 
took up a position near the village of Vimiero. 
The point at which General Anstruther's bri-
gade was directed to land, was on a sandy beach 
at the mou th of the' Maceira. There the disem-
barkation accordingly took place, but amidst dif. 
ficuIties of 110 ordinary 11ature; for the surf ran 
tremendously high; and flying bocEes of the ene-
my's' cavalry hove red about, as if with the design 
of cutting off each detachment as it stepped on 
shore. The skill and perseverance of the seamen, 
however, triumphed over the former of these dan-
gers; one or two boats only being swamped, and 
about half a dozen men losing their lives; and 
against the latter, the vigila11ce and good order of 
the troops themselves offered defence e11ough. 
The whole were got 011 shore at an early hour on 
the 20th; and 110011 had barely passed when they 
took their station along with part of Generar 
Spencer's brigade, in the advance. 
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On the very day which saw this division joiri. 
bis army, 1t was announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley 
that General A ucland was in the offing; and before 
dark, Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira Roads. 
Sir Arthur 10st no time in opening a communication 
with that officer. He went on board of thefrigate 
in which he was embarked the same night, laid be-
fore him a statement of affairs as they then stood, 
and ente red into a minute detail of the plans which 
he had himself formed, and which he was already 
prepared to carry into effect. He represented to 
him the wisdom of resuming the offensive, whilst 
the British troops were yet flushed with their recent 
victory, and the enemy. distracted and disheart-
ened; and he proposed to move on the following 
morning tooccupy Mafra, and to turn the position 
whichhe understood that the French had taken up 
along the heights of Torres Yedras. Whatever 
were real1y the objections to a plan so bold, and 
yet so judicious, Sir Harry Burrard saw many. He 
urged, in the first place, tha~ since Sir John Moore's 
corps might be reasonably expected on the coast in 
the course ora few days at the farthest, it would 
'be more prudent to remain quietIy where they 
were tillit shouldhave actually arrived; in the 
next place, that the army was sadly in want of 
cavalry, and that the horses which dragged the 
guns were represented as being of the 'worst de-
scription. Then again there was a risk 'of losing 
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thei¡' f3upplies, in case they should diverge far froro 
the shipping. It was in vain that Sir Atthur 
pointed out, in reply to aH this, the irnpossibility 
of remaining quiet; beeause, if they did not ad-
vanee to attack the enemy, the enemy would 
surely advance to attaek them. It was in vain 
that he represented the great advantage which 
would al'ise, were Sir John Moore's ~orps to land 
in the Mondego, and rnarch upon Santarem, thus 
cutting off the enemy's retreat both by Alrneida 
and Elvas, Sir Harry Burrard's mind was made 
up. He would sanction no rash rnovement with a 
force as yetineornplete in every one of its branches; 
and as the senior offieer, his will eould not be dis-
puted, Sir Arthur returned to theeamp that 
night, and the very next day gave arnple proof.~ 
that he had not erred in one,· at least, of bis antiei-
pations, 
Whilst Delaborde was executing the ordel's 
which he had received, and watehing and retard-
ing the progress of the English in a style worthy of 
his well-earned reputation, Junot was straining 
every nerve to bring into the field a force eapáble 
of sustaining, with sorne prospeet of success,a 
general action with the British arrny. With this 
view, the garrisons of Lisbon, and of the forts in its 
neighbourhood, were drained of every rnan WhOlll 
it was deemed prudent to withdraw ;and the 
corps of Loison, Thornieres, aneI Kellerman, and 
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latterly of Delaborde himself, received orders to 
concentrate, withou"t delay, in the position of Torres 
Yedras. The concentration too k place during the 
18th and 19th, and on the 20th the army was ar· 
ranged into divisions and brigades. Of the former 
there were two; one of which was given to Dela-
borde, the other to Loison; whilst Kellerman took 
charge of the reserve, composed entirely of grena-
diers. 
These arrangements being complete, Junot im-
mediately advanced towards Vi mi ero, where he 
had heard that the British army was encamped. 
The village of Vimiero stand s in themidst of a 
beautiful valley, through which the Maceira flows, 
at the distance of about three miles, or something 
less, from the sea. On either side the hilIs rise to 
a considerable altitude, particularly towards the 
north, where a chain of detached heights rear 
themselves, with striking abruptness, out of the 
pIain. Over the ridges of these runs the high-
road, through the hamlets of Fontanel and Ven toza 
to Lourinho; and on the eastern side is a deep 
ravine, at the bottom of which stands the village of 
Toledo. On the north-east of Vimiero, again. 
there is a sort of table-Iand, covered in part with 
shrubs, and in part bare, which commands all the 
approaches from the side of Torres Ved ras ; and 
which is itself commanded in rear, and towards 
the west, by a mass of mountains that occupY the " 
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whole space between the left bank of the Maceira 
and the sea. Such was the nature of the ground 
along which the British army now lay in bivouac ; 
its arrangements in detail were these ;-
The greater part of the infantry, including the 
1 st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, with 
eight pieces ofartillery, were posted upon the mass 
of mountains just described; on the south-eastern 
hill, again, or table-Iand, Brigadier-general Fane 
and Brigadier-general Anstruther took their sta-
tions; the former with his riflemen and the 50th 
regiment, the latter with his whoIe brigade; and 
they were supported by half a brigade of nine-
pounders and half a brigade of sixes, which had 
been sent to them during the night. The high 
road to Lourinho, however, and the heights which 
it crosses,can hardly be said to have be en occu-
pied' at all, only a single picket keeping guard 
there; because no water being in the neighbour-
hood, and Sir Arthur not intending to continue OH 
his ground longer than till daylight should enable 
him to quit it, he did not esteem it necessary to 
place anynumber of troops in a situation where 
so many inconveniences must attend them. But 
the village itself was fulIy occupied; the reserve~ 
both of artiIlery and cavalry, being stationed 
there. 
Marshal J unot quitted his position at Torres 
Ved ras soon after nightfall on the 20th;- and hav-
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ing executed a tedious and difficuIt march, throug'h 
narrow defiles, arrived, about seven o'dock in the 
¡norning, within a league and a half of theBritish 
outposts. The ground which he occupied was, 
however, complctely hidden from the view of the 
English. He was accordingly enabIed to form his 
coIumns of attack unseen; nor was it ti11 a con-
siderable mass of cavalry had deployed immedi-
ately in front of the picket which observed the 
Lourinho road, that on the part of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley an action was anticipated. But Sir Arthur, 
who was never taken by surprise, perceived -in a 
moment that the principal attack would be di-
rected where he had most cause to apprehendit, 
and where his line' was most unq uestionably the 
weakest: he ordered the brigades of Generals 
Ferguson, Nightingale, Aucland, and Bowes, suc-
cessively to cross the ravine, and long before the 
first shot had been fired at the outposts, his left 
was secure. 
The enemy carne on in two powerful columns, 
supported and flanked by weaker bodies; the 
right, which consisted of about six thousand men, 
moving, upon the Lourinho road; the left, of about 
-Q.ve thousand, directing its efforts against the table 
land. The first onset of both was, as the first 
onset of Fre~ch troops always is, extrcmely impe-
tuous; insomuch that, on the left of the table 
land, the skirmislters .were fairly driven in, and 
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the head of the advancing column presented itself¡ 
almost without a check, in front of the 50th regi ... 
mento The 50th, which was drawn up in line~ 
permitted the enemy to approach till scarcely 
twenty yards divided them; and then pouring in 
a well-directed volley" made ready to charge. The 
enemy stood, for a moment, as if determined to 
await the shock; but the bayonets of the British 
corps were hardly crossed, when they began to 
waver; and befare the rush was made, they broke 
and Hed. Almost at the saine instant, the 2nd 
battalion of the 43rd found itself vigorously at-
tacked in the town of Vimiero by a lesser column, 
which Hanked the greater. The 43rd had thrown 
part of its body into the church-yard> whilst part 
filled the houses, and covered the road ""hich led 
to it; and it firmly met and bravely repel1ed every 
effort which was made to dislodge it. A similar 
result attended the attack which took place upon 
the extreme left of the British line, which was 
condueted with eonspicUDUS gallantry by General 
Delaborde .. It was repelled with immense slaugh-
ter, chieHy by the exertions of the 97th and 52nd 
regiments. 
In the mean while a tremendous eontest was 
going on among the hilIs, on the British right, and 
in the direction of the Lourinho road. The enemy 
forced their way in thisquarter as they had don~ 
on the other flank, through the body of skirmishers 
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which covered the British line; nor did they make 
the slightest pause, till they beheld the 36th, the 
40th, and 71st regiments in close array before 
them. Their line was likewise formed in a mo-
ment; and severa) terrible discharges of musketry 
were exchanged at a distance which hardly al-
lowed of a single bullet passing wide of its mark. 
At length, the 82nd and 29th regiments carne up 
to the support of their cororades, and the word 
was given to charge. One cheer, loud, regular, 
and appalling, warned the French of what they 
had to expect; but the French were roen of tried 
valour, and they stood to the lasto That was 
a treroendous onset. The entire front rank of the 
enemy perished; and the men who composed it 
were found, at the close ofthe action, lying on the 
very spots where each, during its continuance, had 
stood. Instantly the line gave way; and being 
pursued with great impetuosity, six pieces of can-
non were captured on the field. An attempt was, 
indeed, roade to recover these, at a moment when 
the 71st and 82nd, who had halted in the valley, 
were lying down to rest after their labours; but it 
was made to no purpose. These regiroents only 
fell back to a little rising gronnd, from whence 
thelr fire could be gi ven with greater effect; they 
gave it, and once more bringing the bayonet into 
play, carried every thingbefore thero. 
The French fought well in this action. They 
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fought like men who had been accustomed to con-
quer, and had not yet learned to suffer defeat. 
The grenadiers oftheir reserve, in particular, per-
formed prodigies ofvalour, advancing under a cross 
fire of musketry and cannon, and never giving way 
till the bayonets of the British troops drove them 
down the deseent. But they were routed at all 
points, and that with a slaughter far greater than 
usually occurs to armies of a similar magnitude. 
Out of twelve or thirteen thousand men whom 
they brought into the field, three or four thousand 
feH; besides a large proportion of prisoners, of 
whom several were officers of rank. On the si de 
of the British, the total los s amounted to 783, in 
killed, wounded, and missing; among the former 
of whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, com-
manding the 20th light dragoons. He was 8hot 
through the heart whilst leading a brilliant charge 
which his detachment made; and in which, after 
committing terrible havoc among the enemy's in-
fantry, it suddenly found itself beset by a whole 
brigade of French cavalry. 
The battle had hardly begun, when Sir Harry 
Burrard, followed by his staff, arrived upon the 
field. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as a matter of 
course, proposed to resign to him all further 
responsibility; but Sir Harry possessed too much 
judgment not to ,perceive that the execution of 
plans could not be left in safer hands than in 
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those of the man who had formed them. He 
accordingly declined interfering in any way till 
thé result of the struggle should be known, and 
took upon himself the direction of future ope-
rations only when the defeat of the enemy was 
ascertained. At that critical juncture, Sir Arthur 
Wellesley represented to him, in the strongest 
terms, that this was the moment for advancing; that 
whilst part of the army followed up the be aten 
enemy, part should push on by the nearest road 
to Torres Yedras. . He pointed out that snch a 
movement must inevitably cut off the French from 
Lisbon, and either place them between twofires, 
or compel them to begin a ruinous retreat, by the 
route of Alenquer and Villa Franca : he reminded 
himt~at there was no deficiency either of ammu-
nition or provisions in the camp; that the British 
soldiers were in high spirits and admirable dis-
cipline ; . theirenemiesdisheartened, wearied with 
their late marches, and almost disorganised. AH 
this he urged upon the field with the warmth and 
earnestness of a successful officer, and the clear-
ness and perspicuity for which he is remarkable. 
But Sir Rarry was not to be moved from his de-
termination. Re had made up his mind already 
not to quit Vimiero till Sir John Moore should ar-
rive; and he saw nothing in the events of theday 
to cause a change in his sentiments. The cavalry, 
he said, were certainly notstrengthened, nor the 
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artillery horses improved, by the exertions which 
they had undergone. In a word, he was resolved 
not to act with precipitation; and the British 
troops were accordingly commanded to rest upon 
their arms. 
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CHAI~TER VI. 
Inactivity of the British army under Sir Harry Burrard-Ar-
rival of General Kellerman at Vimiero, with proposals-Sir 
Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters into a 
treaty with KelIerman-Difficulties as to the disposal of tite 
Russian fleet, and preparations for a renewal of hostilities-
Arrival of Sir John Moore's corps-Junot consents that the 
two Admirals shall arrange the point at issue between thern-
selves-The convention of Cintra condemned by both Por-
tuguese and Spaniards-Almeida and Elvas given up-The 
Bdtish troops enter Lisbon-Joy of the inhabitants-Ca-
raffa's corps restored to liberty, and re-armed.-The French 
army sails for France, and the Russian fleet is conveyed. tI} . 
England. 
lT has be en stated, in the preceding chapter, that 
among the variety of motives which induced Sir 
Harry Burrard, bbth before and after the victory 
of Vimiero, to cheGk the advance of the British 
army upon Lisbon, one, and certainly not the 
least influential, was the expectation which he 
entertained, that every day would bring into his 
camp a re-inforcement often thousand men, under 
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the· command of Lieutenant-general Sir John 
Moore. The corps in question (to which it was 
the writer's good fortune to be attached) had em-
barked at Portsmouth so early as the 3] st of July; 
but owing to a continuance ofbaffiing and adverse 
wÍnds, it was the 19th of August before it arrived 
in Mondego Bay. It arrived, too, at a moment 
when the leaders of the divisions which had pre-
ceded it were too much occupied with other 
matters to pay to its movements any particular 
attention; and it became, in consequence, essen-
tial to open an immediate communication with 
them, and to ascertain how, and upon what 
service, it should prepare to empIoy itself. 
Having Iearned from sorne of the coasting ves-
seIs that fue right of the British army was in 
position at Sto Martinho, Sir John Moore did me 
the honour to desire that 1 should proceed at once 
to that point, and communicate. to Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, or Sir Harry Burrard,or the officer, 
whoeyer he might be, in command, the fact of his 
arrival. In obedience to these instructions I set 
sail in a light frigate, hoping, and indeed expect-
ing, that I should be able to reach my destination 
on the following day; but at an early hour on the 
20th the breeze died away, and what was still 
more distressing, the appearance of the sky and 
the state of the atmosphere, indicated a long con-
tinuance of calm weather. Under these circum-
150 NARRATIVE OF THE 
stances 1 did not consider it prudent to remain 
any longer bn board of ship; a boat was therefore 
manned, which conveyed me twelve leagues by 
rowing, and landed me soon after sunset at the 
village of Sto N azareth. 
lt was not without great difficulty, and the loss 
of several precious hours, that 1 bere succeeded in 
procuring either a guide to direct my steps, or the 
means of'conveyance; indeed, of my journey from 
thence to head-quarters no iriconside~able portion 
was performed on foot. On this account 1 failed, 
unfortunately for myself, in reaching Vimiero' till 
the 24th, three days after the battle had been 
fought, and the campaign was, to all intents and 
purposes, at an end ; for the heads of departments 
)"ere, 1 perceived; all busily occupied in conduct-
ing a negociation, of the origin and end of which 
the following is a brief account :-
Sir Harry Burrard, in pursuance of his system 
of procrastination, continued inactive in the po-
sition of Vimiero, when, at an early hour on the 
22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar 
to take upon himself the chief command. Sir 
Hew was of course ignorant, as well of the condi-
tion of his own army, and the state of the country, 
as of the means and resources of the enemy; and 
he could form no other judgment respecting the 
line of conduct which it behoved him to pursue, 
than that which his predecessors in cornmand 
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might happen to suggest. But for the attainment of 
sufficient informatioll sorne time was necessary; and 
before any definite COurse had been determined on, 
an event occurred which gave a .new turn to the 
General's deliberations. 
In the evening of the same day on which Sir 
Hew reached the camp, a body of cavalry was 
espied advancing by the road which the enemy 
had taken in their retreat. The pickets instantly 
stood to their arrns ;but the alarm, 'if such it de-
serves to be called, which had momental'ily seized 
them, was at once allayed, when it was observed 
that the body in question were the bearers of a 
flag of truce. They were stopped, as is usual in 
such cases, at the out-posts, till a report of their 
corning should be made at head-quarters, and an 
officer sent down to ascertain their business. 
They proved tobe the escort in attendance upon 
General Kellerman, who had been despatched by 
Marshal J unot, in consequence of the resolution 
to which he and his principal officers had that 
morning come, in a council of wal'; and who 
was the bearer of proposals for the conclusion of a 
suspension of arms, as the prelude to a more de-
finitive treaty respecting the evacuation ofPortugal. 
Various rumours pr€!vailed in the camp, as to 
the reception which General Kellerman's propo~ 
sitionreceived in different quarters. By sorne it 
was asserted that it gave singular satisfaction to 
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all ;and that even Sir Arthur W ellesley, feeling 
that the moment for action. had passed away, 
offered no objection to the measure; by others 
his opposition to it was represented as having 
been both strenuous and persevering. Be this, 
however, as it may, Kellerman was c~nducted, 
with every mark of respect, to the house where 
Sir Hew Dalrymple resided; and after a con-
ference of some duration, his first request was 
granted. An armistice, to continue during forty-
eight hours, was entered into; and then began 
the more important negociation, to the eonducf of 
which the armistice was hut a fore-runner. 
With admirable tact Kéllerman opened his part 
in this transaction by magnifying, in every possible 
form, the strength of tile French army, and the 
amount of its resources. He spoke of his General 
as determined to aecept no terms whieh should 
not be to the most minute tittle honourable to the 
French arms; and represented him as prepared, 
in ease matters should be driven to an extremity, 
to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon. This 
done, he proceeded to lay before the British eom-
manders a string of propositions, rather as if they 
had be en suggestions from himself, than official 
communications; for he earnest1y desired it to be 
understood that he had no powers to eondude a 
tre aty , and that his. present business was simply 
to ascertain the faet, whether any desire to treat 
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existed on the part of the English. The conver-
satíon had not, however, proceeded far, when 
either his memory, or his regard to consistency, 
forsook him; for he produeed a .written doeument, 
which authorised him to act at his own discretion, 
and pJedged the honour of the Commander-in-
chief to fulfil any agreement into which he might 
be induced to entero 
1t is hardly necessary to repeat he re that the 
evacuation of the whole of Portugal, including the 
forts of Elvas and Almeida, in whieh the French 
had garrisons, formed the basis of the present ne-
goelatIOn. To thís the enemy would consent only 
on the following eonditions :-first, that the French 
arrny should, on no aceount, be considered as pri-
soners of war; seeondly, that the troops should be 
transported with their arms, baggage, and private 
property to Franee, and be at liberty to serve 
again, either in the Peninsula or elsewhere, as 
soon as they should re-assemble; thirdly, that no 
individual, whether Frenchman, Portuguese, or 
foreigner, in alliance with Franee, who chanced to 
remain in Portugal after the departure of the. 
Freneh, should be molested in any way, onac-
count of the sentiments which he might have ex-
pressed, or the line of conduct which he might 
have pursued, during the late oecupation; and 
that all sueh persons, if they desired it, should 
be at liberty ta withdraw from Portugal, with all 
154 N ARRATIYE OF THE 
their effects, within ayear; fourthly, that the port 
of Lisbon should be recognised 'as a neutral port, 
and the Russian fleet which lay there treated as 
enemies' vessels are usually treated when in the 
harbours of a neutral power; and lastly, that aH 
the horses attached to the Frency army, as well 
those belonging to the cavalry and artillery as 
those of the staff, should be conveyed to France 
together with the meno , 
When the su bstanceof these proposals began to 
be generally l.mderstood, and a rumour got afioat 
that they had be en conditionally agreed to, the 
indignation of aH ranks and classes in the army 
rose to a great height. There was not an indivi-
dual who appeared to entertain a doubt that Junot 
felt his situation to be a desperate one; and that 
nothing 8hort ofsucha feeling would have tempted 
him to treat about an evacuation at all; whilst the 
terms which he sought to obtain fOf himselfwere, 
as if by one consent, pronounced to be absolutely 
and totally inadmissible. But that which most 
powerfully stirred up the wrath at least of the 
junior dépaitments, was the impudent endeavour, 
on' the partof the French leader, to stipulate for 
the unmolestéd departure of the Russian fleet. Jt 
was' seeIÍ at once that his object in. introducing 
that artiCle was of a twofold nature ;-that he 
wished both to reconcile his own master to the 
disgrace which his arms had suffered; and tocon· 
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ciliate the good will of the Russian autocrat, 
whose squadron he hoped to preserve; and it was 
earnestIy trusted that the British Admiral, to 
whom reference must of course be made, would 
not give his consent to an arrangement so deroga-
tory to the dignity of the British flag. N or was 
the general discontent directed altogether against 
the details of the convention. Murmurs might 
here and tb."ere be heard, all of them condemnatory 
of that'excess of caution which hadch~cked a victo-
rious army in the midst of its career ; whilst a thou-
sand wishes were expressed, that the new chief's 
arrival had been delayed till the campaign, so pros-
perously begun, had been brought to a conclusion. 
Whilst one part of the army, and that by far the 
most numerous, thus expressed themselves, there 
were others, who, equally regretJing that ad-
vant~ge had not been taken of the victory of 
the 21st, were nevertheless disposed to view the 
pending arrangement as, under existing circum-
stances, an extremely prudent one. In their eyes 
it was a matter of the firstmoment to deliver 
Portugal Emtirely from the presence of French 
troops, even though the troops thus expelled 
should be immediately brought into play at sorne 
other point on -the theatre of war. These persons 
no more doubted, than their more sanguine com-
rades, as to the ultimate results of the campaign, 
were it renewed; but they saw. in the loss. of 
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time which a recommencement of hostilities would 
occasion, evils which not the most absolute suc-
ces s would be sufficient to compensate. Besides, 
it was by no means impossible that the French, in 
possession of the commanding position of Torres 
Ved ras, masters of Lisbon, and having garrisons in 
Elvas and Almeida, might protract the war till 
reinforcements should reach them from Spain; 
fol' though at the present moment their prospects 
in Spain appeared clouded, no one dreamed that 
the cloud would not soonel' or later be dispelled. 
Then, again, winter was hard at hand; the re-
sources of the country were exhausted; and to 
obtain supplies from home might not be at all 
times practicable. Under aH these circumstances, 
they gave their ready assent to the terms of 
the convention, with this solitary exception, that 
they saw no wisdom in treating with the Russian 
Admiral through the medium of a French Marshal. 
During the period which intervened between 
the conclusion of the armistice, and the return of 
the messenger who had carried a copy of the 
convention to Sir Charles Cotton, an things re-
mained in a state of perfect quieto Officers of 
every rank met together, indeed, in coteries, to 
indulge in an occu'pation to which soldiers upon 
active service are peculiarly prone, namely, spe-
culation as to the future; and couriers carne in 
from time to time with despatches of greater or 
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less moment from different parts of the country. 
But neither the speculations on the one hand, nor 
the despatches on the other, proved worthy of 
being recorded at length, though they were not 
without interest at the moment, and that. too of 
the highest order. Among other topics of con ver-
sation which chanced to be occasionally intro-
duced at head-quarters, it was but natural that 
the probable plans of the French, after they had 
cantoned their troops about Burgos, should prove 
not the least attractive. On this head the gene-
ral opinion seemed to be, that they would attempt 
nothing further than to keep their own ground, 
till powerful reinforcements should have been sent 
to them from France. Then, again, there arose 
another question, namely, by the adoption of what 
line of operations the British army would be best 
able· to render effectual aid in their expulsion. 
That we should not continue inactive in Portugal, 
after it was evacuated by the French, was well 
knowri; how then was it probable that we should 
proceed? It was answered to this, that whatever 
might be the plan s actually carried into effect, 
Catalonia and the south of Spain held out nume-
rous advantages to a British force, which it could 
not expect to enjoy in the Asturias or Gallicia. 
The latter provinces, naturally barren and moun-
tainous, had alreadyendured the mi series of wal' 
for some time; theil' forage was therefore con-
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surned, and their resources exhausted. It was not 
SO with Catalonia, where supplies of every kind 
were represented to be abundant. and where the 
people were spoken of as brave even to a proverb. 
To Catalonia, therefore, it was hoped that a sepa-
rate corps rnight be despatched, even if it should 
be deerned unwise to choose it for the scene 
of our principal operations. N or were the present 
and future condition of Portugal left unnóticed in 
these social discussions. The desire of the junta 
of Oporto, to transfer thither the seat of the exe-
cutive, was well known; and it was equallywell 
known that the Bishop had received sorne encou-
ragernent, . even frarn British functionaries, to de-
clare hirnself the head of the governrnent; but to 
thatarrangernent Sir Hew Dalryrnple .appéared 
strongly opposed. He decIared hisdeterrnination 
to re-establish thé regency as it had.been ap-
pointed by lhe . Prince previous to his' departure 
for .the ~razils; and he expressed hirnself dissa-
tisfied with the coñduct of those persons who had 
ventured, on their own responsibility, to excite a 
cóntrary expectation. Then, again, there carne 
despatches frorn. Castanos, stating his design of 
marching direct upon Madrid, and his great an-
xiety to be inforrn~d of the expulsion of the enerny 
from Portugal, and the advance ofthe British army 
to co-operate withhim. But an these matters, as 
has been already hinted, though full of interest at 
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the moment, possess no claim upon the attention 
of the general reader now; they need not there-
for be enlarged upon. 
Men's minds were wound up. to a pitch of very 
considerable anxietr., when on the 26th a 1etter 
from Sir Charles Cotton arrived, in which he de-
clared his decided disapprobation of that article in 
the treaty, which had reference to the neutrality 
of the Tagus, and the treatment of the Russian 
Heet. No words can conveyan adequate idea of 
the satisfaction which universally prevailed, as 
soon as this most acceptable piece of intelligence 
spread abroad. The French were understood, 
with reference to this point, to have assumed 
a tone so high, that no one entertained a doubt of 
the immediate renewal of hostilities; and the ex-
pectation was certainly not diminished, when the 
troops received orders to take their ground· in 
marching order, at an early hom next morning. 
In forty-eight hours the armistice would expire; 
then would operations recommence; and so. con-
fident were all ranks that they would be resumed 
in real earnest, that the following plan was openly 
spoken of as on the eve of being carried into exe:-
cution. 
It so happened that the Heet which contained 
Sir John l\lüore and his division appeared at tbis 
critical juncture in the offing.· N othing could 
have occurred more opportunely; for though the 
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state of the weather was such as to render a dis-
embarkation at the instant impracticable, there 
was little reason, in the month of August, to ap-
prehend a very long continuance of the gale. As 
soon as the surf became moderate, the troops 
would of course land; when it was understood 
that they would press forward to Torres Vedras, 
and occupy that important post, from which the 
enemy had lately withdrawn to a fortified position 
at Cabeza. In unison with this movement, Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, at the head of his own corps, 
was to advance by his left from Ramalhal to "Bu-
ceUas, for the purpose of turning the heights of 
Cabeza, and threatening Lisbon; whilst the Por-
tuguese army would take the coast-road, and 
straiten the enemy there by the occupation of 
Mafra. By these arrangements, the French, it 
was anticipated, would either be compelled to 
fight on their strong ground, un del' the disadvan-
tage ofbeing assailed from three quarters at once; 
or, in the event of their retiring upon Lisbon, 
would probably be shut up there, and thell driven 
at last to the necessity of surrendering at dis-
cretion. AH, however, must depend upon the 
decision at which" J unot might arrive, whenever 
he should be made aware of the Admiral's deter-
minatiolls; and that time might"not be needlessly 
wasted, Colonel Murray, assistant quarter-master-
general, and Captain Dalrymple, military secretary 
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to the Commander-in-chief, were instantly de~ 
spatched to lay these determinations before him. 
The hope which this sudden obstacle to the 
conclusion of a treaty had for a moment excited, 
was destined not to be of long continuance. Mar-
shal Junot was too well acquainted both with his 
own weakness and the strength of his enemy, to 
break off a negociation so favourable to- himself, 
because orthe rejection of a single article; on the 
contrary, he soon consented that the two admirals 
should settle every question relative to the ship-
ping between thernselves, and th"e definitive treaty 
was signed with as little apparent reluctance as if 
no Russian fleet had lain in the Tagus. Thus, in 
the short space of seventeen days, was the cam-
paign brought to a conclusion; and a kingdorn, 
which previous to its cornmencernent lay, as it 
were, at the feet of a conqueror, was restored most 
unexpectedly to independence, and to its former 
rank among the nations. 
The excitement produced by these arrange-
rnents had hardly begun to subside, when new 
sources of uneasiness arose. and that too in quar-
ters from which no causes of uneasiness had been 
anticipated. The Portuguese, though they took 
care to keep as much as possible aloof from their 
allies whilst perilous attempts were to be made, 
and great interests placed at issue, no sooner per-
ceived the turn which affairs had taken, than they 
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chose to interfere in a manner as Httle agreeable 
as, to say the trutb, it was unexpected. General 
Freire, who had refused to co-operate witb Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, but who, as soon as victory de~ 
clared for tbe English, had marcbed his trqops 
towards Lisbon, visited Sir Hew Dalrymple on tbe 
dayafter tbe conclusion of tbe armistiee, and de-
clared his dissatisfaction with every article in the 
definitive treaty. He complained grievously of the 
disrespeet shown to the Portuguese nation, as 
well in the stipulation, that persons should not be 
held amenable for their conduct during the recent 
usurpation, as because no reference whatever was 
made to tbe junta of Oporto, or to any other legis-
lative body. To tbis Sir Hew replied, tbat tbe 
convention was in all its parts a military treaty, in 
which no mentíon was or could be made eitber of 
the Portuguese or of tbe British government; and 
he further reminded Freire, that in point of faet no 
government of Portugal existed. Tbe junta of 
Oporto had, indeed, assumed to itself a superiority 
over other juntas, and it had been, to a certain 
extent, obeyed by the people of Portugal; but if 
any legitimate government existed anywhere, it 
must be sought for in the regeney whieh the 
Prinee had appoirtted; and he took it for gTanted 
that General Freire would not aeknowledge it, 
adulterated as it was with Frenehmen and French 
agents. He nevertheless requested tbat General 
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Freire would commit to writing all the observa-
tions which he might desire to make on the treaty 
in question; and he pledged himself that the ut-
most attention would be paid to them, when the 
terms of the treaty were in process of execution .. 
This difficu1ty had scarcely be en got over, when 
other and no less serious objections to the conven-
tion were started by the leaders of the two S pa-
nish and Portuguese corps, which at this time 
blockaded the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida. 
Elvas had long been kept in a state of irregular 
investment by bands of armed peasants, whose 
utmost exertions never went further than to poison 
a well or two, where the cattle of the garrison were 
accustomed to drink, and to cut off straggling par-
ties, as often as they issued from the town. Be-
fore Elvas, again, the Spanish General Galluza, 
provisi<mal commandant of the army of Estrema-
dura, had seen fit to sit down; in ignorance, per-
haps, that a treaty was going on at the moment 
for its surrender; but in positive contempt of or-
ders from his own superiors, which required him 
to begin his march, without delay, for Castile. 
The Portuguese, though, like their comrades 
nearer to the capital, far from being satisfied with 
the tone of the convention, were easily persuaded 
to subdue their own feelings; and Almeida being 
given up, the French garrison was quietly marched 
under a British eseort, to Oporto. It was not 
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so at Elvas. When a British regiment which had 
been appointed to take charge of the works ar-
rived in his camp, General Galluza positively re-
fused to permit its passing further. He insisted 
that the Spanish corps under his command was 
entitled to, all the privileges of a besieging army; 
and he protested that the Freneh garrison should 
Rot pass the ditch on any other terms, than as 
prisoners of war prepared to lay down their arms. 
Neither Colonel Ross, the commissioner, nor the 
battalion which aUended him, coulel, of course, 
compel an alteration in Galluza's sentiments; but 
advice was instantly despatched to Sir Hew Dal-
rymple, who was justly incensed; and at first 
declared his determination to withhold all suc-
cours from the Spaniards, and to cease aH corres-
pondence with them, if his wishes, in the present 
mstance" w;ere not promptly attended to; but 
being reasoned out of this resolution, Sir Hew con- ' 
sented that Colonel Graham should repair to EI-
vas, with fuIl powers to, coneiliate the Spanish 
General. The Colonel, was, moreover, furnished 
with 10,000 dollars, as a means of eaforcing his 
arguments, should they be violently opposed ; and 
as a last resource, he was required to proceed to 
Madrid, and to lay before the Spanish government 
a statement of the case. AH this was as it ought to 
have been; but Sir Hew's feelings were too VIO-
lently, excited to permit him to stop here. Sir 
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John Hope's division of infantry, with two squa-
drons of cavalry, were ordered to cross the Tagus. 
He was directed to move, in a rnenacing attitude, 
upon Elvas; and in case things carne to the worst, 
to compel, by force of arms, an adherence to the 
terms of the treaty. Fortunately, for all parties; 
this species of interference was not needed. The 
Spaniards, convinced by Colonel Graham's weigh-
ty arguments, that no good, hut rnuch evil, must 
arise, out of a breach of any compact, however 
rashly or improvidently entered into, at last con- , 
sented to a:How thedeparture of the garrison with 
its arms and baggage; and' the garrison accord-
ingly proceeded, as the garrison of Almeida had 
done, undel' a British escort, to its place of em-
barkation. 
It may not be amiss ifI recordhere the fate which 
uItimately befell these detachmeúts. Wherever 
they passed, on their journey from the Jorts to the 
place of embarkation, they were met with the 
revilings and hootings of an enraged peasantry; 
nor was it without the utmost difficulty that they 
were preserved from fue violence with which they 
were threatened. By great exertions, however, 
on the part of the escort, they were at length con~ 
ducted to their vessels; but the troops from AI-
meida, ordered to take shipping at Oporto, had 
not yet weighed anchor, when an accident occurred, 
which had well nigh pro ved fatal to them. In 
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moving a military chest on board one·of the trans· 
ports, it fell to the ground, and búrsting open, 
sorne church.plate rolled out. There was now no 
arresting the fury of the populace. The ships 
were instantly boarded, the French disarmed, theír 
baggage taken on shore, examined, and plundered; 
and when it became apparent that, under the head 
of prívate property, the pillage of the most sacred 
edifices in the kingdom was about to be conveyed 
away, the lives of the whole detachment were 
placed in irnrninent danger. At last, however, the 
native authorities, aided by such British officers as 
happened to be at hand, prevailed upon the people 
to abstain from personal violence; but to tal k any 
longer of the safe departure of these detachments, 
would have been useless. They were disarmed, 
to the number of fourteen hundred, and treated as. 
prisoners of war. 
In the mean while, one division of the British 
army, under the command of Lieutenant-general 
Sir John Rope, moved into Lisbon, and took pos-
session oí the different barracks, and of the castle. 
Shouts and blessings greeted them as they passed 
along; whilst persons of every rank, from the 
fidalgo down to the beggar, vied with one another 
in protestations of gratitude and affection. The 
windows were filled with females, who showered 
down flowers upon the soldiers' heads, and waved 
their handkerchiefs in token oí amity; whilst the 
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men thronged the sides of the streets, and made 
the air ring with their cries, "Long live the Eng-
lish!" "Death to the FreÍlch!" But the most 
gratifying spectade of aH, whic.h met us on the 
present occasion, was exhibited on the following 
morning; when to the Spanish corps, which had 
hitherto be en detained' as prisoners in the hulks, 
not their liberty only. but their arms and accou-
trements were restored. 
To render the ceremony as imposing as pos-
sible, it was determined that' it should take place 
in public, and announcements of what was about 
to be done were everywhere circulated. Great 
crowds were accordingly drawn together on the 
morning appointed, when the Spaniards, in num-
ber about four thousand, assembled in a large 
open spa.ce· called the Campo d 'Ourique, and 
forming a hollow square, with their generals and 
other officers in the centre, awaited the result.· 
They were not kept long in suspense, ere General 
Beresford, to whom the arrangement of the cere-
mony had been intrusted, followed by a large con-
course of Britishofficers, made his appearance. 
Instantly General Beresford, having passed along 
the line, and saluted first the General and after-
wards the whole corps, presented to the former, 
with gr-eat grace and dignity an elegant sword, 
and in an animated speech requested that the 
latter would again accept their arms from the 
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King of England, never to lay them down till the 
cause of Ferdinand VII., of Europe, and of hu-
manity, had triumphed. This address;which was 
forcibly and well delivered, had not yet come to 
a close, when it was drowned in the reiterated 
vivas of soldiers and inhabitants; whilst the roar 
of cannon, and the braying of trumpets, echoed 
from oneend of Lisbon to another. When the 
tumult had in part subsided, the Spanish General 
hastened to make his reply. He spoke evidently 
under the influence of strong feeling, and every 
sentence which fell from him gave testimony, that 
what he did speak, was spoken without premedi-
tation; buí his speech possessed all the fire which 
the circumstances under which it was delivered 
were calculated to excite. He then addressed his 
men in the language of genuine patriotism; ex-
horted them never to forget the events of this 
glorious day; ahd ended by declaring that, when-
ever the people of the Peninsula should cease to 
bear towards England the love and reverence 
which were due froID the oppressed to their de-
liverers, they would prove themselves unworthy 
of a better fate than that which, but for English 
interference, would have befaUen them. Finally, 
the troopsmarched past, and the business of the 
morning was concluded by a grand dijeúné a la 
Jou,rchette, at which the Spanish officers became so 
intoxicated with wine and joy, as to dance waltzes, 
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fandangos, &c. in their boots, swords, and com-
plete field-equipment. 
The rejoicings having ended, it became a ques-
tion of considerable moment how these troops 
were to be disposed of. Destitute as they were 
of money, and of almost every article necessary to 
their efficiency, it was quite evident that they 
could proceed nowhere in a body, nor act to any 
purpose, unless the means of moving and acting 
were advanced from the funds of the British 
army; and the Commander-in-chief seemed to 
entertain serious doubts, whether his instructions 
authorised him to make such advance. After a 
good deal of discussion, however, he was at length 
prevailed upon to &upply them with 20,000 dol-
lars, in addition to a certain number of days' pay, 
and complete supplies oí arms, ammunition, and 
hor~es; and then thequestion as to their ultimate 
disposal was resumed. The first idea on that 
head was, tbat it would be advisable to march 
them off in the direction of Badajoz; because, 
being composed principally of detachments froro 
different regiments, O) which the main bodies 
were understood to be in the neighbourhood of 
that place, they might be enabled, when there, to 
join each its respective battalion. Preparations 
were accordingly begun with this view; but be-
fore they were completed, there arrived from 
Catalonia two deputies, whose representations 
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caused an immediate change in the plans. These 
strongly pressed upon Sir Hew the necessity of 
sending troops of all arms, but more particularly 
cavalry, into their province. They stated that 
the Catalonian arrny amounted to forty thousand 
men, which, though miserably supplied with 
eq uiprnents of every kind, were, nevertheless, 
able to cope with the enemy arnong the moun-
tains; but that in the plains and level country, 
owing to the presence of five or six hundred 
French cavalry, they could not venture to show 
themselves. Under these circurnstances, they 
besought the British General to send round by 
sea a corps of one thousand horse and ten thou-
sand foot, the arriva! of which would, they were 
assured, occasion· an immediate rising throughout 
the whole province, particularly in Barcelona and 
other large towns, where nothing but the presence 
of an overwhelming force kept the people in sub-
jection to the French yoke. There was a good 
deal of justice in the remarks of these deputies; 
nor, perhaps, would it have been an unwise thing, 
had Sir Hew Dalrymple obeyed their councils; 
but to do this he hárdly felt himself authorised. 
The Spanish corps, however, being absolutely at 
his own disposal, he could employ it at any point, 
and on any service, which to hirnself might ap-
pear most desirable; and he instanUy placed it in 
the hands of theCatalonian deputies. It was 
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embarked in a few hours afterwards, and set sail 
for Catalonia. 
AH this while arrangements were busily making 
for the transportation of the Fre.nch troops to their 
own country. Whilst the few garrisons which 
they had scattered through the interior, received 
instructions to march upon Oporto, the main body, 
including the corps which had occupied the castle 
of Lisbon, and the forts at tbe moutb of tbe Tagus, 
assembled in one Gamp, and made ready to em-
bark as soon as tbe sbips were cleared out for 
tbem. Much discussion, however, and many dif-
ficulties arose, as to the construction whích each 
party desired to put upon those articles in the con-
vention of Cintra, which had reference to the pri-
vate baggage of the army. The Portuguese were 
naturaIly anxious that the men who had plun-
dered their churches, museums, and even their 
dweIlings, should not be permítted to carry away 
that plunder under the head of prívate property; 
whilst the French protested violently against any 
search being made, or any inquiríes instituted into 
the contents of their trunks or store-rooms. It 
was no easy matter for the British General to steer 
a proper course in such circumstances, keeping, as 
he desired, a striet regard to the sacredness of his 
own promises. On the one hand, he could not but 
feel, that wbatever might, be the words of the 
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treaty, its spirit was not such as to sanction the 
numerous acts of peculationand robbery of which 
the French might have been guilty; and he took 
care to state this with great distinctness to Mar-
shal J unot. On the other hand, he saw that in 
many cases of alleged plunder it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to iden-
tify the property said to have beeo stolen. Thus 
embarrassed, he took the only judicious step which 
it was in his power to take. A committee of ill-
quiry was appointed, before which all claims might 
be brought; and the quantity of goods restored 
by its decisions to the rightful owners was im-
mense. 
Before dismissing the subject of Cintra alto-
gether, 1 consider it right, without at all desiring 
to discuss the wisdom or impolicy of the arrange-
ment in question, to lay before the readeran out-
line of the impression produced in England by the 
first intelligence of the convention, which was 
communicated to me in the following extraet of a 
letter :-
" The tumult of our joy on Wellesley's glorious 
eonduct and successes has been cruelIy disturbed 
by a communication of a supposed conventioo, the 
operations of which instrument would, if carried 
iato effect, secure to the French advantages be-
yond their reach, under the most brilliant success; 
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whilst their ten thousand men are now pressed 
upon by. not less than thirty to forty thousand 
men, British and Portuguese. 
"In the first place, it is a .recognition, on the 
face of the instrument, of Buonaparte as emperor 
of the French. 
"2ndly. It provides for the safe' retreat of an 
enemy's corps, destitute of all other means of 
escape. 
o< 3rdly. It give.s France the entire. grace of 
saving for Russia her Heet, whilst in truth she had 
not a remnant of power left to pratect it. 
"4thly. It makes a gratuitous sacrifice oí the 
Heet of an enemy, and in the manner of doing it, 
recognises rights of neutrality on the part of Por-
tugal towards Russia, which, if they could have 
ever subsisted for a moment in a port occupied by 
a French army, were destroyed, even in pretence, 
by the formal appointment of J unot as Buona-
parte's Lieutenant of Portugal, andentails upon 
us all the encumbrance of watching, witb a Heet, 
a port of our own~ whilst we must give the enemy 
forty-eight hours' start of us, lest we should catch 
him. 
"5thly. It gives France not only the immediate 
use of her army, which, without an active assist-
ance, she could not have, but givesher also the 
plunder of Portugal, under the mask of private 
property. 
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" 6thly. Jt gives Franee all the graee of having 
protected those Portuguese who have betrayed 
their sovereign, whilst it entails upon us th~ dis-
graee of exposing our alIies to be attaeked here-
after by a fleet whieh Franee has had the authority 
and means to proteet. Will Spain or Europe 
believe that this was preceded by triumphs on our 
part? and will not Franee be convineed of the 
reverse? 
"7thly. It lastly appears in its general result to 
be a happy eontrivanee, by which England shall 
have made a mighty effort, for no other purpose 
than making a dependent state the protector of 
one of its enemies, whilst it beeomes itself the in.,. 
strument by which the other shall remove an arrny 
from a position in which it is tost to one in which it 
may recommenee ita operations with advantage." 
At length the provisioning and storing of the 
transports being complete, the Freneh army began 
its embarkation. It took place in three divisions; 
the first being protected by the two last, as they 
again were covered by the British troops; and 
before the middle oí September the whole had 
c1eared the Tagus. The Russian fleet, likewise, 
in accordance with the arrangernent entered into 
between Sir Charles 'Cotton and Admiral Siniavin, 
was taken possession of by the British navy; and 
the seamen being sent baek to their own shores, the 
ships were forthwith removed to England.They 
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were conveyed thither, however, not as prizes, in 
the strict sense of that term, but rather as a depo-
sit, the British government engaging to restore 
them within six months after a. general pacifiea-
tion. Still it was a matter of no little moment to 
render them for the time innoeuous ; and as Russia 
already began to manifest symptoms of a desire to 
break off her connexion with Franee, it would not, 
perhaps, have been produetive of any additional 
benefit, had they been absolutely and entirely 
transferred to the English service. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir A rthur Wellesley re-
turns to EDgland on leave-Sir Rarry Burrard resigns' the 
command to Sir John Moore-Preparations for an advance 
into Spain-March through A lentejo-Villa Vicosa -March 
to Elvas-Elvas, Badajoz-Difference of character between 
the Spaniards and Portuguese-Colonel Lopez recei ves de-
spatches from Castanos-Merida-Its antiquities-State of 
agriculture in its vicinity. 
THE events which 1 have endeavo.ured to. reco.rd in 
the last chapter were still in pro.gress, when a Ya-
riety o.f changes in the arrangement o.f the British 
army to.o.k place, so.me o.f which were o.f the 
greatest mo.ment. In the first place, Sir Hew 
Dalrymple was recalled, and under circumstances 
which sufficieI?-tIy implied that the co.untry was 
no.t satisfied with the resuIt o.f the two. late victo.-
ries. Sir Arthur Wellesley, likewise, to. the sin-
cere regret o.f every Englishman in Po.rtugal, 
departed upon leave o.f absence; and his example 
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'was foJJowed by many other officers of all ranks. 
The command accordingly devolved upon Sir 
Harry Burrard; but to what use it would be 
turned, no one appeared to know.. AH at on~e our 
preparations and warlike declarations ceased: 
there was no longer the fa¡ntest whisper of a move-
ment; and we gave ourselves up entirely, or at 
least we appeared to give ourselves up, to the 
amusements and dissipation of Lisboa. 
A state of things such as this could not, how-
ever, be of long continv.ance. Rumours began 
gradually to spread themselves, that Sir Harry's 
sojourn with the army would be brief, and that, 
as 500n as he saw fit to return to England, an 
active campaign WQuld be opened. These ru-
mours werenot raised upon false grounds. Sir 
Harry's constitution Was incapable of bearing up 
against the fatigues and privations of active ser-
vice; he therefore applied for leave of absence. 
and obtaiJ.?ed it; and the command then devolved 
upon one, whom, next to Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
the troops most respected and loved-Lieutenant-
general Sir J ohn Moore. It would be no easy 
matter to describe, either the satisfaction which 
all appeared to experience when these arrange-
ments became known, or the state of bustle and 
activity which every department at once assumed. 
An advance into Spain was now openly talkedof; 
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178 N ARRATIVE OF TIiE 
and everything seemed to imply that it would com-
menee ímmediately, 
1 have stated, in one of the introductory chap-
ters, that assoon as intelligence of Dupont's cap-
ture reached Madrid, JoseplÍ made ready for a 
hastyabandonment of his new capital. He had 
enacted the part ~f royalty only two short days, 
when he found it necessary to lay his power aside, 
and to fall back from the stage on which he had 
begun to perform it. The whole of the detach-
ments scattered through the northern and eastern 
provinces were caBed in. Garrisons were, indeed, 
thrown into some of the strong-holds, sufficiently 
nJ.lmerous to man the works, and a post was here 
and there established, merely for the purpose of 
watching the Spaniards, and giving notice of their 
movements; but the main body, amounting in 
aH to about forty-five or fifty thousand men, con-
centrated in N avarre and Biscay. Here a position 
was taken up, with the right resting upon Sto 
Sebastian, the centre at Vittoria, and the left thrown 
back as far as Pampluna; and here they seemed 
disposed to await the arrival of those :ceinforce-
ments, which in great numbers were stated to be 
moving through France. 
Whilst the aboye was pretty accurately known 
to be the disposition of the enemy, we were given 
to understand that there were in arms, il} the As-
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turias and in Gallicia, sixty thousand Spaniards 
undel' Blake and Romana. Two large armies, 
independently of this, were stated to have formed ; 
one, in the immediate front oC the French, the 
other upon their left flank; at the head of the last 
of which was Castanos. The very best spirit was 
said to prevail inall quarters of Spain; every 
Spaniard was, 01' was disposed tobe, a soldier; 
there was therefore nothing to be apprehended by 
US, let us enter the country when we might. It 
was even asserted that, unless we made good 
haste, there would be nothing left for us to effect; 
since it seemed in the highest degree probable, 
that before we should be able to arrive at the scene 
of action, the French would be everywhere driven 
across the Pyrenees. Such were the· cheering 
communjcations which poured iti upon us, not 
only 'from the Spaniards themselves, but from 
sorne of our OWll functionaries; andit was with 
hopes naturally elated to the highest pitch that 
we looked forward to the prospect before uso 
We were not left long in astate of uncertainty. 
On the 6th of October, General Moore received an. 
oflicial despatch, informing him that bis Majesty 
had been graciously pleased to intrust him with 
the chief command of an arrny, in tended to eo-
operate with the forces of S pain in the expulsion 
of the French from the Peninsula. The army in 
question was to consist of not less than forty 
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thousand men, namely, of thirty thousand in-
fantry, five thousand cavalry, and artillery and 
engineers in proportion. Towards making up this 
force, the army in Portugal was to furnish twenty 
thousand men, including two regiments of cavalry, 
the 18th, and King's German regiment of hussars; 
whilst a corps of fifteen thousand men, under 
Lieutenant-general Sir David Baird, was to em-
bark immediately at Falmouth for the harbour of 
Corunna. Sir John Moore was further informed 
that a scene of action had been already planned 
out for him in the north of Spain, though it was 
left to his own judgt11ent to name a point of ren-
dezvous on this side of it for the assembling of his 
troops. He was likewise expressly enjoined to 
move the cavalry by land; but his infantry and 
artillery he might either despatch by sea, or 
march across the country, as should to himself 
appear most expediento Finally, he was in-
structed to pay to the feelings and prejudices of 
his allies every attention; to preserve the strictest 
discipline among his men; and to keep his divi-
sions, as fal' as might be practicable, together, 
that they might act, at aU times, in one body, and 
as a field army .. It was added that, from the 
Spanish authorities and people, he might expect 
the most friendly reception, and the l'eadiest com-
pliance with his wishes; whilst, in case of any 
unlooked-for difficulties which it might be essen-
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tial to remove, he was recommended to commu-
nicate directly both with the government at home, 
and with the English minister resident at the 8eat 
of the central junta. 
Immediately on the receipt of this communica-
tion, Sir John Moore set himself actively and 
seriously to prepare for a fuIl accomplishment of 
the wishes of his government. After mature de-
liberation, he determined that it would not be 
advisable to move any part of the army by sea, 
but that the whole, infantry and artillery as well 
as cavalry, should proceed by land. As, however, 
the roads through Portugal were represented to 
be extremely bad, and as no magazines or depots 
of provisions had be en established, he resolved to 
advance, not by one route, but by three; and to 
unite his columns with that of Sir David Baird 
at Salamanca. But to move beyond the frontiers 
of Portugal, unprovided as we were with draft 
cattle, and having no depots of any kind, was im-
possible. Though, therefore, the troops were put 
in motion so early as the 13th, it was fully under-
stood that the campaign would not be opened 
before November; and even then, from the aspect 
of things immediately about us, from the inex-
perience of our own commissariat, and the supine-
ness of the Portuguese, it was extremely doubt-
fuI whether anything could be done to the purpose. 
The hussar brigade, of which 1 was put in com-
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mand, received instructions to assemble at Vill~ 
Vicosa, a- town distant twenty-eight leagues from 
Lisbon, and consequently at no great distance 
from the frontier. We began our march far this 
purpose on the 18th of October, and taking it by 
easy stages, arrived at our mustering place on the 
24th. Here the information was communicated 
to us, that whenever the moment of further ad-
vance should arrive, the whole army was to pro-
ceed in four columns; one under the command of 
General Paget, by Elvas and Alcantara; one 
under Beresford, by Coimbra and Almeida; one 
under Frazer, by Abrantes and Almeida; and a 
fourth under Hope, by Elvas, Badajoz, Merida, 
Med'ellin, Truxillo, Almanza, Oropesa, and Tala-
vera de la Reyna,_ towa-rds Madrid. To the latter 
column, which was to consist chiefiy-of artillery, 
with four regiments of infantry to escort it, we 
were attached. 
In passing through the Alentejo, nothing oc-
curre€! to ourselves particularIy deserving of re-
cord. We found the country, indeed, in a state 
of miserable destitu tion ;.~ flelds unsown, and ham-
lets ruined and deserted; whilst it was not with-
out great exer.tion~ and a serious waste of time, 
that with all the previous arrangements which had 
been entered into, we found it practicable to pro-
eure sufficient food either for men or horses; but 
we met with no adventures, by the way, nor be-
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. held any objects which had a peculiar claim upon 
our attention. With such spectacles constantly 
before the eye, it was impossible not to indulge in 
a few idle surmises, as to what must have been the 
fate ofthe French army, had it attempted to make 
good its retreat in this direction. The French are, 
unquestionably, a hardy and enduring race of 
men; they exceJ, moreover, in the art of disco-
vering and bringing to account every morsel of 
nutritious matter which may liein the direction of 
their movements; but it appeared as if all their 
ingenuity, and aJ] their patience, would have farled 
in carrying thero safely through the Alentejo. 
There was literally nothing left for them to con-
sume. But the difficulty of procuring subsistence 
would not have been the only obstacle against 
which they must have contended. The very 
name of a Frenchman was, in that part of the 
, country, a thing to be abhorred; the peasantry 
were all ready to faH upon their stragglers; 
whilst the Spanish army before Elvas, formidable 
at least in numbers, would have stood seriously in 
the way of troops disheartened bydefeat, and 
broken down with fatigue and hunger. How 
sincerely we all regretted that the convention 
should have interfered to prevent a consummation 
so devoutly to be wished! 
Though our marches had been short, and nei-
ther men nor horses seemed at all distressed on 
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their arrival, we had not occupied Villa Vicosa 
two days, when symptoms of dysentery began to 
show themselves amongst uso The weather, too, 
soon began to break, and the rain carne down with 
such violence, as to induce an apprehension that 
the wet season had actually set in. These would 
not have be en very gratifying occurrences at any 
moment; but at a moment like the present they 
were peculiarIy distressing. N othing, however, 
remained, except to make the best of them. To 
the sick every possible attention was paid; and as 
the disease proved, by good fortune, not to be 
violent of its kind, the labours of the medical 
officers were rewarded by their speedy convales-
cence. N or did the weather continue, as we had 
begun to apprehend that it would, obstinately 
unpropitious. On the contrary, after two days of 
incessant rain, the clouds dispersed; and by the 
3rd of N ovem ber every appearance in the sky 
promised a long continuance of sunshine and 
drought. 
The whole of Sir John Hope's corps having by 
this time assembled, and every other arrangement 
being complete, on the 5th of N ovember we began 
our march towards Spain. At first, neither the 
. aspect of the country, nor the manners of the 
natives, differed very materially from those which 
had met us in our way hither; for we were still a 
couple of days' march from the frontier, and the 
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Portuguese, more than perhaps any other people, 
carry their own peculiar manners to the extreme 
line of their country. But the close of our journey 
presented us with much both to interest and 
amuse. We halted on the 5th at Elvas; and as 
we carne in at an early hour of the day, such as 
felt disposed were enabled to take an accurate sur-
vey of that highly-striking place. 
The first object which here attracts the notice 
of a stranger, is a magnificent aqueduct, measur-
. ing in altitude no less than one thousand feet. It 
rests upon three or four arches, raised one aboye 
the other, and is composed entirely of a rernark-
ably fine and polished stone. In length it mea-
sures about three miles, and it conveys aH the 
water which is used in tbe place, to a. cistern of 
such dimensions, as to be capable of contaiping a 
suffieient supply for the inhabitants during six 
rnonths. Of tbe town itself, it may be sufficient to 
state that the streets are generally handsome,-
the houses being an built with stone, and ex-
tremely neat in their appearance; but though sur-
rounded by a wall, it is nota place of .any great 
strength .. It lies, indeed, atthe foot of Fort La 
Lippe, and consequently at its mercy; and it is 
commandedby other heights, which overlook it 
from various quarters. 
Of Fort La Lippe, it would be no easy task to 
convey to. the mind of the reader an accurate no-
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tion, unless some exact plan or drawing were sub-
mitted to him. It stand s upon the very summit 
of a steep and commanding eminence, and over-
hangs the left ofthe town; the military occupation 
of which is thus rendered totally impracticable, 
llnless the fort shall have been previously reduced. 
It appeared to me to be a chef-d'reuvre in the 
science of fortification; and to consist of five 
principal angles, or rather bastions, each covered by 
batteries formed into smaller bastions, in tiers, 
one aboye another, which gradually recede towards 
the centre of the fort. From the highest of these 
you command a view of the whole country for 
many miles round, and they aH commul1icate with 
oue another,-all, at least, which possess the same 
degree of elevation by strongly casemated pas-
sages. The fo1't is abundantIy supplied with 
reservoirs for water; and furnaces for heating shot 
are erected in all the most convenient places; in a 
word, nothing appears to have been omitted which 
the knowledge of its founder could suggest as cal-
culated to place it beyond the reach of insulto 
The only height, within a moderate distance of 
the place, upon which, in case of a siege, it would 
be possible to construct a breaching battery, stands 
in a line almost di1'ectly opposite to the angle 
which faces the north. It was upon this hill that 
the Spaniards threw up works during the late in-
vestment, whell they were so unwilling to permit 
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the carrying into execution of OUt convention ; and 
from it they contrived to throw a few shells into 
the fort. But little or no damage was done; 
nothing, at least, in any degree likely to affect the 
issues of the siege. Yet, trifling as the damage 
was, the Portuguese had not taken the trouble to 
repair it: indeed, it was melancholy to see how 
completely the nrttional indolence prevailed here. 
Everything was, as far as it could be, out of order; 
and it seemed as if the weather alone would shortly 
lay in ruins. a work, which, if there were no other 
or more powerful motives to preserve it, deserved 
to be kept up as a mere specimenof the arto 
Having halted at Elvas during the night, we 
marched next morning soon after dawn; and 
passing through a plaiu of considerable extent, 
crossed the Guadiana at Badajoz, the capital of 
Estremadura. This movement introduced us at 
once into Spain; and the contrast which was in-
stantly presented to us, both in personal appear-
ance and in manners, between the people of the 
two nations, 1 shall not readily forget. Generally 
speaking, the natives 'of frontier districts partake 
almost as much of the character of one nation as 
of another; the distinctions between them become, 
as it were, gradually blended, till they totally dis-
appear. It is not so on the borders of Spain and 
Portugal. The peasant who cultivates his little 
field, or tends his flock on the right bank of the 
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Guadiana, is, in aH his habits and notions, a differ-
ent beillg from the peasant who pursues similar 
occupations on its left bank; the first is a genuine 
Portuguese, the last a genuine Spaniard. N or are 
they more alike to each other in their amities 
than in their manners. They cordially detest one 
another; insomuch, that their common wrongs, 
and their cornmon enmity to the French, were 
not sufficient, even at this time, to eradicate the 
feeling. 
It was not, however, by the striking diversity of 
private character alone which subsisted between 
them, that we were made sensible, as soou as we had 
passed the Guadiana, that a new nation was before 
us. The Spaniards received us with a degree ofin-
difference to which we had not hitherto been ac-
customed. They were certainly not uncivil ; they 
poured no execrations upon us, nor did they 
hoot or rudely annoy us; but they gave t.hemselves 
no trouble to evince to US, in any way, their sa-
tisfaction at our arriva!. Whatever we required 
they gave us, in return for our money; but as to 
enthusiasm, or a desire to anticipate our wants, 
there was not the shadow of an appearance of any-
thing of the kind about them. How differeilt all 
this from the poor Portuguese, who never failed to 
rend the air with their vivas, and were at aH times 
fuU of promises and protestations, no ma.tter how 
illcapable they might be of fulfilling the one, or 
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authenticating the other! The truth is, that tbe 
Spaniard is a proud, independent, and grave per-
sonage; possessing many excellent qualities, but 
quite conscious of their existente, and not unapt 
to overrate them. On the present occasion, too, 
they seemed to be more than or~inarily self-im-
portant, in eonsequence of their late achievements ; 
they were quick to take offence, even where none 
was intended, and not indisposed to provoke, or 
engage in broils with our soldiers. Not that any 
serious disturbance oecurred during our stay; the 
discipline preserved in our own ránks was too 
- good to permit it; but numberless little ineidents 
were continual1y taking place, which served stlffi· 
eiently to make us aware of the spirit wmch ae-
tuated the natives. Yet with all this. there was 
much about the air and manner of the Spaniards 
to deserve and eommand our regard. The Portu-
guese are a people that require rousing; theyare 
¡ndolent, ]azy, and generally helpless: we may 
value these our faithful allies, and render íhem 
useful; but it ls impossible highly to respeet 
them. In the Spanish eharacter, on the contrary, 
there is mixed up with a great deal of haughtiness, 
a sort of manIy independence of spirit, which you 
eannot but admire, even though aware that it will 
render them by many degrees less favorable to 
your wishes than their neighbours. 
Badajoz is a fine old town, situated on a lofty 
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eminence, which overhangs the Guadiana on its 
southern bank. The fortifications were then in 
a state oí tolerable r.epair;. and a tete-de-pont, 
and a fort on the opposite side of the river, gave 
indication that, in the wars between Spain and 
Portugal, it ha~ been regarded as a place of sorne 
importance. During my sojourn here, 1 met an 
old acquaintance, in the person of Colonel Lopez, 
an officer who had been sent forward by the 
Spanish government, to assist in clearing the way 
for our entrance into the country; and who had 
delayed his journey back, that he might with 
his own eyes see that proper accommodations 
were furnished to the troops in their passage. 
Colonel Lopez had just received despatches from 
the army of General Castanos, which bore date 
the 30th of Odober. He declined submitting 
them for my perusal; but he acquainted me that 
Castanos had narrowly escaped being made pri-
soner when executing a recognizance into the dis-
position of the French corps. His head-quarters 
being at Logrono, he had ridden into Lodosa, 
where a Spanish light battalion was stationed; 
when the French, by a sudden movement across 
the Ebro, contrived to surround both him and his 
escort. Castanos himself escaped; but the bat-
talion, after a brave resistance of two days, during 
which their ammunition became wholly exhausted, 
were obliged to surrender. The same officer 
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described the position of the French, army, in the 
terms in which 1 have detailed it at the beginning 
of this chapter. He stated that it was Castanos's 
intention to cross the Ebro at Tudela, to form a 
junction with Palafox, and to penetrate into the 
rear of the enemy; whilst Blake's corps should 
hang upon their left, and observe Vittoria. These 
were highly interesting and gratifying communi-
cations; unhappily a very few days sufficed to 
bring proof that they rested upon no solid founda-
tion. 
From Badajoz the column departed on the 7th, 
reaching Talavera la Real that night; and on the 
following day it carne into Merida. Between 
these two extreme points the country is almost 
entirely one continued plain; clear and open, and 
admirable for the operations of cavalry. The ac-
commodations which we met with by thé way 
were moreover such as we had no cause to com-
plain of. In the different towns, aH persons who 
happened to possess stables, freely threw them 
open, and took in both men and horses in num-
bers proportioned to the extent of these and of 
their dweHings; whilst the alcaldes had invariably 
men in readiness to eonduct the soldiers to their 
quarters, and to colleet, at convenient points, 
forage, bread, meat, and wine, ready for delivery. 
Everything was done with the most perfeet regard 
to order and precision; and though the marches 
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were gene rally severe, varying from twenty-eight 
to thirty English miles per day, still, as the horses 
were well fed upon barley and straw, there ap-
peared no reason to apprehend that they would 
not be brought ¡nto the fleld in as good condition 
as could be wished., And at Merida it may with 
truth be asserted, that the hussars were in no 
respect less efficient than when they first landed 
at Cascais. 
Merida is a handsome old town, full of relics, 
not a few of which it owes to the skill and in-
dustry of the Romans. There are the remains of 
what must have been a splendid triumpbal arch, 
an amphitheatre, several statues, columns, and 
old walls, all well worth the attention of the anti-
quary; and there is a bridge across tbe Guadiana, 
which the inhabitants allege to have been built by . 
direction of the emperor Trajan. Nor is it the 
antiquary only who would find much to ¡nterest 
and amuse him here. The agriculturist might see 
in the province, generally, much which he has 
never seen before-ploughs at work, each of them 
drawn by a single ass or mule, and guided by a 
single hand; and yet, in spite of the lightness of 
the soil, crops produced, such as neither Kent nor 
N orfolk will exceed. Then again there is the 
breed of sheep, so justly celebrated for ¡ts wool, to 
be found hefe in perfection, with pigs of the most 
beautiful and perfect breed. There are no milch 
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COWS here, goat's milk being alone In use, and 
that extremely scarce and difficuit to be had; but 
the breed of draft cattle is remarkably fine. The 
beef, likewise, is excellent; bU,t that which an 
Englishman enjoys aboye all the other produc-
tions of the country, is the bread. The poorest 
peasants here eat bread of the purest and whitest 
flour, which they generally twist up into a sort of 
ring, and knead and bake with the utmost careo 
lt is really delicious, and it appeared doubly 80 to 
us, who for so many weeks back had eaten nothing 
but the sour and unwholesome loaves of Portugal. 
VOL. J. N 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
Advance towards Madrid-Rumours of Blake's defeat-Ar-
rival at N aval-camero-Madrid; the state of public feeling 
there-)Vant of energy in the 8p'mish government, exhausted 
state of the treasury, aRd miserable plight of the armies-
Movementof General Hope's corps upon 8alamanca-
Fears lest it should be cut off-Causes of them-Overthrow 
of the 8panish armies, commanded by Blake, Belvedere, 
andCastanos-A French corps at Valladolid-8kirmish at 
Amvola-Rumour of General Baird's retreat-Refiections 
on the conduct of the war. 
HA VING passed the night in Merida, with very 
considerable comfort to ourselves, we prepared to 
renew our journey on the following morning.Pre-
vious to our setting out, however, two pieces of 
intelligence reached us, neither of which had any 
tendency to increase the feeling of satisfaction that 
attended us on our' arriva1. In the first place, we 
were given to understand that, as we proceeded 
onwards, though we should find at least as good, 
if not a better, disposition among the people, the 
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fare and general accommodations furnished, would 
greatIy deteriorate. The country was represented 
as naturally more sterile, and its rneans, scanty at 
the best, were said to be quite ,exhausted during 
the recent struggle. In the next place, and this 
was a piece of news much more alarming, a report 
got into circulation, that Blake had sustained a 
serious defeat in Bi~cay, and had retreated, no one 
knew whither, with the 10ss of three thqusand 
rnen.The reinforcernents, likewise, to the French 
army, of which we had heard somethirig previous 
to our advance from Portugal, were stated to have 
arrived; and their numbers were estimated at 
sixty thousand infantry, and from five to seven thou-
sand cavalry. AH this was startling enough, but as 
yet there were no authentic sources to which it 
could be traced back; and as evils are usually 
exaggerated, we , willingly believed that rnuch 
exaggeration might have been employed on the 
present occasion. At all events, our course was a 
very simple one; we had only to follow our in-
structions, and move in the direction' of Madrid. 
In the expectations which we had been led to 
form respecting the receptionand entertainment 
that awaited us, we were not disappointed. The 
people, though supine, were remarkably civil; 
whilst the treatment which we received from them, 
if in sorne respects less agreeable than that which 
we had hitherto experienced, was still as generous 
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as we had any reason to 100k for at their hands. 
They gave us freely whatever they themselves 
possessed, and we had no right to demand more. 
We accordingly pllshed on in good order and in 
excellent spirits, and passing through Medellin, 
Miajadas, Truxillo, J araicejo, Almaraz, N avalmo-
ral, Talavera del Reyno, and St. Ollalo, at each of 
which a night was spent, we reached, at last, a 
temporary halting place, in the town of N aval-
carnero. As this place was distant from Madrid 
not more than twenty miles, 1 determined to quit 
the brigade for a couple of days, for the purpose 
of visiting that city; and it may not, perhaps, 
prove uninteresting to the reader if 1 lay before 
him a sketch of the condition, military and poli-
tical, in which 1 found it. 
The first person whom 1 made it my business to 
see was Lord William Bentinck, at that time offi-
cially resident in Madrid, and in attendance upon 
the supreme government. 1 found him discon-
certed, in no ordinary degree, at the manner in 
which all things were conducted. The junta, it 
appeared, did nothing, or rather it was doing 
everything which Buonaparte could have desired. 
There was neither energy nor decision in the 
councils of the government-there was no money 
in the treasury-stores of every kind were want-
ing; and anarchy and misrule seemed to prevail 
in every department. Morla was at this time 
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secretary to the committee for the management of 
military affairs; and MorIa was known to be an 
able, as he was then believed to be an honourable 
man; but the managing committee itself was 
made up of men, as ignorant as they were credu-
lous. In their meetings there was abundance of 
cabal and party spirit, but neither talent nor infor-
mation. Such were the accounts which Lord 
William gave of the Spaniards; whilst of our own 
situation he drew no more flattering picture. He 
was himself totally in the dark, and he beIieved 
that others were equally so, touching the amount 
and situation of the French army; he knew onIy 
that they were rapidly advancing, and in great 
force; but where they were now, or whither they 
might move hereafter, he was completely ignorant. 
So much, indeed, was he struck with the absence 
of aU vigour in the conduct of the Spanish autho-
rities, that he already appeared to regard the 
game as desperate. Our columns might, he con-
ceived, effect their junction at Salamanca; it was 
evenprobable, from the accounts which had re-
cently reached him, ihat they would; but it was 
by no means impossible that the enemy might 
succeed in throwing a strong corps in the way of 
that junction; for there were no Spaniards up in 
a state to oppose them. 
These were certainly not the most acceptable 
communications which might have been made, 
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particularly to one who was already aware of the 
somewhat sombre temperament of his own leader. 
Sir J ohn Moore was a most excellent but cautious 
man; too much so perhaps to give his own abili-
ties a free scope, or to do himself justice in the 
cause in which he had embarked : he had set 
out with the avowed determination of acting -only 
in conjunction with the Spanish armies; and he 
would not move at all tiU the whole of his force 
should beassembled. Now, if there could be 
one truth more self-evident than another in the 
existing state of affairs, it was this, that to look· 
for any adequate support from the Spaniards till 
he should have more decidedlyentered upon his 
great enterprise, was useless; the q uestion there-
fore was, would he, when at the head of thirty 
thousand British troops, including a brilliant, 
fresh, and most efficient cavalry, abstain from 
striking a bJow? There was too much reason to 
apprehend that he would; though the army ap-
peared to feel that now was the time to strike, or 
nevero It is true that Buonaparte in person was 
stated to be either at Burgos or Vittoria, and that 
large masses, bothof infantry and cavalry, were on 
their march to join him; but the force imme-
diately up was represented as not exceeding that 
under Sir John: why not endeavour to bring him 
to action ? 
On the other hand, the junta appeared to be in 
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a state of the most pitiable alarm, lest Madri.d 
should again faH into the hands of the enemy. 
They peste red General Moore with daily requests, 
that, in case of any reverse, he should fall back, not 
upon Portugal, or towards the north, but upon the 
capital; and they were particularly desirous that 
General Hope's corps might be detac~ed altoge-
ther; and assist in the defence of the city. For 
they declared their determination to accept of no 
terms; and to' make'no submission to the 'invaders. 
Madrid, they affirmed, should be' a second Sara-
goza; and if any judgment could be formed from 
the display of enthusiasm exhibited by the lowf>f 
orders, it required but a moderate share of ability 
and good faith on the partof their chiefs to realise 
the boast. 
1 have said that the situation of affairs in gene-
ral, as these' at least were represented, deIIlanded 
a decisive line' of conduct from Sir John Moore; 
and that, upon every principIe ofwarfare, a prompt 
commencement . of offensive operationswas re-
quired at his hands. Of the jústiceof this remark 
the reade(will be thé better able to judge, whén 1 
inforrri him, that upon our first line of operations, 
there' were computed to be in arms, of Spanish 
and English troops, 116,000 infantry,and about 
2700 cavalry. These were miserably scattered, it 
is true. There were the remains of Blake's corps 
at Reynosa, estimatedat 20,000 men; General 
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Baird's corps of J 2,000, including 1400 cavalry, 
was on its march from Astorga to Benevente; 
Moore himself had collected full 15,000 at Sala-
manca; and Hope's division, of five thousand men, 
was at the Escurial, already under orders to move 
upon Salamanca. There was also General St. 
Juan's corps, estimated at twenty thousand men, 
which occupied the passes of the Somosierra and 
Guadarama; whilst the armies of Arragon, com-
manded by Palafox, Omel, and Doyle, and that of 
Castanos united, could not amount to less than 
forty thousand. No doubt the latter force was far 
removed from any ofthe former, for its head-quar-
ters were said to be at Saragoza, and its right to-
wards the Pyrenees; it was likewise in the most 
imminent danger; for Blake being overthrown, 
the enemy seemed to be' collecting all their 
strength, for the purpose of surrounding. and over-
whelming Castanos;' yet the probabilities were, 
that a forward movement, executed with prompti-
tude, might defeat that design; and there would 
be no very serious risk in advanc}ilg, at aH events, 
to Valladolid. Nor was this the only circum-
stance which seemed to point out the propriety of 
adopting decisive measures. The French, though 
extremely formidable, were not as yet equal to 
the allies in point of numbers; their army, in-
creased sorne time, ago to eighty thousand men, 
hall received an additional reinforcement of thirty 
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thousand only; the odds were therefore on our 
side. But it was not' probable that we should 
long enjoy this superiority, as fresh troops were 
understood to be in progress from aH parts of 
France towards the Spanish frontier. 
But whilst thus arguing, let me not forget, in 
justice to the memory of a most excellent, in-
trepid, and able officer, to state one or two reasons 
why heshould not rush, as it were headlong, into 
unseen dangers. Bis information, like that of the 
Supreme Junta itself, was most defective. Upon 
. public and official reports, no confidence whatever 
could be placed; and from private sources of in-
telligence he seemed to be even carefulIy cut off; 
lt was from his own officers alone, from Colonel 
Graham, Gaptain Whittingham, and others, whom 
he from time to time employed in coHecting such 
facts as might faH in their way, that he received any 
communications on which he considered himself 
justified in relying; and these all united in repre-
senting the Spanish armies as not only half-armed, 
and otherwise w~tchedly equipped, but inefficient 
also in respect ofji.umbers. Corps put down by the 
juntas at twenty or thirty thousand men, proved, 
when inspected by these officers, to mus ter eight 
or ten; and of these eight or ten thousand, per-
haps one-half, or nearly one-half, might be un pro-
vided with muskets. Then, of the position of the 
enemy, no one knew anything. That they were 
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concentrating, seemert to he generally understood ; 
and that their object was to overwhelm Castanos, 
most men apprehended; but no one could speak 
with' confidence, because no one spoke on other 
grounds than those of common rumour. N or was 
this aH. Dissensions and quarrels were said to 
have arisen, both in the juntas and in the armies; 
at this most critical momento Castanos was said 
to be harassed in his' command by the presence of 
the commissiciner Palafox ; and to be on bad terms 
with those' under him. Romana was true and 
able, but he was at a distance, and had hishands 
fuIl; whilst Sir John Moore's own positiori, half-
way between us and Baird, rendered any 'im.: 
mediate movement extremely hazardous, either to 
the one flank or the other. That ,thesecircum-
stances 'carried great weight in the mind of our 
chief, his future proceedings proved; but it is now 
high time to resume this detaiL 
. 1 have said that the central junta was ex-
tremely anxious that sorne British troops should 
be detachedfrom the main army, for the express 
púrpose of covering Madrid; and as General 
Hope's division chanced to be nearest at hand, the 
nÍost urgent entreaties were pressed upon him, to 
corrie "into this plan at his own discretion. It was 
strongly úrged upon him, that were his corps to 
unite itseif to that of General Sto Juan, the passes 
of Somosierra and of the Guadarama would be 
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perfectly secured. General Hope, however, whose 
head-quarters were now at the Escurial, could 
not listen to any suggestion' of the kind. The 
orders from his superior were abundantly explicit 
to join him, unless something extraordinary carne 
in the way, at Salamanca; and General Hope saw 
nothing, either in the immediate situation or fu-
ture prospects of the Spanish capital, to lead him 
into a neglect of these orders. Having, therefore, 
halted a few days, for the purpose of collecting 
his stragglers, and closing up the cavalry, which 
had rnarched at sorne distance frorn the rear of 
his colurnn, he made preparations for pushing 
on, with as little delay as possible, upon Sala-
manca. ; . 
On the 27th, the whole division passed the 
Guadarama mO,unt~ins; and the 18th hussars, with 
the 71st infantry, reached Villa Castrin; on the 
opposite side of the Sierra. N ext day, the rest 
of the infantry, together with three brigades of 
guriS and the whole park of ammunition-waggons, 
reached the same point; whilst the hussars pushed 
on to Adanero, where they took the duty . of the 
olltpostS. But though our movernents had been 
so far abundantIy satisfactory, certain intelligence 
carne in that day, which caused considerable un-
easiness, as well to General Hope as to all who 
happened to be iritrusted with it. Ir was in sub-
stance as follows :-
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Lord Proby had been sent forward by Sir John 
Moore on the road to Valladolid, with the view, if 
possible, of ascertaining whereabouts the enemy 
were, and how they might appear disposed to 
acto Lord Proby had proceeded as far as Tor-
desillas, when a patrol of the French cavalry 
entered the town, and he with great difficulty 
escaped being made prisoner. In spite of this 
interruption, however, he so far effected his ob-
ject as to be able to report that six hundred 
French cavalry, with two field-pieces and two 
howitzers, were actually in Tordesillas, and that 
they were supported by six hundred more who 
occupied Valladolid. The former force, he stated, 
had advanced their posts as far as Puerto del 
Do~ro and Arnajo, and detachments from both 
were scouring the country, levying contributions, . 
and acting exactly as if no troops were in tbe field 
against tbem. But this was no! all the intelli-
gence which his despatch contained. It ap-
peared that tbe magistrates of the towns and 
villages near, had received requisitions, accom-
panied by proclamations, from Marshal Bessieres, 
indicating that he was on his march from Palencia, 
at the head of ten thousand men; that he ex-
pected to be in Valladolid on the 24th; and that 
he should look to find rations prepared for· his 
men, as well as forage for his horses, along the 
whole line of his marcho 
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The reader will easy believe that such informa-
cion, coming fram such a quarter, produced no 
little stir among the principal functionaries of our 
little corps. Whoever will take the trouble to 
consult the map, may see that the distance from 
Valladolid to Salamanca is at least not greater 
than from Villa Castine to the latter place; and 
hence that, supposing the two corps to have ar-
rived at their several destinations on the same 
day, there was every probability. that Bessieres, 
unencumbered as he doubtless was with waggons, 
and even with artillery, would be able to throw 
himself between us and our point of rendezvous, 
should he feel so disposed. But if such were the 
case on the supposition of our arriving si multa-
neously at Valladolid and Villa Castine, the danger 
of being intercepted was doubled, provided the 
French Marshal should have acted up to the pur-
port of his manifestos, and entered Valladolid on 
the 24th. Bad, however, as this was, it was not 
the worst news that met us here; for on the very 
same night a courier carne in with accounts of the 
disastrous battle of Tudela. That the reader may 
the better understand how this misfortune threat-
ened to affect us, it wilI be necessary for me to 
draw off his attention, for a few moments, from 
the details of our own proceedings, and to make 
him acquainted with the operations of the different 
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Spanish corps, upon whose efficiency we had been 
all along led to calculate. 
Previous to 'our entrance into Spain, we had 
been given to understand that three large armies, 
oneunder Blake and Romana, another under 
Castanos, and a third, which kept up the com-
munication between these two, under the Conde 
de Belvidere, were all manceuvring in the front 
and on the flanks of the French line, and would 
probably overwhelm it erewe should be able to 
join them. The manceuvring of the three corps 
proved to be nothing more than a mere retention 
of their separate positions, in which they watched 
the French, with extreme caution no doubt, but 
from which they never dreamed of attempting any-
thing offensive. In this state things continued till 
the enemy's reinforcements arrived; arid then it 
was lefttothem to form' their own plan, and to 
choose their own field of operations. The first 
Spanish General who felt the weight of their 
prowess was Blake; he was attacked in his posi-
tion in the debouches of Villarcayo, Orduna, and 
Munjuca; from which, after a very spirited and 
obstínate resistan ce, he retired upon Espinosa. 
No time, however, was granted him for breathing. 
On the very day after his arrival there, he was 
again assailed by an overwhelming force; andhis 
army, worn out with fatigue, and destitute of pro-
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visions and clothing, was utterly dispersed. It fled 
in all directions, and . the magazines at Reynosa, 
as well as the harbour of Sto Andero, were both 
taken possession of by the enemy. 
Whilst the operations which led to this victory 
were going on, Buonaparte himself entered Spain, 
and fixed his head-quarters, on the 8th of Novem-
ber, at Vittoria. His first act was to send forward 
a corps, under the orders,ofMarshalSoult, against 
the • Estremadura army, which, headed' by the 
Conde Belvidere~ lay in his front. Belvidere was 
a young man of great bravery, but said to be defi-
cient in military talent; he took up a defensive 
position near Burgos, and awaited the approach of 
the enemy. The consequence was, that, attacked 
in an open . country by veteran troops, of which a 
large proportion was cavalry, he suffered a com": 
plete'. defeat, upwards of thre'e . thousand dead 
being left upon the field, and the rest scattered, 
beyond the possibility of immediate reunion: 
Thus ,were two of the three' armies, of which so 
much notice had been taken,' summarily disposed 
of; it 'remained now only to dispose of the' third 
in a like manner; nor did any great while elapse 
ere it also was made to succumb under superior 
discipline and numbers. 
Castanos was at this time posted in the vicinity 
of Calahorra, and had undel' his orders the united 
al'mies of Andalusia and Arragon. Of the num-
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bers which composed that army, it is impossible 
even now to speak with accuracy; for the records 
of Spanish historyare so overrun with exaggera-
tion, that it would be extremely unsafe, in almost 
any case, to rely upon them; but from every cre-
dible rumour, it could not exceed forty thousand 
men; and of these, perhaps, one half only were 
adequately armed. As soon as Castanos heard of 
the fate of Blake's and Belvidere's armies, he de-
clared his determination to retreat, and to avoid, 
as long as he possibly could, bringing matters to 
the issue of a battle. But Castanos was not left to 
the guidance of his own judgment. He was beset 
by spies from the central junta, which, on all 
occasions, appeared to distrust its generals, in 
exact proportion to their abilities; and he was by 
them urged and importuned to take a step, of the 
folly of which his better reason had long convinced 
him. He fell back from Calahorra upon Tudela, 
and there risked an action. As he had antici-
pated, his raw army was beaten; and it was with 
the utmost difficulty that the General could keep 
together,after the defeat, a force sufficient to 
form the nucleus of another. With this he fled, 
rather than retreated, to Calatayud, where his 
troops endured ali the miseries of destitution, and 
even famine to the utmost. 
1 t soon became known that the enemy were 
moving in force upon Segovia; and though Segovia 
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was occupied by a division of St. Juan's army, 
amounting to six thousand men, under General 
Aradia, no great confidence could be cherished, 
that such an impediment would long deIay him. 
The resistance to be offered by Segovia had 
already been measured, by the faciIity with which 
St. Juan might be able to ~efend himself in the 
Somosierra pass. In case he shonld succeed in 
holding that, then was General Aradia to keep his 
post to the last ex trcmi t y ; but if the Somosierra 
were carried, then was Aradia to fall back at once 
upon the Guadarama pass. N ow the' Guadarama 
pass was the only road left open for our retreat, in 
the event of our junction with Sir John Moore 
being cut off by troops from Valladolid; should 
it likewise -be forced, our situation would become 
a desperate one. N othing indeed remained, ex-
cept to throw ourselves into A vila; where, as it 
was a fortified place, we must needs maintain 
ourseIves, till Sir John Moore should be. able to 
advance to our reIief. 
When General Hope began his mareh from the 
Escurial, he intended to proceed by Adanero to 
Arrivola, and from thence to Madrigal, Penaranda, 
Huerto, and so onwards to Salamanca. As soon, 
however, as the aboye intelligence reached him, 
he prudently determined to alter his route, alld to 
move by a road considerabIy to the left, and of 
course further from the direct line of the enemy's 
VOI •• l. () 
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probable operations. The cavalry accordingly re-
ceived orders to ,march on the 30th to Fontiveros, 
~nd to occupy posts for the protection of the co-
lumnof artillery and infantry, which moved on 
the same day to Avila. On the follQwing morning 
the march was resumed, and the road to Pena-
randa taken, where the column arrived without 
molestation on the 2nd of December; but the 
p¡ain body of the cav.alry was still kept at Fonti-
veros, whilst its outposts were extended as far as 
Adanero, Arrivola, Villa N ova de Aroud, Madrigal, 
Royama, and even to Penaranda itself. Thus 
were the rear and the right flanks of the division 
perfectly secured; and it was rendered quite im-
practicable for the enemy to harass its movements, 
without at least sufficient time being gaine<J. to 
provide against any,emergency. 
It is hardly necessary to say, that my own posi-
tion was with the cavalry. While thus employed, 
1 instituted various in quiries as to the nature and 
strength of the French troops which had shown 
themselves in this quarter; and 1 heard that they 
consisted only of portions of a partisan corps, de-
tached at a great distan ce from their main body, 
and intended to effect no other end, than merely 
to spread alarm ayer the country, and distract 
people's attention. In this they had certainly 
succeeded; whilst the chief part of thei.r force was 
moving all the while towards their left, with the 
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design, after the defeat of Castanos, of ovel'whelm-
ing St. Juan, and taking possession of Madrid. 
How it carne about, that they made no attempt 
to penetrate between our columns; whether the 
possibility of succeeding in the effort had not oc-
curred to them, 01' that they considered the other 
an object of much greater importance, 1 had of 
course no means of ascertaining. But 1 did as-
certain that they had not, from the first, made any 
movement, either partially 01' generally, which 
could lead to the supposition, that such an un-
dertaking had ever entered into their contempla-
tion. 
We had traversed a large portion of Spain, and 
during the last few weeks had been almost con-
stantly in the immediate presence of the enemy ; 
yet, strange to say, we had never exchanged shots. 
On the 29th, at night, that event occurred for the 
first time. It Ihight be about midnight, when the 
videttes, furnished by the picket at Arrivola, gave 
an alarm that the French were coming on. The 
troopers mounted and made ready, and in a few 
minutes found themselves attacked by a strong 
party of cavalry; concerning the nature of which, 
whether it were the advanced-guard of a corps, 01' 
a mere patrol, they were unavoidably ignorant. 
As nothing was to be gained by keeping possession 
of Arrivola, our people, after skirmishing fDr a few 
minutes, feH back; but they were not pursued, 
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and they halted for the. night at a house upon 
the road-side, distant about half a mile from the 
village. At daylight they once more advanced 
upon Arrivola. The movement was, of course, 
made with extreme caution; though for caution, 
as the event proved, there was no necessity; for 
the enemy had abandoned the place several hours 
before, having taken time merely to plunder the 
post-office. This was the only event which befell 
uso from the hour of our quitting Lisbon, up to the 
day ofour junction with the main body of the army 
at Salamanca. 
During the Srd of December, no change took 
place in the position of the cavalry; its main body 
stillcontinuing at Fontiveros, whilst iís posts were 
extended, as before, along the f!ank of the column 
of infantry: littIe, therefore, occurred calculated 
to amuse or excite; for the enemy made no move-
ments, and we were left entirely to ourselves. 
Whilst thus situated, every little piece of intelli-. 
gence which happened to come in, attracteda de-
gree of attention far deeper and more lasting than, 
in aH probability, would have be en the case had 
our minds and bodies been more actively employed. 
AH the rumours which reached us were not, how-
ever, in themselves uninter,esting; at least there 
was one, which, under any circumstances, would 
have driven us, in spite of ourselves, into a train of 
speculation and inquiry. . 
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We were given to understand that Sir David 
Baird's column, which had landed at Corunna 
on the 13th of the preceding month, and had ad· 
vanced on the road to Salamanca as far as Astorga, 
had suddenly received orders to fall back agáin 
upon eorunna. Such intelligenceexcited in us 
great surprise; nor could we see either the motive 
which should lead to such a measure, or the ne-
cessity which could compel ¡t. Was it that a 
retreat had been determined upon, in order to save 
Portugal, by abandoning Spain altogether? or 
were we to take shipping, and proceeding south-
wards to Cadiz, to make the south instead of the 
north of Spain the theatre of our operations? These 
were questioIÍs which,' at the outposts, it was im-
possible to answer; yet was it equaUy impossible 
not to perceive the unhappy results which would 
cert~inly. follow out of the one as well as the other. 
This was not the moment for retracting, unless we 
should be fairly driven to it by a force overwhel-
mingly superior; and of such we certainly saw 
nothing, at least in our immediate front. Our 
business, on the contrary, was to advance; and 
the late disasters, so far from taking away froro 
that necessity, only increased it. 
In order to carry on operations with at least a 
fair prospect of Sl1ccess, several modes of acting 
were before uso In the first place, supposing the 
Somosierra and the Guadarama passes to be de-
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fcnsible by Sto JUan's army, and that the remains 
of Castanos's troops should have arrived, as they 
were said to have arrived, at Siguenza, on the 30th, 
aH immediate apprehension as to the fate of Madrid 
might safely be la id aside. lil this case, Moore's 
column might endeavour to unite itself with that 
of Blake, either at Leon or at any other conve-
nient spot in that quarter, Sir David Baird's corps 
directing its march upon the same point; and as 
Blake was represented to have still twenty thou-
sand men under his orders, the junction of the two 
would make up a formidable force, fit either for 
offensive or defensive undertakings. U pon this 
centre, the scattered battalions from the other 
armies might easily rally; and then, or even 
earlier, should it be deemed advisable, an advance 
upon Valladolid might be undertaken, and a cam-
paign opened, upon a grand scale, with the com-
bined strength of the whole. 
In the next place, and still taking it for granted 
that the passes could be maintained for sorne timey 
the British army would run but littIe risk, were it, 
unconnected witlÍ any Spanish force whatever, to 
advance froro Salamanca, by Abba de Tormes, 
upon Madrid. There was no force between these 
two points capable of resisting it; and the very 
knowledge tIlat it was in motíon to the front, 
would call off the attention of the enemy from 
their present plans, and give time to the broken 
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Spaniards to collect and recover their order. And 
lastly, should matters fall out in every respect 
contrary to our wishes and interests; should the 
Somosierra pass becarried, and all communication 
between St. Juan's army and the army at Sigu-
enza be cut off; should Blake's corps be so Cotn-
pletely broken up, as to be rendered incapable of 
rallying or re-assembling; and Portugal be fallen 
into a state of helpless inactivity,-even in the 
event of all these misfortunes hefalling us, we 
were not without a resource. There was nothing 
to prevent St. Juan's and Castanos's troops from 
retreating with all speed upon Cuenca or Va-
lencia, and to unite themselves there with the 
Catalonians; orpassing the Sierra Morena, to 
collect everything around them under the walls of 
Cadiz; whilst we also, with a good grace, might 
change our ground froro the north to the south ; 
,whither our shipping could convey us' from any 
ports between Corunna and Lisbon. At all events, 
a precipitate retreat, at a moment like the present, 
was unpopular. Our arroy had suffered no dis-
asters; it had never come into contact with the 
enemy; it was now inthe very centre of SpttÍn, 
and tite eyes not of Spain only, but of all Europe, 
were upon it ;-what would be the consequence 
were it.to abandon the capital without striking a 
blow, and quit tite field before a single encounter 
had taken place r N o doubt the game was a deep 
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one; but it was the last which Eng1and had ta 
play, and it appeared desirable in the eyes of the 
army to play it boldly. 
Such wete the ideas which occurred at the mo-
ment, and which, in spite of very dispiriting intel-
ligence from other quarters, continued to remain 
uppermost in our minus. The supineness and 
inactivity of the Portuguese, excessive as these 
were repl'esented to be, in no respect led to a 
change of opinion. It is true that, from these. 
little efficient eo-operation was to be expected; 
the energies of the people being appliedwhoUy-to 
the arrangement of religious processions; and the 
government, either froID the absence of power or 
of ability, making no attempt whateverto support 
us; for even a line of dragoons, between Sir John 
Moore's army and thatof the British cornmander 
in Lisbon, though requested in the joint names of 
these two functionaries, was refused. Yet in Spain 
the case was certainly differel1t. There the com-
_ mon people, with sorne remarkable exceptions. 
were all enthusiastic in the cause; in Madrid 
this was particularly the case,_ as their expressions 
of joy, at beholding a British uniform, abundantly 
testified. Why should men thU8 actuated be 
abandoned? It was- no good reason to urge, that 
the inhabitants of Estremadura and Toledo had 
exhibited symptoms of a self-confidence sadly 
misplaced, and.of a hauteur and irritability of tem-
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per highly disagreeable to their allies. Among 
them the French had not yet appeared; they 
knew nothing, therefore, either of the sufferiIigsor 
of the defeats of their fellow-countrymen, except 
by reporto Withas little justice might it be urged, 
that the people of Old Castile deserved no support, 
because they were either unwiliing or unable to 
defend themselves. The people of Old Castile 
present doubtless a poor specimenof the Spanish 
character; and resernble, in indolence and sloth, 
the natives of Portugal rather than those of Spain ; 
but the people ofOld Castile constituted but a small 
portion of the Spanish nation. Spain itself was 
not to be abandoned, because sorne Spaniards 
were spiritless or uncivil. 
But N apoleon himself was in the freId, his head~ 
quarters being already' at Aranda. Itwas to ·be 
_ regretted that the case shouldbe so, and that 
Alexander had not detained him somewhat longer 
at Erfurth; for hehad, beyond question, appeared 
upon our stage too soon. Still, even Napóleon 
was not invincibIe. And, lastly, there wasno 
unanimity, no vigour, no energy, in thé proceed-
ings either of the Spanish government or the Spa-
nish generals. Instead of nominating some ·one 
person as commander-in-chief, to whom all the 
other generals might pay obedience, each leader 
of an army was left to act according to the sug-
gestions of his own faney; and all were, or claim-
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ed to be, on a footing of the most perfect equality. 
PaJafox, Blake, and Cuesta, were continually in-
triguirig and caballing against one another; Cas-
tanos had been ruined by the presence of spies, 
and Blake sacrificed to a similar interference. 
As to Romana, his place of sojourn was quite un-
known, though r~mours were in circulation, both 
that he was about to be placed at the head of the 
Spanish armies, and that he might be daily ex-
pected at Salamanca, to consult with Moore. N o 
doubt these were terrible evils; so terrible, as to 
bring upon Spain greater danger and greater cala-
mities, than she ran the smalIest risk of incurring 
from the efforts of th~ enemy. Yet were they. not 
such as to authorise our withdrawal from the scene 
of action, at a time when upon our presence the very 
existence of the country might be said todepend. 
Besides, there was something so galling to the 
mind of a British soldier in the prospect of flight 
before he was beaten, that no one could think oÍ, 
it with patience. The very common troopers 
seemed indignant at the suggestion; and it cer-
tainly did appear strange, that whilst the women 
of Madrid were labouring night' and day to put 
their city in a posture of defence, we should be 
preparing to abandon them. 
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CHAPTER IX. 
Visit to head-qua,rters, and interview with Sir John Moore-
A retreat determined upon-General dissatisfactioIÍ of the 
army-The idea of retreating abandoned, and orders issued 
to advance -Movement upon Tordesillas - Skirmish at 
Rueda-Sir John Moore resol ves to attack Soult on the 
Carrion-The army advances for that purpose-Brilliant 
affair of cavalry at Sahagun-Preparations for a battle sud-
denly countermanded. 
HA VING good reason to believe that the French 
were aH moving upon Madrid, and that there was 
no probahility of any attack heing made upon our 
posts for sorne time to come, 1 set off at an early 
hour on the morning of the 4th, and reached Sala-
manca about noon on theday following. 1 was 
induced to take this step~ not from mere curiosity 
alone, hut in consequence of certain letters which 
1 had received from Sir John Moore, concerning 
the contents of which 1 was desirous of personally 
consulting him. 1 entered the place full of doubts 
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and apprehensions; and 1 certainly did not quit it 
with apprehensions allayed, or doubts removed. 
Having waited upon the General, and the com-
pliments usual on such occasions having passed, 
our conversation naturally took the turn into which 
the present situation of affairs, and the position of 
the army, were calculated to guide it. lt was then 
that Sir John explicitly stated to me, that he had 
come to a final determination ta retreat. He had 
caBed the general.officers together, he added, for 
the purpose of acquainting 'them with his decision, 
as well as with the reasons which led to it; but 
he had neither requested their opinions, nor de-
manded their judgment. He next entered, at 
great length, into the motives ,which swayed him, 
reasoning, in conversation, as he reasoned in his 
letters, with a decided leaning to the gloomy side 
of the picture. He spoke warmly in condemna-
tion of the Spanish government, and.of the nation 
generally; and enlarged upon the absence of all 
right understanding among the general s, as well 
as upon the abs~rdity of their military movements, 
which had subjected them all to be beaten in de-
taiL . He expressed his sincere regret that they 
had not marched, as theyought to have done, when 
he first began to enter the country, so as to unite 
themselves with him; and declared that, with a 
fOTce as yet uncollected, and having nQthing but 
the remains of defeated corps on his flanks, a 
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choice of evils alone remained for him. The de-
termination to which he. had at last come, was 
not formed without extreme pain to hims~lf; but 
the duty ofpreserving his army"situated as it now 
was, presented to his mind a consideration para-
mount to every otber; he was, therefore, resolved 
to retreat. 
Though 1 could not but feel deeply on hearing 
such a declaration, 1 deemed it my respectful 
duty to say little in reply. further than by ex-
pressing my regret that so strong a necessity for 
the measure should exist, and my apprehension of 
its consequences 10 the cause. The slightest in-
dication of a retrograde movement, exhibited at 
such a moment as this, would, 1 feared, produce 
fatal effects; for, Spain would fall, Portugal would 
fall, and the whole of Europe be once moreat the 
feet .of the enemy. Then what would become of 
Madrid, ,whose inhabitants were enduríng the 
severest privations, chiefly with the hope of re-
ceiving aid from us; and of Castanos, and Pa-
lafox, and Blake, aH oí whom, OH the same ex-
plicit understanding, were labouring to re-as-' 
semble their scattered troops. No doubt, 1 added, 
the General's information was more likely to be 
correet than mine; but 1 dreaded the heavy dis-
appointment which his proposed s~ep would 
occasion to the people of Epgland, whose very 
bearts seemed set upon the success .of his under-, 
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taking; and whose mortification at his failure 
would be biiter, in proportion to the degree of 
hope with which they saw him embark upon it. 
1 then retired, with the painful conviction on my 
mind, that the army would begin its backward 
journey in the course of a day or two at the 
furthest. 
The feelings of regret under which 1 laboured 
were not, 1 soon fonnd, confined to my own 
breast; they were shared by many in the army. 
Even the General's personal 8taff sought not to 
conceal their chagrin at tbe adoption of a system 
which seemed so unsatisfactory. General Hope 
having by this time joined, there were at Sala-
manca and in the neighbourhooq full twenty 
thousand British troops, in a state, both from 
their equipment and discipline, to oppose any 
French force of almost double the number. Ge-
neral Baird, with a strong reinforcement, particu-
larly in cavalry, was at Astorga; nor were there 
any impediments whatever in his way, which 
should hinder him from arriving within six days at 
fue furthest. But if it should be deemed unsafe 
to wait so long here, why not move towards him, 
and concentrate the divisions behind the Douro, 
from whence ofi'ensive operations might be under-
taken? Any thing, in short, was pronounced 
preferable toa retreat, which, independently of 
the disgrace which it would bring upon the Bri-
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tish arms, must expose Madrid to destruction, 
and cause the certain annihilation of Castanos and 
Palafox's armies. Seldom did men, situated as 
we were, venture to speak out, so boldly against 
the measures of their chief. But murmurings and' 
remonstrances were useless; the die was cast, 
and it could not be recalled. 
In the midst of these discussions, news carne in 
from tha capital, which served to produce an effect 
upon the mind of our General. The Spaniards 
were represented as prepared to bury themselves 
under the ruins of the city, and to perish to a 
man, before the French should entero In the 
short space of forty-eight hours they had unpaved 
the streets, and loaded the balconies and flat roofs 
of their houses with the stones, in readiness to be 
burled on the heads of the assailants. A huge 
trench was already drawn round the entire cir-
cumference of the city; numerous outworks were 
begun, and men and women of aH ranks and 
classes were labouring incessantly for their com-
pletion. Morla had assumed the chief command 
of the place; and all were united in one enthusias-
tic resolutioI} to conquer or perish. It is pro-
bably needless to add that the annunciation of 
these tidings served but to increase our disconten t. 
Men were no longer contented to express gene-
rally tbeir disapprobation of the retreat, but each 
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wasready with his own plan, from the adoption of . 
which he was perfectly convinced that the most 
advantageous results might arise. Why not move 
to. the right, cried one, and endeavour to unite 
with Castanos? Should matters come to the 
worst, there will always be a retreat aeross the 
Sierra Morena, upon Cadiz. Why not make a 
forward movement at once, exclaimed another, or 
else close up our own troops in. the rear of the 
Douro? this will at least retard the enemy's 
operations, if it do not absolutely defeat them? 
Was it tobe expeeted that Buonaparte, having 
gone so far, would relinquish Spain, till bis whole 
strength shóuld have been brought against it? or 
that . the raw Spanish levies would not suffer de-
feats? Were .there no provine es whither, in the 
event of being overpowered, the British army 
could withdraw, still warm in the cause, and stiU 
capable of .exertion? W ould not a British force 
in the north of Spain, ev.en though driven to act 
on the defensive; or the same force retiring gra-
dually towards the. south, and gathering round it, 
as it went, the remnants of the different Spanish 
,corps, cast prodigious difficulties in tbe way of the 
enemYI alld give prodigiolls ellcouragement to our 
allies? AH these questions were asked with the 
tone which men will assume, when matters are in 
progress of which they disapprove; and it was 
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answered, as if with one voice, tbat balf the army 
had better be sacrificed, tban the cause tbus 
abandoned. 
N otwithstandlÍlg these murmurs, of which be 
was not left in ignorance, General Moore exlií-
bited no signs of any alteration in his previolfS 
resolutions. On the contrary, Lord Paget, who 
had been previol1lsIy commanded to close up from 
Astorga with the whole of the cava1ry, reeeived 
<>rders nQt to march; and it was given. out that 
the retrograde movement would commence on the 
day after the morrow ; one cavalry regiment only 
was summoned, but it was called in for tbe 
avowed purpose of strengthening the hussar bri-
gade, and enabling it to cover more effectualIy tbe 
retreat of the column. Thus, on the night of tbe 
5th, the troops retired to rest, in the unshaken be-
lief th~t the proud hopes with which they had 
entered thiscountry, were aH doomed. to suffer 
overthrow. 
Having remained during the night in Salamanca, 
1 departed on the following morning to the out-
posts, whieh had been drawn in, and now oceu-
pied stations in the immediate front of this city. 
1 had not resumed my ordinary toutine of duty 
many hours, when, to my in,expressible satisfac-
tion, intelligence was communicated to me that 
the General had altered his plans. Sir David 
Baird, who had actually begun his retrogade 
VOL. J. l' 
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movement from Astorga, was ordered to retrace 
his . steps; and an advance, instead of a retreat, 
was u~derstood to be in contemplation. N ever 
,has a condemned criminal rejoiced more heartily 
at the receipt of a reprieve, than did the British 
army when these tidings got abroad among them. 
But a few hours ago, and every face looked blank 
and woe-begone; men did their duty, indeed, at~ 
tended to their horses and accoutrements, and 
performed all the other offices which their stations 
required; but they set about every thing with the 
air of people who took no manner of interest in 
what they were doing. Now all was life and 
activity, insomuch, that even occupations, which 
but a few hours ago would have cost many a com-
plaint whilst in process of execution, were exe-
cuted, not only without murmur, but withapparent . 
satisfaction. 
It was but natural that the curiosity of all 
should be powerfully excited respecting the causes 
which, in so short a space of time, had produced 
effects so remarkable. Whilst by sorne it was 
surmised that the disapprobation of the general 
officers to his proposed measures, had of itself 
induced Sir John Moore to take them into further 
and more serious consideration; others, with per-
haps more reason, attributed the circumstance 
.mainly to the receipt of fresh information from 
Madrid, and letters which were known to have 
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come in from Mr. Frere. From the formerofthese 
it was collected, that the inhabitants of the capital 
had abated nothing of their ardour; that the 
French had made oneassault, ~n which they were 
repulsed with loss; and that, from the temper 'of 
the people andthe zeal of their leaders, it was 
anticipated that no better suécess wouJd attend 
them in others. Such were the news from 
Madrid; whilst Mr. Frere's letter was understood 
to contain little el se than one tissue of cogent 
reasons ag'ainst any movement to the rear. Mr. 
Frere was doubtless fully justified in writing in 
this strain; as minister from the court ofEngland. 
he was perfectly authorised to give advice respect .. 
ing the course to be pursued by the English 
General, even if that officer had abstained froID 
requesting it; but Sir John Moore having re .. 
peatedly soIicited his opinion, as to the p'rudence 
or imprudence of schemes in agitation, his right 
to speak or write stl'Ongly became increased four~ 
fold. Mr. Frere, however, in my humble judg.:. 
ment, erred, in desiring that Colonel Charmilly 
should be examined before acouncil of war prior 
to any movement being made. Respecting ~olonel 
Charmilly's trust-worthiness, 1 beg to be under-
stood as offering no opinion; he might have been 
a very good and a very prudent man, or he might 
have been the reverse; but in either case it would 
have beeri not onIy insulting to the Commander of 
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the forces, to have the judgment of an unofficial 
emigrant set up in opposition to his own; but the 
consequences might have been in every way 
ruinous. Sir John Moore dismissed that person 
with marks of dissatisfaction ; and I think I should 
have done the same. 
In spite of all this, however, and in spite of the 
excessive timidity of the Supreme Junta, which 
on the first alarm of danger had fled to Badajoz, 
at the very extremity of the kiugdom, only oue 
opinion can, I conceive, be formed, as to the sound-
ness of the views taken by Mr. Frere on the presént 
occaSlOn. No doubt we should have had serious 
difficulties to contend against, not the least serious 
of which was presented by the disorganised and 
disjointed state of the Spanish armies; but of the 
evils arising from. that system, even the imbecile 
government seemed to be aware; and there was a 
prospect that the separate corps would be shortly 
brought together under sorne single chief. Romana. 
too, was generaIly spoken of·as the man; and in 
Romana we had all great confidence. N ow should 
thisplan beacted upon, as we had good reason to 
believe it would, the absence of the junta, so far 
from beiug a subject of regret, ought rather to be 
viewed as one of cordial congratulation; inasmuch 
as the intrigues, cabals~ and absurdities, whích at-
tended constantly upon its deliberations, were 
likely to produce less mischiefwhen the body itself 
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was at a dístance, than if it were near at hand. 
But to return to our own movements. 
It was on the evening of the 5th,-on the even-
ing.of the very day on which 1 'had my last inter-
view with him, that Sir John Moore's sentiments 
began to waver .. A courier was accordingly de-
spatched that night, with directions to General 
Baird not to persist in his movement upon Corunna; 
ánd on the following morning a second courier set 
off, bearing orders for him to retrace his steps upon 
the Astorga road. At the same time Colonel Gra-
ham was despatched to Madrid, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the real condition of the city, and of 
bringing back such accounts as might be worthy of 
confidence. This officer, who throughout the war 
peculiarly distinguished himself by his activity and 
diligence, had come in, only a few days before, 
with tidings of the defeat of Sto Juan's' army, and 
the forcing of the Somosierra pass by a corps of 
French cavalry. It was then that men began to 
inquire why measures had not been adopted to 
secure that pass more effectualIy, than by leaving 
it to thecare of a Spanish levy of half-armed 
peasants; and many were of opinion, that had 
General Hope's corps taken a position there, much 
time might have be en gained; whilst Baird's 
column joining Sir John Moore's, the whole might 
have advanced togcther, or, in case of reverses, 
fallen back in a body upon Madrid. That advan· 
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tage, however, was lost; and hence not only would 
any movement of troops upon the capital he made 
at a double risk, hut even a single messenger-
such as Colonel Graham-was compelled to make 
a long detour, in order to reach it in safety. By a 
circuitous route, however, Colonel Graham pro-
ceeded; and upon the results of his mission, and 
the report which he might happen to hring back, 
the future operations of the army were understood 
to dependo 
In these uncertain measures, and still more. in 
the general tenor of his conversation, it Was easy 
to perceive marks of the gloom which at this time 
overshadowed the mind of General Moore. That 
he was an officer of great distinction, every 
one acknowledged during his life, and posterity 
will never deny it; hut it was too manifest that a 
fear of responsibility, a dread of doing that which 
was wrong, of runnirig himself and his troops into 
difficulties from which they might not be able to 
extricate themselves, were a great deal too active 
lo permit either his talents or his· judgment pro-
perly to exert their influence. Sir John Moore 
had earned the highest reputation as a general of 
division; he was aware of this; and perhaps he 
felt no inclination to risk if--at alI events, he was 
clearly incapahle of despising partial ohstacles in 
the, pursllit of some great ultiinate advantage; in 
one worcl, he war-; not a Wellington. Of this no 
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more convincing proof need be given, than the fact 
that, even at the moment when preparations for 
an advance were going on, his whole heart and 
soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese fron-
tier. Did any one talk to him of the possibility 
of gaining Valladolid, and then, in case of the 
worst, of retiring into the northern provinces, and 
acting on the defensive, he would answer by a 
declaration that in the north there were no sup-
plies; and that it was a country, in every point of 
view, most unfavourable for military evolutions. 
Perhaps this might be true. The northern pro-
vinces are certainly barren enough; and we should 
have doubtless be en met by a variety of inconve-
niences, had we made them the theatre of our 
operations; but with the sea open to us, what had 
we to apprehend? Besides, even upon the suppo-
sition that our first and greatest object was to de-
fend Portugal, it was by no means certain that we 
mig'ht not cover it as effectually by taking up posi-
tions in the north of Spain, as by falling back at 
once upon the frontier. Unless the French pos-
sessed a disposable force much greater than we 
had reason to believe they díd, it was extremely 
improbable that they would venture to pass us by; 
whereas, were we to retire, they would of course 
pursue, and t11U8 the whole of the Península would 
be gradually overrun. 
But though our leader seemed in no way dis-
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posed toembark upon any hazardous undertaking, 
he showed himself well inelined, in the event of a 
favourable communication froID Colonel Graham, 
to attempt something. Ofthe motions and strength 
(9f the enemy, no tidings had of late beenreceived; 
but our own torce was in the highest spirits, and 
in the best possible order. The' hospitals were 
almost entirely tenantless, and the regiments of 
infantry were complete, not only in mumbers, bui 
in their equipments and clotbing, and everything 
necessary for taking the fleld. The cavalry, again, 
were in admirable ease; whilst of the artillery it 
is necessary to say no more, than that it never 
IJresented a more imposing appearance. How sin-
cerely did aH regret that the unhappy delay, oc-
casioned by Baird's retrogression, should keep 
such an anny idle, even for a single da.y ! 
From this period up to the return of Colonel 
Graham, only one event occurred of sufficient im-
portance tú< be narrated. It was this: A couríer, 
who was carrying despatches fmm Bayonne ad-
dressed to N apoleon at Aranda, having fallen into 
thehands of some armoo peasantry, was by them: 
. sent in to the head-quarters of our army. Whe-
ther the rnail contained any very interesting in-
telligence 1 cannot say, not having personally 
examined it; but 1 learned that sorne of its 
contents were at least arnusing, if not instructive. 
They were of old date; for they spoke of the army 
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of Portugal as on its march through Bourdeaux, 
under the orders of J unot, whose letters were a11 
written in a style of humility Huite unprecedented. 
Their purport, however, accounted for their tone 
pretty effectualIy; for tbey were chiefly devoted 
to entreaties that some increase of pay might be 
granted; the writer being but badly provided for, 
now tbat his Portuguese resourbes had failed him. 
lt will easily be believed that the perusal of these 
piteous petitions created no little merriment among 
the men, to whose exertions the Marshal was in-
debted ror bis present poverty. 
On tbe 9th of December, Colonel Graham 
returned from his mission. He bad taken the 
route by Talavera, at wbich place he arrived on 
the 7th, in time to be told of the surrender oí 
Madrid, and of the murder of General Sto Juan by 
his mutinous troops; and not judging it either 
prudent OF necessary to proceed further, he in-
stantly retraced his steps. According to his report,. 
though many· reverses had been sustained, still, 
from the attitude which the country continued to 
maintain, and the divided state of the French 
army, something might yet be done. The chiefs 
in the capital bad indeed betrayed their trust; 
and tbe enemy were in possession of tbe Retiro; 
but tbe indignant populace bad refused to Iay 
down their arms; and tbere was Httle probability 
that they would 800n be induced to change tbeir 
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sentirnents. There were about thirty thousand 
French troops thus kept in ernployment. Of the 
rest, sorne had proceeded against Saragoza, sorne 
against Toledo; sorne liad taken the road to Valen-
cia, and othel's had bent their steps towards Cadiz. 
AH this appeared to Sir John Moore as inviting a 
forward movernent on his part; and the army were 
too much gratified at the prospect of advancing 
at all, to question very minutely the grounds or 
motives upon which our General acted, or changed 
his opinions. 
The l110vement began on the 12th frorn various 
points. On that day Lord Paget, with the prin-
cipal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro, 
whither he had moved up in the course of the 
week, to Tordesillas; whi1st the hussar hrigade, 
under my own orders, proceeded froID its ground 
at Arrivola. The divisions likewise defiled from 
Alba de Tormes, Salamanca, and Ludesrna, and on 
the 14th a new position was taken up, the right 
resting on Tordesillas, the centre at Alayoz, and 
the left at Toro. In order to render it as secure as 
possible, the whole ofthe cavalry was placed upon 
the right of the stream, part occupying posts on 
<me side of the river, and part upon the other. 
Lord Paget's corps crossed the stream; whilst that 
of which 1 was at the head, distributed itself 
throúgh Patricios, Rubios, Madrigal, Nava del 
Rey, and Pollos, on the Domo. Thus we had 
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completely reversed the order in which, but a few 
days ago, we stood. Then our real' was to the 
Guadarama, that pass being in the hands of our 
friends, and opposed to the enero.y; now we were 
facing the Gúadarama, and expecting the enemy 
to debouch from the very places which we our· 
selves had formerIy occupied. 
lt was the good fortune of a squadron of the 
18th hussars to cOIne, at this time, into contact 
with the enemy. There is a large viUage, 01' 
rather a small· town, called Rueda, situated about 
half-way between Nava and Tordesillas; in which, 
we had been given to un.derstand that detach-
ments of the enemy's cavalry, with sorne infantry, 
were quartered. Having caused it to be re con-
noitred, and finding that the Frenc4 seemed quite 
ignorant of our proximity, 1 determined to sur~ 
prIse thern, ir possible; at all events to bring them 
to action. With this intention a squadron pro-
ceeded against them on the night of the 12th; 
and having happily rnade good our entrance un-
observed, we soon tJ1rew thern into corifusion. 
The greater number were sabred on the spot, 
rnany were taken, and only a few escaped to in-
forrn General Franceschi, who occupied Valladolid 
with a body of two 01' three thousand horse, that 
the British arrny had not retreated. 
When he began his movernents, it was, 1 believe, 
General Moore's intention to advance by Valla-
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dolid, to unite himself with Romana's army, and 
to threaten the communieations between Madrid 
and Franee. With this view he had taken up his 
position at Tordesillas, and haddespatehed a mes-
senger with a letter to Romana, making him ac-
quainted with his plains. But on the 14th a 
French offieer having been intereepted by the 
peasantry, the despatches of whieh he was the 
bearer were brought in to me; and seeing that 
they were of the firstmoment, 1 lost no time in 
forwarding them to head-quarters. An imfi?c-
diate change of plan was the eonsequenee. 1'he 
army, it was understood, would move to its left, 
for the purpose of effeeting a junetion at once with 
Sir David Baird's column; and then, either in 
connexion with Romana, if he could be found, or in-
dependently of him, should hekeep out ofthe way, 
attaek Marshal Soult, who, at the head of sixteen 
or eighteen thousand men, was in position about Va-
lencia and Saldanha. The plan seemed to be both 
a wise and a spirited one; and it deserved sueeess. 
Whilst the eolumns of infantry were filíng off 
in the direction of Toro and Benevente, the 
cavalry enjoyed several opportunities of again try-
ing its strength with that of the enemy. In every 
instance the superiodty of British soldiers was 
well asserted; and in a variety of skirmishes we 
succeeded in making prisoners of one lieutenant-
colonel, one major, with upwards of a hundred 
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privates, and sixty horses. It was in truth a glo-
fious spectacle . to see with what perfect con-
.fidence of success the smallest patrol of British 
horse would charge bodies,often doubling them..: 
selves in number; and it was no less gratifying to 
find that a mere numerical superiority in no 
single instance availed the enemy anything. 
In the mean time intelligence carne in from 
Romana, that he had actually commenced his 
retreat from Leon, in consequence, as it was sur-
mised, of the arrangements into which Sir John 
Moore had entered a few days ago, for retiring 
upon PortugaL Such information, at a moment 
like the present, could not fail of causing con-
siderable vexation to our leader. He blamed 
Romana severely, and despatched another courier, 
with a letter eouched in terms even more pressing 
than any which he had employed before, to re-
quest that the Spanish General would re trace his 
steps without a moment's delay. It was added 
that, should he find it impossible to act upon this 
suggestion at once, General Moore could not wait 
any longer for his convenience; beca use an op-
portunity of striking a blow was now before him, 
such as had never previously come in his· way, 
and which the smallest 10ss of time might remove. 
In due course Romana's answer arrived; and it 
was to the effect, that he would eo-operate, to the 
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utmost of his power, in any enterprise III which 
the British General might see fit to embark. 
So far all was satisfactory enough; but the 
same thing could certainly not be said with refe-
rence to the information which we derived from 
our prisoners, touching the amount of French 
troops employed in the Peninsula. From one of 
these, Colon el Arvignac, we learned that there 
either were, or shortly would be, opposed to lIS 
ten corps d'armie, each consisting of two di vi . 
sions, or nearly twenty thousand men; and the 
following is the list of generals in command, with 
their stations, as he enumerated them :-:-Ney and 
Moncey, in the neighbourhood of Saragoza; Le . 
Fevre and Ma~elliny moving on Salamanca; Bes~ 
sieres, at I Madrid; Soult and Lassalle, near Pla-
cencia; J un~t.. I;1dvancing to Burgos; Gouvion 
SÍ; Cyr, in the direction of Barcelona; Milhaud, 
in communication with Le Fevre; and Marmont, 
whose exact province 1 have forgotten. The 
cavalry attached to this mass he represented as 
embracing no fewer thl;1n thirty-six regiments; 
and he affirmed that there were full seven thou-
~alid of the imperial guards then quartered in 
Madrid. How far these statements wére to be re-
lied upon, it was o(course impossible to say; but 
of one truth no man could be ignorant,-namely, 
th~t t~e enemy's force in the country was enor-
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mous, and that our only chance of success lay in 
beating him in detail. But was it probable that 
we should succeed in this? The most sanguine 
amongst us could not but experience doubts, when 
it was recollected that, of all tbe Spanish armies 
wbich but a month ago had kept the field, Ro-
mana's alone remained; and that it could hardly 
be counted upon, inasmuch as it was as yet only 
in the act. of forming. Then, again, the French 
generals were as. prudent as tbey werebrave. 
Should any one of them be made aware of our 
approacb, he would doubtless fallback, with tbe 
view of drawing us after him, till we should' be 
thrown into the midst of as many corps as the 
Emperor might deem it advisable to employ in 
our destruction. Still, much was to be effected 
by promptitude and boldness; and though we 
heard of nothing except immense ma,sses ofFrench 
moving in every direction; though the people 
undeniably began to exhibit symptoms of abated 
zeal and decaying patriotism; and thougb, aboye 
aH, our own General was not aman to attempt 
anything, unless he saw before him a sort of moral 
certainty of success, such as others wouldsCárCély 
look for; in spite of an these considerations, not a 
man in the army desponded, but all felt their 
spirits rise in proportion as tbe prospect of meet-
ing the enemy became more decided. 
With this feeling uppermost in our minds,every 
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march which brought us nearer to the position of 
Marshal Soult was performed, not only without a 
murmur, but with an excess of good-will. On 
the 16th, the head-quarters had beenestablished 
at Toro; on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, it passed 
Villapondo and Valderosa, and on the 20th we 
were established at Majorga. Here Sir David 
Baird's column joined us; and here we could 
lnuster no fewer than 23,000 infantry, 2,300 ca-
valry, and nearly fifty pieces of cannon of different 
calibres. 
Whilst head-quarters were established at Ma-
jorga, the cavalry and horse-artillery having ad-
vanced as far as Monastero Melgar Abaxo, suc-
ceeded, on more than one occasion, in measuring 
tbeir strength with the enemy's outposts. Of the 
skirmishes which took place at this time, few were 
productive of any very serious effects; though all 
tended, in a greater 01' less degree, to increase the 
confidence of oul' people in themselves, and so fal' 
to prepare them for the grand stl'uggle which 
was supposed to be pending. ,But there was one 
exploit which deserves lasting remembrance, not 
onIy because of the gallantry which the troops 
displayed in its performance, but because of the 
complete knowledge' of his profes8ion which was 
exhibited by Lord Paget in cDnducting it. 
The Monastero Melgar Abaxo i8 distant about 
three leagues from Sahagun ;in which place a 
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corps of seven hundred French cavalry were re-
ported to be 10dged. As they were at some dis-
tance from the main body of the French army, it 
was deemed practicable to cut .them off, and Lord 
Paget determined, at aH events, to make the at-
tempt. He accordingly put himself at the head 
of the 10th and 15th hussars; and, in the middle 
of a cold wintry nigbt, when the ground was 
covered with snow, set off for that purpose. 
When they had ridden about two-thirds of the 
way, Lord Paget divided his force, and desiring Ge-
peral Slade, with the 10th, to pursue the course of 
the Cea, and to enter the town by that side, he him-
self, followed by the 15th, wheeled off to approach 
it by a different route. Jt was not long before his 
Lordship's party fell in with a picket oí the enemy. 
The picket was instantly charged; and aH, except 
one man, were either cut down or made prisonersó 
But the escape of one was as injurious, under 
existing circumstances, as the escape of the whole; 
for the alarm was given, and before the 15th could 
approach the place, r, the enemy were ready to 
receive them. 1t was now broad daylight; and 
as our troops drew near, the French were seen 
formed in what appeared to be an open plain, at. 
no great distance from the town. The 15th were 
~heeled into line in a moment; and as there was 
no time to be lost, they followed their leader at a 
prisk trot, with the intention of charging; but 
VOL. I. Q 
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when they were yet fifty yards from the enemy; 
they fúund that a wideditch divided them, and 
that the French had availed themselves of other 
inequálities in the ground7 of which, when sorne 
way off y they had not been aware. A pause was 
now necessarily made, but one instant served to 
put the whole again. in motion. The regiment, 
wheeling to its left, soon found out a convenient 
spot for. crossing; and though the enemy manreu~ 
vred actively to hinder the formation, they were 
again in line and advancing to the charge, within 
five minutes from the commencement of the check. 
A few changes of ground now took place,. as each 
corps strove to gain the flank of another; but they 
were only a few. The British cavalry effected ¡ts 
object; and then coming down at fuIl speed upon 
theír opponents, who stood to receive the shock, 
they overthrew them in an instant. Many were 
killed upon the spot, many more unhorsed, and 
one hundred and fifty-seven were made prisoners, 
including two lieutenant-colonek On this oc-
casion the English cavalry amounted only to four 
hundred men, whilst that of the French feH not 
short of seven hnndred. 
This brilliant rencontre took place on the 20th; 
and on the 21st the head-quarters of the army 
were advanced to the spot where it occurred. 
The weather wasat this time remarkably inc1e-
ment, a succession of frost and snow .having been 
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followed by heavy rains; and the troops, who had 
performed of late many severe forced marshes, 
were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Under 
these circumstances, though fulIy conscious that 
every hour which passed was so much time lost to 
him and gained by the enemy, Sir John Moore 
determined to halt for a day; and he devoted it 
to a careful suppIy of all the necessaries of which 
the menseemed to be in need, as well as in pre-
paring against t11e events of the trial which he felt 
to be at hand. 
Whilst resting here, the corresponden ce be-
tween General Moore and the Marquis de la Ro-
mana was renewed. The latter made no secret of 
the general inefficiency of his army, but he 
agreed to co-operate with us in our attack upon 
Soult, with an whom he could bring into the tieId 
in a fit state to meet the enemy. He sent more-
over, from time to time, such pieces of information 
as he was enabled, by means of spies, or the vigi-
lance of the peasantry, to collect. At first he re-
presented the French force as amounting to no 
more than ten thousand infantry and one thousand 
cavalry, with eight or ten piecesof cannon, whom 
it would be perfectly practicable to surround and 
destroy before any reinforcements could reach 
them from other q uarters; but by and by he be-
gan to discover that these reinforcements had 
actuallyarrived, and that there-werefulleighteen 
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ornineteen thousand men in position álong the 
Carrion. Sir John Moore had b~en aH aIong 
aware that SouIt's corps amounted to this force; 
he 'was not therefore disconcerted by the inteHi-
ge11ce; but he neglected no means which pre-
sented itself, of obtaining fresh communications; 
and his channels were, at this time, both nume-
rous and sure. Hour after ,hour however passed 
on; without the occurrence oí anything caIculated 
tO prod uce an alteration in his plans; hour after 
hour, therefore, was believed by the troops to 
bring nearer and nearer to them the opportunity. 
fol' which they had long panted, of forcing upon 
the enemy the issue of a battle. 
So passed the whole of the 21st, and the greater 
part of the 22nd of December. Respecting the 
French it was understood that, out of the eighteen 
thousand men of which Soult's army was com-
poscd, seven thousand were státloned at Saldanha, 
and five thousand at the town of Carrion; whilst 
the rernainder either lined the banks of the river 
in files of communicatiol1, or covered, in force, the 
different fords and bridges by which it could be 
passed. On our part, again, no definite position 
-fione at least deserving of the name in a mili-
tary paint of view-had been taken up. We 
were 011 the eve of moving, and therefore our 
regimellts were kept as much togetber, as a regard 
to shelter would allow; but we had selected no 
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points d'appui, nor were we particularly prepared 
to reeeive an attack, should such be made upon 
us, to advantage; yet were we ready to aet in 
almost any manner which circumstances might 
require; though our object was manifestly to act 
offensively ratber tban on tlle defensive; and to 
this end a1l our other and minor preparations were 
turned. Hospitals were established in every con-
vent near, and arrangements marle for the safe 
and speedy removal· of the wounded to the rear; 
whilst nothing was spoken of except the approach~ 
ing contest, and the probable consequenees of a 
victory, which all anticipated. 
The evening of the 22nd was now approaching, 
and orders had actually be en issued, for an im-
mediate advanee against the enemy.The army 
was commanded to march at eight o'cloek at night~ 
in twocolumns, for the purpose of forcing the 
bridge at Carrion, and so penetrating to Saldanha ; 
and the right column, to which this .charge had 
been peculiarly intrusted, was making ready to 
get under arms, when two couriers, one from the 
head-quarters of the Marquis de la Romana, and 
the other from Los Santos, arrived. They we.re 
bearers of intelligence, of which it is no figure of 
speech to affirm, that none could have been re-
ceived more replete with sources of mortification 
to every member of the army. The enemy, it ap-
peared, were moving in all directions upon uso 
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The eorps which had begun its march towards the 
south, had halted at Talavera; severa] strong di-
visions had moved froID Palencia, and were already 
in the vicinity of Carrion; the Badajoz army had 
wheeled round, and was in full march towards Sa-
lamanca; whilst N apoleon himself had set out 
from Madrid, with the avowed intention of making 
Benevente his next halting place. Sir John Moore 
felt, or imagined, that this was not the moment, 
nor these the circumstances, under which to risk 
a battle. He believed that Soult would retire 
before him, for the express purpose of allowing 
time to these different divisions to get into. his 
rear; and he was persuaded that the passage of 
a few days would, in all probability, expose him 
\0 the risk of being surrounded by sixty or seventy 
thousand troops, of the flower of the French army. 
With this prospect before his eyes, he instantIy 
countermanded the orders which had be en issued 
in the earlier part of the evening. The regiments 
which had begun tomuster,were dismissed to their 
quarters; and it was understood, throughout the 
ranks, that all idea of áttacking, at least for this 
night, was abandoned. 
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CHAPTERX. 
Dissatisfaction of the army-.SirJohn Moore prepares to re-
treat-The infantry and artillery retire in two columns, 
covered by the cavalry-Movements of th? French armies-
Affair of cavalry at Majorga-Sutferings of the troops 01\ 
their march-Alarm at Benevente, and brilliant cavalryac-
tion-Destruction of stores at Astorga-Wretched pligbt of 
Romana's troops-Disorganization of tbe English army-
March from Astorga to Villa. Franca-::---Seriou,s skirmish at 
Villa Franca.~Retrea.t to Liego, where battle is otfered, but 
declined by the French-The armies in position three days 
-Retreat upon Corunna-The fleet arrives, and the embar-
kation is begnn-Battle of Cornuua, and death of Sir Joho 
Moore-The army is withdrawn. 
I T would be no easy matter to describe the effect 
which this unlooked-for event produced upon 
every roan and officer in the arroyo The troops 
who had long panted to roeet the ellemy, and who 
'but an hour ago were full of life and confidence. 
suddenly appeared like men whose brightest hopes 
.were withered, and their favourite expectations 
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overthrown. Few gave vent to their feelings, 
either by complaint or murmur; but aH retired to 
their quarters in a state of sullen silence, which 
indicated, more powerfully perhaps than any 
words could have done, the extent of the mortifi-
cation under which they laboured. 
We rose next morning perfectly ignorant, and 
to a certain degree quite indifferent, as to the 
fate which awaited us; norwere our spirits 
greatly heightened, when we saw hour after hotir 
pass away without the occurrence of any move-
ment either to the front or rearo There is good 
reason to believe that Sir John Moore himself had ' 
hardly determined on the course which it behoved 
him to follow. He was still imperfectIy informed 
as to the amount of the different corps which were 
advancing against him; though the natural tem-
perament of his disposition induced hiÍn to rate 
these at the highest; and he was extremely un-
willing to commence a rapid retreat, tilI it should 
have become indispensable. Besides, despatches 
carne in this day from Romana, announcing that 
he had advanced with all the disposable part of 
his army, amounting in the whole to seven thou-
sand men, for the I>urpose of co-operating in the 
projected attack upon Soult. 1t was necessary to 
countermand this movement, as weH as to make 
such arrangements with the Spanish General as 
should prevent the two armies from incommoding 
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or commg into collision with each other during 
the retreat: In settling this point, as well as in 
preparing the hospitals and stores for a speedy 
removal, the whole of the 23-rd was spent; and 
the following is the order in which it was finally 
determined that the two corps should be with- . 
drawn. 
As the defence of the Gallicias was esteemed 
by no means impracticable, Sir John Moore was 
desirous of retiring in such a direction as would 
enable him, should circumstances authorise the 
measure, to take up positions in these provinces; 
whilst, at the same time, in case of the worst, á 
retreat should be open to him towards the coasL 
To effect this, it was necessary, i.n the first place,-
to cross the Eslar; which, from our present situa-: 
tion, might be done by three ·routes. We might 
proceedby Mansilla, at which point the river is 
crossed by a bridg~; or by Valencia, where there 
was on1y a ferry; 01' we might take the route by~ 
Castro Gonsalo, where there is likewise a bridge, 
and from whence a road passes directto Bene-
vente. At Mansilla, however, the Spanish troops 
were already posted; they had exhausted the 
country of aH its. supplies; it was therefore vain 
to think of going thither; but the roads by Va-
lencia and Castro Gonsalo were both open, and 
ti: was resolved to make use of them; This was 
the more necessary, as well ~ecause it would have 
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been extremely inconvenient to lead the whole 
column in the same direction; as because, were 
such a measure attempted, the magazines which 
had been established both at Benevente and Za-
mora, must, one or other of them, be exposed to 
capture by the enemy. Astorga was named as the 
place of meeting for the two columns, where it 
was understood that a determined stand would be 
made;' whilst the Spaniards were requested to 
faH back upon Leon, from whence, in the event of 
our offering battle, they might harass the rear and 
Hank of the French. In the mean while, however, 
Romana was to keep possession of the bridge of 
Mansilla as long as possible; and the city of Leon 
was not to be surrendered, till it should be re-
duced to the last extremity; Every preliminary ar-
rangement being complete, the armybegan, on 
the 24th, to retire in the order whichhad been 
assigned to it. General Hope, with his own divi-
sion, and that of General Fraser, fell back upon 
Majorga, on the road to Castro Gonsalo; whilst 
Sir David Baird, at the head of the other éolumn, 
took the direction of Valencia. To cover these 
ÍIlovements, the cavalry received directions to push 
strong patrols toward.s Carrion, as far as the enemy's 
pickets, and not to q uit the position till night-fall 
on the 25th, -sorne hours after the reserve and light 
infantry had been withdrawn. Everything was 
~one with the most perfect regularity. Tbe ca-
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lumns made good their march, the one to Valen-
cia, the other to Castro Gonsalo, without molesta-
tion, and the rear-guard withdrew, at the appoint-
ed hour, leaving the enemy in apparent ignoran ce 
that a retreat was in contemplation. 
In the mean while, however, Buonaparte was 
advancing with rapid strides, from the Escurial. 
On the 24th, he had reached Tordesillas with the 
advance of his cavalry; sending strong detach-
ments on as far as Villalpando and Majorga; and 
at the latter of these place s our troops were again 
enabled to try the strength oftheir opponents. 1t 
was on the 26th that a considerable force of the 
enemy were seen drawn up upon the brow of 
some rising ground, and apparently making ready 
to cut off any stragglers which might lag behind, 
or wander far from the ranks. Lord Paget, who 
was present at Majorga, instantly directed Colonel 
Leigh, at the head of two squadrons of the 10th 
hussars, to dislodge them. Colonel Leigh, forming 
his little band into two lines, rode briskly forward, 
one squadron leading, and the other supporting, 
till he had gained the top of the hill. Here the 
roen were commanded to reÍn up, for tbe purpose 
of refreshing the horses after the ascent; and they 
díd so, under a heavy but not very destructive fire 
froro the French. But the horses had no sooner 
recovered their wind, than the word was given to 
.charge. aild in five minutes tbe French were over-
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thro.wn. Many were killed, many mo.re wo.und-
ed, and upwards úf o.ne hundred taken priso.ners. 
The 10th, ho.wever, was no.t the o.nly cavalry 
corps which succeeded in distinguishing itself. 1 t 
was remarked by aH, that as o.ften as the French 
and o.ur peo.ple carne into. co.ntact, the superio.rity 
o.f the British cavalry was shown to. a degree far 
beyo.nd anything which had been anticipated. 
They seemed to. set all o.dds at defiance; and in no. 
single instance was their temerity punished by 
defeat, o.r even by repulse. Matters went so. far 
at last, that Captain Jo.nes, o.f the 18th, ventured, 
with no. mo.re than thirty men o.f his regiment, to. 
attack o.ne hundred French cavalry; and he put 
them to. the ro.ut, killing fo.urteen, and making six 
priso.ners. 
Whilst the cavalry were thus co.ming into. almo.st 
daily co.ntact with the enemy, and kept in excel-: 
lent spirits by their repeated successes, the infan-
try, co.vered by two. o.r three light regiments, were 
marching o.ver miserable ro.ads, and thro.ugh an 
exhausted co.untry, expo.sed to. hardships mo.re 
terrible than it has frequently fallen to. the lo.t o.f 
British so.ldiers to. endure. The weather was no.w 
more severe than it. had been since we entered 
Spain; co.ld winds blowing, and heavy sho.wers o.f 
sleet and rain falling; and it was no.t always that 
the tro.o.ps co.uld findshelter, even at night, against 
their influence. The Ulules and o.ther animals em .. 
PENINSULAR WAR. 253 
ployed to carry the baggage, soon began to foun-
der; 6r the muleteers, terrified at the prospect of 
being overtaken by the French, left them and Hed. 
In such cases it was found quite impracticable to 
get the animals along, for they would obey no 
voice but that of their master, and they were COll-
sequently abandoned, and their loads given up to 
plunder. N or were these the only evils to which 
qur men saw themselvesexposed. The Spaniards, 
whether they were men in authority or not, either 
abandoned their houses as the British army ap-
proached, locking their doors, and concealing, as 
far as they were able, the little stock of provisions 
of which they might chance to be possessed; or 
they met our. requisitions for food and wine with 
murmurs and complaints, suéh as they would not 
have ventured to utter before French soldiers. 
These things not unnaturally inéreased the irri-
tation under which the troops already laboured. 
They began to view the S paniards as their worst 
enemies, alld to treat them as people unworthy of 
any consideration whatever. This was severely 
retaliated upon them by an enraged peasantry; 
and scenes of violence and bloodshed, in which 
these allies were the actors, proved by no means 
uncommon. 
On the 27th of December the coIllmn reached 
Benevente. Benevente is remarkable for an oId 
baroníaI casUe, which for many generations has 
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been the property of the dukes-of Ossuna; and to 
whieh, in point either of splendour or extent, it 
would be diffieult to find in E urope a fellow. N ear 
it runs the litt]e river Eslar, aeross whíeh, at soroe 
distanee froro the town, a bridge was thrown, but 
whieh was eommanded by some hilIs, that rise 
rather abruptly from the opposite bank of the 
stream. Our people had seareely entered the 
place, when an alarro was raised that the enemy 
were approaehing; and it proved to be so far not 
without foundation, that troops were seen, as if in 
the aet of forming, on the heights beyond. Pre-
parations were instantly made to reeeive thero. 
The regiments assembled at their several points of 
mm¡ter, and the cavalry rushing through the gates, 
descended to the level country, where they could 
most eonveniently aet; but neither the one nor the 
other were called into play. ' The enemy, satisfied 
with thus disturbing our repose, melted away, and 
we returned again to our former quarters and our 
original oecupations. The best precautions were, 
however, taken, to provide against surprise; the 
bridge over the Eslar. was broken down; and 
piekets of eavalry were extended all along the 
bank, so as to watch the fords, and give timely 
notiee of any movem'ent. 
The night of the 27th passed by in quiet; and 
as soon as day-light carne in, the retreat was re-
newed. The cavalry, however, had not been 
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withdrawn, when certain movements on the part 
of the enemy appeared to indicate that we should 
not be permitted to escape thus easily. A body of 
flve or six hundred horse were observed, about 
nine o'clock, to try a ford not far from the ruins of 
the bridge; and in a few moments afterwards they 
crossed, and bega~ to form on our side ofthe river. 
Instantly t4e pickets, which had been appointed 
10 do the duty of a rear-guard, made ready 10 op-
pose them. Though they mustered little more tban 
two hundred men, they boldly advanced, under 
the command of Colonel Otway, against the mass, 
repeatedly charging its leading squadrons, and 
keeping it fairly in check, till Lord Paget and the 
writer of these pages arrived; wben the former 
made haste to bring up the 10th hussars, whilst 
the Iatter put himself at the head of tbe detach-
ments aIread y in tbe fleld. Many charges were 
now made on both sides, and the squadrons were 
repeatedly intermingled; whilst the pickets still 
continued to give ground, as it was intended that 
they sbould. But the 10th were now ready: tbe 
pickets saw that tbey had support; and they re-
quired no entreaty to dash against the enemy. 
One cheer was given, and the horses being pressed 
to their speed, the enemy's line was broken in an 
instant. They fled in great disorder to the river, 
and repassed it much more actively than tbey had 
passed it before; leaving in our hands General Le 
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Fevre, their colonel, with upwards of seventy otheI 
officers and meno This was, however, the most 
seriQus affair in which we had yet be en engaged. 
The cavalry opposed to us formed part of the im-
perial guard; they were all tried soldiers, and they 
fought in a manner not unworthy of the reputation 
which they had earned in the north of Europe. 
They lost in killed and wounded, independently oí 
prisoners, about sixty men; our casualties fen 
$omewhat short of fifty. 
" It has been said that N apoleon himself was an 
eye-witness of this rencontre, from the opposite 
heights on which he stood. Whether there be any 
truth iD: the rumour, 1 know not; but one thing is 
quite certain, that the enemy did not venture, for 
sorne days after; again to oppose themselves hand 
to hand to oureavalry. The column accordingly 
reached Astorga on the 30th, having heen very 
little harassed by its pursuers. It arrived, how-
ever, in a state of great disorganisation; and it 
carne to a place, where pictures of want and misery 
were already too" frequent, in the persons of Ro-
mana's soldiers. For Romana, in spite of General 
Moore's entreaty to the contrary, had seen fit to 
fall back, not upon Leon, or the difficult country 
near, but in the same direction with ourselves. 
The conseq uence was, that all the houses were 
filled with his peopIe, among whom a malignant 
typhus rever was raging; and the roads were lite-
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rally covered and encumbered with men, horses, 
cars, and aH the other accompaniments of an army, 
which had foundered or broken down on their 
marcho It is hardly possible to conceive any set 
of men bearing less resemblance to soldiers, or 
having a stronger claim upon the compassion of 
those who beheld them, than these wretched crea-
tures. They were almostall in a state bordering 
upon lludity. They had no provisions; their afms 
were, for the most part, useless; and of ammuni-
tion, either for musketry or cannon, they were 
wholly destiti.Ite. N or, to say, the truth, were our 
own people in a plight by,many degrees superior. 
With us, as w~th them, provisions had long been 
scanty; and our shoes, that most essential article 
in a soldier's wardrobe, were, in most instances, 
worn out. Many officers had, indeed, brought 
with. them from England considerable quantities 
of apparel; and depots of stol'es had been 
formed at various points, one of which chanced to 
be Astorga; but the rnuleswhich carried the bag-
gage of individuals had almost all knocked up, and 
of the stores deposited in the town liUle use could 
be made. The Spaniards were, indeed, supplied 
with muskets-for of muskets, a large quantity 
had been collected here-and they received as 
much ammunition as they were able to carry; but 
as to c10thing and provisions, these we possessed 
not in sufficient quantities to supply ourselves ;we 
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cotlld not, therefore, supply the wants of others. 
Rornana's troops accordingly departed on the fol-
lowing morning, to follow the road by Fonubadon 
into Gallicia, having derived frorn us none of the 
refreshrnent of which they stood so rnuch in necd, 
and in the hope of obtaining which they had, per-
haps, deserted their post at Mansilla l11any days 
earlier than they needed to have done. 
The arl11y had hitherto fallen back under the 
persuasion that it would not be required to retreat 
beyond its present position at Astorga; but that 
here, or hereabouts, l11atters wOtlrd be brought tó the 
issue of a battle. Though their conduct, in rnany 
respects, cannot certainly be spoken of in high 
terms, it is probable that this prospect, and this 
alolle, had hitherto kept the l11en in sornething 
like a state of subordination. They had com-
mitted various excesses, it is true; l11any had 
individually robbed and plundered, and got drunk 
by the way, and sorne had thus fallen into the 
hands of the enemy, 01' perished from the incle-
l11ency of the weather; yet the army, considered 
as a body, was still efficient, and required nothing 
more than a few hours of rest, and a moderate 
supply of provisions, to restore it to the state of 
high ord~r in which it was at Salamanca. From 
the moment when preparations began to be made 
fol' a continued retreat from Astorga, all this l11ay 
be said to have been at an end. In Astorga, the 
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blowing up of ammunition-waggons, the destruc-
tion of intl'enching tools, and the committal to the 
flames of field-equipments for a whole division, 
gave the signal, as it were, fór all the bad pas-
sions of those who witnessed them, to be let 
loose; and mortifying as it is to confess it, the 
faet eannot be denied, that from that hour we no 
Jonger resetnbled a British arrny. There was still 
the same bravery in our ranks; bat it wasonly 
at moments when the enemy were expeeted to 
come on, that our order and regularity returned; 
and except in that single point, we resembled 
rather a erowd of insubordinate rebels, in full 
flight before the victorious soldiers of their sove-
reign, than a corps of British troops executing a 
series of military movements in the presence of 
their enemy. 
When he began hisretreat in real earnest" it 
was, 1 apprehend, Sir John Moore's intention to 
fall back upon Vigo, and there to embarkJlis army 
in. the transports which had be en ordered round 
to receive them. With this view he had, when at . 
Benevente, despatched General Crawford, at the 
head of three thousand men, along the nearer but 
steeper road by Orense, in order that ~ny at-
tempt on the part of the enerny to gain ground 
upon him with a light eolumn might be prevented; 
whiIst he himself took the more circuitous but 
beUer route, by Astorga and Villa Franca. At 
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the former place he was joined by Sir David 
Baird's division; and here everything, no matter 
whether it might be private or public property, 
for the removal of which means were wanting, 
was destroyed; and the army began its march on 
the following morning, in worse plight, and under 
more trying circumstances, than ever. 
The road from Astorga to Villa Franca leads 
through the villages of Torre, Benivedre, Pin-
ferrade, and over a country as much diversified, 
and as striking, as will be seen perhaps in ~ny 
part of Europe. The first four or five leagues 
carry the traveller up one continued aseent, and 
along the face of a hill, steep, bare, and open; on 
gaining the summit of whieh, he arrives at the 
entrance of sorne tremendous passes, such as a 
thousand resolute '!llen might easily maintain 
against ten times their number. These extend as 
far as the village of Torre, a distan ce of nearly 
three leagues; after which the landscape becomes 
as magnificent as the intermingling of hill and 
valley:, rock and mountain, wood and pasture, can 
render it. We, of course, beheld it under all the 
disadvantages of a season remarkably inclement. 
when the ridges ~ere covered with deep snow, 
and the fields and roads little better than mere 
heaps of mud; yet even thus it was impossible to 
pass it by without feelings of the liveliest admira-
tion, and a strong regret that it had not been our 
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fortune to wander here when the forests were in 
fuIl leaf, and the green hills in their glory. But 
it was not froID its temporary bleakness alone, 
that a scene like that around us stirred up a 
strange commingling of pleasurable and painful 
sensatians. The candition of the army was at this 
time a most melancholy one; the rain carne down 
upan us in torrents; men and horses were foun-
dering at every step; the former fairly worn out 
through fatigue and want of nutriment, the latter 
sinking under their loads, and dying upan the 
spot. N 01' was it only among the baggage ani-
mals that an absolute inability to proceed further 
began to show itself; the shoes of the cavalry 
horses dropped off, and the horses themselves 
soon became useless. It was asad spectacle to 
behold these fine creatures urged and goaded on 
till their strength utterly failed them, and then 
shot to death by their riders, in order to prevent 
them from falling into the hands of the enemy. 
Then, again, the few ammunition-waggons which 
had hitherto kept up, fell one by one tó the rear; 
the ammunition was immediately destroyed, and 
the waggons abandoned. Thus were misfortunes 
accumulating upon us as we proceeded; and it 
appeared e:xtremely improbable, should our pre-
sent system of forced marches be persisted in, 
that one half of the army would ever l'each the 
coast. 
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The reader is doubtless aware that the spirit of 
insubordination of which 1 have already s.poken, 
as exhibiting itself in a variety of particular in-
stances, became now almost general. There was 
no possibility of keeping the men in their ranks. 
Some under one pretext, and sorne under another, 
whole regiments strayed from their colours; and 
as often as a wine-house or store carne in the way, 
scenes of the most shocking descnption ensued. 
The army moved, as is customary in such cases, 
by divisions, the main body keeping a day's march 
ahead of the - reserve and the rear-guard. The 
former reached Benivedre on the 31st, and at an 
early hour on the 1st of January was ordered to 
leave it; but when the latter arrived, the place 
was fuU of stragg1ers, aH, or almost aH, in a state 
of desperate intoxication. At this time the ene-
my's cavalry, though they seldom sought an 
opportunity of coming to blows with us, pressed 
closely and incessantly upon our rear: we rode 
frequently many miles in sight of each other; and 
from ti~ne to time, our rearmost dragoons would 
exchange pistol shots with their Ieading files. 
Under such circumstances, no pause could, of 
course, be made, for the meré purpose of closing 
up such as lagged; and hence every one who 
proved unable, either from intoxication or weari-
ness, to push on, was of necessity left behind. 
But the multitudes who lingered in Benivedre 
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were so great, that the utmost repugnance was 
experienced at the idea of abandoning them; and 
it was not till every effort to rouse them had been 
made in vain, that they were left to their fate. 
Even after the rear-guard hadmarched, a small 
detachment of horse still endeavoured to cover 
them; nor 'was it till the enemy, in great force, 
were seen approaching, that it retired. Then 
followed that scene which has been so frequently 
described already; but of the horrors of which 
none can form an adequate conception who were 
no! eye-witnesses of it; when the French dra-
goons, pursuing our patrol, galloped through the 
midst of a crowd of men, women, and children, 
and wantonly slashed to the right and left, with-
out regard to the age or sex of the object of their 
fury. Of thé numbers who thus fell a sacrifice to 
their own intemperance, 1 cannot pretend to 
sreak with certainty; but 1 know them to llave 
been very considerable; and 1 am sure that Bri-
tish troops never looked upon a spectacle more 
appalling than those few presented, who, having 
come up with the col~mn, bIeeding and cut in nu-
merous pIaces, were, by order of the General, 
paraded through the ranks as a warning to their 
comrades. 
We reached Villa Franca on the 2nd, having 
performed a distance of upwards of sixty miles in 
two days, where the greater part of the cavalry 
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took up its quarters, only a small detachment 
remaining with the reserve at Caeabelos. Like 
Benivedre, it was filled with drunken and dis-
orderly men, belonging to the divisions whieh had 
preceded us; by whom the most violent outrages 
bad been committed, not upon the natives only, 
but upon our own magazines. A store of wine 
bad been broken open, and the wine either drunk 
or wantonly spílt; and a considerable quantity of 
forage, of which we stood sorely in need, des-
troyed. One man was executed here, being 
detected in the act of marauding; but the disci-
pline of the army was by this time too much 
impaired to be very seriously affeeted even by 
su eh an example. Similar deeds were performed 
wherever opportunities occurred, and that with 
the openness of men, who saw, 01' faneied,that 
their case was desperate. 
The enemy, who since the affair of the 28th had 
kept generally out of reach, showed a disposition 
on the 3rd to renew their system of attacking. A 
large force of eavalry was se en about oue o'clock 
in the afternoon, advancing at a leisurely . pace, 
and with IDuch apparent caution, on Cacabelos. 
Through the middle of the town the~e runs a small 
stream, along the bank of which part of the re-
serve was drawn up; whilst the 95th rifle corps, 
supparted by a picket of hussars, occupied a rising 
graund about half a league in advance. The rifle-
PENINSULAR W AR. 265 
men were eommanded to faH back, and retreat 
through the town over a bridge. The greater 
number had alreadyeffected this rnovernent, when 
the French eavalry corning on in overwhelrning 
nurnbers, our picket was forced to give way; and 
the French getting in among the two rear com-
panies of the 95th, sueeeeded in rnaking some 
pl'isoners. The riflemen had hardly reeovered 
their surprise, and were barely able to spread in 
skirrnishing order,· when a eloud of disrnounted 
chasseurs dashed forward, and crossing the stream 
in every part, cornmenced a sharp onset upon the 
village. They were met with great gallantry by 
the 95th, who retiring slowly up the hill in rear of 
the town, took post among sorne vineyards, and 
galled them terribly from behind that shelter. 
From these the eavalry attempted to dislodge 
them: they eharged boldly up the road, and 
threatened to take the skirmishers in rear; but 
they were almost immediately driven back by the 
steady and well-directed fire of our troops; and 
they retreated, leaving General Colbert, with many 
other officers and men, dead upon the field. 
The alarm had by this time spread to Villa 
Franca, and Sir John Moore appeared at the se ene 
of action. He had scareely done so, 'when a heavy 
eolumn of infantry showed itself over the opposite 
hills, in fun march upon our position. The artil-
lel'y attached to the reserve instantly opened upon 
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it; and such was the excellence of the practice, 
that the enemy, having suffered severely in killed 
and wounded, was fain to withdraw his corps 
before it had been able to fire a musket. N evel'-
theless, Sir John Moore was not desirous of bring-
ing on a general action here. He had heard of a 
position near Lugo, of which he proposed to take 
advantage by fighting there, should it be neces-
sary to 6ght at all previous to his' embarkation ; 
he was not, therefore, willing to waste time, or 
sacrifice lives, in the obstinate maintenance" of 
ground to which he attached no value. Whilst, 
therefore, the reserve was ordered to Villa Franca, 
the main body took the road to Herrieras; and "jt 
was foHowed, about ten o'clock, by the rear-guard, 
which reached its halting-place soon after mid-
night. 
The country became, from this point, such as to 
render cavalry of no avail. It was universally 
steep, rocky, precipitous, and covered with wood, 
and, where in the few spots it was otherwise, too 
much enclosed with vineyards and mulberry plan-
tations, to allow even a sq uadron of horse to form 
up or acto The cavalry were accol'dingly sent on 
at once to Lugo, whi.ther the infantry and arti11ery 
followed, as fast as extreme exhaustion, and the 
nature of the road by which they travelled, wOllld 
allow. But they followed both painfully and 
slowly; fOf though as many as forty miles were 
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performed in one march, that march compre-
hended, not the day onIy, but the night also. 
This was more than men, reduced to the low ebb 
to which our solctiers had fallen, could endure. 
They dropped down by whole sections, on the 
way-side, and died, sorne with curses, others with 
the voice of prayer, in their mouths. lt was 
dreadful, likewise, to know that not rnen onIy, but 
women and children, were subject to this misera-
ble fate. By sorne strange neglect, 01' by the 
indulgence of a rnistaken humanity, Sir John 
. Moore's arrny had carried along with it more than 
the too large proportion of women allotted by the 
rules of our service too arrnies in the fieId; and 
these pOOl' wretches were now heighten-ing the 
horror of passing events by a display of suffering, 
even more acute than that endured by their hus-
bands. Sorne were taken in Iabour on the road ; 
and in the open air, arnidst showers of sleet and 
snow, gave birth to infants, which, with their 
rnothers, perished as soon as they had seen the 
light. Others, carrying perhaps each of thern two; 
chiIdren on their backs, would toil on, and wheTh 
they carne to look to the condition of their precious' 
burdens, they would find one or both frozen to· 
death. Then the depth of moral degradation to! 
which they sank, their oaths and críes, uttered; 
under the influence of intoxication, were hardly' 
less appalling than the groans which burst froID 
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them, as an hope of aid abandoned them, and they 
sat dówn to die. 1 am well aware that the 
horrors of this retreat have been again and again 
described in terms calculated to freeze the blood 
of such as read them; but 1 have no hesitation in 
saying that the most harrowing accouIits which 
have yet been laid before the public, fall short of 
the reality. 
The journey from Villa Franca to Lugo occupied 
one night and two days, the army reaching the 
latter place on the 5th of January. It was one 
continued skirmish between the rear of the British 
and the advanced-guard of the French, in which 
the latter were invariably repulsed with considera-
ble loss. But, in spite of these advantages, the 
Britis~ army became· every hour more and more 
unfit for service. Its resources wasted away at 
every mile. First, whole waggon-loads of clothing, 
afms, shoes, and other necessaries, which had 
just arrived from England for the purpose of re-
fitting Romana's army, were met, and after the 
men had helped themselves to those articles of 
which they stood most in need, the residue was 
destroyed. Next, two bullock-cars, loaded wit.h 
dollars to the amount of 25,0001. were found to be 
immoveable. The casks which contained the 
money were stove in, and the treasure thrown 
from the road over a precipice. This was a most 
unwise as well as uselcss measure. Had it been 
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distributed among the soldiers, there is little 
doubt that they would have contrived to carry it 
along; whereas the knowledge that it lay among 
the cliffs, tempted many men to lag behind, who 
aH feH into the hands of the enemy, or perished 
from cold. But every thing was now done as if 
our case was absolutely desp~rate, and as ifthe llt-
most that could be expected, or even desired, was 
to escape with our p.ersons, at the expense of the 
whole of our materiel. Even guns were now 
abandoned, as fast as the horses which dragged 
them knocked up ; and the very sick and wound-
ed were left behind in the waggons, of w hich the 
bullocks or mules could proceed no further. 
1 have said that the march from Herrieras tú 
Lugo produced one continlJed series of skirmishes 
between the rear of one army, and the head .of 
tha other. For the most part, these were pro-
ductive of very trifiing results, and seldom pro-
mi sed to produce more than actually arose out of 
them; but there was one occasion on which the 
spirits of the troops became powerfully excited, 
and when nothing but a degree of caution on the 
part of Marshal SouIt. for which no one was pre-
pared, kept off asevere, if not a general action. 
It was this : . 
. The village of Constantino stands upon the edge 
of a small stream, which runs along a deep and 
rockychannel, forming the bottom of a ravine, 
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which, on either hand, is closed in by hilIs. The 
hill on the left of the villag-e i8 ascended from the 
south by an exposed and winding road, tolerably 
steep and uneven; whilst on the opposite side ls 
a long gradual slope, till you arrive at the head of 
the bridge aIread y spoken of. Sir John Moore 
was naturally apprehensive that, should he permit 
the enemy to take possession of the summit, whilst 
his own eolull'ln was yet withingun-shot, the troops . 
wou'Id be terribly annoyed during their open and 
g-radual deseent; he therefore determined to dis-
pute the further advance of his pursuers, and to 
give time to all the regiments which should be 
thus employed to make good the passage of the 
river, and gain the village. 
Withthis view ther.ifle corps, supported by a 
brigade of horse artillery, halted on the brow of 
the hill. The enemy perceiving the disposition, 
and presuming that his troops, should they at-
tempt to carry the ridg-e by assault, would be 
exposed to a murderous fire from the guns op-
posed to them, halted on the declivity of a range 
of hilIs opposite, and continued for more than half 
an hour to look at our people without attempting 
anything. By this time· the column had gained 
the head of the bridge, and the principal daúger 
was past; the riflemen and artillery wereaecord-
ingly directed to retreat also, in good order, but 
with all possible celerity. They obeyed these in-
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junctions faithfully; but they were soon followed 
by the French, who carne poul'ing down the hill, 
just as the rearmost companies had effected the 
passage of the stream. Arrangements were in-
stantly made to receive the attack which seemed 
now to be threatened. The 28th and rifle corps 
formed so as to defend the bridge; w hilst the 
20th, 52nd, and 91st, under Sir John Moore in 
person, assumed a position on the summit of a hill 
in the real'. Here, likewise, the _ horse artillery 
took post; and now all was expectation and anx-
iety. The enemy carne on with great apparent 
boldness. His cavalry and tirailleurs attempted 
to pass the bridge; they were met, not only by 
the fire of the riflemen, but by a heavy and well-
directed cannonade from the high grounds, and 
they feH back. In a few mornents they renewed 
their efforts on the same point, and with similar 
want of success; and again, after a short pause, 
for the third time. But they were be aten back 
in every attempt; till at last darkness put an end 
to the skirmish, and they withdrew. At eleven 
o'clock at night, -however, our people abandoned 
their post. The troops were dreadfully harassed 
by their exertions, but not a roan sank under 
them; and before rnorning they reached Lugo, 
where they found the whole arrny concentrated. 
At Lugo, as has been already stated, General 
Moore had resolved, should the enemy press hard 
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upon him, to halt and offer battle. With this de-
sign, orders were sent forward to Villa Franca, 
that General Crawford should re trace his steps, 
and that General Hope's column, which moved a 
days' march in advance, should rest at Lugo till 
the divisions in the real' had arrived. These 01'-
ders were, 1 believe, transmitted by the hands of 
Sir John's aide-de-camp, Captain Napier, and 
were enclosed under cover to Sir David Baird, 
who was req uested to forward them to their 
several places of destination. Captain N apier 
delivered his packet at N agaIes, and Sir Da\,jd 
Baird instantly despatched an orderly dragoon, 
with written instructions for General Hope and 
General Frazer. It unhappily fell out that the 
dragoon got drunk, and the pácket miscarried. 
The misfortune was not discovered till the fo11ow-
ing morning, when fresh orders were instantly 
sent off; but the loss of time nothing could repair. 
General Hope, with his division, was already a 
full day's march beyond Lugo; and though he 
wheeled about immediately Oil the receipt of Sir 
David's communication, he did not arrive at Lugo 
till after the rear-guard had come in; and even 
then his troopswere so fatigued, that their fitness 
for immediate service of any kind seemed to be 
extremely problematical. Many of the horses 
aUached to this division dropped down dead in 
the streets; many more were destroyed as usc-
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less; and even of the men, more than one were 
known to have perished of absolute exhaustion. 
N evertheless, as the General had now determined 
tofall back, not u'pon Vigo, but upon Corunna, it 
was well that the detached columns had be en 
called in. General Orawford, indeed. was too 
far on his way to be overtaken, and he reached 
Vigo without molestation, embarking there in good 
order, and at his leisure; but had the rest of the 
army endeavouredto follow him, the probability 
is, that half its numbers must have fallen by the 
way. 
The ground upon which Sir John Moore pro-
posed to await the arrival of the enemy, was dis-
tant about a league, or a "league and a haH: from 
Lugo. It offered, upon the whole, a tolerably ad-
vantageous position, along the summit of a range 
ofIow hills, and eovered on both flanks by roeks 
and precipices. Here the reserve, under General 
Paget, took ¡ts station; whilst the rest of the 
army found quarters for the night in the town, and 
among su eh houses and cottages as were near. 
About noon on the 6th, the French columns 
made their appearance, and deployed, as it had 
been antieipated that they would, upon the heights 
opposite. Immediately the army got under arms, 
and everything was in readiness, in case of an 
attack, to be moved to its proper station. But no 
offensive operations ensued. The lines looked at 
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one another for sorne hours, as if each expected 
the first movement to be made by its opponents; 
till at last, as evening began to. close in, an. idea of 
a battle was laid aside. Those who had it in 
charge to keep possession of the position, piled 
their arms, and prepared to bivouac; whilst the 
rest retired, each brigade and regiment, to its own 
quarters. 
The morning of the 7th had scarcely dawned, 
when the enemy showed a disposition, either to 
attack us in real earnest, or to provoke us into a 
forward movement against themselves. They 
opened upon our line with four pieces of cannon ; 
which, though they did little serious damage, 
served to irritate and annoy the soldiers a good 
deal. The fire was, however, speedily returned 
by the British artillery, and with sucheffect, that 
in a few minutes one of the French guns was dis-
mounted, and the remainder silenced. These 
were the only hostilities which passed between 
the two armies during the earlier part of the day; 
but towards sunset columns were observed to de-
file, in considerable force, towards our left, at the 
same time that a cloud of tirailleurs began an ac-
tive skirmish with the pickets. Sir John Moore 
natural1y conceivecl. that he was about to sustain 
a serious attack, and that it would be principally 
made upon the point which was threatened. He 
flew to the spot, and arrived just as a heavy co-
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lumn of French troops began to ascend the rising 
ground, and to press upon a wing of the 76th, 
which held it. The 76th gradually retired till it 
was joined by the 51st; a regirnent in which Sir 
John had served as an ensign, and to which he 
addressed a few words calculated to remind thern 
of the fact, and expressive of his confidence in 
their valour. The short address was not thrown 
away. After exchanging a few discharges of 
musketry, our people rushed forward with the 
bayonet; the enemy scarcely stoOO tú receive the 
shock, but fled in much confusion down the hill, 
leaving a good many killed and wounded behind 
them. This was the last operation on either side; 
and the two armies again spent the night in 
anxious expectation of what the morrow rnight 
bring forth. 
Sir John Moore no longer entertained a doubt 
that the honr of trial was at hand. He sincerely 
rejoiced in the conviction; f(}r the prospect of a 
battle had restored to the army the whole of its 
confidence, and much of its discipline; and the 
General saw that it was only by beating his pur-
suers, and beating them efl'ectnally, that he could 
hope to free himself from their presence, or secure 
a safe and orderIy embarkation. The greater part 
of the night mlS accordingly spent in bringing 
gnng into the position, and making every arrange-
Qlent which the circuIÍlstances of the case seemed 
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to require; and men's hopes were excited to the 
highest: but aH our preparations had been made 
for no purpose. We were in position during the 
entire day, anxiously desiring that an attack would 
take place; but hour after hour passed away, and 
the enemy made no movement. On our part it 
was deemed unRafe to advance, because the French 
were understood to surpass us greatly in numbers; 
and they occupied ground extremely difficult of 
approach, though furnishing. numerous facilities for 
a retreat; whilst another corps. under Victor, 
was known to have halted at Villa Franca, and 
therefore to be within reach. Under these cir-
cumstances,' nothing remained for us, except to 
make the most of the impression which our de-
monstration might have produced upon the ene-
my's confidence. The troops remained at their 
arms till dark; and then large fires having been 
lighted along the heights, the retreat was recom-
menced. 
We marched all night, both men and horses 
suffering dreadfully from cold, fatigue, and hun-
ger; and passing th~ough Lugo, we arrived at 
Valenuda about ten o'cIock next morning. Here 
the positive inability of the troops to proceed 
further compelled á halt; and we lay upon the 
ground, and under a pelting rain, totally devoid of 
shelter, for several hours. But even this space of 
time was not granted to undisturbed repose. A 
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cry arose, from time to time, that the enemy were 
advancing; and at each alarm the regiments were 
ordered to faH in. It is needless to say, how se-
verely this constant call to arms told upon men 
already worn down by a night-march; indeed, it 
is not going too far to affirm that many of the 
corps which had be en most frequently roused from 
their sleep, made ready to renew their march in 
the eveIiing, as little refreshed as if they had not 
halted at aH. 
From this time ti11 it reached Corunna, the arrny 
saw little more of the French. We had gained by 
the late night-march twelve full hours upon Mar-
shal Soult, and he was never able to overtake us ; 
yet was our journey, at least for a time, little less 
harassing, and little less disorderly, than it had 
been before. When we came in to Betanzos, in-
deed, at a late hour in the night, so many were 
found to have fallen behind, not only from the 
leading divisions, but from the reserve itself, that 
to have pursued our progress on the following 
morning, would have be en to sacrifice a large por-
tion of the army; and the 10th was accordingly 
given up as a day of resto By this- means, mul-
titudes of stragglers were permitted to overtake 
their corps; and though the enemy were certainly 
enabled to recover part of the ground which they 
had lost, that was a matter not to be put in com-
petition with the preservation of so many British 
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soldiers. BesideF:, the only French force which 
succeeded in corning up with us, was a small patro} 
of cavalry, which our rear-guard had no difficulty 
in keeping in check. The advantages resulting 
from tbe day of rest were therefore very great. 
At length the coast began to appear, and Corun-
na, with its citad el and towers, rose upon our view ; 
but the harbour, in which we had expected to find 
a large fleet. at anchor, was occupied only by the 
few coasters and fishing-boats which usually find 
shelter there. Though intelligence of the aIte-
ration in our plans had been sent off sorne days 
previously, and the Admiral used every exertion 
to bring. the shipping round, a continuance of ad-
verse winds had rendered the effort abortive; and 
it was only after an interval of sorne days that the 
fleet arrived. Most sincereIy did every one now re-
gret that a battle had not been fought long ago; for 
it was quite manifest, that to embark without fight-
ing was entirely out of the question. But where 
to fight, was a question which few felt disposed to 
answer. \Ve had left behind us positions innu-
merable; in any one of which an arrny such as 
ours illight have maintained itself against twice its 
numbers; at all events till reinforcernents should 
reach US, or sorne diversion in other parts of Spain 
. call off part of the enemy's attention from uso In 
the vicinity of Corunna, no such favourable ground 
existed. There were, indeed, p~sitions here-
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severa} of them very respectable, and one po-
sitively cornrnanding; but to oceupy these as they 
ought to be oceupied, would require a force rnuch 
greater than ours; whilst to oeeupy thern irnper-
fectly, would be to expose ourselves to prodigious 
risk. Still there was no he]p for it. That we had 
fallen into difficulties, every one seemed to be 
aware; but there was no disposition anywhere to 
magnifythem; and our General insta~tly set about 
su eh arrangernents as appeared to hirn best eal-
culated to render them productive of no serious 
results. 
The Jeading brigades arrived in Corunna on the 
afternoon of the 11 th; and the night was passed 
by one division in the town, by another in the 
suburbs, and by the reserve, partly at the villages 
on the Sto Jago road, and partly in El Burgo, near 
the bridge over the Mero. That bridge was of 
course destroyed, as well as another sorne little 
distanee further up the river; and strong pickets 
were posted beside their ruins, in order to check 
any atternpt on the part of the enerny to repair 
them. But the ground whicb, in case of a battle, 
the troops were to occupy, was not marked out till 
the rnorning of the 12th, when the following final 
arrangements were rnade :-
- There is a range of heights, or rather of swelling 
knolls, which forrn a sort of arnphitheatre round 
the village of Elvina, at the distance of perhaps a 
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mile, or rather more, from the town of Corunna. 
Upon these Sir John Moore resolved to draw up 
his army ; for though there was a much more formi-
dable range a mile or two further in advance, his 
numbers were not adequate· to its occupation. 
He accordingly stationed General Hope's division 
upon the left,. posting it along a ridge which com-
manded the Betanzos road, and which sloped away 
gradually, with a rearward inclination, towards 
Elvina. At this place Sir David Baird's division 
took up the line, covering the hilIs which still 
continued to bend in, and extending to a valley 
which divided this range from another on the op-
posite side of the Vigo road. Across that valley 
the rifle corps threw itself in extended order; and 
it was supported by General Frazer's division, 
which covered the road to Vigo, and protected a 
principal approach to Corunna; whilst the reserve, 
under General Paget, took post at a village, about 
half a mile in rear of General Hope. 
These arrangements were still incomplete, when 
the enemy made their appearance, moving in 
force along the opposite bank of the Mero; but 
there was no exchange of shots, nor any design 
manifested on their parts to try the strength of our 
posItlOn. The sanie state of inaction continued 
during the 14th, except that on that day the artil-. 
lery which was attached to General Hope's co-
lumn, maintained a short but warm contest with 
}'ENINSULAR WAR. 281 
so me of the enemy's pieces; and that a maga-
zine, containing four thousand barreIs of gunpow-
der, which had been lately brought from England, 
was blown up. It expIoded with a force which 
shook the ground like an earthquake, and threw 
the inhabitants of Corunna into the utmost con-
sternation. On the 15th, the fleet began to ap-
pear in the offing ;whilst the enemy moved for-
ward a body of troops, for the purpose of occupy-
ing the height on which the magazine had been 
constructed. A littIe skirmishing was the conse-
quence; but as the height in question was in no 
degree valuable to us, the riflemen who had held 
it, and who seemed disposed not to yield it up at 
an easy price, were withdrawn. About the same 
time some companies of the 5th regiment made 
an attempt, under their commanding oflicer, Co-
louel Mackenzie, to possess themselves of a couple 
of field-pieces, which the enemy had advanced 
somewhat too far upon our left. - The attempt, 
though boldIy made, failed; and Colonel Macken-
zie, who conducted it, was killed. Thus were the 
two armies in sight of one another, during three 
whole days, without any serious disposition being 
exhibited, to bring matters to the issue of a 
battle. 
In the mean while, Sir John Moore was busily 
employed embarking the sick, the woul1ded, the 
womel1 and childrel1, and all such stores of am-
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munition as yet remained, and could be spared . 
from immediate use. This was effected with 
great regularity during the afternoon and night of 
the 14th; and on the following day, the bulk of 
the artillery, for which our ground was no! 
adapted, was likewise withdrawn. The cavalty, 
after destroying the remainder of their horses, had 
gone on board Soffie time before; so that nothing 
now remained ex"Cept the most efficient of thein-
fantry in position. On the 16th, therefore, as all 
appeared to be quiet in the French lines, orders 
were issued for the gradual retreat of the different 
divisions; and the boats of the Heet were col-
lected in the harbour, and along the beach~ to re-
ceive the regiments on board as fast as they should 
arrive at the water's edge. But about noon, just 
as the General had given his final directions, and 
had mounted his horse for the purpose of visiting 
the outposts, an alarm was spread that the ene-
my were in motion. Sir John Hew to the front, 
expressing his high satisfaction at the intelligence; 
and arrived just as our pickets were beginning to 
skirrnish with the tirailleurs, which, in great mul-
titudes, covered the advance of the French army. 
The enemy carne on in four strong columns, 
two of which threatened the right of our position; 
whilst a third bore down upon the centre, and a 
fourth manreuvred so as to occupy the attention of 
the left. It soon became apparent tbat his main 
PENINSULAR ,\rAR. 283 
object was to tum our right, which was decidedly 
tbe weakest point in our púsition. It was de-
fended by Lord Wi1líam Bentinck's brigade, COll-
sisting of the 4th, 42nd, and 50th regiments; 
having the brigade of guards in their rear, under 
Major-general Warde. In order to secure these 
against being turned, General Paget was ordered 
to advance ínstantly with the reserve, and throw-
ing himself upon the right of Lord William, 10 
take post in the foremost line; whilst General 
Baird rnade ready, after he should have checked 
the force which threatened his own position, to 
succour both by a flank rnovernent of General 
Manningharn's brigade against the enemy. The 
left colurnn, again, needed only to keep its ground, 
and to resist any effort which might be made to 
force it. 
The first attack of the French troops has long 
be en noted for its impetuosity; nor was it less im-
petuous on the present day than on other occa-
sions. Our advanced post s were a11 driven in; 
and the columns of attack moved forward with 
every demonstration of courage, covered by a 
cloud of skirmishers, and supported by a conti,nued 
and well-directed fire from eleven pieces of artil-
lery. As they drew near, these columns deployed 
partIy into 1ine; and it soon became apparent 
that tbey extended far beyond tbe extreme rigbt 
of the British position. But our troops seemed 
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totally to despise this disadvantage; instead of 
waiting upon their own ground to receive the 
shock, they advanced to meet the enemy; the 4th 
regiment, with admirable celerity, wheeling back 
its right wing, and presenting a front in two direc-
tions. N or was the slightest impression made 
upon them, either by the cannonade, which carne 
fast and murderously, or by the appearance of 
whole coi'ps of infantry, which seemed as if they 
must make their way between our people and 
Coruuna. Sir John Moore was near the 4th when 
it executed this movement. He was highly de-
lighted with it, and cried aloud, "This is exactly 
what J wished to be done 1" And feeling that 
men who could act with so much coolness in the 
presence of a superior force were not likely to give 
way merely because the General quitted them, he 
rode off to see that in other parts of the field a 
similar spirit was in operation. 
The French a~d English armies were separated 
from each other by a number ofwalls and hedges, 
and other enclosures; to pass which both parties 
seemed equally anxious. A few moments sufficed 
to bring them into contact; and though the onset 
was spirited in no ordinary degree, it failed in pro-
ducing the slightest impression upon our lineo The 
village of Elvina, which had been occupied by a 
few light troops, was indeed carried, and the 
enemy pressed on with high courage, and in great 
PENINSULAR WAR. 285 
f'Úrce; but their advance was soon checked by the 
50th regiment, which not only drove them down 
the slope, but pursued them through Elvina, and 
to a considerable distance beyond it. It was on 
this occasion that the generals," two majors," 
Napier and Stanhope, were both lost to the ser-
vice; the former being severely wounded and 
made prisoner, whilst the latter was killed 'Ún the 
spot. 
The action became now extremely warrn along 
the whole front of our lineo The 42nd, after re-
ceiving and returning several volleys, crossed its 
. bayonets, and, supported by a battalion of g"uards, 
repulsed a strong body of the enemy, which had 
endeavoured to possess itself of the heights on the 
left. The. charge was an exceedingly brilliant 
one; and Sir John Moore was in the act of watch-
ing .and applauding it, when a cannon-bal1 struck 
hirn on the left shoulder, and beat him to the 
ground. Sorne time previous to this, Sir David 
Baird had been cornpelled, by asevere wound in 
the arm, to quit the fleld: the regirnents were 
therefore left, in a great measure, to the guidance 
of their own courage, and the rnanagement of their 
respective commanding officers. But, to use the 
words of the gallant soldier who succeeded to the 
command, " the troops, though not unacquainted 
with the irreparable 10ss they had sustained, were 
not dismayed; but by the rnost determined bra-
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very, not only repelled everyattempt of the enemy 
to gain ground, but aetually foreed him to retire, 
although he had brought up fresh troops in sup-
port ofthose originally engaged." 
His efforts to force our right being thus foiled, 
Marshal Soult endeavoured to turn it, and to ad-
vanee a eolumn into the rear of our people un-
observed. His design was discovered at once; 
and General Paget, moving forward with the re-
serve, met thecolumn in the most gallant style, 
and drove it back with 10ss upon its original position. 
N ot contented with this, General Paget pressed 
on; and instead of filling the situation of men who 
desired no more than merely to maintain them-
selves, and to repel assaults, the right of the Bri-
tish army became the assailants. The ellemy were 
broken and dispersed; they not only desisted . 
froro all further attempts in this quarter, but were 
fain to alter, in so me degree, their own disposi-
tions, and to take ground considerably to their 
right. N or were they more successful_ in the ef-
furts. which they made to penetrate our centre, 
and; ln:e«k through 001' left. At these points the 
ground was greatly in our favour; and as our 
tr(;)Ops· showed' the same firmnes..c; which distin-
gnished: their comrades to the right, the issue was 
neverfor a moment doubtful. For about half an 
hoor; indeed,. they were in possession ofBetanzos. 
from whieh their tire carne in heavily upon the 
PENINSULAR W AR. 287 
14th regiment; but from that point they were 
speedily dislodged; and when darkness put an 
end to the fighting,. they had been repulsed, with 
terrible slaughter, in an their attacks. Ourloss in 
this affair amounted to about eight hundred in 
killed and wounded: that of the enemy is uncer-
tain; but it has been computed, and not, 1 should 
conceive, without reason, at double. Some priso-
ners were taken on both sides; hut they were not 
numerous, nor were there any officers of rank among 
them. 
1 have said that Sir John Moore received a se-
vere wound whilst animating the 42nd regiment to 
the charge, in an early stage of the action; it is 
hardly necessary to add, that the wound proved 
mortal; nor is it more necessary to enter into any 
minute deíailof the last moments of that illustrious 
soldier's life, orof the melancholy solemnity with 
which his funeral obsequies were performed. The 
tale has been told already, with greater eloquence 
than 1 could employ; nor is it probable that it will 
soon cease to retain a place in the memory of the 
people of this country. 1 t is sufficimlt for me to 
observe, that not all the consciousness of vi€tory, 
cheering and gratifying as that ¡s, was capable of 
al1eviating, in the slightest degree, the grief of the 
army for the 108s of ¡ts chief. Perhaps the British 
army has produced sorne abIer men than Sir John 
Moore; it has certainly produced many who, in 
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point of military talent, ~ere and are quite his 
equals; but it cannot, and perhaps never could, 
boast of one more beloved, not by his own perso-
nal friends alone, but by every individual tbat 
served under him. It would be affectation to deny 
that Sir John Moore, during his disastrous retreat, 
issued many orders in the bighest degree painful to 
the feelings of honourable men, who felt that their 
conduct had not merited them. Mis warmest ad-
mirers have acknowledged this, and his best 
friends have lamented it; but, in all probability, 
no one would have lamented it more heartily than 
himself, had he lived to review, in a moment of 
calmness, the general conduet of this campaign; 
because there never lived aman possessed of a 
better heart, nor, in ordinary cases, of a clearer 
judgment. 
It would be superfluous in me to enter, at this 
place, into anything like a review of the merits of 
this our first military effort in the Peninsula. 
From the observations which 1 have taken the 
liberty to make here and there in the course of the 
narrative, the reader will have doubtless arrived at 
a knowledge of my opinion on the subject; andto 
the justice of that opinion, given as it was on the 
spot, and amidst the progress of the events re-
corded, everything which has since occurred in 
Spain bears testimony. The truth is, that Sir 
. John Moore, with many of the qualities requisite 
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to eonstitute a general, was deficient in that upon 
which, more perhaps than any other, sueeess in 
war must ever dependo He wanted eonfidenee in 
himself-he was afraid of responsibility-he un· 
derrated the qualities of bis own troops, and greatIy 
overrated those of his adv~rsary. Yet let justice 
be done. He acted under circumstances .at once 
difficult and trying. He was harassed by being 
made, in sorne degree, dependent upon the opi. 
nions of others; whilst he was from the first abso-
lutely destitute of support from the authorities in 
the country, as well military as civil. Sir John 
Moore was, moreover, a brave and high-spirited 
soldier. Of this the most satisfaetory proof was 
furnished, by his refusal to aet upon a suggestion 
made to him by sorne of the oldest- and most ex· 
perieneed -generals in his army, and his declining 
to enter into any convention for the quiét em· 
barkation of his troops. He preferred the honour 
of his army to its safety; and by preserving the 
oue, he provided for the other also. 
On the faH of Sir J ohn Moore, and the removal 
.of Sir David Baird from the field, the command 
devolved upon General Hope; who conducted 
everytbing with that judgment and coolness which 
peculiarly distinguished him. Though successful 
in the battle, he did not consider himself autho· 
rised to depart from the plan upon which he knew 
that the late commander of the forces had intended 
VOL. I. T 
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to acto The enemy no sooner retired than he re-
newed the preparations for embarking the troóps, 
which their attack had interrupted; and the boats 
being aH in readiness at ten o'c1ock that night, 
brigade after brigade filed silently down to the 
beach. The embarkation was covered by Major-
general Beresford, at the head of two thousand 
men, who occupied the land-front of Corunna ; 
and by Major-genCeral Hill's brigade, which took 
post on, the promontory, in rear of the town. It 
went on during the night with great celerity, and 
without any interruption from the French; but on 
the following morning they pushed forward a corps 
of light troops towards the town, and seized the 
heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. 
No attempt was, however, made to molest the 
covering brigades. The situation of General Be-
l'esfol'd, undel' the walls of the place, was indeed 
such, as to place it in a great ,degree beyond the 
l'each of danger ; . and the Spaniards, to do them 
justice, seemed resolved to protect our mov,e-
ments to the utmost. General Hill's brigade was 
accordingly withdrawn at thl'ee o'c1ock on that 
afternoon; and finally, as soon as darkness set in, 
the last division quitted, its ground, and was re-
ceived in perfect safety on board of ship. 
Thus" withO:ut any other interruption than arose 
from a feeble cannonade, directed against our 
shipping, froIn the heights of St. Lucia, was the 
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whole of the British army, including its sick, it8 
wounded, its artillery, its stores, and even its 
prisoners, conveyed from the coast; and the first 
regular campaign of our soldiers in lhe Peninsula 
came to a close. 
In the course of the preceding details, I am 
aware much may be said and recorded of the par-
ticular exploits of different corps, and the conduct 
of officers. The just view of everything cannot be 
collected, nor individual merit marked out, by one 
in my humble position; my desire therefore has 
heen limited to give fairly my own general impres-
sions, without offence to any,and to apologise to 
al1, whose corps, names, and actions, ought to be 
recorded in militar y history by an abler pen than 
mme. 
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CHAPTER XI. 
Consequences of Sir Jobn Moore's campaign-Departure of 
N apoleon for Germany-Military condition of Spain .and 
Portugal previous to the arrival of Sir Arthur WellesJey-
Invasion of Portugal by Soult-He passes the Minho at 
Orense, defeats the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey, 
and enters Chaves-Oporto carried by assault-Lupisse fails 
to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo, and goes to join Victor-Battle 
of Medelin, and overthrow of Cuesta's army-SirJohn Cra-
dock and Marshal Beresford make preparations to oppose 
Soult-Sir Arthur WelIesley embarks at Portsmouth; 
reaches Lisboll; is received with enthusiasm-He makes 
arrangements to take the field. 
IN spite of its' disastrous and somewhat humi-
liating termination, the first campaign of the' 
Brítish troops in Spain cannot be said to have 
been wholly unproductive of benefit to the general 
cause. The attentíon of the enemy being turned 
mainly towards the north, an opportunity was 
given to the southern provinces of repairing, at 
least in part, the inj uries sustained by the defeats 
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of BIake, Castanos, and Bel videre; and of that 
opportunity they were not altogether neglectful. 
The remains of the beaten armies were collected 
and re-organised, and fresh levies were indus-
triously set on foot. Palafox, Cuesta, the Duke 
del Infantado, and the Marquis de Palacia, ap-
peared each at the head of a corps; whilst Ro-
mana, retreating towards the Portuguese frolltier, 
did his best to rouse the energies of Gallicia; and 
Saragoza, though too fatally for its brave garrison, 
again made itself i1lustrious by the length and ob-
stinacy of its defence. But the event to which, 
aboye an others, the Peninsula owed its escape 
from immediate conquest, was the unlooked-for 
arming of Austria, and the consequent departure 
of Buonaparte towards another scene ofoperations; 
He had scarcely returned to Madrid from his 
movement against Sir John Moore's army, when 
intelligence of the rising storm in the north reached 
him; and he found himself under the necessity of 
leaving to his marshaIs the compIetion of that tri-
umph, of which he persuaded himself that he had 
laid the foundation. Having once more seated his 
brother on the throne, 'and amused himself and his 
adherents by the promulgation of a few de crees, 
he took the road to France; whither he was fol-
lowed,on the 22nd of January, by the division of 
imperial guards, amounting in all tofifteen thou-
sand meno 
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Of the proceedings which took place, both in 
Spain and Portugal, from this date up to thé 
return of Sir Arthur Wellesley 'to Lisbon, it falls 
not within the plan of the present imperfect narra": 
tive to attempt any minute relation. Enough is 
done, when the reader is reminded that the Spa': 
nish armies, of whose re-organisation notice has 
been taken, suffered, one after another, signal 
defeats; and that before the mO~lth of March had 
expired, the principal matter of which the French 
generals had cause to complain, was their igno-
ra'nce upon what point it behoved them to bear, 
for the purpose of cómpleting theirconquests. 
In Portugal, again, an was alarm and dismay. 
There remained in or about Lisbon, a corps of ten 
or twelve thousand British soldiers, under the 
command of Sir John Cradock, upon which alone' 
the smallestconfidence could bereposed; fOÍ" 
though the Portuguese ,were still as far as ever from 
being reconciled to a foreign yoke, they were with-
out officers, without discipline, and without confi-
dence in themselves~ General Beresfordhad in-
deed, with the activity and zeal for which he is re-
markable, begun to exert himselffor the removal of 
these evils. As soon as he received his appoint-
ment as commander-in-chief, he set steadily to t~e 
task of re-modelling the Portuguese army in all its 
parts, by introducing. into each battalion a system 
both of drill and internal arrangement, similar to 
PENINSULAR \VAH. 295 
that which exists iIiBritish regiments; but a re-
volution so complete coüldnot be effected in a 
moment, nor were its beneficial consequences 
fullyfelt till a later period in the war. Tbe sole 
means of defence, independently oE Sir John Crá-
dock's division, tberefore, which Portugal could 
hope to oppose to a fresh invasion, consisted of a 
corps under Silveira, mustering in an about six 
thousand men, of which one-half only were fE;gu~ 
lal's; of the Lusitanian legion, organised by Sir 
Robert Wilson; of Bel'esford's levies, then in pro-
cess of organization, of the gal'rison óf Oporto; 
made upalmost entirely of volunteers; and oí 
bands of ill-armed peasants, whose want of order 
would necessarily incapacitate tbem from acting 
with effect in the freId, though theirindividual 
courage might render them tl'uly. formidable as 
guerillas and partisans. . , 
Such was the state of Portugal, when three 
corps d'armée from the French army prepal'ed to 
inváde it. Having reduced Corunna and Ferrol, 
and otherwise secured the tranquillity of Gallicia, 
Soult set forward in the direction of Tuy, with the 
design of penetrating through the province of Tl;as 
os Montes, seizing Oporto, and so' advancing upon 
Lisbon. To aid him ~n this attempt~ Vic'tor was 
commanded to manreuvre on the side of Badajoz; 
and to send on a strong' cQlumn, which should 
unite itself with Soult's army in the capital. As 
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these two points of attack were, however, at a 
great distance from one another, General Lapisse 
was directed to strengthen them by occupying the 
country between the Douro and Almeida, and by 
the reduction of the important fortress of Ciudad 
Rodrigo. Here he was to remain tilI the fall of 
Oporto should be communicated to him; after 
which he was to unite himself to Victor; when 
both having covered Soult's movement to Lisbon, 
and seen the imperial eagles once more hoisted 
there, were to countermarch upon Andalusia, and 
complete its subjugation :-This was the general 
intelligence received, though for accuracy in all ils 
parts it is impossible to vouch. 
In accordance with these data Soult began his 
journey; his place in Gallicia being supplied by 
Marshal N ey at the head of a fourth corps. He 
reached the Minho without encountering any 
othe'r obstacles besides those which a wasted 
district necessarily threw in his way; and he 
made ready to pass the river in a flotilla of fishing-
boats, which had been collected together for the 
purpose. But the river was wide and rapid; his 
sailors were unskilful; and the opposite banks 
being in possession of sorne armed peasants under 
General Freire, wiih a couple of six-pounders, his 
flotilla was either sunk or swept away. He gave 
up the attémpt as, impracticable, and turning to 
bis left, marched at a quick pace upon Orense, 
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where there is a bridge. Here his passage was 
made good; and here information reached him 
that Romana, with a body of Spaniards,. and Sil-
veira, at the head of his Portuguese, were drawn 
up near Monterrey, for the purpos'e of opposing his 
advance upon Chaves. He hastened to give them 
battle, defeated them with considerable slaughter, 
and removed to Chaves the hospital and magazines 
whichhe had pteviously established at Orense. 
His next movement was upon Oporto; where 
the spirit of discord, and even mutiny, which pre-
vailed among the garrison, not less than the ab-
sence ofjudgment exhibited by the authorities in 
putting the place in a position of defence, gave 
promise that no very obstínate or bloody contest 
awaited him. 
The resistance offered by the garrison of Oporto 
was not more serious than Soult hadantici-
pated. Having overthrown a tumultuary force, 
which ventured to oppose him at Braga, he ar-
rived before Oporto on the 23rd of March, and 
on the same day sent in to demand its surrender. 
The summons was rejected, and dispositions were 
made for an assault. A long line of open out-
works covered the place, so extensive as to be 
perfectly indefensible, except by a very numerous 
army. These were attacked at three o'clock in 
the afternoon of the 24th; they were carried al-
most at a rnsh; and before fourthe French soldiers 
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were in possession of the streets. Three or four 
thousand regulars and rnilitia eitherescaped or 
surrendered; the Bishop fled across the Douro, 
never pausing till he had reached Lisbon; and the 
town was given' up, during three whole days, to 
indiscrirninate plunder. Several ships _were in 
the harbour, laden with the property of indivi-
duals, which they had hoped to rernove; but the 
north winds happening to blow, they could not 
put to sea, and becarne, of course, a prey to the 
conquerors. 
Established here, Soult proceeded to make the 
people of Portugal acquainted with the nature of 
the cornmission which he bore, and the extent of 
the powers with which he was intrusted. He 
issued proclarnations, calling upon the peasantry 
to return everywhere to their hornes, and threat-
ening with the severest punishrnents all such per-
sons as should be found with arms in their hands. 
He assured the inhabitants oí Lisbon that the 
hour oftheir deliverance frorn the bondage of Eng-
land had arrived, and invited them to placethem-
selves and their city under the protection of an 
officer who had the honour to appear among them 
as the Emperor's representative; and who, in his 
capacity of governor-in-chief, would pay the strie-
test attention to their prejudices, and se cure to 
thern the elljoyrnent oí just laws and personal 
liberty. Finally ~ he denounced a terrible ven .. 
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geance against aU who should presume in any way 
to offer to his progress an opposition as perverse as 
it must be hopeless, and assumed generally the 
style of a monarch returning, o at the head of a 
powerful party, to the throne of his ancestors. 
In the mean while, Victor and Lapisse were 
each carrying on a series of operations, though not 
exactly in accordance with the supposed general 
plan which had been laid dewn for the conduct of 
the campaign. o Lapisse, indeed, appeared before 
Ciudad Rodrigo with a corps of six thousand men, 
and endeavoured, by a coup-de-main, to make 
himself master of it; but he was repulsed, and 
being wholly unprovided with battering cannon, 
he did not renew the attempt. On the contrary~ 
he marched to his left in search of Victor, leaving 
nothing behind for the purpose of keeping open 
theo communication with Soult; who became, in 
consequence, cornpletely isolated in his new posi-
tion at Oporto. With respect to Victor, again, he 
found employrnent enough in pursuing, from place 
to place, the army of Cuesta; which led him first 
froro Talavera upon Truxillo, and afterwards, by a 
variety of circuitous routes, upon Merida and Me-
delin. Here,Oat last, the Spanish General, appre-
hensive for the fate of Badajoz, determined to 
offer battle. An acfion was accordiugly fought in 
an open plain, which surrounds the latter town, on 
the left bank of the Guadiana; ánd it ended in the 
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total rout of the patriot army. In this affair the 
Spanish infantry behaved well; they had even 
gained ground upon the enemy at several points, 
and were pressing forward with great gallantry, 
when a sudden panic seized the cavalry, and it 
fled froID the field without striking a blow. Cuesta 
díd his best to rally the fugitives; but to no pur-
pose. The French broke in upon the Spanish 
left, exposed by the flight of the cavalry, and 
turned it, at the moment when Cuesta was thrown 
from his horse, and severely bruised. AH now 
became confusion and dismay. The Duke of AI-
buquerque, who commanded on the right, endea-
voured to form his division into columns, and to 
retire in good order; but the columns were not 
yet formed, when a heavy fire ofartillery dispersed 
them, and the men could not again be recalled to 
their standards. The rout was complete; and the 
10ss, in killed, wounded, and taken, was greater 
by far than a Spanish army had yet sustained from 
, the commencement of the war. 
It was not, however, a bloodless victory. The 
Spaniards, particularly in the commencement of 
the day, fought with determined gallantry, and to 
great advantage; and the ,French suffered more 
than their General had at aH calculated upon. 
This was distinctly proved from the disinclination 
which he exhibited to follow up, with alacrity, the 
success which he had obtained. Though Cuesta 
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retired towards Llerena overplains of immense 
extent, with scarcely any cavalry to protect him, 
Victor, who was particularly strong, in that arm, 
attempted no pursuit. On the contrary, he re-
sumed his former position at Medelin and Merida, 
from whence he sent to call in Lapisse; and where 
he continued inactive, till the operations of the 
British army at last compelled him to move. 
Things were in this state, the designs of the 
French having been temporarily frustrated, when 
the British government carne to the wise determi-
nation of making another great effort for the deli-
, veranee of the Peninsula. For this purpose, large 
bodies of troops were collected, here and tlIere, 
along the coast, consisting partly of the regiments 
which had returned from Corunna, and partly of 
others which had not yet seen service; and these, 
as they became severally complete, were sent off, 
under able oflicers, to Lisbon. Among the first . 
who arrived at the scene of action, was Major-
general Hill. He reached Lumias on the 6& of 
April, where Sir John Cradock had fixed his 
head-quarters; and found him making such dis-
positions as did not indicate offensive measures. 
General Hill, it was said, at this time suggested 
holder measures, and he was aided by Beres-
ford's council; and it was agreed that, instead of 
continuing preparations for a retreat, the combined 
British and Portuguese armies -should move for-
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ward. The enemy were, at tliis time, in a state 
of perfect inaction. The fe~ demonstrations of a 
further advance, which, on first entering Oporto, 
they had made, were at an end; and they con-
tented themselves now with pushing on their oút-
posts as far as the banks of the Vouga, whilst the 
main body took post between that river and the 
Douro. It was resolved to threaten them there ; 
and it was confidently hoped that Soult, already 
alarmed by transactions in his real', would not only 
evacuate Oporto, but retire from the whole north 
of Portugal. The latter was an event for the at-
tainment of which no exertions, it was believed, 
ought to be spared; because a conviction every-
where prevailed, that the occupation by a French 
army of th:e provinces ofTras os Montes and Entre 
Douro e Minho, was an injury to the cause second 
only to the faH of Lisbon itself. 
These resolutions had been formed, and some 
movementswere actually made towards their ac-
complishment, when Sir Arthur Wellesley. to 
whom the chief command in Portugal hadbeen 
intrusted, by an extraordinary effort of the wal' 
minister of the day, embarked with his staff for 
the seat of war. To that staff it was the writer's 
fortune to be attached, in the capacity ofadjutant-
general. We set sail from Portsmouth on Satur-
day~ the 16th of April, with a stift' breez~ blowing 
ahead, and had nctt proceeded beyond the Isle of 
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Wight, when an event occurréd which had well 
nigh proved fatal to uso Itmight be about mid-
night, or rather Jater, when Captain Collier of H. 
M. ship -- burst into the cabin, entreating us to 
rise without deJay, for that we were on the eve of 
shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time 
in Jeaping from our cots, and mounting the deck ; 
when a very awful as well as alarming spectacJe 
presented itseJf. In striving to pass a bank which 
runs out from S1. Gatherine's point into the sea, 
the ship missed stays; this occurred again and 
again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer 
to danger; and now when we looked· abroad, the 
breakers were to be se en at about a stone's-throw 
froID the bow. There was not an indiyidual 
amongst us who anticipated any other xesult than 
that in a few minutes, at the furthest, the vessel 
would strike; but we were deceived. The wind; 
which had hitherto been blowing on shore, sud-
denly changed, and we were at once relieved 
from a situation, than which the whole progress of 
our lives had not before brought us into any more 
uncomfortable. But it was the only adventure 
which befell us by the way. The fair wind which 
sprang up at a moment so critical, did Iiot desert 
us during the remainder of our voyage; and we 
anchored in the Tagus, after a: passage of only six 
days, on the 22nd of April. 
N o words would be adeq uate to convey the fainh 
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est idea of the delight exhibited by all dasses of 
persons, as 800n as the arrival of Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley at Lisbon became known. AH day long 
the streets were crowded with men and women, 
eongratulating one another on the happyevent¡ 
and at night the city was illuminated even in the 
most obscure and meanest of its lanes ana alIeys. 
In the theatres, pieces were hastily got up, some-
what after the fashion of the masks anciently ex-
hibited among ourselves, in whieh Victory was 
made to crown the representative of the hero 
with laurels, and to address him in language as 
far removed from the terms of ordinary conver-
sation, as might be expeeted from an allegorieal 
personage. But it was not by sueh exhibitions 
alone that the Portuguese nation sought to evinee 
its confidenee in its former deliverer, and its 
satisfaetÍon at his return. Sir Arthur Welles-
ley was immediately nominated Marshal-gene-
fal of the armies of Portugal; by which means, 
whilst the eare oftraining and managing the whole 
of the interior economy rested still with Beresford, 
the fuUest authority to move the troops whither-
soever he would, and to employ them in any series 
of operations in w~ieh he might desire to embark, 
devolved upon him. 
It wiU easily be believed that no time was lost, 
either by the' commander of the forces, or by those 
immediately attached to him. in endeavouring to 
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make themselves thoroughiy aequainted, as well 
with thesituation and amount of our own resourees, 
as with the arrangements and designs of the enemy. 
With respeet to our own resourccs, we found that 
the whole of the British eorps had moved in tbree 
eolumns, and that it was to assemble, on the 24th, 
at Leiria. Of the Portuguese, again, two battalions 
only remained at Abrantes, whilst the remainder, 
with Marsbal Beresford, were colleeted at Tho-
mar; and so strenuous and unremitting had been 
his exertions, that they were already estimated at 
or about fifteen thousand meno But it was not 
from their numbers only tbat the Portuguese troops 
promised to prove formidable. Warmly attaehed 
to their English officers, and reposing unbounded 
confidenee in them, they had applied of late with 
so mueh ardour to their military education, that 
some were already in fit state to take the field ; 
and it required only a litt]e experienc€, as well 
as a more extensive intermingling of Englishmen 
in their ranks, to put them on a leveJ with the best 
troops of Europe. The battalions which gave way 
so easilyat Oporto, entertained no respeet for their 
leaders; there was not an officer of rank among 
them to whom they conlel at alllook up. It was 
not so in Beresforel's army. There the men were, 
what the lower orders of Portugal always are, per-
fectly -brave; they were officcred, at least in part, 
by persons for whom they entertainec1 the highest 
VOL. I. U 
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respect; and had a few more English generals 
taken rank among them, they would have been, 
even now, not unworthy to take their places by 
the side of British soldiers. There was one bri-
gade in particular, commanded by Colonel Camp-
bell, which struck me as being in the finest possible 
order. It consisted of two battalions, each mus-
tering about six hundred bayonets; and it stood 
under arms. and went through a variety of evo-
lutions with a precision and correctness which 
would have done no discredit to many of the 
brigades in our own army. N or was it less satis-
factory to find that the interior economy of these 
battalions had been brought to a state of perfection 
altogether in keeping with their external appear-
ance. Both men and officers had learned to mess 
as themen and officers in the English service; the 
pay of the common soldiers was increased; and 
the mischievous system which heretofore had en-
abled the captains of companies to defraud their 
troops, was abolished. Everything went on, in 
short, as it ought to do; and the fairest prospect 
was given, that with a little additional help on the 
part of their allies, the Portuguese army would 
soon become not only efficient in the field, but 
orderly and well reglllated in its cantonments. 
With respect to the enemy, a variety of rllmours 
were afloat, out of which it was not very easy to 
select one more plausible, or having a greater ap-
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pearance of probability, than the rest. That their 
armies, on both sides of the country, remained 
stationary, was well known; but the causes of the 
halt were differently reptesented, according to the 
taste or faney of our informants. By sorne, it was 
asserted that the war in Germany had eompelled 
N apoleon not only to omit sending reinforcements 
into the Peninsula, but even to draín off part of the 
force which he had formerly kept there; and that 
the French generals found themselves, in conse-
quence, ehecked in the midst of their career, and 
ineapaeitated from bringing to a eonclusion the 
work whieh they had begun. By others, their 
inaetivity was attributed solely to the effeets of the 
battIe of Medelin, on the one hand, and on the 
other, to the intelligence which had reached them 
of the arrival of our reinforcements; whilst, by a 
third party, the French marshals were represented 
as at variance among themselves, and not more un-
able than unwilling, to act up to the plans which 
they had formed. As the event proved, there was 
not one of all these sur mises which díd not possess 
sorne truth, though we of course could not at the 
moment aseertain this; but we did-ascertain that 
their corps were far from. being efficient, and that 
we might fairly calculate upon three or four months 
of absolute freedom from attack. In this case, 
little doubt could exist of our ultimate success, at 
all events, in delivering and keeping possession of 
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Portugal; whilst it was by no means improbable 
ihat we should take advantage of whatever suc-
cess might attend us, and carry the war into 
8pain. 
The reports incirculation as to the strength of 
80ult's and VictQr's corps; were hardly less varied 
than those which spread abroad respecting other 
matters; but the opinion at head-quarters was, 
that the former could not have at his disposal aboye 
twelve thousand effectives, nor· the latter more 
than double that amount. lt became, therefore, 
rather a nice question to determine, w hethe1' an 
attempt upon Victor would not be preferable to 
an operation in the north. On the one hand, it 
was quite evident that, were we strong enough t-o 
destroy Victor, the great game would be played 
at once; for, in this case, Sou1t could not venture 
to remain at Oporto; and even Madrid would, in 
alI probability, be evacuated. On the other hand, 
it might be attended with hazardous consequences, 
to Ieave the capital open, and Soult with his army 
in our rear.These were matters which required 
mature ,corisideration; and though few men pos-
sess the faculty of arriving, with promptitude, at 
judicious determinations in the degree in which 
it was possessed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he 
could not pretend to make up his mind tillhe 
should huye seen and advised with Beresford and 
Cradock. In the mean while, however, that 
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time might not be wasted, the lIlost active prepa-
rations were set on foot, to render the troops 
moveable in any direction, and at the shortest no-
tice. Our commissariat arrangements, which had 
fallen into miserable confusion, were once more 
placed in train; mules, bullocks, and such cars as 
seemed likely to be wanted, were put in requisi-
tion; and fIying' depots of hospital and other 
stores were disposed in order for immediate trans-
portation. AH these matters served to satisfy the 
troops that they would not be long kept inactive ; 
and the promise which they held out, received, in 
due time, its fulfilment. 
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CHAPTER XII. 
Dispositious of the allied troops - They assernble at Coinibra, 
aud are reviewed-State of the French army becornes sorne-
what changed by the defeat of General Lefevte-Rumours 
of a mutiny arnong the enemy-Sir Arthur \Vellesley ar-
ranges his plaus, aud the brigades are commauded to rnove. 
SIR JOHN CRADOCI{ being at this time affiicted 
with asevere illness, failed in reaching Lisbon as 
early as he wished; but Marshal Beresford, on 
whose report of rnatters great reliance deserved to 
be placed, carne in without the 10ss of an hour. 
He spoke in high terms of tbe Portuguese troops, 
and exp~essed himself sanguine as to the result of 
any operations wbich rnight be undertaken. Un-
der these circumstances, Sir Arthur Wellesley 
deterrnined to take the field at once; and the fol-
10wing is a brief outline of the arrangements which 
were entered into in consequence of that determi-
nation. 
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The British troops, with the exception of one 
infantry and one cavalry brigade, under General 
Mackenzie, were directed to assemble, with as 
little delay as possible, at Coirobra, and to take 
up, in the mean time, the line of the Mon-
dego. They amounted in all, including two bri-
gades of Germans, to 17,000 effectives, the de-
tached corps mustering 2,700 men, about one-
half of which was cavalry; and they were to be 
joined there by a portion of the Portuguese army, 
which was so distributed, as that in each brigade 
one Portuguese might take its place between two 
British battalions. By this disposition, the fide-
lit y, and to a certain extent, the gallantry of our 
allies, would, it was presumed, be secured; if 
they should exhibit the slightest disposition to 
desert their colours, or to turn their, backs upon 
the French, they might at any moment be annihi-
Jated by the corps which hemmed them in. The 
army, thus arranged, would amount in all to about 
twenty thousand men, six thousand of which were 
allotted to act as a separate corps under Beres-
ford; and it was understood that its undivide<\ 
attention would, in the first place, be turned 
against Soult and the French force in Oporto. 
In the mean while, a division of twe]ve thou-
sand men, composed entirely of Portuguese, with 
the exception of the two British brigades already 
aUuded to, was to take post. under General Mac-
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kenzie, at Santarem and Abrantes. The object 
of this distribution was an exceedingly important 
one, for a due comprehension of which it may be 
necessary . to advert to other matters, of which 
sorne notice has already becn taken. 
1 have said that, according to the plan original!y 
devised for the second invasion of Portugal by the 
French, Victor was on no account to rnove into 
Andalusia, till after he should have ascertained 
the fact of Soult's success, and been joined by the 
division of General Lapisse. Of this, certain . in-
tercepted letters frorn King Joseph and Marshal 
Jourdan informed uso But Victor had been already 
drawn into sorne deviation frorn these arrange-
ments, in consequence of the movements of Cues-
ta; and it was not improbable that the comse 
which events had lately taken, would draw him 
into still wider deviations. Though he knew no· 
thing of Soult-nothing at least calculated to give 
him satisfaction-he had been aIread y joined by 
Lapisse; it accordingly became a matter of doubt, 
whether he should proceed into Andalusia, Ol 
march upon Lisbon by way of Alentejo. 1 t was 
to provide against the latter contingency, that 
General Mackenzie's corps too k post as aboye 
described. In that position he cornpletely COffi-
manded the fords over the Tagus; and he occupied 
ground, where twelve thousand men might, under 
any circumstances, offer a successful resistan ce to 
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at least twice their O'wn numbers. 1t is true that 
a nO'tiO'n prevailed, that if the French endeavO'ured 
tO' crO'ss the Tagus at aH, they wO'uld rnake the at-
tempt atSalvatierra; from whence, shO'uld they 
make good their passage, the strO'ng ground cO'uld 
be turned; but that idea in nO' degree disturbed 
the eq uanilllity O'f any O'ue whO' bore in mind, that 
at the present seasO'n O'f the yeal' the Tagus, sO' lO'w 
at least as Salvatierra, cO'uld nO't be passed except 
in bO'ats. Effectual care wO'uld, hO'wever, be taken, 
that with such means O'f passing the enemy should 
. J-
not be supplied; and hence the occupatIO'n O'fr! 
Abrantes, and Santarem, and the neighbouring _;',,-
villages O'f Golegam, &c. might be said to place ~ '¡ 
LisbO'n in perfect security frO'm all insult in that 
quarter. 
It was, hO'wever, extremely improbable that 
VictO'r wO'uld embark in an undertaking sO' hazar-
dO'us as an advance upon Lisboll. He knew that 
Cuesta was again in force; he could not, there-
fO're, tum his back upO'n him withO'ut leaving a 
strO'ng cO'rps behind for the purpose of watching 
his mO'tions; and this wO'uld necessarily expO'se 
him tO' the risk·O'f being attacked and destrO'yed in 
detail. It was mO're probable that, being strength-
ened by the junctiO'n O'f Lapisse, he wO'uld leave 
SO'ult tO' his fate, and mO've, with all his force, upO'n 
Andalusia. In this case, Sir Arthur Wellesley 
repeatedly urged upO'n Cuesta the wisdO'm of 
~.'. \ 
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retiring to the mountains, and keeping wholly 
upon the defensive; whilst the garrisons of Elvas 
and Badajoz should march upon the enemy's rear, 
and harass his convoys. This would give us an 
opportunity of completing our projects in the 
north; after which, by a rapid march to the eas-
tero frontier, we might come up to his aid, and by 
a combined attack, overwhelm Victor's army. 
Having put these matters as far in train as it 
was possible to do at this stage ·of the business, 
the head-quarters of the British army quitted 
Lisbon; and halting at Pombal on the 1st, arrived 
at Coimbra on the 2nd of May. Here, as in the 
capital, General Wellesley was received with a 
degree of enthusiasm which strongly marked the 
confidence of all classes in his abilities. But 
affairs were in too critical a posture to authorise 
the waste of time, even in the agl'eeable occu-
pation of giving and receiving compliments; and 
Sir Arthur was not aman to gratify his own va-
nityat the expense of the public good. He ac-
cordingly cut short many of the dispositions which 
the Portuguese authorities had made, for the pur-
pose of manifesting their good-will, and set him-
self, on the very .day of his arrival, to the task of 
arranging and distributing his army for irnmediate 
operations. 
It has been already stated that one brigade of 
infantry, and another of cavalry, \Vere placed 
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under the orders of Major-general Mackenzie, and 
detached on a particular service. The regiments 
composing the latter, were the 3rd and 4th heavy 
dragoons brigaded together under General Fane, 
and the 2nd and 24th regiments of footcomposed 
the former. The 1'emainder were distributed into 
seven brigades of infantry of the line, two bri-
gades of German infantry,one brigade of guards, 
and one brigade oflight cavalry. Of the cavalry, 
which consisted of the 14th, 16th, and 20th Bri-
tish, and the 3rd light dragoons of the King's 
German Legion, the command was given to Major-
general Cotton; whilst a: brigade of guards, com-
posed of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream, and 
1st ofthe 3rd guards, and additionally strengthened 
by one company of riflemen from the 5th batta-
!ion of the 60th, was commanded by Brigadier-
general H. Campbell. Major-general Hill was at 
the head of the fi1'st brigade, consisting of the 
Buffs, tbe 66th, the 48th, and one company 5th 
battalion 60th. Major-general Tilson had the 
third brigade, composed of five companies 5th bat-
talion 60th, the 88th, and 1st battalion Portuguese 
grenadiers, and the 87th. The fith brigade, made 
up of the 7th, 1st battalion 10th Portuguese, the 
53rd and 1st company 5th battalion60th, was 
headed by Brigadier-general A. Campbell. Bri-
gadier-general Cameron commanded the 7th bri. 
gade, which consisted of the 9th, 2nd battalion 
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10th Portuguese, the 83rd y and one rifle company. 
The sixth brigade, composed of the 1st battalion 
detachments, 1st battalion 16th Portuguese, and 
the 29th, was under the orders of Brigadier-general 
R. Stewart. The 4th brigadey consisting of the 
2nd battalion detachments, 2nd battalion, 16th 
Portuguese, the 97th, and a rifle company, was 
headed by Brigadier-general Sontag; whilstthe 
2nd brigade, madeup of the 27th, 45th, and 3Íst, 
acted under the orders of Major-general Mac-
kenzie. With respect to the Germans, again, 
they were divided into two brigades, under the 
respective orders of Brigadier-generals Longthwert 
and Drieberg; the whole being commanded by 
Major-general Murray. 
Inaddition to these ar-rangements, four major>-
generals,-namely, Sherbrooke, Payne, Lord Wil-
liam Bentinck, and Paget,-received local rank as 
lieutenant-generals during the· continlJance of the 
service, that they might severally take command 
of such divisions as the General-in-chief should 
from time to time see fit to consolidate. At the 
head of the adjutant-generals' department was 
the writer of these sheets, then Brigadier-general 
Stewart; and Colonel Murray, 3rd guards, acted 
as quarter-master-g~neral. 
His troops being thus distributed, and placed, 
each corps under ¡ts own leader, Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley proceeded to consider his plan of the cam-
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paign which he was so soon about to open. That 
the reader may the better comprehend the nature 
of that plan, as well as the purposes of .the diffe~ 
rent movements which subsequently took place, it 
will be necessary to remind him of the exact 
situation in which Marshal Soult stood,or, to -speak 
more eorrectly, in which he was believed to stand, 
when the plan in question was formed. 
It has be en stated that Soult made his way 
with very little difficulty to Oporto, and that he 
remained there for sorne time, with his advanced 
posts on the bank of the V ouga, in a state of per-
fect inaction. In the mean while, the Spanish and 
Portuguese troops, which he had wirb so much 
ease dispersad, were again assembling, and gra-
dually closing in upon his communications. Sil-
veira, who had retired, first to the mountains of 
Oura' and Reigaz, and afterwards to Villa Pouca, 
no sooner became aware that the enemy were 
moving upon the Braga road, than he quitted his 
new position, and advanced again upon Chaves. 
He entered that place without opposition, and after 
blockading the castle for four days,compelled it, 
with -a garrison of 1300 men, to surrender. En-
couraged by this success, he proposed to follow tbc 
steps of the French army, and,' if possible, to cut 
off their detachment at Braga, as he had done 
at Chaves; but intelligence of the fan of Oporto 
caused him to relínquish that determination; 
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whilst a rumour of· an intended movement 
through the province of Tras os Montes, by way 
either of Canavezas or Entre Ambos Ríos, induced 
him to act upon another. He immediately occu-
pied the villages above-named; repulsed the énemy 
in two attempts upon the former; and reaching 
Amarante just as a body of Frerich troops were 
advancing upon it, compelled them to retire to 
Peñafiel, and himself took possession of the city. 
Whilst Silvei.ra was thus straitening the left of 
the enemy's position, and interposing himself in 
that direction between the corps of Soult and 
Victor, Romana was not id le in the rearo In spite 
of his defeat at Monterrey, the Spanish General, 
who had retreated upon La Puebla de Sanabria, 
soon found himselfat the head of four or five thou-
sand men, with whom he resolved to strike a blow 
upon the line of French posts between Astorga and 
Villa Franca. The former city was, indeed, too 
strong for him; it could not be won without artil-
lery, and in artillery he was deficient; but the 
latter, after a trifling resistance, he contrived to 
reduce, making prisoners of a colonel and eigbt 
húndred meno This victory, trifling as it was, 
roused, once more, tbe dormant energies of Ga-
licia into exertion. The French were attacked in 
every point where appeared the slightest prospect 
of success. Vigo was closely invested, on the 
hnÜ ~)Ü~, b-:y G~n~l'O.\ 'M.\)l\\\\)·, \~(j\\"\ tn.e \;ea, b'Y 
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Captain Mackenley of the Lively frigate; and it 
capitulated just as a force from Tuy, destined for 
its relief, arrived under the walls. The retiring 
force was attacked and routed, and Tuy itself 
placed in a state of blockade; but in Tuy, Soult 
had established considerable magazilles, and both 
the garrison and the sick in the hospital were 
numerous; he could not, therefore, permit it to 
fall as Vigo had fallen. Generals Gramdorges 
and Heudelet were sent, at the head óf a tight 
corps, to its relief; and their force was such as 
the half-armed and undisciplined levies employed 
in the siege coidd not successfully oppose. They 
entered Tuy, after having sustained sorne resist-
ance, particularly at Ponte de Lima. But there 
was no designentertained of keeping· permanent 
possession of Tuy, important as the place unde-
niably was. The orders of these generals instr.uct-
ed them only to withdraw the magazines and the 
garrison; and this, as well as the removal of the 
sick and wounded from Braga, they successfully 
accomplished. That done, they returned to Oporto, 
where Soult found himself fairIy hemmed in ;_. 
in front by the British army, on the left by Sil-
veira, in the rear by bands of armed Spaniards, 
and on the tight by the sea. 
Aware that such had lately been the enemy's 
situation, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to ma-
nreuvre, for the purpose of surrounding them in 
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Oporto, and compelling them to surrender. \Vith 
this view, Beresford received instructions to pl'O-
ceed from Coimbra with his own corps, and sorne 
Portuguese troops, which, under Sir Robert Wil-
son, occupied Vizeu, as far as Lamego; to cross 
the Douro there, and to join General Silveira in 
Amarante. As soon as this movernent should 
have been effected, and the detached column es-
tablished in the provine e of Entre Douro e Minho, 
the force from Coimbra was to advance, and rnake, 
by the great roadsof V ouga and A vouros, upon 
Oporto. In the mean while, Beresford's corps 
descending the Douro, was to seize every boat 
which lay along its shore, and so to arrange them, 
as that the means of erossing might be at our dis-
posal, as soon as we should reach the banks of the 
river. The probabilities were, that Soult, finding 
himself beset on all hands, would not attempt a 
resistance which he must pereeive to be in vain; 
but in case his obstinacy should get the better of 
his prudence, we \Vere instantly to pass the 
stream; and nobody eould for one moment doubt 
as to the r.esults of the struggle. 
Everything was in readiness for carrying these 
arrangernents into force, when, on the evening of 
the 4th, a despatch from Silveira arrived, to in-
form us of asevere defeat which he had sus-
tained at the town of Amarante. The enemy, it 
appeared, favoured by a dense fog, attacked him 
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there on tbe 2nd, foreed tbe bridge over the Ta-
mega, and took fromhim eight or nine pieces of 
cannon; and hewas now falling back, with the 
remains of his corps, upon Lamego, in presence of 
several bodies of French trüops which had crossed. 
the Douro. In addition to this intelligence, a ru-
mour reached us, thatthe enemy had evacuated 
Viana, Villa de Conde, and other places on the 
.coast ;it was reported, moroover, that he was 
busily employed in- the destruction oí stores and 
magazines in Oporto, and numerou;s preparatíon¡; 
were said to be going on for the immediate aban-
donmentof the city. AH tlús information coming 
at once, could not but occasion sorne change in 
our plans. It was now manifest enough that 
Soult would not submit quietly to be surrounded; 
on the contrary, no oue could doubt that he me-
ditated either the removal of the seat of war. by 
circuitous marches 10 tbe Tagus, there 10 be sup-
ported by sorne movements on the side of Victor, 
or designed to attempt an escape out of Portugal 
by way of tha Tras os Montes. Tbe latterscheme 
was justly regarded as by many degrees more 
probable than the former; because, to bril'l.g bis 
army 3.efOSS the Dóuro, and advance by Lunego, 
would be to leave us upon his flank; and it was 
r-esolved that no time shonld be lost in striving to 
defeat it. 
TI:e reader is probably awar.e, that at· tbe 
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perlod concerning which 1 now write. the most 
serious discontent was understood to prevail in the 
ranks of the French army. There existed there a 
secret society, the members of which, under the 
title of Philadelphes, bound themselves by oath 
to attempt, whenever a favourable opportunity 
should occur, the abolition of the imperial dynasty, 
and the restoration of a democracy in France. 
Soult's corps was not free from men of this de-
scription, at the head of whom was an adjutant-
major. This personage was in constant commu-
nication with Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom he 
proposed á. scheme for seducing the soldiers from 
their duty, and arresting his general; and though 
he was received with aH the caution, and treated 
with the reserve which prudence required; still 
there was that in his maimer and mode of acting. 
which commanded attention. Frol11 him we 
learned that a spirit, almost mutinous, was 30t 
work in Oporto; that the hospital s were crowded 
with sick; and that but one feeling prevailed among 
all ranks, that of unmitigated dislike of the parti-
cular service in which they were employed. It 
will readily be believed that su eh information 
only increased our anxiety to be beforehand with 
the enemy, of whose· design to evacuate Portugal 
it was impossible any longer to entertain a doubt. 
Preparations were accordingly made to lead the 
army, in two divisions~ direct)y upon the Douro, 
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-one proceeding by Aveira, and the other by 
Vouga; whilst Beresford, preceding it with his 
advanced-guard a single day, should rnove by 
Vizeu upon Lamego. 
Sorne time was, however, required to bring upthe 
various regiments and brigades from their detached 
stations; and this interval was spent, partIy in 
putting the commissariat into a state of greater 
efticiency, and partly in smoothing down certain 
awkward feellngs which had unhappily arisen 
among ourselves, on the score of rank. There 
was a considerable jealousy, on the part of sorne 
of our senior ofticers, with respect to the stations 
to which the Portuguese commission might ad-
vance their juniors, whilst acting with the com-
bined armies. General Beresford furnished a 
case in point, who. though inferior in the date of 
his British appointment to several locallieutenant-
génerals, took rank as a n.eld-marshal in Portugal, 
and commanded, as such, the advance of the 
allied forces. To obviate this, it was necessary to 
explain, that Portuguese rank could be permitted 
to have weight onlyas long as both British and 
Portuguese troops were under their present leader; 
but that, in case of any vacancy in the supreme 
command, hewould of course succeed, whose Bri.,. 
tish rank happened to be the most elevated. N or 
was it ever in tended that a senior British officer 
should act immediately under his junior, notwith-
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standing the station which the latter might tero-
porally fill; and hence care was taken that no 
man should be appointed to a command in Beres-
ford's corps, who was not, in point of faCt, his 
junior in the British service. These were unplea-
sant discussions; and they were not the less so, 
on account of the necessity which all acknow-
ledged for the employment of British officers in 
the Portuguese service. But they came not aIone. 
Other difficulties arose as fast as these ceased. to 
operate, touching the mode of paying the officers 
attached to Portuguese battalions; and it wasonly 
by an exercise of that clear judgment and firmness 
of mind w'hich so peculiarly belong to him, that 
our chief was at last enabled to set them all at resto 
As the troops began to arrive in and around 
Coimbra, the difficulty of finding forage for the 
horses and mules attached to them, became very 
great. The markets were, however, good, the 
inhabitants freely supplying us with everyarticle 
of provision at a moderate priee; but the expense 
of supporting the army here was enormoua. It 
was calculated that the British troops aIone cireu· 
lated through Coimbra a sum of not less than 
10,0001. per day; and that the whole money 
spent by the allies exceeded 100,0001. per week. 
With respeet to our own employments, again, they 
may be related in few words. Part of almost 
every day was spent in inspecting the several 
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corps as they came up, and in seeing that their 
arms, necessal'ies, and general equipments, were 
in a serviceable condition; whilst the remainder 
was consumed, either in the office, or in riding 
over the country. When reviewing the different 
brigades, it was impossible not to be forcibly 
struck with the superiority of the EngIish over 
the Portuguese soldiers in external appearance. 
The latter either were, or seemed to be, by far the 
worst description ofmen in the country, infmitely 
inferior in every respect to the peasantry. They 
were diminutive and narrow-chested in the ex-
treme, yet were they extremely steady under 
arms; and, as the event proved, fully equal to 
their allies in the endnrance of fatigues and priva-
tions, and in several instances not greatly inferior 
to them even in the freId. 
On the 5th of May, the army being at length 
assembled, a. grand review took place; and 
a most imposing and magnificent spectacle it pre-
sented. To some of the troops which stood that 
day under arms, it is not going too far to affirm, 
that the whole world can produce none superior. 
Of this description were the brigade of guards, the 
29th, the S3rd, and the four battalions of the 
King's German Legion; and the rest, if in a few 
minor points they fell short, were. such as any 
general might be proud to command. The whole 
were, indeed, in the highest state of discipline and 
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. efficiency; and all appeared animated by one 
spirit-an ardent desire to meet the enemy. Nor 
were they kept long in a state of suspense. On 
that very evening the definitive pIans were ar-
ranged; and on the following morning it was un-
derstood that the columns would begin to moye. 
As the intention of turning Soult's left by way 
of Lamego and Amarante still he Id good, Beres-
ford, to whom that office was intrusted, received 
orders to march at day-break on the 6th. He was 
to be followed on the morning of the 7th, as pre-
viously arranged, by the brigades of General Til-
son and Fane. On the same day, Cotton, at the 
head of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, sup- . 
ported by General Stewart's brigade of infantry, 
wasto March upon Mullanda, and to arrive at 
Adigal on the 8th, followed by the King's German 
l,egion. General Hill's brigade was likewise to 
march on the 6th, so as to reach Aveira on the 
8th; and the head-quarters were to move on the 
latter of these days towards Adego and the Vouga. 
Such were the orders issued on the evening of the 
6th; and these the several divisions specified 
made ready to obey. 
PENINSULAR W AH. 321 
CHAPTER XIII. 
The army advances towards the Douro-A body of the enemy 
attacked arid dríven from Albergaría Nova::-Affair of 
Grijon - Passage of the Douro, and defeat of Soult. 
THE dawn of the 7th of May was beginning to 
appear, when the advanced-guard of. the army, 
accompanied by General Cotton'-s brigade of caval-
. ry, began its march in the direction of Oporto. It 
proceeded leisurely, and it was followed by the 
whole of the arrny, divided into two columns, of 
three divisions; two of which, under Generals 
Paget and Payne, moved by the Vouga road, 
whilst the third advanced upon Aveira, under the 
orders of General Hin. The latter movements did . 
not, however, take place till the 9th, the main 
body halting during the 8th, in order that Beres-
ford, who set out on the 6th for Vizeu and La-
mego, . might be enabled to reach his place of 
destination in good time, and take possession of 
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Amarante at the moment most desirable, when we 
should begin to show ourselves in front of Oporto. 
It was intended that, on the evening of the 9th, 
Hill should embark at Aveira, where boats were 
prepared for the purpose, and make good his land-
ing at Ovar, at an early hour on the morning of 
the 10th. On the latter day, Cotton was directed 
to beat up aH the enemy's posts between the 
Vouga and Oliveira, opening a communication, by 
this means, with General Hin; and he was to be 
supported in the undertaking by Generals Stewart 
and Murray, who, with their respective corps, re-
ceived directions to pass the Vouga, and move 
upon Albergaria N ova. In the mean while, Sher-
btooke and Cameron ,vcre to follow, so as that the 
latter; embarking at Oveiro on the evening of the 
10th, might reach Ovar on the 11th. Then Cot-
ton and Hill, who~e junction, it was calculated, 
lnight by that time be effected, were to march 
rapidly upon Villa N ova; and it was confidently 
hoped that the celerity of the movements would 
be such as to secure the bridge, at aH events, even 
if they should faH in cutting off the rear-guard· of 
the enemy. This was the more necessary, as the 
bridge at Villa N ova formed the only visible means 
by which we should be enabled to pass the Douro ; 
and were it to be broken down, a very serious ob-
stacle to the ultimate success of the expedition 
would, ít was apprehended, be raised. 
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Such were the general outlines of tbe plan as 
far as 1 could colleet, which was of course liable to 
change according as circumstances migbt direct, 
but for which, were it to provemoderately suc-
cessfut in its main points, the following advantages 
might be expected to resulto We had reason to 
believe that the enemy's force was pretty equally 
divided, one half being at Oporto, and the other at 
Amarante. N ow by throwing Beresford across 
the Douro, fun occupation wouId be given to· tbe 
troops in Amarante; and hence our main attack, 
which was directed upon Oporto, wouIa be mate-
rially forwarded. Again, by sending Hill and 
Cameron by water, we shouId seriously facilitate 
our line of march, and perhaps give an opportunity 
to Cotton, on the arrival of the former at Oveiro, 
to drive in part of the enemy's cavalry upon him. 
But· the preceding arrangements were further cún-
firrned by a report 'which had Iately reached us, 
that Soult was collecting his whole disposable 
strength in front of Villa N ova, with the intention 
of sustaining an attack upon some high ground in 
the vicinity, which he had carefully fortified. We 
were extremelyanxious that he should adhere to 
this determination, inasrnuch as he could not pos-
Bibly do us a greater favour; yet it was hardly tú 
be expected that he wouId so far cornmit himself. 
On the contrary, it seemed more probable that he 
wouId rnove off with his whole army towards 
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Amarante, and endeavour to strike a blow at 
Beresford before we should be able to come up. 
In this case Beresford must needs keep the Douro 
betweén him and the enemy; and thus a road 
would be opened for the latter through Tras os 
Montes into Spain. These were, of course, the 
chances of war. Should the die' turn up in one 
way, the enemy would escape us; should allother 
cast be thrown, and his reported resolution of 
fighting between Tidrusa and Villa N ova hold 
good,-th~n was the game more likely to be our 
own. Hill's c.orps might, indeed, be for a moment 
in danger; but it would only be for a moment; 
because there was nothillg to hinder the whole 
a.rmy from reaching the field ofaction by the 11th 
at the latest. In a word, the plan seemed the best 
which, under existing circumstances, could be 
Jormed; and it was vigorously carried into exe-
cution. 
I have stated sorne reasons why Sir Arthur 
Wellesley was anxious to bring Soult to action at 
once, an of them originating in an apprehension, 
lest the enemy should make good his retreat un-
harmed. There was another motive at work be-
sides these. It was confidently rumoured that 
ten thousand men' from the armies of Spain, "'ere 
ordered to reinforce the corps in Portugal; that 
they had quitted Arragon sorne time ago, and might 
be expected to reach Tudela on the 16th at the 
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latest. Now, though no account of their passage 
through Madrid or Burgos had come in, the rumour 
possessed too much of probability about it to be dis-
regarded; and it mattered little to us, in the end, 
whether Soult or Victor was to receive the addition 
to his strength. Our business was to be before-
hand with them, and to despatch one, if not both 
the French generals, before the reinforcements 
could reach them. Even if Soult alone should be 
destroyed, our prospects wouldbecome brilliant; 
for the accounts of the Spaniards, sent in by 
Colonel Doyle, were in the highest degree flatter-
ing; and nothing but the presence of the enemy 
in Portugal stood in the way of our co-operating 
with thero. AH these reasons had full weight in 
precipitating our measures against Sonlt; and as 
the army was well provided in every respect, and 
provisions and other nece&saries were abundant, 
little doubt could be entertained, that a few days 
at the furthest would see the first part of our pro-
ject fully realised. 
It has been said that the advanced-guard, ac-
companied by General Cotton's division of cavalry, 
began its march on the morning of the 7th. The 
corps in question consisted óf two brigades of 
infantry, one British and one German-the former 
commanded by Brigadier-general R. Stewart; 
with two brigades of artillery-one of sixes, the 
other of threes. It reached the village of Andeja 
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on the evening of the 8th; and finding that a body 
ef the enerny, consisting of two regiments of 
cavalry. with sorne infantry and guns, were can-
toned in Albergaria Nova and the villages near, 
a scheme was devised for surprising thern. With 
this design, the troops passed the Vouga soon after 
it becarne dark, when General Cotton, diverging 
from the be aten track. sef off with the cavalry, by 
a road which led round the villages to the right. 
Whilst he was executing this m overnent, the in-
fantry and artillery. led on by General Paget, 
prepared to rnake their way over sorne very diffi-
cult ground, in what is called the pass of Vouga. 
Having halted for about two hours, in order that 
Cotton rnight have time to get well up, and to 
niake his dispositions, they too began their 
march, Colonel Trant, with his Portuguese, 
undertaking to transport the guns through the 
most rugged parts of the pass. It unfortunately 
feH out, however, that the obstacles· opposed to 
the progress of the artilIery, were greater than 
had been anticipated; and the morning of the 9th 
broke long before the pass was cleared. This 
necessarily retarded both the infantry and the 
cavalry; in addition to which, the guides on whorn 
Cotton had relied, mistook, in the darkness of the 
night, the proper road. The consequence was, 
that when our cavalry arrived, not in the rear, nor 
on the flank of Albergaria, but in its front, they 
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found the enemy dl'awn up to .receive them, their 
horse being in line upon an open plain, covered by 
a body of l'iflemen; whilst a party of infantry oc-
cupied a pine-wood on their flank. Cotton had 
not antieipated su eh reception; he halted his 
people, and remained stationary; and was thus 
situated when Sir Arthur Wellesley arl'ived with 
the infantry. The latter were instantly directed 
to advance; the British,. under Paget, passing 
through Albergaria; . and the Portuguese, under 
Trant, through sorne hamlets on the left; whilst 
the cavalry, forming the centre, pressed upon the 
open space between the two villages. Both the 
British and Portuguese infantry pushed on with-
out a halt, under an exceedingly brisk fire, which 
they as briskly returned; but the eavalry were not 
so fortunate. They found no convenient oppor-
tunity to act, and they were somewhat left behind 
by their dismounted comrades; but the position was 
carried with little 10ss on either side. The enemy 
retreated hastily, and our advanced-guard passed 
the night at Oliveira; the guards and the remain-
der of the column taking quarters in Albergaria. 
At an early houron the 11th, the march was 
renewed ; but we had notproceeded far, when a 
strong bodyof the enemy, amounting to perhaps 
fOUT or five thousand infantry, with four regiments 
of cavalry, appeared in our front .. They occupied 
a commanding position upon sorne hilIs beyondthe 
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village of Grijon, and seemed determined to de-
fend it. Sir Arthur Wellesley saw, in a moment, 
that the height upon which the enemy rested his 
left could be turned, and he took his measures ac· 
cordingly. Without once halting his column, he 
ordered General Murray, from thé rear of the ad-
vanced-guard, to move round by the right, throw-
ing, at the same time, the 16th Portuguese into a 
pine-wood on the left. The latter were intended 
rather to distract- the enemy's attention, than them-
selves to attempt anything serious; whilst General 
Paget, supported by two battalions in reserve, 
manreuvred upon their front. A very heavy firing 
immediately began; but the enemy no SOOller ob-
served the judicious movement round their left, 
than they abandoned their strong ground, and 
Hed. U pon this, our troops were again thrown 
¡nto column, and the march resumed as if nothing 
had happened; every movement being made with 
the same coolness, and in as perfect order, as if at 
lit field-day. 
It would be difficult to conceive any little piece 
of manreuvring more beautiful than that which had 
just been executed; but the business of the day 
was by no means overo As soon as we mounted 
the heights from which the French had just be en 
driven, the rear was observed retiring in great 
confusion; and it occurred to me that a good op.., 
portunity was furnished, of making a successful 
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charge with a few troops of cavalry. Sir Arthur 
Wellesley instantly acceded to my proposal, and 
two squadrons being intrusted to me, we galloped 
forward in sections along the road, and overthrew, 
by repeated attacks, everything which stood in 
our way. Our prisoners alone amounted to up-
wards of one hundred meno The enemy, upon 
this, halted, and forrned their infantry on the 
heights of Carvalhos, whieh eornmanded the road 
to a great distance,and checked the pursuit ofthe 
two squadrons. A rnessenger was immediately 
. despatched to the rear, to request that greater 
force might be sent up; and in the mean while, 
the squadrons wheeling offto the right, threatened, 
by a road which ran in that direction, the enemy's 
left. This movement, alone, had the. desired ef-
feet. Before the additional troops could arrive, 
they were once more in full retreat, and the heights 
ofCarvalhos were abandoned. 
In this ma!1ner we continued our journey, march-
ing and fighting without any intermission, frorn 
nine in the morning till five in the afternoon; for 
the march of the column was never for an instant 
delayed, because the advanced-guard happened to 
be engaged. At last, however, we halted for the 
night; the advance bivouacking on ·the ground 
where it stood, and the guards oceupying Grijon 
aud Carvalhos; and the head-quarters ofthe arrny 
establishing itself in the eonvent of Grijon, where 
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tbe French generals breakfasted tbat morning. 
Respeeting these, we were given to understand, 
that Marmet, Thomieres, Delaborde, and Fran-
cesehi, were this day opposed to us; and sorne 
hopes were entertained, that even Soult himself 
might be on this side of the Douro. N or was it 
less satisfactory- to learn, that Hill'g landing at 
Ovar sueeeeded to our utrnost wL'Shes. He Wa!3 
followed by Cameron; and both were already 
communicating with uso 
Our casualties during the morning were consi-
derable, a good many roen having been killed, a 
still greater number wounded; but they were not 
more serious than might have be en e2lpected, for 
the enemy's force opposed to us greatIy outnum-
bered the ~ivisibn of our army which was alone 
engaged. Their ground, too, was generally ad-
vantageous to them; and in opposition to aU as-
suranees previously received, they fought like men 
who were not willing to be beaten. . The result of 
the affair~ however, tended greatly to elevate the 
spirits ofall who had taken part in it. Once more 
had English troops be en brought into contact with 
French, and once more had they proved theif 
superiority; they wanted but a wider and better 
field, to prove 1t still more satisfactorily. 
We rose next moming with frames considerably 
refreshed, and began our march in the highest 
possible spirits. As we proceeded, cottages un-
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roofed and in ruins; gardens and enclosures laid 
waste; and the most wanton destruction of every-
thing destructible, marked the rout which the 
enemy had taken. But we fell in with non e of 
his parties. Soult had withdrawn his whole force 
across the Douro in the night, and breaking down 
the bridge, was already congratulating himself on 
his escape from, at least, immediate molestation. 
It might be about ten o'clock in the motning, 
when the advanced-guard, consisting of two bri-
gades of infantry, those of General Stewart and 
General Murray, with two squadrons of the 14th 
dragoons, under Paget, arrived at the village, 01 
tath6"f suburb, oí Villa N ova. It was joined here 
by General Hill's corps, which, marching from 
Ovar along the sea-shore, overtook usat the en-
trance of the place. We found, as we had ex-
pected to find, that the bridge was destroyed; and 
we discovered, likewise, that Soult had taken the 
precaution to remove every boat and barge from 
this to the opposite side of the river. Under these 
circumstances, it became no easy matter to sur-
mise how the passage was to be effected; though 
every one felt that effected it must be, and that 
speedily. We were yet hesitating what course to 
pursue, when Colonel Waters of the Portuguese 
servíce, by whom the destruction of the bridge had 
been reported, was ordered to gallop forward, arid 
to secure the means of transport at any risk. That 
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intelligent officer instantly proceeded to the river's 
bank, at a spot where it forms a curve, opposite to 
the Convento da Cerra~ and where, at the distance 
of a mile and a half from Oporto, its course is con-
cealed by a thick wood.· He found here a small 
boat, hid among the bushes; and standing near it 
were the prior of the convent, and three 01' four 
peasants. The latter, partly at his entreaty. aIid 
partly by the exhottations of the prior, were per-
suaded to leap withhim into the little skiff, and 
they made directly to the opposite bank, where· 
there lay among the mud four large barges~ of 
which they made themselves masters. The deed 
was a daring one, because patrols of the enemy 
passed to and fro continually; but it was produc-
tive of the very bestresults. They returned with 
their prizes unobserved, into which General Pa-
get, with three companies of the Buffs, instantly 
threw themselves; ann crossing the river without 
a moment's delay, too k possession of sorne houses 
on the opposite bank, before the enemy were at 
an aware of their intentions. They had not, how-
ever, taken their ground many minutes, when the 
French. awaking as it were from a trance, ad-
vanced to dislodKe them. Asevere action now 
ensued, in which our troops resolutely main-
tained themselves, in spite of odds the most over-
whelming; nor was the slightest impression made· 
upon them, till fresh companies arrived to their 
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support, and all chance of a defeat had been 
averted. 
In the mean while, our people on the opposite 
side were busily employed in planting guns upon 
the height of Sto Convento, from which a plunging 
fire was speedily opened upon the enemy's co-
lumns. General MQrray too, who had been de-
tached with his division to a ferry higher up, was 
fortunate enough to gain possession of ai many 
boats as enabled him to pass over two battalions 
ofGermans, with two squadrons of the 14th; and 
these showing themselves upon the enemy's left, 
the latter immediately retreated from the bank of 
the river. In an instant the Douro was covered 
with boats, which the inhabitants hastened to con-
vey across for our accommodation; and the 29th, 
the two remaining battalions of Germans, and the 
guards, were all passed over from Villa Nova. 
We were now in complete possession of the town, 
theenemy fleeing in aH directions. Their prin-
cipal retreat was, however, upon the road to Ama-' 
rante, which they covered with infantry, cavalry, 
ando artillery, all in the greatest confusion; and 
thither they were pursued by the dragoons from 
General Murray's corps, under my orders, with 
the gallant Colonel Hervey of the 14th, who un-
fortunately lost his arm in this skirmis~. The 
slaughter was very great,' for a panic had evidently 
fallen upon them; and as we followed them a 
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considerable way, repeated opportunities were 
furnished of charging to advantage. But at last 
we were recalled; and the whole army assembled 
to recover from its fatigues, in the city. 
The affair which 1 have thus, 1 fear imperfectly, 
attempted to describe, has be en considered, alld 
deserves to be considered by all military men, as 
not less brilliant than ally action of its magnitude, 
either in the Peninsular or any other modern war. 
To pass a wide, deep, and rapid river, in the face 
of a formidable enemy, even with the assistance 
of an adequate supply of boats and pontoons, re-
requires no trifling degree either of courage or 
management; but on the present occasion the 
passage was made good in spite of difficulties, 
under which, perhaps, any other officer, except 
the -roan who effected it, would have sunk. So 
little, indeed, did Soult anticipate an attempt of 
the kind, that he directed his undivided attention. 
to the sea; and when reports were brought to him, 
that the British trops were crossing from Villa 
N ova, he refused at first to give them credit. But 
Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the very boldness 
of his plan went far towards securing its success; 
he feIt, inoreover,. that upon the promptitude of 
his movements, the safety of Marshal Beresford's 
corps in a great degree depended, and he made 
up his mind to hazard something, rather than. 
permit such an opportunity of striking a blow to 
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escape him altogether. Had he adópted the re-
solutioR for which Sonlt gave himcredit, of 
embarking his army, and so passing the mouth of 
the Douro with the boats of the Heet, the French 
must have escaped in good order; for a delay 
would have arisen of at least two days, and two 
days were aH that Soult required to insure his 
safety. He therefore chose the more gallant 
course, of crossing his troops by detachments; 
and as he knew of what materials his troops were 
formed, he entertained no apprehension as to the 
results. His bravery and exceHent arrangements 
were rewarded by a victory, which would alone 
immortalise any other individual, had another been 
so fortunate as to obtain it. 
The evening was not far advanced, when the 
sound of firing ceased, and the most perfect order, 
consistent with a scene of universal rejoicing 
among the people, prevailed in Oporto. Our 
head-quarters being established in the house 
which Soult had occupied, we found every prepa-
ration for a comfortable dinner in progress; for 
the French Marshal quitted the place so lately as 
two in the aftemoon, long after his sumptuous 
me al had been ordered. It will be reádily ima-
gined that we were not backward in doing ample 
justice to it. But ours was not a situation which 
sanctioned the loss of a single hour in relaxation. 
Orders were issned, and arrangements made, for 
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putting the army in a condition to resume the 
pursuit with as little delay as possible; and On 
the morrow the columns were again in motion. 
Of the night advantage had been taken to bring 
up and pass along the whole of the artillery, wag-
gons, and commissariat stores; and when the 
dawn of the 13th carne in, General Murray's bri-
gade were in a condition to marcho They set out 
accordingly on the road to Amarante; and the 
guards, with the rest of the infantry, prepared to 
follow in the evening. . 
Whilst we were thus carrying everything before 
us on the banks of the Douro~ Marshal Beresford, 
with his detached corps, was not idle. Arriving 
at Villa Real on the 9th, and being there strength-
ened by the junction of Silveira's troops, he began 
bis march on the following morning, in the direc-
tion of Amarante. On the 11 th, his advance, 
under Silveira, reached that place, where a slight 
skirmish occurred with the division of General 
Loison ; but the latter retreated almost imme-
diately, taking, as it was believed, the road to 
Oporto. Of these events Beresford took care to 
inform us; whilst he himself marched rapidly in 
pursuit of Loison,. fearful lest his junction with 
. Soult should render the latter too strong for USo 
By this time, however, Soult was overthrown, and 
in full retreat: the consequence was, that his 
corps feH in with that of Loison, at Peñafiel, on 
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the evening .of the 12th; and they both prepared 
to continue, in conjunction with one another, their 
confused and disastrous flight upon Spain. 
There were two routes b€fore Soult, by one or 
otherof which he must necessarily move, if he 
desired to preserve any of the materiel of his army 
in its retreat. Either he would make for Galicia; 
by Ponte de Lima, Valencia, and Tuy; or, as was 
more probable, he would endeavour to reach Val-
ladolid by Chaves.. It was réquisite, on our part, 
to provide against both emergencies. For this 
purpose, instructions were forwarded to Beresford, 
on the ] 3th, directing him,in case the enemy 
should abandon Amarante, to move upon Chaves, 
and to make himself master of that line of opera-
tions. In the mean while, our corps were to 
march in such order, as would at once press upon 
the. rear of the fugitives, supposing them to hold 
sti11 to the Amarante road, and seize the communi:. 
cations along the other rout~, towards Tuy. Ge-
neral Murray accordingly pressed forward in the 
direction of Peñafiel, followed by the Hanoverian 
Legion and a squadron of. cavalry. Thismove-
ment took place on the morning of the 13th. On 
the 14th again, the rest of the army, consisting of 
the guards, the cavalry, Generals Stewart's, 
Campbell's, and Hill's corps, followed the lower 
road towards Barcelos and· Valencia. On the 
15th, authentic intelligence reached us, that the . 
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whole of the French force was retiring upon 
Chaves, after it had burned and destroyed the 
great bulk of its stores, and even its artillery, in 
Peñafiel. An immediate alteration of plan was 
the consequence. Whilst the cavalry, the guards, 
and General Cameron's brigade, advanced as far 
as Braga, the remainder stopped short at Villanova 
de Famelicao; and the lower road being entirely 
abandoned, all were instructed to move towards 
Chaves. Thither, therefore, the whole strength 
of the army directed itself; and it was confidently 
anticipated that great events must follow; foÍ' no 
one could doubt that the French army would suf-
fer here cOmplete defeat, provided Beresford's 
corps should have succeeded in occupying Chaves 
in their front. 
In the mean while a variety of rumours respect-
ing the present and future uudertakings of the 
enemy in Spain, were hourly pouring in upon uso 
or N ey it was reported thathe had withdrawn 
from Lugo, and was verging gradually in the direc-
tion of the frontier; whilst Bessieres was stated to 
have detached from Valladolid a strong force, for 
the purpose of acting against uso Then came cer-
tain letters from Victor to N ey, which our flying 
parties had intercepted, bearing date at Merida, 
on the 29th of April. From these; it appeared 
that Victor had, by King Joseph's orders, opened 
a communication with the junta of Seville, froID 
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which he expected the most favourable results; 
and he accordingly informed his co.rrespondent 
that he had withdrawn his advance frorh Medellin; 
and should not, for the present, enter upon any 
forward operations. It is probably needless to 
add, that the latter piece of information afforded 
great satisfaction to us, inasmuch as it freed us 
from all immediate apprehensions on the side of 
the Tagus, and gave us assurance of being enabled 
to prosecute our designs against Soult without in-
terruption~ These completed, other and no less 
splendid undertakings were before us~ We might 
march rapidly to Alcantara, by way of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, desiring Mackenzie to join us at the for-
mer place; when the whole concentrating at 
Truxillo, might threaten Victor's right, and, in 
connexion with Cuesta, force him to give battle, or 
retire from his present position. For all this, how-
ever, more troops were wanting. At present we 
could not muster, even with the addition of Mac· 
kenzie's corps, twenty thousand effective infantry 
and cavalry; and twenty thousand men were con-
fessedly not adequate to the undertaking. In 
cavalry, especially, we were extremely wéak; and 
it was unreasonable to expect that the successes 
already obtained could be followed up with any 
vigour, unless that arm in particular were ren-
dered perfectly efficient. 
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CHAPTER XIV. 
Sir -Arthur Wellesley follows the Freneh army-Skirmish at 
Salamonde-SouIt makes for Orense, and the pursui-t is 
abandoned-The allies eountermareh upon Coimbra, where 
a reinforeement of five thousand men reaehes them-Move-
ment towards the south-Communieations opened with 
Cuesta-His pIans for the eampaign opposed by Sir Arthur 
WeIlesIey-The army becomes sickIy, and is distressed for 
money and stores. 
THOUGH no man could feel more acutely than 
our gallant leader, that his energies were sadly 
cramped for want of means; and though the arri-
val of at least ten thóusand fresh troops was an, 
event for which he, in common with his followers, 
rather wished than hoped, he determined that no-
thing should be wanting on his part to make the 
most of the victorious little band already at his 
disposa!. 
Having ascertained, on the night of the 15th, by 
a report from General Murray, who, with the Ha-
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noverians, had followed the enemy frorn Peñafiel 
to Guirnaraens, and was now in comrnunication 
with us frorn that place, that Soult was destroying 
his artillery and stores, and that the utmost dis-
tress prevailed in the French ranks, Sir Arthur 
Wellesley carne to the concIusion, that to 'pursue 
any further with the whoIe of his force, would be 
to harass the rnen for very Iittle purpose. It was 
evident, frorn these preparations, that Soult had 
made up his mind to retreat in a directión where 
no 'army could pretend to follow him, unIess its 
leader were willing to disorganise his own means 
to the full as effectualIy as the enemy had disor-
ganised h!s. WhiIst, therefore, he directed M ur-
ray to fall from Guimaraens into our liné of 
march, under the impression that menin a despe.:. 
rate situation might even yet rnake a desperate 
attempt, he commanded General Hill, with the 
four brigades of which he was at the head, to haIt 
at Braga; and he did so, bóth because he still 
Iooked to a countermarch upon the Tagus, and 
because he entertained no intention of wasting his 
resources arnong the barren mountains of Galicia; 
for, that Soult would make for the mountains; no 
one could Ionger doubt. He had disencumbered 
himself of everything calculated in the slightest 
degree to retard his progress, not excepting even 
the plunder of Oporto, or the caissons which con-
tained the spare rnusket-ammunition for his 801-
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diers; and he was in fuIl march towards the rugged 
pass of the Sierra de Montalegre. 
In consequenee of these arrangernents, the ad-
vanee of our arrny began its mareh at an early 
hour on the morning of the 16th, and carne up 
towards evening with the enemy's rear-guard near 
the village of Salamonde, about four leagues from 
Braga, on the road to Chaves. The enerny were 
posted upon strong heights in front of the village, 
having the river Cavade in their rear~ over which 
are thrown two small bridges. These conduct to 
two roads, one of which passes through Ruevaens, 
and along the tops of sorne lofty mountains be-
yond; whilst the other leads only to a sort of by-
path, which, after penetrating by a shorter cut 
through the valley, ultimately winds into the main 
road, over the hilIs. Though the brigade of guards 
was the only portion of our force at hand, the Ge-
neral resolved to attack; and one mornent spent 
in reconnoitring, served to satisfy hirn as to the 
best mean s of proceeding. There was an exceed-
ingly high and steep hill upon the enemy's left, 
which they oeeupied in sorne force; their right 
being likewise upon a hill, but covered in front by 
a deep ravine.. The latter point could not, of 
eourse, be assailed; but the former appearing to 
Sir Arthur Wellesley to be eapable of being 
turned, he instantIy despatched the riflemen, sup-
ported by three companies, to rnake the atternpt. 
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The guards were then formed in column upon the 
road, covered by two three-pounders, conveniently 
placed for the purpose; .and they were directed, 
as soon as the light troops should show themselves 
on the brow of the hill, to charge. 
As the ground over which the light troops were 
compelled to pass, chanced to be peculiarly broken, 
a considerable detour was necessary, and so me 
time elapsed before they reached their point of 
destination; but their arrival there was no sooner 
known than the guards advanced. The enemy 
made no attempt to offer them any serious resist-
ance. They gave their fire, indeed, as soon as 
the head of the column came within range; but 
having done so~ they immediately abandoned their 
ranks, and. fled in the greatest confusion. We 
pursued them through the village with al1 the 
eagerness of men who had barely seen an object 
which they were eager to overtake; but the dark-
ness carne on so fast, that no one was able to 
determine exactIy by which of the two roads they 
had retreated. At last, a large mass were descried 
upon the lower bridge, passing in a state of abso-
lute disorganisation, and with much haste. Upon 
these we got the guns to bear; and before they 
couJd clear the defile, considerable execution was 
done among them. Our infantry, however, were 
soon obliged to abandon the pursuit; and we 
returned to the village, where, in a few miserable 
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hovels, stripped and plundered of everything porta-
ble, we passed the night. 
At the first break of dawn, on the following 
morning, we again made ready to advance; and 
as day-light broke, we were able to discover 
that terrible havoc had been made at the lower 
bridge. The bodies of four or five hundred rnen 
and horses lay there; sorne killed by cannon-shot ; 
others precipitated, in· the confusion, headlong 
into the river; whilst baggage of every desérip-
tion, cars, waggons, and even knapsacks, aH loaded 
with plunder, blocked up the bridges, and ·ren-
dered thern quite impassable. The same species 
of encumbrances filled the little streets. Articles 
of the greatest value, such as silver cups, rich 
tapestry, and cloth of gold, lay strewed about in 
the mud; indeed, it seemed as if the enemy had 
now, at length, lost heart, and were willing to 
relinquish every thing in order to. preserve their 
own persons. One advantage they certainly ob-
tained by this hasty abandonment oí the last 
re:rimants of their property; for the roads were so 
completely encumbered, as to render our passage 
both disorderly and slow; and we were, in con-
sequence, obliged to halt that night at Ruevaens. 
During the three last days the rain had come 
down in torrents; and our men, who were con-
tinuaHy exposed to it by night as well as by day, 
began to exhibit syrnptoms of suffering from their 
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hardships. On this account, as well as becausé 
it was now ascertained that Soult, instead of 
moving upon Chaves, had turned off from Mon-
talegre to Orense, Sir Arthur' Wellesley deter-
mined to. relinquish the pursuit. Beresford, it 
appeared, had anticipated the instructions sent to 
him, and was already in possession of Chaves; so 
that all which could be done to intercept the fly-
ing enemy, had been effected; but, as the General 
expressed himself, "if anarmy throws away aH 
its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and every-
thing whieh can strengthen it, and can enable it 
to act together as a body, and abandons all those 
who are entitled to its protection, but arld to its 
weight and impede its progress, it must be able to 
march by roads through which it cannot be fol-
lowed with any prospect of being overtaken by an 
armywhich has not made the same sacrifices;" 
and that such had been the case with Soult's 
army, the most convincing proofs were before our 
eyes. The whole extent of their route was 
strewed with the careases of mules, horses, and 
even nien, who, unableto keep up, had been left 
behind; the horses and mules being either killed' 
or hamstrung, and the men either dead, or in a 
state of the most pitiable exhaustion. Broken 
carriages, tumbrils, guns, and everything capable 
of rendering an army efficient; met us at every 
step. N or was it by such marks alone that their 
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Hne of march could be pointed out. Every vil~ 
lage, hamlet, or cottage, which they passed, was 
wantonly set on fire, till the sky became obscured 
during the day by volumes of smoke, and illu-
minated at night by the blaze of burning dwell-
ings. On the inhabitants, likewise, they exer-
cised the most wanton cruelty. But these out-
rages went not wholly unpunished. Such of the 
peasimtry as escaped, collected together in groups, 
and hung upon the rear and flanks of the retreat-
ing army, and every straggler who fell into their 
hands was put to death under circumstances oftbe 
most terrible atrocity. It was no uncommon thing 
to come upon French soldiers lying by the road-
side, not dead, but fearfuIly mutilated; whilst 
such corpses as bore marks of violence, seemed to 
have died under lingering torture. Our retreat 
from Sahagun was bad enough, - few retreats, 
perhaps, in modern times, have been more harass-
ing; but the retreat of Soult through the moun-
tains of Galicia must have been fully as disastrous. 
His loss in men alone could not faH short of four 
or five thousand, whilst his whole materiel was 
destroyed; and even of the troops who escaped, the 
probability was, that more than one-half would be-
come denizens of the hospital. Yet is SouIt deserving 
of the highest praise for the celerity and talent 
with which his flight was conducted. True, the 
army, after it should reach a place of safety, must, 
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like the Spanish armies, be entirely re-organised 
before it could pretend again to take the fie1d; 
but even thus, it was no easy matter to escape; 
and the French Marsha1 was fully entitled to all 
the applause ·which we liberally bestowed upon 
him, for having, at the expense of any sacrifices, 
extricated himse1f from his difficulties. 
1 have said that Sir Arthur Welles1ey, as soon as 
he had positively ascertained the route which the 
enemy were pursuing, determined not to follow 
them any further. He carne to this reso1ution 
when the advance was already within a short dis-
tance of Montalegre, and he was confirined in it 
by a report from General Mackenzie, which 
reached him on the night of the 17th, that a corps 
from Victor's army was moving· on Alcantara. 
The four brigades, which had been 1eft behindat 
Braga, were ordered instantly to return to Oporto; 
and those which accompanied the head-quarters, 
prepared to follow in the same direction. At the 
same time advice was forwarded to Marshal Be-
resford, desiring him to meet us in Braga, for the 
purpose ofarl'anging a defensive plan for this part 
of the country; and Silveira with his Portuguesé 
being left to pursue Soult, we an bent our steps 
once more towards the -Tagus. 
It will nO~;¡ge necessary to record with much 
minuteness, the progress of the army during· its 
retrograde movement. Enough is done when 1 
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state that, passing once more over the scene of its 
late triumphs, it arrived at Coimbra on the 28th, 
where head-quarters were established during a few 
days, and a short respite granted to the weary 801-
diers. The latter was an arrangement of which 
they stood much in need. Their sufferings in the 
mountains, though cheerfully borne at the mo-
ment, began, as soon as the immediate excitement 
abated, to take effect upon them; and not a few, 
particularly of the younger and les s seasoned 
among them, feH sick. Rest was therefore de-
sirable. N or was it a matter of indifference to us 
to learn that a reinforcement of five thousand men 
had landed, and that they might be expected to 
join us in the course of the week, so as to take 
part in the series of operations in which the army 
might next embark. We should, indeed, have 
felt greater satisfaction, had the numbers of our 
recruits been doubled; but five thousand British 
soldiers were not to be spoken of lightly, and we 
were all extremely pleased at the prospect oftheir 
arrival. 
Whilst this brief period of relaxation lasted, we 
found occupation enough, partIy in considering the 
reports which were from time to time sent in re-
specting Cuesta, and partIy in striving to compose 
those unhappy differences on th~ score of rank, of 
which 1 have already said something, and which 
now again began to show themselves. Much um-
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htage was taken, because the oflicers attached to 
Portuguese 'corps received, not only an additional 
step in the British armY1 but a second advance, as 
soon as they took their places· in the ranks of our 
allies. By this arrangement a British captain, 
who might happen to volunteer into the Portu-
guese army, was promoted to a British majority; 
and was still further pushed on, by receiving the 
Portuguese rank oflieutenant-coloneI, immediately 
on his attaching hiinself to a POrtuguese battalion. 
As such, he necessarily took precedence of the 
tnajors in the British army, no matter ofwhat date 
their commissions might be. It was hardly to be 
expected that such an arrangement should not 
give serious offence to aH who thus found them-
selves commanded by men whom they persisted 
in regarding as their juniors. Yet was the circum~ 
stance in a great measure unavoidable. To render 
British oflicers of real utility in the Portuguese ser-
vice, it was necessary that they should enter it, not 
as subalterns, but as persons of rank; and they 
were generally the younger men who accepted 
commissions in that service at all. The difficulties 
respecting majors and lieutenant-colonels could, 
however, be overcome. It rarely happened, and 
it rarely could happen, that they would be brought 
into coHision with one another; but the case was 
widely different with respect to the generals, 
Tilson, Murray, Hill, and eotton, were all the se .. 
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niors of Beresford; though Beresford, in virtue of 
his commission as commander-in-chief of the Por-
tuguese troops, necessarily took precedency ofthem, 
as often as the two armies acted together. There 
was, at least in one instan ce, no surmounting this ; 
and General Murray gave up his command in con-
sequence, and returned to England. 
With respect, again, to other matters, we learned 
that Victor, as soon as he discovered that his 
movement to save Soult was made too late, feH 
back again from Alcantara, and that he. was 
now retiring to his former position. He had not, 
however, quitted it unobserved or disregarded by 
Cuesta: on the contrary, the Spanish General 
had followed him in his advance; had directed a 
corps, under Zayas, to attack Merida, where four 
or five hundred sick were left; and it was even 
rumoured, and apparently upon plausible grounds, 
that Merida had actually fallen. In the mean 
while, the main body ofthe Spaniards were under-
stood to be at Caceres; from which it was ex-
pected that they would march upon Truxillo and 
Almaraz, for the jmrpose of securing the bridge. 
It was stated, moreover, that the Portuguese, who 
defended the bridge at Alcantara, fought nobly; 
and it seemed to be gene rally believed that, with 
a due proportion of British officers to direct them, 
the Portuguese troops would soou beco me exceed-
ingly efficient. 
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Of our own future movements, no one, except 
the Cornmander-in-chief, knew anything; nor had 
he, as far as I could learn, as yet determinately 
fixed upon them. Officers were, indeed, sent to 
Cuesta, with intelligence that Sir Arthur Welles-
ley was ready to co-operate with him in an attack 
upon any Freneh corps whieh might be situated 
between Lisbon and Seville; but, at the same 
time, to make the Spaniards aware that any 
promise beyond this could not be given. Portugal 
was our field; and to mové from it altogether would 
be to abandon the post which the British army 
was required peculiarly to proteet. Still, our 
chief was willing to attempt as much as his nu-
merical strength and the nature of his instructions 
would permit; and if Victor would but remain 
where he was, a great blow might possibly be 
struck at him. In this case we should mareh to 
Thomar and Abrantes, throw a corps on the left 
bank of the Tagus, communicating on its right 
with Cuesta's left; and detaching a division along 
the right bank, to destroy the bridge, it was not 
impossible that Victor might be surrollnded. 
It so happened that, at the moment when these 
dispositions were talked of, news reachedus, not 
only from the north ofSpain, but from the Danube. 
We read of the tuinous defeat of the Austrians in 
a papel' printed at Madrid, and read it with the 
feelings of deep regret which it was calculated to 
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excite. Yet tbere was a good deal to cheer us in 
tbe rumours wbich carne in from Galicia. It was 
said tbat, whilst Kellerman had united his corps 
to tbat of Ney, and both were marching against 
Romana into tbe Asturias, four thousand French 
troops out of the seven thousand wbich had be en 
left to secure Galicia, bad surrendered, at Lugo, 
to one of Romana's generals. Sto Jago, likewise, 
was reported to have fallen; and hence a sanguine 
expectation prevailed. that if these victorious 
Spaniards would but fall upon Soult whilst he was 
yet in disorder, and return again to 8upport Ro. 
mana before Kellerman and N ey should bave be en 
able to annihilate him, tbe affairs both of Galicia 
and the Asturias might do well. But these were 
httle better than ordinary rumours, and, like the 
reporta of the evacuation of Saragoza, and of the 
assembling of a strong force at Burgos, hardly de-
served to be relied upon. 
At length the troops having been well refreshed, 
and many of the sick restored to a serviceable 
condition, the army renewed its march on the 
6th of June, and fixed its head-quarters at Tho-
mar. Nothing occurred here, calculated in any 
lively degree to. excite our interest. We were 
again amused, indeed, by rumours respecting the 
movements of Victor, most of which represented 
hím as in full retreat upon Madrid; and under the 
impression that these might be wcll fonnded, we 
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experienced something like a feeling of regret, 
that our advance towards him had not be en con-
ducted from the Tras os Montes, by way of Ciu-
dad Rodrigo. Yet it was far from being too late 
to follow up, with vigour, that plan of operations 
which appeared to hold out prospects of ultimate 
success. It was the policy of the French marshals 
to unite their several corps, and to act in a body ; 
it was ours to prevent their junction, to cut off 
their communications, and to fight them in detail. 
To effect this, nothing appeared more advisable 
than that we should bring our army, in conjunc-
tion with that of Cuesta, to the north of the Tagus, 
and advance from thence upon Plasencia, Sala. 
manca, and Valladolid. By taking that step, the 
probabilities were, that we should be able to over-
take one or other of the French armies, and des-
troy it before it could be succoured by the rest; 
whilst we should certainly reduce Victor to the 
necessity, either of abandoning the capital, or of 
being cut off frorn the great road to the Pyrenees, 
by our cavalry in Castile. Should we, however, 
fail in this, and should N ey and Kellerrnan, and 
Soult and Victor, succeed in uniting within their 
lines on the Ebro, then, indeed, with our present 
force, the chances of success would be rnaterially 
dirninished. On Cuesta's arrny we were not in 
the habit of greatIy counting; sorne service it 
rnight doubtIess render us; that is to say, it would 
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probably enable us to cope to advantage with any 
force which might be found between the Portu-
guese frontier and the Ebro; but it would not 
render an army of twenty thousand Englishmen, 
-and the sum total of our effectives at this time 
barelycame up to twenty thousand,-competent 
to the overthrow of the united corps of four French 
marshals. 
On the 7th, the army resumed its march, and 
took up its head-quarters on the same evening at 
Abrantes. Here other, and, as far as we could 
judge, more correct reports relative to the motions 
of Victor, reached uso He had not withdrawn, as 
had formerly been represented, to the north of the 
Tagus, but was busily concentrating in the neig'h-
bourhood of Merida, as if with the design of pass-
ing the Guadiana, and attacking Cuesta previous 
to our arrival; and this was considered the more 
likely, because the news of N ey's successes in the 
Asturias must, by tbis time, have reached him. 
But there were other and more interesting matters 
laid before us than even this, and of these a few 
words will suffice to give an account. 
Lieutenant-colonel Bourke, of the Quarter-mas-
ter-general's department, had be en sent, sorne 
time before, to General Cuesta's head-quarters at 
Fuente del Maestro, for the purpose of concerting 
with him a joint plan of operations against the 
enemy in Estremaclura. The day after our arrival 
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at Abrantes, letters carne in from Colonel Bourke, 
bearing date the 4th and 6th of J une, in whieh he 
informed us that Cuesta was afHieted with a se-
vere ague, and henee that an his eommunieations 
had been made through Major-general O'Dona-
ghoe, ehief of the staff. These, however, proved 
so far satisfaetory, that tbe Spanish General was 
willing to negociate with us on our own terms. 
For it had been his original wish that our army 
should divide; that part should keep possession 
of the bridge at Aleantara, whilst part exeeuted 
a movement on the enemy's right; and it was 
chiefiy to impress upon his mind the utter impos-
sibility of acceding to that proposal, that Colonel 
Bourke's mission was undertaken. After a good 
deal of discussion, the point was conceded; and 
now three propositions were submitted for Sir 
Arthur Wellesley's eonsideration, eoncerning whieh 
it was at the same time stated that Cuesta gave a 
decided preference to the first. 
In the first place, it was suggested that the 
whole British force might move from Abrantes 
upon Elvas and Badajoz, and uniting itself with 
the Spanish troops, make a joint attack upon 
Victor; whilst Cuesta should detach General . 
Venegas, with a corps of seven thousartd men, by 
Llerena, through the mountains towards Talavera, 
which, turning the enemy's left, and heading them 
in their retreat, would enable the combined armies 
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toannihilate them by falling on their rear. At 
the same time, Cuesta would detach a second 
corps from Badajoz towards Plasencia, so as to 
threaten their right; and he professed to be capa-
ble of sparing both detachments, and yet bringing 
eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand 
cavalry, to the assistance of the British near Me-
rida. In case this plan should not be adopted, it 
was proposed, in the second place, that the Eng-
lish army should move, en masse, to Alcantara, 
and press from thence upon the enemy; whilst 
the Spaniards following them closely, should take 
Merida by assault, and make themselves masters 
of aH the artillery and stores which might yet 
be laid up in that place. Lastly, it was submitted 
that we should' march upon the Teitar and Alma-
raz, and equaHy threaten the enemy's right and 
rearo AH these proposals, it is necessary to ob-
serve, were made on the supposition that the 
enemy's head-quarters were at Caceres, and that 
their troops were cantoned partly there, and partly 
at Merida and the villages near. With respect to 
the movements towards the rear, no opinion could 
be formed, because they managed effectually to 
conceal these, by. keeping strong patroIs of cavalry 
continually in their front. 
The force immediately under Victor was esti-
mated at twenty-six thousand meno In addition 
to thes.e, there was at Ciudad Rodrigo a corps of 
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thirteen thousand infantry and three thousand ca-
valry, under Sebastiani; but the roads of commu-
nÍcation between these were either extremelyincon-
venient or fatally circuitous. Should theyattempt 
to unite, with artillery and baggage, Sebastiani must 
of necessity march round by Madrid; should they 
choose the mountain path, the junction might no 
doubt be effected, but it would be at the expense 
of all the mate riel of one, if not of both corps. 
Besides these, a body of four thousand men in 
Madrid, and about one thousand in other garrisons 
between the capital and the frontier, there was 
represented to be no French force capable of being 
brought immediately against us, or interrupting 
the plan of operations, be it what it might, on 
which our Commander-in-chief should determine. 
In pressing upon our consideration the first of 
his propositions, Cuesta strongly represented that 
we might expect ample supplies of every descrip-
tion at Badajoz; and th~t, should more be re-
quired than Badajoz was able to furnish, the 
deficiency could be promptly and sufficiently made 
up from Alentejo. The case would be very dif-
ferent, were we to proceed by Alcantara.The 
whole of that country was exhausted by the 
enemy, who ravaged it in all directions; and we 
should find it extremely difficult, as well as incon". 
venient, to carry along with us both provisions for 
the men, and forage for the horses. Besides, if it 
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were our design, as he was satisfied that it was 
our wisest course, to bring the eneroy to action 
with as líttle delay as possible, we should certainIy 
enjoy a better chance of attaining that end, by 
following the one route rather than the other. 
Were we to advance by Badajoz and Elvas, we 
should threaten the eneroy's front, who would 
probably not abandon his position without a 
strugg'le; whereas by moving froro AIcantara or 
Almaraz, we should instantly alarro him for his 
flank, and he would withdraw at once. For 
Victor, he continued, was particularly jealous of 
his right; and therefore the roost prudent policy 
would be to turn his left by a corps pushed from 
Llerena. 
To each and all of these pIans Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, 1 believe, saw serious objections, and he 
immediately wrote to Cuesta, pointing out, in 
forcible terms, his own sentiments. With respect 
to the first proposition, an opinion generally pre-
vailed, that by marching first to Badajoz, and 
afterwards towards Cuesta, we should effect· no 
other end than merely to throw ourselves in the 
enemy's rear; whereas our object clearly was, to 
cut him off entirely from all sources of communi-
cation with any other corps in the country. Then 
again, as to the detached Spanish corps, it could 
not for a moment be doubted that it would either 
be defeated by Victor in his retreat, or, which was 
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not less likely to occur, find itself suddenly placed 
between the troops of Victor on the one hand, 
and of Sebastiani on the other. Besides, it was 
not on the left at all that an aftempt ought to be 
made, becau.se the right of the enemy offered to 
us the readiest puint of attack. Of the three 
plans, 1 conceive that our commander considered 
the last less open to objection than either of the 
others, though even in it there were too many'and 
too serious difficulties for him to sanction its adop-
tion. The British army, therefore, it was consi-
dered, ought to direct itself upon Plasencia at 
once, so as to compel Victor to fall back, if not to 
receive battle; and whilst this was doing, Cuesta 
might move upon Sebastiani, so that both the 
French corps might be brought to action sepa-
rately, and at the same momento 
It is probably needless to add, that the Spanish 
and British generals differed on the present oc-
casion, not more in their views touching the sub-
ject immediately before them, than with reference 
to the series of operations which they expected to 
follow. Whilst Cuesta desired, aboye all things, 
that the armies of the two nations should be united, 
that they should fight side by side, and follow up 
to the utmost any advantages which they might 
obtain, Sir Arthur Wellesley was guidedby other 
motives, and restricted his designs to a narrower, 
but a much safer and surer field. The Spaniard 
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was eager to see his allies fairly committed, and 
his native country made the theatre of their glo-
ries ;-the Englishman felt that, by the tenor oí 
his present instructions, so bold a policy was not 
authorised. The deliverance of Portugal, and the 
repulse of the enemy from Estremadura, were 
the two objects which he was required to keep in 
view; and he limited his present designs to the 
furtherance of these by the destruction of Victor's 
army. No doubt Sir Arthur Wellesley judged 
right; but it was said that, could we but succeed 
in getting between Victor and his supplies, and 
forcing him to give us battle before fresh troops 
should reach him, a wide door to future enterprise 
would be opened~ Yet we had many disadvan-
tages to overcome. In the first place, we were, 
single-handed at least, innumbers greatIy inferior 
to the enemy; in the next place, on our allies we 
could not count, not only because of the want of 
discipline among the men, but because of the ex-
treme obstinacy of their leader; and lastly, Victor 
was strongly posted. Under all these circum-
stances, it seemed doubtful whether anything 
could with prudence be attempted, till our own 
long-promised reinforcements should arrive. 
In this state of uncertainty we remained during 
sorne days, no event occurring which at all merits 
repetition. Letters, indeed, and despatches ar-
rived from England, the tone of which gave, in 
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sorne respects, general satisfaction to the army; 
wbilst in others it was as generally condemned. 
We were well pleased to find tbat, instead of ex-
citing public expectation too bighly, government 
was exerting itself to keep' men's bopes within 
bounds; because we felt that our game was not 
yet won; and we were willing to receÍve credit 
in the end for having done more, rather than re-
proach for having done less, than had been anti-
cipated.But we were not satisfied that sorne 
higher and more decided proofs of the sense en-
tertained by h~s sovereign of our leader's merits, 
had not been given. On Sir Arthur Wellesley 
himself that circumstance produced no visible 
effect; but his soldiers had looked for other re-
sults, and they were far from being reconciled to 
the overthrow of their expectations. They ima-
gined that the passage of the Douro entitled him 
who had effected it, to sorne striking acknowledg-
ment of gratitud e from his country; and tbey 
were surprised to find that none such had been be-
stowed. These, however, were transient feelings ; 
nor were others, which a somewhat unprecedented 
promotion of a few individuals excited, more 
lasting. But on one head an felt particularly 
anxious.. The long-promised reinforcements were 
not yet arrived, and the despatches contained no 
information as to the period when they might be 
expected. This was the more vexatious, as almost 
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every day brought in sorne fresh rumour respecting 
Victor and the French army. At one time we 
heard that he had actually quitted his position. 
and that he was in full retreat towards the capital; 
at another, it was confidentIy asserted that he 
was preparing to pass the Guadiana, for the pur-
pose of attacking Cuesta. That the latter appre-
hended such an event, all his communications 
made us aware; but for our own parts, we felt 
perfectIy assured that he would not move till we 
commenced our operations, and that, as soon as 
we should approach Vera de Placencia, he would 
begin his retreat. In this case it was vain to ex-
pect that any serious stand would be made till 
after he should have been joined by Joseph's 
guards from Madrid; and then at Segovia, 01' 
somewhere in that vicinity, we anticipated that a 
mighty struggle awaited us, in which we should 
be opposed to an the force which it would be pos-
sible fol' Victor to bring together upon one field. 
In the mean while, news carne from the north, 
that N ey and Soult, having united their corps, 
were employed in the siege of Vigo; and that, as 
soon as it should fall, an event of which every one 
appeared to anticipate the speedy accomplishment, 
they were preparing once more to cross the Min-
ho, and carry the war into the north of Portugal. 
Such an occurrence would naturally lead to 
changes in our arrangements. In the first place, 
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it would become absolutely necessary for Marshal 
Beresford, who had accompanied us SO far with 
three Portuguese brigades, to return for the de~ 
fence of the provinces, and to relinquish the in-
tention, which at present he entertained, of pene~ 
trating along with us into Spain. The fact indeed 
is, that he was best placed at Oporto. There was 
no second under him capable of carrying on the 
organising system as he had begun it; and though 
his services with us were doubtless highly impor-
tant, his presence among his own levies was infi-
nitely more so. N o doubt it would be extremely 
galling to him, to quit the scene of active opera~ 
tions for the sake of training recruits, and watching 
a distant enemy; but upon his vigilan ce our future 
successes in a great measure depended; and there-
fore he was prevailed upon, in case untoward 
events should occur in the north, to sacrifice his 
own wishes to the public good. 
1 have said that our effectives never exceeded, 
at this period of the war, twenty thousand men'. 
Even now, with the addition of the five thousand 
lately joined, we barely carne up to that number ; 
for our men had become extremely sickly of late, 
and as the summer advanced, and the heat in-
creased in intensity, sickness daily, and even 
hourly, accumulated upon uso It was not, how-
ever, the number of our sick alone which rendered 
us, in a great measure, inefficient: we were des-
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titute of a variety of articles absolutely necessary; 
in order to tit us for a campaign. Our shoes were 
generally worn out, and no supply had reached 
liS; and our military chest was quite exhausted. 
There was not a regiment in the army, to which 
many months' pay was not due; ando what was 
infinitely more distressing, therc were no funds in 
the country from which to supply what was want-
ing. Yet, in spite of an this, not a murmur or 
complaint could be heard, from the highe'st to the 
lowest. Generally speaking, our imrnediate sup-
plies were ample; that is to say, the men received, 
for the most part, their full allowance of provi-
sions; and they were too thoroughly satisfied with 
the honour of the government which they served, 
to entertain any doubts as to the ultimate settle-
ment of their balances. On t1}e contrary, the 
very best spirit prevailed everywhere; nor is it 
going too far to affirm tbat, under their present 
leader, the troops would have borne any pnva-
tians, and undertaken any services~ 
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CHAPTER XV. 
The British army moves nearer to Victor, and threatens hí3f 
flanks-The latter withdraws across the Tagus-Sir Arthur 
)Vellesley fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia-He visits 
Cuesta at Casa del Puerto, and is shown the Spanish army 
by torch-light-He returns to his own troops, which are put 
in motion, and Victor's posts driven from Talavera across the 
Alberche-Preparations for attacking him there, but he 
effec1s his eseape-Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur WeIlesley 
with the conduct of the Spaniards-He is compelled, by the 
negligence of Cuesta, to remain inactive. 
IN the last chapter it has been stated that Cuesta 
sent in three proposals for the consideration of Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, and that an opioion generalIy 
prevailed that Sir Arthur had objected to the 
whole of them, laying before him at the same time 
sorne project of his owo. N o great while elapsed 
ere we were given to understand, by Ietters from 
Colonel Bourke, that the Spaniard remained bi-
gotedly attached to his own opinians. On no 
372 NAHHATIVE Ol!' THE 
account whatever would he agree to act as Sir 
Arthur Wellesley suggested; and the only altera-
tion to which he would at aH consent was, that 
after having joined him at Badajoz, we should di-
rect our march upon Caceres, in order to threaten 
the enemy's right; whilst he moved by Merida 
to Talavera. Whoever will take the trouble to 
consult the map, must see that by this scheme 
Cuesta proposed, first to form a junction between 
the two armies, and afterwards to divide them by 
a chain of almost impassable mountains. It is 
scarcely necessary to observe that neither Sir 
Arthur, nor any person of inteHigence in his army, 
could approve of such an arrangement. We were 
aH, indeed, well assured that the movement upon 
Badajoz, and the combination of the armies there, 
would compel Victor to cross the Tagus; but we 
knew a180 that it would only drive him back upon 
his resources, prevent our striking- a blow, and 
enable him to escape with his army entire. Under 
such circuqlstances nothing remained for us, except 
to continue quietIy where we were, and watch 
the evento Care was, indeed, taken to secure 
every point which seemed at all in danger of an 
attack from the enemy; and a few movements 
were made, calculated, in the event of any un-
looked-for piece of good fortune occurring, to for-
ward our enterprises on the offensive. Marshal 
Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the 
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north, was ordered to proceed, with one British 
arrd two Portuguese brigades, by Castello Branco 
to the Teitar, so as to menace Victor's flank, in 
case his retreat should be delayed; whilst the rest 
of the Portuguese troops were commanded to con-
centrate at Braga, for the defence of the northern 
provinces. But the strength of the army remained 
stationary; and as forage and provisions were suf-
ficiently abundant, it suffered nothing in conse-
quence. On the contrary, the cavalry horses 
improved every day in condition, and fresh regi-
ments of infantry were continually brought up 
from the coast; so that, in the course of three 
weeks, we found ourselves, if not greatly more 
numerous, at all events more efficient in every 
respect, than we had yet been since our arrival in 
Portugal. 
In the mean while, however, Victor had taken 
the alarm, and commenced his retreat towards the 
Spanish capital. His whole army was withdrawn 
across the Tagus; and Cuesta, as soon as he began 
to move in pursuit, saw the wisdom of Sir Arthur 
Wellesley's proposal, and agreed to it. Prepara-
tions were accordingly made for advancing upon 
Plasencia; but whilst these were in progress, ad-
vice came in that the French armies in the north 
had occupied Orense; and Beresford was, in con-
seq uence, compelled to resign his cornmand here, 
and to hurry off where his presence was more 
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wanted, between the Douro and the Minbo. Of 
course the departure of that officer produced no 
alteration in our plans, which, on the contrary, 
were brought at once to maturity; and it was 
determined to enter Spain, without a moment's 
delay, in two columns. Of these, one, consisting 
of three divisions of infantry, and the whole of the 
cavalry, was directed to move upon Plasencia, by 
way of Coria; the other was to proceed across the 
Gata, near Moraza, and to rendezvous at the same 
point. 'Vith respect, however, to any future un-
dertakings, there seemed to be considerable mis-
givings. On Cuesta no reliance could be placed ; 
his opinion of the English \Vas not a generous one; 
and every body seemed to be aware that on the 
fi~st favourable opportunity he would )eave us to 
our fate, and follow up any desig~ wbich to him-
self might appear most advisable. N ow, from 
intercepted letters addressed by Joseph to his 
generals, which, one after another, fell ¡nto our 
hands, it was evident that the. enemy designed to 
draw their corps gradually towards one point, and 
to ·act entirely upon the defensive. This would 
of ,course lead to an evacuation of Madrid, and a 
retreat to the north of the Ebro; and how far, and 
with what prospect of success, the campaign could 
be carried into these distant regions, were ques-
tions which no one could answer. But with 
matters so contingent we were not, in the present 
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instance, very deeply concerned. 1t was our bu-
siness to follow up the enemy with aH the energies 
of which we were masters; and we lost no time in 
,bringing these effectually into play. 
'Ve had so far acted upon these plans, as to 
reach Castello Branco with the head-quarters of 
the army, when accounts carne in, that Joseph 
had marched from Madrid at the head of five 
thousand men to join Victor, and that the latter 
had taken up a strong position at Talavera. 
Sebastiani, likewise, was reported to be in motion 
towards the same point; whilst Cuesta had sud-
denlyehecked bis advance, and leaving a corps at 
Argaterem, had fallen back upon the Tagus at 
Almaraz. To counterbalance these rumours, it 
was stated that General Venegas was in close 
pursuit of Sebastiani, and tbat he migbt be confi-
dently expected to form a junction with Cuesta 
from the opposite side of the river. Then again 
we were given to understand, tbat several corps 
fmm tbe north were marching towards Salamanca 
or Valladolid, and that their patrols had appeared 
at Lenares and San Estevan, places as near to 
Plasencia as Castello Branco. This was not a 
matter of surprise to us; for we saw tbat, if Victor 
should entertain serious notions of risking a battle 
on. this side of Madrid, the Jatter movements were 
absolutely necessary to secure him against being 
turned. But thegrand question was, wbetber be 
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would risk a battle at all; and in case he were 
willing so to do, whethet we would accept the 
ehallenge. It was surmised that, on the arrival in 
camp of all t11e battalions and detachments, of 
whose landing reports had within the last few 
days reached us, our force in the field could not 
fall greatly short of thirty thousand meno Cuesta, 
again, had under his orders fun thirty-eight thou-
sand; but they were, for the most part, raw levies, 
and could not in any respect be counted upon. 
Of the French force, on the other hand, all reports 
agreed in stating that it amourited to at least 
forty-five or fifty thousand men; would it be pru-
dent, under such circumstances, to stake the issues 
of the campaign upon one battle? The point 
was, to say the least of it, an extremely delieate 
one to determine; but we a11 felt that our desti-
nies were in the hands of one who was quite com-
petent to guide them; and hence we were all 
ready either to fight 01' to manreuvre, according as 
he should direet, with the fullest conviction on our 
minds, that we were doing that which our circum-
stances required us to do, and which, sooner or 
later, would bring about the most beneficial re-
sults. 
1 have said that our plans were no sooner 
matured, than they were so far carried into execu-
tion, that the army began its. march, and, on the 
last day in June, fixed its head-quarters at 
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CastelIo Branco. No greatspac'e of time was 
wasted here; but entering Spain by way of 
Zarza la Major, we arrived at the town of Coria 
on the 5th of July. Intelligence reached lIS here, 
that General Crawford, with his brigade from 
England, had quitted Lisbon on the 28th, and 
hence, that their arrival in the camp might daily 
be expected. Some regiments, likewise, from 
Ireland, and the islands, were stated to have 
landed, respecting whom orders wcre sent back 
req uiring them to encamp at Belem ; from whence, 
as soon as they should have got into proper order 
for field service, they were to push forward. But 
it was not concerning our own people only that 
rumours crowded in upon uso A great deal was 
said both of the French and S panish armies-of 
their strength and their position; and though we 
we"re not disposed to place in these rumours impli-
cit confidence, it may not be amiss if I give here a 
brief outline of their general strain and character. 
Victor's corps, amounting in the whole to about 
twenty-seven thmisand effectives, had taken post, 
as was formerly stated, at Talavera, and occupied 
ground so formidable, that any attempt at turning 
could be made only by moving in force upon 
Avila. On the other hand, Cuesta, who at first 
had pursued at a quick pace, but who became 
alarmed when he found that we were not imme-
diately inhis rear, and that he was in danger of 
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getting' entangled between the two rivers, returned 
to his old p08ition on the left bank of the Tagus, 
from whence, kecping possession of Almaraz with 
his advance alone, he scoured the country in an 
directions with his cavalry. He was not, how-
ever, regardless eithcr of us or of the means by 
which our communÍcations might he rendered most 
direct and secare; for he had alrea,!ly established 
a bridge over the Teitar, and was busily engaged 
in the construction of two more across the Ta-
gus; one in the vicinity of Almaraz, the other 
below tlle point where the waters of the Teitar 
and the Tagus meet. Whilst these movements 
were going on, Sebastiani had advanced from To-
ledo, with the design, as it \Vas surmised, of at-
tacking Venegas; but the latter feH back to Vil-
lanova de la Fuente, anu drew Scbastiani after 
him as fal' as Consuegra. Thus ,vere Victor and 
Sebastiani as complctc1y separated from one ano-
ther, as Venegas was separated frorn Cuesta, and 
Cuesta fram Venegas. 
With respect to other points, again, the corps 
of N ey and Soult were reported to have assembled 
at Zamora, to the number of twenty-three 01' 
twenty-follr thous;:md men; whilst Marshal Mor-
tier was represented to be with his force at Valla-
dolid. The latter piece of intelligence we acquired 
fram General Franceschi, the officer to whorn our 
hussars hau been so frcqnently opposed during Sir 
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John Moore's campaign, and who, till he feH into 
our hands, had been in command of the light ca-
valry and advance of the northern army. He was 
proceeding from his quarters -at Toro, by way of 
Tordesillas, for the purpose of visiting his friend 
Marshal Mortier, when he was attackcd near the 
ferry by a fríar and ten Spaniards, and himself 
ll.nd his aide-de-camp made prisoners. The gallant 
friar was in the act of conveying him across the 
mountains, in order to present him to the Supreme 
Junta at Seville, when the head-quarters of our 
armychanced to be at Zarza la Major, by whích 
means we were enabled to hold sorne conversation 
with him. He appeared dreadfully out of humour 
with his evil fortune, repeatedly ejaculating, "O! 
comme e'est pitoyable pOOl' un général d'hussars 
d'Hre pris par un capuchin!" Yet, Frenchman-. 
like, he met an our ad\'ances with the greatest 
frankness and candour. Upon his person were 
found Ietters, which gave a very deplorable ac-
count of Soult's present situation and future pros-
pects. His army was stated to be perfectly di s-
organised; and the whole COlll1try round to be in 
a state of the most alarming revolt. 
The news from the south-east, which arrived 
abont tile same time, were 110t, however, so fa.:. 
vourable. There Blake, pushing forward \vith his 
accustomed rashness, hacl suffered a great defeat, 
and the French were said to be gaining ground, in 
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consequence, in every corner both of Catalonia 
and Arragon. But, in the present state of affairs, 
the south was infinitely less a source of anxiety to 
us than the central and northern provinces. Could 
we but contrive to destroy Victor, and afterwards 
press on through Gallicia and the Asturias, carry-
ing with us Cuesta's and the Portuguese armies, 
and picking up, as we went along, the different 
corps which, und-er Romana and his compatriots, 
were in arms there, it was at least within the 
verge of possibility, that we might succeed in pe-
netrating to Burgos and Vittoria, and so act upon 
the line of the enemy's communications. AH, 
however, must depend upon circumstances, of the 
exact bearing of which no one could, as yet, form 
a judgment; for it was far from being a matter 
absolutely decided upon, that a battle ought to be 
risked at aH. But to return to my nal'rative. 
On the morning of the 6th, the head-quarters of 
. the, army moved from Coria to Galesto; and on 
the 8th they were established in Plasencia. From 
this point Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to 
open a personal communication with General 
Cuesta; and the 10th was selected as a conve-
nient day for the. purpose. As the events arising 
immediately out of this detennination had in them 
a great deal of interest at the time, and as its more 
remote consequences bore powerfully upon the 
issues of the war, 1 shall take the liberty of re-
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cording, at length, most of the particulars attend-
ing our remarkable journey. 
As soon as the official business of the morning' 
was disch~lrged, and things put in a proper train, 
we set out from Plasencia, on the day above-
named, for Cuesta's head-quarters, and were met 
at a flying bridge, of which 1 have ·already spoken 
as thrown across the Teitar, by a squadron of 
Spanish hussars. The hussars, who belonged to 
the regiment of Villa Viciosa, were, upon the 
whole, well mounted and equipped; indeed, we 
were not long in discovering that they had been 
selected to do the duty of an escort to us, simply 
because their appearance was superior to that of 
any other corps in the Spanish army. Unfortu-
nately, however, in conducting us tówards the 
bridge of boats upon the Tagus, our guides lost 
their way, and darkness had, in consequence, set 
in before we began to approach the campo This 
was the more to be regretted, .as Cuesta had 
drawn out his whole force for Sir Arthur Welles-
ley's inspection. The troQPs had been under arms 
during four hours, in momentary expectation of 
our arrival; whilst the poor old man himself, 
though still lame from the effects of his bruises at 
Medelin, sat on horseback at their headduring the 
greater part of that time. 
Our arrival at the camp was announced by a 
general discharge of artillery, upon which an im-
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mense number of torches were made to blaze up, 
and we passed the entire Spanish line in review 
by their light. The effect produced by these ar-
rangements was one of no ordinary character. As 
the torches were beld aJoft, at mOdel'áte intervals 
from one another, they threw a red and wavering 
light oyer the whole scene, permitting, at the same 
time, its minute]' parts to be here anJ there cast 
into shade; whilst the grim and swarthy visages 
of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uni-
forms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as 
the Rashes feH upon them. Then there was the 
frequent roar of cannon, the shouldering of fire-
locks, mingled with the briefword of command, 
and rattling of accoutrements and arms, as we 
passed from battalion to battalion; an these 
served to interest the sense of hearing to the fu1l 
as much as the spectacle attracted the sense of 
sight.Nor was old Cuesta himself an object to 
be passed by without notice, even at such a mo-
ment and under such circumstances as these. The 
old man preceded us,-not so much sitting on his 
horse as held upon it by two pages,-at the im-
minent hazard of being overthrown whenever a 
cannon was discharged, 01' a torch Rared out with 
peculiar brightness; indeed his physical debility 
was so observable, as clearly to mark his total 
ullfitness for the situation which he then held. 
As to his mental powers, he gave us little oppor-
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tunity of judging; inasmuchas he scarcely ut-
tered five words during the continuance of our 
visit; hut his corporal infirmities alone were at 
absolute variance with all a general's d uties, and 
showed that he was llOW fit only for the retire-
ment of prívate life. 
In this manner we passed abüut six thousand 
cavalry, drawn up in rank entire, and not less than 
twenty battalions of infantry, eaeh consisting of 
perhaps from scven to eight hundred meno These 
formcd but one portion of the army, the rest being 
either at the bridge of Arzobispo, or in position 
along the Tagus; and tbey were all, with a few 
exceptions, remarkably fine meno Some, indeed, 
were extremely young-too young for service-
particularly among the recruits which had lately 
joined; but take them for all in a11, it would not 
be easy to point out a hetter made, stouter, 01' 
more hardy-Iooking body of soldiers in the service 
of any nation in Europe. Of their appointments, 
it is not possible to speak in the same terms of 
commendation. There were, indeed, sorne hattalions 
whose arms, accoutrements, and even clothing, 
might he pronounced respectable; out in general 
they were very deficient, particularly in shoes. 
It was easy to perceive, likewise, from the attitude 
in which they stood, as well as from the manner in 
which they held their arms, that little or no disci-
pline prevailed among them; and hence that l~ 
/7. 
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general they could not be regarded in any other 
light than as raw levies. Sorne corpsthere doubt-
less were, such as the Irish brigades, abattalion 
or two of marines from Cadiz, and the remnants of 
their grenadier battalions, which deserved a higher 
military character; but speaking of them in the 
aggregate, they were little better than bold peasan-
try, armed partially like soldiers, but cómpletely 
unacquainted with a soldier's duty. This remark 
applied fully as much to the cavalry as to the 
infantry. The horses were many of them good, 
but theü' riders manifestly knew nothing of move-
ment or discipline; and they were, as well on this 
account as on the score of a miserable equipment, 
quite unfit for general service. The artillery, 
again, was numerous, but totaIly unlike, both in 
order and arrangement, to that of other armies; 
aml the generals appeared to have been selected 
according to one rule alone, namely, that of seni-
ority. They were almost all old men, and, except 
O'Donaghoe and Largas, evidently incapable of 
bearing the fatigues or surmounting the difficulties 
of one hard campaign. It was not so with the 
colonels and commanders of battalions, who ap-
peared to be young and active, and of whom we 
had every reason to believe that many were ra-
pidly learning to become skilful officers. 
The place at which we paid this visit, and wit-
nessed these events, was called Casa del Puerto; 
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where the head-qnarters of the Spanish army were 
established in a wretchedhovel. We alighted 
here after the réview had ended, aud as soou as 
we entered, Cuesta, who seem:ed quite overpow-
ered by fatigue, retired to rest, but he returned 
again at eleven o'c1ock to supper, and sat with us 
till past midnight. He sat, however, as he al-
ways did under similar circumstances, in profound 
silence, neither seeking to take a share in the con-
versation, nor, apparently at least, paying the 
slightest attention to it. 1 was much struck by this 
,singularity of manner, and inquired oftllose around 
me whether it were assumed; but they aH repre-
sented it as being perfectly· natural, and gave 
rather a curious account of the aged chief. Every-
thing, it appeared, went on throughout the army~ 
rather in his uame than by his'immediate orders'; 
forhe governed his followers wholly bya system 
of silence and terror, of which aH stood wonder-
fuUy in awe. Cuesta was a person of no talent 
whatever; but he was a brave, upright, and ho-
nourable man, fuU of prejudices, and obstinate to á 
great degree, and abhorring th~ French with the 
hatred of personal rancoUl'. On the latter account, 
and because they knew that he would never willing~ 
Iy betray them, the Spaniards reposed unbounded 
confidence in Cuesta; and they did so the more rea':' 
dily, as he never failed to hang, 01' otherwiseput 
to death, every traitor that feH into his hands. 
VOL. I. 2 B 
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Cuesta never gained a victory, yet he was con-
stantly eager to fight; and when the battle began, 
he was always to be found in the post of greatest 
danger. That, however, was a matter of very little 
moment; for he gave no orders except to push 
on; and as to arrangement, or the mode of execu· 
ting manreuvres, they were things quite unknown 
in his army. It was said that Brigadier·general 
Quiske, Cuesta's military secretary, was aman of 
talento 'Him, however, we did not see; but 
O'Donaghoe struck me as being elever and sen· 
sible, though, like other favourites who act for 
their principal, an intriguer and a politician. 
Respecting the rest of the generals, it was im-
possible to form anyopinion, as Cuesta seemed par-
ticularly unwilling that they should holda,ny se-
rious conversation with uso It is true that 'he pre-
sented them one by one to Sir Arthur Welles-
ley, the ceremony taking place after breakfast on 
the 11 th; but no words were exchanged on the 
occasion, and each retired after· he had ma~e his 
bow. 
This ceremony having be en gone through, Sir 
Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta withdrew, at the 
request of the former, to an inner apartment; 
where they held a conference which lasted four 
hours. What passed on the occasion 1 know not, 
as 1 did not happen to be present; but 1 heard 
that O'Donaghoe, who assisted his general, was 
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the chief speaker, and that Cuesta was, as 
usual, almost wholly siJent. When it carne to 
a close, dinner was announced; and we sat down, 
about three o'clock, to aboút forty dishes, the 
principal ingredients in. which were garlic and 
onions. Our meal did not occupy us long; and on 
Cuesta retiring, as was his c~stom, to enjoy his 
siesta, we mounted our horses, and rode out into 
the campo By this means we were enabled to see 
more of the regiments separately, than we had 
seen during the torch-light review. We saw, how-
ever, nothing which served, in any degree, to raise 
our opinion of the general efficiency of our aUies; 
and we returned to our host at a latehour, more 
than ever impressed with the persuasion, that if 
the deliverance ofthe Peninsula was to be effected 
at aH, it must be done, not by the Spaniards, but 
by ourselves. 
At an early hour next morning we took leave of 
Cuesta, and set out on our return to Plasencia. 
The old Spaniard brightened up as we bid him 
fareweH, and embracing us after the manner of his 
country, repeated over and over again that he was 
fuUy satisfied with the result of the communication 
with which Sir Arthur had honoured him. How 
far the feeling of satisfaction was mutual, 1 take it 
not upon me to determine; but that the journey 
had not been performed absolutely in vain, tha 
orders which were issued immediately on our a1'-
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rival at head-quarters, for the troops to hold them-
selves in readiness to march at a moment's notice, 
sufficient1y attested. 
The object for which we were now in a state of 
preparation, was nothing less than the advance 
towards Victor's army in its position at Talavera. 
To render this movement as decisive and as little 
doubtful as need be, it was resolved that, whilst 
Cuesta pushed him in front, both his flanks should 
be threatened at the same time, the right, or prin-
cipal flank, by us, and the left by the Spanish 
corps under Venegas, from the southward of Ma-
drid. The following dispositions were accordingly 
understood to be in forwardness, and the following 
marches definitely arranged. 
The first corps appointed to move from its pre-
sent encampment was that of Venegas; and it was· 
to march by way ofMadridejos, Tembleque, Oraca, 
Fuente-Duena, and Arganda. As soon as it had 
proceeded a day's journey on its route, a simul-
taneous movement was to be made by the corps at 
present at Arzobispo, and by Cuesta; the former 
crossing the Tagus, and hastening by Colira to 
Salaveral, the latter breaking up from Almaraz, 
and marching by N aval Moral and Oropesa, to the 
same point. In the mean while, the British army 
from Plasencia was to pass the Teitar, near Fuente 
de Bargazagona, and moving by Toril, N aval Moral, 
Oropesa, and Gamonal, to arrive near Escalona, at 
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the moment when the othercorps should reach 
their several places of destination. Whilst these 
things were going on, Sir Robert Wilson with the 
Lusitanian Legion, a corps máinly formed by his 
active exertions, sorne dragoons, and two Spanish 
battalions, was to follow the right bank of the 
Teitar as far as Arenas, and to secure the passes of 
the Puerto del Río; and measures were at the 
same time taken that those of A vila and Guadara-
ma should not be left open. Sir Robert Wilson's 
corps was not, however, to confine its services to a 
mereoccupation of the passes above referred too 
Masters of the fruitful vale of Plasencia, they 
would be able to furnish us, through the entire line 
of our march, with aH the supplies of which we 
were likely to stand in need; whilst they would 
hinder so much as one foraging party of the ene-
mys army from committing havoc in that beautiful 
country. 
So far everything was settled with the nicest 
attention to risks and advantages; but after all, it 
seemed. something more than doubtful whether 
Victor would give us an opportunity of proving the 
excellency of oul' arl'angements. He who l'efused 
battle at Merida and Truxillo, was not very likely 
to accept it in the position of Talavel'a. On the 
fol'mer ground he could not have been assailed, 
except by a flank movementon oul' parts, thl'ough 
Badajoz, which must of necessity have left the 
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Spaniards exposed to an attack from his entire 
force, whilst we were at a distance; and we knew 
our allies too well to entertain any hope that the 
attack would have been successfully resisted. 
But even ifit had, or supposing that we had found 
another opportunity of defeating him, his retreat 
was perfectIy open; and we could have only fol-
lowed as far as the passage of the Tagus, in the 
face of numerous and ve~y serious difficulties. 
Situated as he now was, matters bore a widely 
different aspecto The mountains of the Sierra de 
Gata on the one hand, and those of Arganda on 
the other, afforded to us numerous facilities for 
detaching corps, absolutely without risk, round 
his flanks; whilst no necessity whatever existed, 
of supporting them by a direct attack upon his 
centre. 1 confess that, bearing these things in 
view, 1, for one, entertained but slender hopes 
that he would wait to receive us in his present 
position; nor could all ruy wishes to the contrary 
succeed in removing the impression, that no good 
would arise out of our judicious but somewhat 
tardy determination at Plasencia. We remained 
quietly in our camp till the 17th, giving the 
Spaniards time to put their several columns in 
motion; but on that day we began our march, 
and passing the Teitar, occupied on the 18th 
Talaguela, and tbe rivulet of Talamora. On the 
19th we arrived at Castinello and Casa de Jos 
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Somas, pushing on oul' advanced-gual'd as fal' as 
Sto Julien; and on the 20th we entered Oropesa, 
where one day's halt was determined on. On 
the 21st, Cuesta and his people passed through 
the town; upon which occasion Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley took an opportunity of exhibitillg to the 
Spaniard twenty-'thousand British troops under 
arms. Cuesta expressed himself much gratified 
by the spectacle; but the display was scarcely 
concluded, when he hurried forward, and arrived 
the same evening~ with that portion of his army 
. which marched from the bridge of Almaraz, by 
the great road through N aval Moral, at Villada. 
The ¡;;everal corps had now assumed their re-
spective stations; and it was determined on the 
22nd to drive in those divisions of the enemy 
which occupied Talavera, to their position on the 
left bank of the Alberche. That we might be 
aware beforehand of the nature of the opposition 
about to be offered, recognisances in the direction 
of the town were made; and it was found. to be 
filled by a considerable force of French troops, 
particularly cavalry, of which there could not be 
less than fifteen hundred in and round the place. 
But to possess ourselves of that point was essen-
tial to all our future operations; and therefore on 
the 22nd the columns moved forward with the de-
sign of seizing it. 
On this occasion the Spaniards took the high-
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road towards Talavera, whilst the British were 
directed to move upon the enemy's left by a pa-
ralleI road through the motintains, in the direction 
of San Roman. As soon as the former began their 
advance~ the French showed their cavalry in the 
pIain in front of the town; which not only checked 
the Spaniards, but caused them very needlessly 
and very clumsiIy to depIoy into lineo This done, 
instead of endeavouring to drive them back, which, 
with their very superior cavalry force, they might 
have easiIy effected, our allies commenced a heavy 
cannonade, which lasted, without producing any 
visible effect, till our troops began to show them-
selves on the right. Then, indeed" the enemy 
retired with precipitation; and abandoning Tala-
vera, and the ground immediatelyabout it, they 
betook th~mselves to their principal position on 
the opposite sirle of the stream. They were fol-
lowed· in this movement by the cavalry and artil-
lery of the Spanish army, and they lost a few men 
in the suburbs of Talavera; but of severaI admi-
• 
rabIe opportunities of making a charge, which 
presented themselves to the Spanish cavalry, these 
troops took no advantage. The truth is, that men 
could not more carefuUy avoid coming to close 
quarters with their adversaries, than the Spanish 
troops did this day. To us it was quite annoying 
to see with how much caution they hung back. 
when everything invited them to advance; and to 
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confess the truth, we acquired for them a feeling 
of distrust, of which, during sorne time-:-I might 
have said during the remainder of the war-we 
hardly sUcceeded in divesting ourselves. 
On the 23rd, the enemy were seen in position 
behind the AJberche, and occupied ground which, 
had the Alberche been impassable, might have been 
considered extremely formidable. As, however, 
this was not the case, as there were several fords in 
the stream, by which both the right and the centre 
of their line could" be threatened, it seemed extra-
ordinary in Victor to remain where he was, with 
twenty thousand men only; for twenty thousand 
constituted the whole strength of the corps which 
now lay in our front. lt is scarcely necessary to 
add, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was exceedingly 
anxious to take advantage of an occurrence on 
which he could have hardly calculated. Yet was 
he extremely unwilling to urge Cuesta to the 
adoption of any measure : on the contrary, he was 
. desirous, from particular ciréumstances, that what-
. ever- was done should, if possible, be undertaken 
on the suggestion and at the entreaty of the Spa-
nish General. For this it is not difficult to assign 
an adequate cause. From the day of our entrance 
into Spain, up to the present moment, no care 
whatever had been taken by the Spanish authori-
ties, to supply us with any one of the many arti-
eles of which we stood in need. Sir Arthur had 
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repeatedly complained to Cuesta, and had, on 
every occasion, received the strongest assurances 
that bis requests would be promptly attended to; 
but day after day passed by without bringing about 
the fultilment of the promise; and we were now 
as far as ever from being satisfied. Thus circum-
stanced, Sir Arthur felt himself under the neces-
sity of informing Cuesta that be would see him 
with his army across tbe Alberche; but tbat, in 
justice to his own troops, and to the king whom he 
served, he neither could nor would advance one 
step further into the country, till aH the articles 
for wbich .he had so tepeatedly made requisition, 
should be supplied. 
The discussions to which such a state of affairs 
frequently' gave birth were again renewed, and 
with increased acrimony, on the evening of the 
22nd; but it was, 1 believe, finally determined by 
Sir Arthur Wellesley, on tbe 23rd, that a general 
attack should be made upon the enemy at dawn 
on the following morning. On this occasion, two 
divisions of British infantry, with one brigade of 
cavalry, were to pass the fords of the Alberche, so 
as to assault the heights on the enemy's right. 
Whilst this was· going on, the Spanish cavalry, 
supported by a column of infantry, rinder the 
Duke of Albuquerque, was to pass a fordopposite 
to the centre of the position, leaving to Cuesta in 
person, assisted by Generals Zayas and Eguia, the 
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charge of carrying the bridgeand battery on the 
]eft; and two divisions of British infantry, with 
two brigades of cavaIry, were to remain on the 
plain, in rear of AIbuquerque's' coIumn, as a sup-
port to the whole. 
Cuesta received the suggestion with his accus-
tomed dry civility, but desired time to consider of 
it and digest it. He spent the greater part of the 
night in deliberation; and at last gave his assent 
to the scheme. In the mean whiIe, we had not 
been wholly idIe. Soon after dark sorne guns 
were pushed across the bridge at TaIavera, fOl" the 
purpose of assisting in the dislodgement of the 
enemy from their batteries on the left, and in ad-
vance of their position. The different officers in 
command 01' divisions and brigades, were likewise 
instructed as to the duty which they would be 
expécted to perform, and the general plans, liable 
to be changed upon the spot according as events 
might turn out, were matured. This done, we 
lay down to snatch a few hours of sleep. But as 
our troops had a circuitous mal'ch to execute, the 
space granted for -repose was necessarily brief; 
and at two o'dock in the morning we were again 
under arms. We set off immediately in the di-
reetion agreed upon, and reached the Alberehe 
without molestation; but it was only to ascertain 
a faet which seriously mortified and ehagrined us 
-namely, that the enemy had escaped. Not a 
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vestige of their troops, nor a morsel of their bag-
gage, remained; and their huts, or standing carnp, 
alone bore testimony that they had been there. 
It was but natural, that feeling, as every one 
did, the fuU extent of our disappointment, a variety 
of motives should be assigned as those which 
actuated Victor on the present occasion. By sorne, 
it was alleged that the expected reinforcements 
not having come up, the enemy felt himself too 
weak to hazard a battIe; by others his retreat was 
attributed to fresh orders from Madrid, positively 
requiring him to withdrawand concentrate upon 
the capital. For my own part, it appeared to me 
that the French had never entertained the slightest 
idea of fighting, provided they could escape with 
aIiy credit, and at the same time se cure their 
plunder. They had kept their ground on the 
Alberche during the 23rd, partIy because sorne 
time was necessary for the removal of their bag-
gage, and partly because they probab1y conceived 
that our whole force could not be assembled; and 
they retired on the very first opportunity which 
offered, after they had accomplished their own 
designs, and saw reason to believe that we were 
in a fit state to molest thern. It was, therefore, 
ver y evident to me, that unless we followed them 
up closely, no possibility ofbringing them to action 
would occur; whereas by a rapid pursuit, there 
was every prospect before us of even yet com-
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pelling them to risk all upon the chances of a 
battle. 
Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, determined not 
to deviate from the course which he had already 
threatened to pursue, should Cuesta persist in his 
system of procrastination and neglect. No one in 
the army questioned the soundness of the policy 
which dictated the measure-for of that there 
could be no question; but it was mortifying to 
reflect that a series of brilliant operations must 
be interrupted, and perhap.s serious injury Ínflicted 
'!Ipon the cause, through the ill-timed obstinacy of 
a perverse old mano 1t seemed certain now, that 
we were not to pursue at aH. But were the 
Spaniards to follow single-handed, as it was high-
ly probable they might, it was an event quite 
within the compass of possibility, that the enemy 
would suddenly turn round upon them when they 
least expected it, and destroy thero, when we 
should be near enough to know of their fate, and 
yet too distant to avert it .. There was something 
more distressing in these considerations than an 
ordinary reader may be able to conceive. It was 
impossible for many not to put the question, why 
might we not go on at all events? and if provi-
sions should be scarce, why not exist upon quarter 
allowance, rather than permit an opening so pro-
pitious to be closed up?A few days' march 
would drive the enemy beyond the capital, the 
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passes,.and the mountains, and to effect more was 
not required of uso We should then be in a 
country where, in spite of Cuesta, we might sup-
port ourselves well,-it were better that we had 
attempted nothing, than to stop short just at a 
moment like the presento Our chief, however, 
had made up his mind upon mature deliberation, 
and doubtless formed his judgment upon grounds 
satisfactory to himself; nothing, therefore, re-
mained to his followers, except to submit implicitly 
to his decisions. Besides, there was one great 
good of which no one could doubt, as likely to 
arise out of these decisions. Cuesta would see 
that we were in earnest, and he would then, per-
haps, exert himself to suppIy our wants, rather 
than lose altogether the advantage of our co-opera-
tion. 
On the morning of the 24th, it was rny fortune 
to go on with two squadrons of cavalry, in front of 
Cuesta's arrny, as far at St. OlaIla; we had there 
a srnart skirrnish with the rear-guard of the enemy, 
j ust as they were q uitting the· town; and 1 was 
enabled to ascertain that the· rnain body ha.d fallen 
back to Torrejos, on the Toledo road. From that 
point, it would he easily in their power either to 
double round towards Madrid, or to retire by 
Aranjuez upon Arganda, and so to the southward 
of Siguenza; froro whence, being joined by Sebas-
tiani, and in communication with Souchet, they 
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might continue their march towards Tudela. In 
the latter case, Venegas' corps could hardly avoid 
a defeat from the united armies of Victor and 
Sebastiani; for he had moved· in the directioll 
formerly described, and was supposed to be by 
this time at Fuente-Duena,' or Arganda. We 
learned, likewise, that Sir Robert Wilson's corps 
had reached Escalona, and that the enemy, 
alarmed for their right, had detached a division to 
occupy the Guadarama pass. Besides these heads 
of information, there were several others commu-
nicated to us here, on aH of which we were not 
disposed to place implicit reliance. One went to 
state that Joseph had evacuated Madrid, and was 
concentrating all the force which he was able to 
collect upon Burgos; another, ihat the French 
nation was weary of the war, and that tbe French 
troops would shortly be withdrawn from Spain. 
The last rumour was more feasible than either of 
the preceding, and we saw good reason to credit 
it, namely-that Sebastiani's corps had never 
formed a junction with Victor at an; and the 
inference was not ah unfaÍr one, that he found 
ample occupation in La Mancha. 
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CHAPTER XVI. 
Cuesta follows the Frcnch, who turn upon and drive him back 
in confusion--Battle of Talavera-Sutferings of the British 
army after the action, and its consequent retreat towards 
Portugal. . 
WHILST Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Talavera, 
sending two divisions under General Sherbrooke 
to Casa Leguas, across the river, Cuesta followed 
close upon the steps of the French army. The 
latter, however, were not, as the old man fondly 
believed them to be, in full retreat, but were 
merely falling back upon a point, where they knew 
that reinforcements would meet them; for an 
our information respecting Sebastiani and J oseph 
proved to be erroneous. Sebastiani was now in 
Toledo, from whence, leaving three thousand men 
to garrison the place, he set out to meet Victor ; 
and Joseph and Jourdan, having formed a junction, 
were also hastening to support him. 
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The junction of these several corps. d'armée took 
place at Torrejos; and the total amount of the 
force thus brought together, fell little, if at aH, 
short of fifty thousand meno S'uch, at least, were 
the statements of the prisoners who afterwards 
carne into our hands. As soon as this was effected, 
Victor wheeled round, and attacking Cuesta's ad-
vanee, whieh had proeeeded as far as Olalla, drove 
it baek upon the main body, and eompelled the 
whole to retreat with precipitation to the plain, 
between the position which the Freneh had for-
merly oecupied, and the Alberche. The retreat 
was condueted with extreme disorder, and must 
have led to the total rout of the Spaniards, had not 
General Sherbrooke, with the division on the left; 
protected them. But this he did effectually, an.:) 
then withdrew oVer the ford into the camp at 
Talávera, leaving General Mackenzie's division to 
keep possession of a convent and wood, on the 
right bank of the Alberche. 
Sueh was the state of our affairs on the evening 
of the 26th, and itwas eertainly not of the most 
promising nature; for Cuesta lay upon a river, 
¡nto which, in ease of defeat, he must be driven ; 
and he appeared to be making no arrangements 
whatever to meet the attack, with which he eould 
not doubt that he was threatened. By one of 
those happy expedients, however, to which quick-
sighted mortal s can alone have recourse, both the 
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Spanish and ·British divisions were extricatedfrom 
their difficultieB" and placed, during the following 
day, in an extremely advantageous position. Sir 
Arthur Wellesley had, for sorne time,. been ex-
amining, with an eagle's glance, the countryabout 
Talavera, and he suddenly selected ground, of 
which no one except himself had taken notice, but 
to the excell'ence of which future events bore 
ample testimony. Bere he determined to draw 
up the armies; and he took his measures with 
su eh promptitude, and issued his orders with so 
mueh coolness and perspicuity, that every' bat-
talion, Spanish as well as English, stepped into 
the very spot which his admirable foresight had 
marked out for it. The following is a sketch of 
the dispositions which were thus effected :-
The town of Talavera is situated upon the 
northern bank of the Tagus, and extends so cIosely 
to the river's edge,. that there is hardly any space 
left vacant between the buildings and the water. 
In front, and lying slightly to the left, there is 
a small but commanding height, upon which a 
heavy Spanish battery was constructed, and which 
constituted a point d'appui to the right of the 
Spanish army; for the twó armies were drawn up 
in ane continuous line, ofwhich the English held 
the left, and the Spaniards the right. Our people 
extended from the town to the mountains of Tala-
vera ~ which form part of the Sierra de Gata, and 
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running parallel to the Madrid road, enclose, on 
one side, the vale of Plasencia. The extreme left 
took post upon a bold height in thedirection of 
Alataza de Segusella, protected in front qy a 
ravine, and flanked by a deep valley, on the oppo~ 
site side of which the mountains rose again in 
increased altitude, and swept away in one uniform 
lineo The Spanish troops, on the other hand, 
were arranged among sorne olive groves, and 
along a road, the embankment of which supplíed 
them with an excellent parapet, and rested their 
left upon a little hill distant about two miles from 
Talavera. A portion of their cavalry was sta~ 
tioned here, so as to support their left; and 
Zara's van kept possession of the rising ground. 
Upon that height our right likewlse leaned. 
A strong redoubt had been begun, for the purpose 
of increasing itsdefensibility; but it was not yet 
sufficiently advanced to add much to the security 
of the troops who happened to be in position there. 
These consisted of the fourth division under Ge-
neral Campbell, next to whom carne the guards ; 
which, again, ~ere succeeded in the alignment by 
General Came"ron's brigade and the Germans, as 
these were by General Mackenzie's and General 
Hill's. The last-named division held the extreme 
left of aH. Posted on a sharp rising but corn-
manding eminence, two brigades ofBritish ca~ 
valry, one heavy and oue líght, were in the valley 
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on the left of this height: one brigade, under 
General Cotton, took post on the right, in rear 
of Campbell's division; and the Duke of Albu-
querque, with a cloud ofSpanish horse, supported 
our cavalry on the left. Such was the general 
arrangement for the occupation of the defensive 
position, which the allied armies were commanded 
to take up; and at an early hour on the morning 
of the 27th, they began to move into it. 
The greater part of the movements had been 
made without annoyance, and an appeareu -to be 
going on as we could have wished, when about 
noon General Mackenzie's division was suddenly 
attacked at the convent and wood on the right 
bank of the Alberche, by two strong columns of 
the enemy. They carne on so suddenly, and with 
such impetuosity, as to throw the 87th and 88th 
regiments into sorne confusion; and when Sir 
Arthur Wellesley reached the ground, they had 
succeeded, to a certain extent, in penetrating be-
tween the two brigades of which Mackenzie's di-
vision was composed. The consequence was, 
that, for sorne little time, we were unable to dis-
cover the position which one of these brigades had 
taken up, and it-required great exertion, on the 
part of every officer present, to restore order. 
At last, however, the 31st and 45th, supported by 
the 60th regiment, were got in hand, and they 
covered the falling back of theother regiments in 
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fine style, from the wood into the plain. Here 
the cavalry were in readiness to support them; 
and frQm that moment a regular and well-con-
ducted retreat began, which was continued, lei-
surely and orderly along the heights, towards the 
left of the position which the army had been 
directed to seize. 
The enemy, nothing daunted by the steadiness 
of our people, continued to press on; and a par-
tial action ensued along the whole front of the 
lineo Towards everüng it became more serious. 
The enemy appearing then to observe the great 
importance of the height upon which the left of 
our army rested, made a desperate effort to pos-
sess himself of it. He formed his infantry into 
close columns of battalions, and, covered by a 
tremendous cannonade, advanced at doublequick 
pace to the assault. General Mackenzie's divi-
sion having been withdrawn somewhat to the 
rear, and forming at this moment in the second 
line, the attack was met by part only of General 
Hill's division; but they proved themselves quite 
adequate to the task. The 48th, the 1st batta-
lion of detachments, and the 29th pouring in a 
volley, rushed forward with the bayonet; and 
three companies of the latter gallant corps Grove 
the enemy from the very ridge to which they had 
attained. - It was a splendid charge; and it was 
one, upon the issues of which much might have 
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hung; for had the heíght in question been car-
ried, the strength of our position became at once 
exposed. It was not, however r made without a 
heavy 108s to the brave troops engaged; for the 
enemy fought nobly; and we had to lament, when 
darkness put an end to the contest, about eight 
hundred i~ killed and wounded, among whom 
were several very valuable officers. 
We lay all night upon our arms in momentary 
expectation of an attack, the cavalry resting beside 
their horses, and the infantry on the ground which 
they had occupied during the day; but no attack 
was made. N o great while elapsed, however, 
after the dawn appeared, ere the enemy once more 
put themselves Ín motion. The height upon our 
-left was still the grand object of their desire; and 
that they prepared to storm with all the force 
which they found it practicable to bring against it. 
At five o'c!ock on the morning of the 28th, two 
~trong columns of chosen troops, the grenadiers of 
Lapisse's division~ were formed in front of the 
height in question. The formation was marked 
by a furious cannonade, under cover of which the 
columns pressed forward; and desperate and nume-
rous were the efforts which they made to render 
themselves masters of the summit. But nothing 
could exceed the gallantry and steadiness of the 
brave men who opposed them. The brigades of 
General Tilson and R. Stewart were' here; they 
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permitted the enemy, again and again, to arrive 
within a few paces of the ridge, and they drove 
them back in admirable style with the bayonet, 
ti11, disheartened by so many repulses, they at last 
retreated altogether, leaving the ground covered 
with their dead. Had our cavalry been at this 
moment sufficiently forward in the p]ain and val-
ley, they might have produced a terrible impres-
siol1 upon these fugitives; for the enemy retired in 
great confusion; and opportunities of making 
charges occurred, such as could not have been by 
any possibility overlooked; but, unfortunately, 
they were too far in the rearo The broken mass~s 
were thus enabled to reform themselves, and to 
withdraw, in something like order, within their 
lines. 
The fighting had been mahItained, without any 
intermission, from five in the morning till half-past 
eight, and the slaughter on both sides was terrible; 
but the enemy's loss in killed and wounded ex-
ceeded ours greatly; and, which was not less in 
our favour, his troopsappeared dispirited and dis-
mayed. They made no further movement during 
the next three hours, and the sound of firing ceased 
to be_ heard throughout the field. At this juncture 
it was a question with us whether we should ad-
vanee, and in our turn become the assailants, 01' 
remain quietly where we were, and await the re-
sult of the enemy's deliberations. lt was a fortu-
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nate circumstance that Sil' Arthur Wellesley 
determined on following the latter of these courses, 
for about half-past eleven several heavyclouds of 
dust were discerned,announcing the approach of 
the French army to a renewed attack upon diffe-
rent points in our lineo They had now fully 
ascertained the exact station which the English 
army occupied, and rightly judging, that if it were 
shaken, the Spaniards would· faH an easy prey, 
they made ready to bear down upon us with the 
whole weight of theír force. Four distinct columns, 
each strongly supported by artillery and cavalry, 
carne on;. the first against that part of the line 
where the British and Spanish troops joined; the 
second against the guards and Cameron's brigade ; 
the third against the Germans and Mackenzie's 
division; whilst the fourth, escorted by a mass of 
cavalry, moved up the valley on the left of Gene-
ral Hill's station. It may be necessary to observe 
here, that General Hill, having received asevere 
wound in the early part of the morning, quitted 
the field; and that the command of the troops 
which occupied the often-contested height, had de-
volved, in consequence, upon General Tilson. 
The advance of French columns is invariably 
announced by a general fire of artillery throughout 
the whole extent of their position; and the 
ordinary custom was not omitted on the present 
occaSlOn. A murderous. cannonade spread havoc 
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among our ranks, whilst the attacking parties, 
covered as usual by clouds of tirailleurs, pressed 
forward with the gi'eatest firmness and regularity. 
Our people had received instructions to reserve 
their fire till the enemy should have arrived within 
a few yards of them, and giving it with effect, to 
bring the bayonet immediately into play. They 
obeyed these orders to the letter. The heads of 
the enemy's columns were close upon our line 
before a musket was discharged, and then one 
volley was given with a degree of precision which 
must have astonished those against whom it was 
directed. A conflict now ensued, more desperate, 
beca use more completely hand to hand, than pos-
sibly the annals of modern warfare ever recorded. 
General Campbell's division, on the right, not 
only repelled the attacking column, but rushing 
on "them when broken by its fire, drove them be-
fore it in gaIlant style; and charging a battery, 
from which it suffered severely, took, at the point 
of the bayonet, thirteen pieces of cannon. The 
enemy, however, were veteran troops, accustomed 
to be broken, and to recover their ranks again; 
and as our soldiers could not ven tu re very far in 
pursuit, lest by so doing they should expose their 
eomrades, the fugitives were enabled to rally, and 
to resume the offensive. What might have been 
the conseq uence of a renewed assault, it were a 
hard matter to sayo The captured guns, at all 
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events, would have beenprobably recovered; but 
just as the French were preparing to rush for-
ward, they were taken in flank by a regiment of 
Spanish cavalry, and again overthrown. 
In the mean while, the second and third of the 
French columns, reckoning from their left, bore 
their fuIl weight upon our centre, and made a 
desperate effort to pierce it. They were met and 
beaten back with the same gallantry which marked 
the oppositioñ of General CampbelI's corps; but 
the guards, eager to ernulate the example of the 
7th and 53rd regiments, pushed on, unfortunately 
sornewhat too far, in pursuit. The enemy were 
not slow to take advantage of this. Observing a 
chasm in our line, they threw in a trernendous 
and most galling fire upon the Gerrnans, who, for 
an instant, were in confusion. Here the battle 
was, for sorne minutes, most obstinate, and victory 
doubtful; for the enemy's right colurnn had with-
stood and repulsed a charge from Anson's light 
brigade of cavalry; and had he prornptly availed 
himself of the advantage thereby obtained, a 
different result might, perhaps, have occurred 
frorn that which crowned tbe operalÍons of this 
glorious day. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, who 
was everywhere, saw how matters stood. He 
ordered up the 48th, which had be en in reserve, 
to support the broken Germans, and to cover the 
retrogade movernent of the guards; and that regi-
PENINSULAR WAIL 411 
ment, by its steadiness and good conduct, re-
trieved the disorder in this part of the lineo The 
Germans were speedily brought back to their 
standards; General Sherbrooke succeeded in re-
forming the guards; and the French were beaten 
back, with terrible slaughter, from every point 
which they had assailed. 
At this moment our troops were successful in all 
parts of the field, and it needed but a forward· 
movement on the part of the Spaniards, to render 
the victory of 'l'alavera as decisive as any upon 
record. Had it been possible to bring them up 
from the right of their line, so as to have gained, 
by a rapid march upon the Alberche, the enemy's 
flanks, one-half of the French army must have 
been sacrificed. But unfortunately this could not 
be done. The Spaniards, miserably disciplined, 
and totally unaccustomed to change their forma-
tion in the face of an enemy, were quite immove-
. able; there they stood, as they had been origi-
nally drawll up; alld to attempt any mallurevre, 
however simple, would have served on]y to throw 
them into confusion, without beillg productive of 
any good effect. The cOllsequence was, that the 
enemy were enabled to commence and to continue 
their retreat in excellent order, carrying off with 
them much of their artillery, the whole of their 
wounded, and the greater part of their materieI. 
We could not venture to follow far, because evell 
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yet they more than doubled us in numbers; and 
they escaped in better plight than usually attends 
an arrny which has suffered a repulse so decided 
and so bloody. 
The los s of the British army in this action was 
very severe, and it was occasioned chiefly by the 
murderous and overwhelming fire of the French 
artillery. From that, several regiments, which 
can hardly be said to have been personallyen-
gaged at aH, suffered nearly as much as others 
which bore the brunt of the contesto Out of nine-
teen thousand men, which formed the whole of 
our effective force when the battle began, upwards 
of four thousand were either killed or wounded ; 
and among them were many officers, whose ser-
vices, at a juncture like the present, could ill be 
spared. Generals Mackenzie, Hill, and R. Camp-
bel1, were wounded, and placed ho1's de combato 
Brigade-majo1' Beckett, an excellent officer, at-
tached to the guards, together with Majors For-
dyce and Gardiner, were among the killed. With 
respect to the enemy, it was not easy to form an 
accurate notion, but their 10ss must have exceeded 
oursby at least one third. Many rated it higher ; 
but none below this' amount. The Spaniards suf-
fered but little, as few of their corps chanced to be 
engaged; but it is no more than justice to state, 
that the little which they had to perform aere, 
they performed well. Sorne artillery, which they 
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had upon our left, was excellently served; and 
their cava1ry regiment, called the King's, charged 
gallantly.' It is likewise but faír to record, that 
they were in raptures with liS and our behaviour ; 
and that they decIared, with all the cIamorous 
eIoquenceof their country, that those who spoke 
of the British as less capabIe of fighting by land 
than at sea, lied in their throats!! ! 
We bivouacked that night upon the fieId of bat-
tle, having removed our wounded into Talavera, 
and estabIished there an extensive hospital; and, 
on the following morning, we were joined by Ge-
neral Crawford's brigade from I_isbon, consisting 
of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. Had it 
arrived only a few hours earlier, more might per-
haps have been done; but it came in at a moment 
when our successes were not sufficient to reconcile 
us to our position; for we were in a sta te bor-
dering on want. N othing had been done, and 
nothing seemed about to be done, by Cuesta or 
the Spanlsh government, to afford us supplies: 
our bread was a11 expended; and cattle, which 
hitherto had been found in abundance, were now 
become scarce. Add to this, that the enemy still 
showed troops upon the left of the Alberche; and 
that the Spaniards, afraid to approach them unless 
we were at their side, crowded still upon us, and 
drained the country of everything. N or was this 
aH. Whilst it was yet doubtful whether Venegas 
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had reached Aranjuez, a corps of French troops 
was reported to have advanced from Alba de Tor-
mes as far as the pass of Banios, on the road to 
Plasencia, with the design of cutting us off from 
our communications with Portugal. Sir Ro-
bert Wilsol1, also, had fallen back from Escalona, 
and was close upon our 1eft. In a word, though 
we had won a great victory, our situation was only 
so far improved, that we were for the moment free 
from an overwhelming force in our front; but we 
were in the midst of difficulties, nevertheless, from 
which nothing but some prompt and vigorous 
movement . would deliver uso The mind of our 
General was, however, as we well knew, full of 
resources; and though most of us saw our embar-
rassments clearly enough, there was not an indivi-
dual in the army who entertained a doubt, that his 
talent and decision would, in due time, overcome 
and disperse them. 
During the 30th and 31st, all things remained as 
they had done, except that the enemy disappeared 
entireIy from before us, and our wants became 
every day more and more urgent. The utmos( 
exertions of our cornrnissariat were unabIe to pro-
cure even a moderate suppIy of bread, and the 
meat was hard1y in greater abundance. Rumours, 
likewise, of SouIt's approach from the north, be-
carne every hour more and more frequent; nor 
couId all the hopes which we persisted in cherish-
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ing, that Venegas must have g'ot well round to the 
right of Madrid, suffice to allay entirely the ap-
prehensions which that reported movement created. 
At 1ast, on the 1st and 2nd óf August, authentic 
intelligence reached us, that from Venegas we had 
nothing to expect; for that Soult, having carried 
the pass of Banios, which a corps of Spaniards 
under the Marquis del Reyno had been appointed 
to keep, but which they had deserted almost 
without striking a b10w, was already jn, Plasencia. 
He entered that town, in fact, on the 1st; and 
having been reinforced from Salamanca, 01' during 
his march from the northward, and supplied with 
artilleryand stores from Madrid, he appeared there 
at the head of fourteen thousand men, inferior, in 
point of equipment, to no portion of the French 
army. This was a startling piece of news, and 
required that sorne measure should, on our parts, 
be promptly devised; and Sir Arthur Wellesley 
lost no time in seeking a conference with Cuesta, 
for the purpose of determining of what nature that 
measure ought to be. 
On the present occasion, Cuestasuggested that 
the British army should be divided; that one-half 
should proceed with a portio n of his troops against 
Soult; and the other haIf, with the remainder of 
the Spaniards, goforward in pursuit of Victor. 
To this proposition Sir Arthur Wellesley would on 
no account agree, declaring that a11 idea of di.., 
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viding the British force was preposterous; but he 
proposed, in his turn, to· rnarch with the entire 
British arrny against Soult, provided Cuesta would 
rernain at Talavera, and secure his real'. Cuesta 
consented to that arrangernent; and our troops, in 
consequence, rnarched back upon the 3rd frorn Ta-
lavera to Oropesa. But we had hardly taken our 
ground, when advices arrived frorn Cuesta, to state 
that he had intercepted a friar who was carrying 
despatches both frorn Marshal Jourdan and King 
Joseph, addressed to Soult. In the former, an ex-
ceedingly accurate and precise detail was given, 
not only of our force, but of all our previous inten-
tioos up to the 28th; a species of knowledge 
which could have been obtained only by treachery 
in sorne quarter 01' aoother; whilst a narrative of 
the late battle was added, which, for the story of 
a Frenchrnan, exhibited wonderfully few devia-
tions from the truth. The latter contained orders 
to "Marshal Soult, to press forward with aH dili-
gene e upon us, assuring him that his rnovernent 
must cause a separation of the British from the 
Spanish forces; that he would be supported by 
Mar!lhal N ey, who had be en directed to pursue his 
line of march from Castile; and that, whilst they 
marched upon our flank, Joseph would again act 
on the offensive, and threaten our front. lt was 
added that Joseph had, in the mean while, placed 
his force in a central situation abont Barga, near 
PENINSULAR WAR. 41, 
Torrejos, so as at once to keep Venegas in check, 
and to arrest any advance which we might ende a-
vour to make irnmediately from Talavera. 
Frorn the tenor of these letters, it was easy to 
perceive that what had formerIy been surmised 
respecting Venegas was correct, and that, instead 
of pushing briskly, as he had been directed to do, 
upon Fuente-Duena and Arganda, he had become 
alarmed for the safety of Seville, and had moved 
towards Toledo and Aranjuez. By this injudicious 
movement, he enabled the enemy, with their forces 
united, to keep both Spanish corps in check. Cu-
esta was dreadfully alarmed at the information. 
He gave orders for the irnrnediate evacuation of 
Talavera, and made ready to follow our march tQ 
Oropesa without a moment's del ay, though aware 
that he must thereby sacrifice the whole of our 
wounded, and that too when no enemy was in 
sight. Tbis was a most galling arrangement to us, 
and it cut us the more deeply, that the old Spa-
niard, though literally encumbered with cars and 
waggons, refused to spare usmore than seven for 
the transportation of the bI'ave men who had 
fought and bled for his country. The abandon~ 
ment ofthe town was, as may be imagined, a most 
heart-rending scene. Such of our poor soldiers as 
we.re in a condition to move at aH, craw]ed after 
us, some still bleeding, and many more with their 
wounds open and undressed; whilst those wbose 
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hufts were too severe to permit of this, lay upon 
their pallets, ~and implored their comrades not to 
desert them. By indefatigable exertions, and by 
sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, Sir Arthur 
Wellesley got together forty cars, which enabled 
lIS to bring forward in all about two thousand men ; 
but there were still sorne hundreds left behind, aH 
of whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity or ho-
nour, might have been preserved. The reader will 
easily believe that such 'a scene, added to the ex-
treme distress which scarcity of provisions occa-
sioned, cast a damp upon our spirits which we had 
not anticipated, and which certainly ought not to 
have been the consequence ofa victory hardly won 
indeed, but singularIy splendid. 
As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley was rnade 
acquainted with Cuesta's determinations, he re-
monstrated in strong terrns against the iro policy 
and cruelty of the measure; but his remonstrances 
were disregarded. During the night uf the 3rd, 
the Spaniards carne pouring in upon us like a 
flock of sheep; and a scene of noise and confu-
sion ensued, of which no words could conveyan 
adequate conception. At the same moment intel-
ligence arrived, that Soult had passed the Teitar, 
and that his advanced-guard was alreadyentering 
N aval Moral. The bridge, of Almaraz . JIlust, 
therefore, be either destroyed by the Spanish pea-
sants, or in the hands of the enemy; and hence 
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we were reduced to the alternative, either of 
fighting our way through Soult's corps~ or of 
returning over the bridge of Arzobispo, and taking 
up the line of the Tagus. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
gave to each aspect of affairs a due portion oi' 
consideration. He felt, that should he determirie 
to advance ágainst Soult, he might,. from the 
nature of the country, and the facilities which the 
line 'of the Teitar afforded to an army on the 
defensive, be kept, in spite of his utmost exer-
!ions, in play, till Ney had arrived with his corps, 
and J oseph and Victor were again able to come 
on. Nor was this the on;ly risk which he rano 
Should he not succeed in forcing his way to 
Plasencia, his circumstances would become despe-
rate indeed; for the destruction of the bridge 
at Almaraz, which was now fully ascertained to 
have taken place, deprived him of all means oC 
crossing the Tagus; and a retreat, in case of 
disaster, became, in consequence, extr-emely pre-
carious. These were contingencies of grave and 
serious aspectj but they were not the only consí-
derations whieh served to guide him. By suhse .. 
quent accounts, it appeared that the enemy were 
pushing by La Calzada upon the Arzobispo 
bridge; there was, therefore, no room 1eft for 
hesitation, nor a moment to spare in matúring and 
acting upon sorne decision. 
The greater part of the Spanish army arrived at 
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Oropesa during the night of the 3rd; but itwas 
the rnorning of the 4 th before Cuesta hirnself carne 
in. Sir Arthur Wellesley instantly waited. upon: 
him, for the purpose of stating his views as to the 
line of conduct which it behoved us to pursue. 
He represented to hirn, that situated as the allies 
now were, with a French force hurrying forward 
to surround thern on every side, and destitute of 
all rneans of subsistence,except the little which, 
frorn day today, ffiight be collected in an ex-
hausted country, the only step which they could 
venture, in cornrnon prudence, to take, was to 
assurne the line of the Tagus, and to rernain there 
in a defensive position, till stores could be col-
lected, and sorne prospect of acting on the offen-
sive, more attractive than was now before them, 
could be discovered. Cuesta, however, whose 
fears had driven hirn to evacuate Talavera, to 
sacrifice our wounded, and to leave the way open 
for Victor's arrny, was now stoutly opposed to 
every proposal which had a retreat for its object. 
He was satisfied that a second battle would end 
quite as advantageously for us as the first ; and he 
gave his voice decidedly for risking it. It was 
useless to rernind . him that the physical strength 
of men, to whom no provisions could be supplied, 
would not suffice to carry thern through the toils 
of a. long action; and that, if we did fight, we 
should fight under all the disadvantages of a state 
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of utter· and deplorable exhaustion. He would 
listen to no arguments of the kind, till at last, 
perceiving that argument was thrown away, Sir 
Arthur Wellesley assumed á higher tone. He 
told him plainly, that whatever the Spaniards 
might resol ve upon doing, he would not sacrifice 
the arrny of which he was in command; and he 
left him, to issue orders for an immediate march 
towards Arzobispo. The orders were promptly 
obeyed; and we· passed the bridge just as the 
enemy's patrols began to appear in sight. 
The path which leads from Arzobispo, through 
.the pass of Mesa d'Ibor, into the great road from 
Almaraz to Truxillo, Merida, and Badajoz, had 
been represented to us as wholly impassable for 
artillery. We found it extremely bad, no doubt; 
but we nevertheless contri ved to drag our guns 
alóng, and by dint of extraordinary exertions, 
reaehed Toralida among the mountains, on the 
5th. We remained there only during the night, 
and resting at Mesa d'Ibor on the 6th, we carne 
in, on the 7th, to Deleitosa. Here a halt took 
place during two daJ s, of which the troops stood 
greatly in need; for though our journeys had not 
·been remarkable for their length, they had been 
accomplished in the face of numerous and severe 
difficulties. In the first place, no bread had been 
issued out from the commencement to the close of 
our march, and the men had tasted none for three 
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whole days. This, of itself, was suffiCient to wear 
out their strength; but, besides suffering from 
hunger, they had a rough, and ofien precipitous 
track to follow; and they travelled through a 
district everywhere laid waste, and deficient in all 
the necessary articles, either for sheIter or sup-
port. The season of the year was, indeed, in our 
favour, the weather happening tú be remarkably 
temperate; and it was well that the case proved 
so; ror h~d winter overtaken us, circumstanced 
as we then were, it would have been a hard task 
to foretell the probable consequences. As if for-
tune, too,had determined to try our patience in 
every possible way, we were scarcely settled in 
Deleitosa, when intelligence of the overthrow of 
Austria reached uso It was communicated from 
Seville, through our ambassador Lord Wellesley, 
and no doubts could be entertained as to its au-
thenticity. The reader will readily believe that 
news so afHicting carne with doubIe weight upon 
men already beginning to lose heart iñ conse;.. 
quen'ce of their own sufferings and reverses; and 
that not a few of the most desponding amongst us 
looked upon affairs as despeTate, and all chance 
of successful resistan ce to French power as ab-
solutely taken away. 
No such sentiments, however, found a home in 
the breast of Sir Arthur Wellesley. He saw and 
felt the' difficulties of his situation keenly enough ; 
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perpIexed as he was by being kept a good deal in 
the dark as to the steps which the enemy were 
preparing to take~ and harassed and annoyed by 
the continued supineness of ihe Spanish autho-
rities; but he was far from regarding the game as 
lost. On the contrary, he spoke and actedon all 
public occasions asif events were taking the very 
Course whichhe had expected them to take; and 
he satisfied every one~ either that he had providedt 
or that he was perfectly competent to provide, 
against any aecident or contingency which might 
chance to occur. Our principal danger arose from 
the. side of Plasencia. Were Soult, whose force 
was now ascertained to faIl littleshort of twenty-
five or thirty thousand roen, and who was _ well 
known to hold the Spaniards in soyereign con-
tempt, to push upon Portugal, by way of Coria, 
andthe othef towns which we had passed in our 
advance, then shQuld we hethrown into circum-
stances of great embarrassment; for his line of 
march -would, in this case, be shorter than any 
which we could take, and he might reach Lisbon 
before uso Butwe eotertained sanguine hopes 
that Marshal Beresford, of whose junction with 
the puke de la Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo we 
were informed, must, by this time, he sufficientIy 
advanced to. intercept the movement; and Sir 
Arthur invariably caused it to appear, that for such 
hopes there were amplegrounds. Nevertheless, it 
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was gene rally felt, that ifhe intended to look ex-
c1usively to the defence of Portu'gal, the sooner he 
took up a line for that purpose the better. On 
Cuesta and the Spaniards, it was evident enough 
that no further reliance could be placed; there 
were around us, at present, no means of subsis-
tence; our' communications from every quarter 
were either entirely interrupted, or at best very 
uncertain; and, aboye all, sickness raged amongst 
us. Our effective strength, including General 
Cniwford's division, was reduced at this period to 
seventeen thousand meno Where so many re a-
sons existed for the adoption of a defensive sys-
tem, there was little doubt that it would be adopt-
ed by him, who was so competent to judge of its 
fitness; and they who entertained this expecta-
tion were not disappointed. 
1 have alluded aboye to the supineness of the 
Spanish authorities, and the unsatisfactory rela-
tions in which our intercourse with the civil go-
vernment at Seville stood, amply exemplified as it 
was by the arduous task which Lord Wellesley had 
to perform in the position in which he was placed, 
and fully borne out by the voluminous and con-
stant correspondence that was kept up at this 
time between the two brothers. Jt is not my 
province, however, to enter further into those cir-
cumstances than to state that our chief was not 
ony caBed upon to consider every military point 
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as connected with his arrny, but that every civil 
arrangernent in the Peninsula was submitted to 
him; and hence he cornmenced that early practice 
of universality of reflection and decision, to which. 
for reasons in the hands of Providence, he seerns 
especiaI1y to have been designed. 
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CHAPTER XVII. 
Defeat of Cuesta's army at the bridge of Arzobispo-Victor 
enters Talavera-Sir Robert Wilson's corps worsted at the 
Puerto de Banios-Sir Arthur Wellesley takes up the line 
of the Tagus--Cuesta is superscded, and General Eguia 
succeeds to the command ofthe Spanish army-Distresses of 
the British army, and extraordinary conduct of Eguia and 
the Spanish government-Sir Artbur WeUesley retires upon 
the Guadiana-General Arrezaga defeated at Ocana, and 
, the Duke del Parque at Pamarue-Successes of the French 
in Andalusia-FaU of Gerona and Astorga-Massena as· 
sumes the command in the Peninsula-The British arIO y 
moves towards Almeida, leaving General Hill's corps at 
Abrantes-Comparative strength ofthe opposing armies, and 
mutual preparatiolls for the campaign. 
W E resumed our march on the morning of the 
11th, and arrived that day at Jaraicejo, a place 
distant about three leagues from the former posi-
tion. Here we paused for sorne time, sendingthe 
cavalryas far to the rear as TruxilIo, and occu-
pying Almaraz and the Puerto de, Miravete with 
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two divisions; but the head-quarters \Vere- estah-
lished in J araicejo, and the main body of the army 
cantoned in the villages round. To oprselves 
nothing occurred, whilst we.reIhained here, deserv-
ing of particular notice; but a variety of events, 
more or Iess important, were going on elsewhere; 
and of these, as they were reported to US, and~ 
generalIy speaking, truly reported, it may not be 
amlss if 1 subjoin a brief outline. 
The . first rumour which reached US, was of a 
defeat which the Spanish anny had sustained, 
on the 8th, at the bridge of Arzobispo. It ap-
peared that Cuesta, having fortified the bridge, 
alld leaving two divisions of infantry, withone of 
cavalry, under the Duke of Albuquerque, to de-
fend it, returned, in the night of the 7th, to Para-
leda de Garben, where better facilities for housing 
and covering his troops existed. He had scarcely 
departed, when the enemy appeared in force UPO!! 
the opposite bank, and employed themselves, 
totálly disregarded by the garrison of ,Arzobispo, 
in 8earching for a ford. This they 8ucceeded in 
discovering, about two or three hundred· yardE! 
aboye the barricade, and they sent over a column 
of cavalry, supported by infantry, which, falJing 
upon the Spaniards during the heat of the day, 
took them wholly by surprise. They were put to 
the rout in a- moment, with the 108s of twelve 
pieces of cannon; and had the French füllowed 
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with the vigour 'which usually characterised thero, 
the Spanish arroy musthave been entirely dis-
persed. Cuesta, however, finding that he was not 
pursued, succeeded in rallying his men, and then 
retreated into the pass of the Mesa d'Ibor, where, 
upon ground partaking as much of the nature of 
, impregnability as it is easy to conceive, he took 
up a position. 
With respect to the enerny, again, it was under-
stood that Victor had entered Talavera, where he 
behaved with the utmost humanity and kindness 
to our wounded; whilst the arroies from the north 
were surmised, rather than accurately known, to 
- have retrograded upon Plasencia. Of the exact 
posture of the latter we were, however, ignorant. 
We knew only that they had not appeared, at 
least in force, in the vicinity of Coria, though seve-
ral plundering and foraging parties had arrived 
there; whilst a corps of five or six thousand men 
Was fulIy ascertained to keep its station still in 
Plasencia. But we ascertained, at the same time, 
that a division had moved back as far as the 
Puerto de Banios, with a view to intercept Sir 
Robert Wilson. This officer, it may be necessary 
to state, had fallen in from Escalona, some time 
ago, upon our left. When we began our retreat 
towards Arzobispo, there were no opportunities of 
cornmunicating with him, or drawing him off at 
the inst-ant; and he had now penetrated in pursuit 
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of us, to the Puerto de Banios,whither the French 
corps has tened to attack hirn. Sir Robert Wilson 
could neither decline the battle, nor very success-
fully maintain it. In artillery he was quite defi-
cient, the whole of his guns having accompanied 
our train, and his men were considerably harassed 
by repeated marches; but they offered a stout re-
sistance, and when at length they were forced to 
yield, made good their retreat upon Ciudad Ro-
drigo. This they did, not as armies usually retreat, 
in compact bodies, and covered by their skir-
mishers, but by utterly dispersing, and again uni-
ting at the particular point of rendezvous which, 
previous to their rout, had be en deterrnined upon. 
In the mean whíle Marshal Beresford, with his 
Portuguese arrny, was in position at Zarza, whither 
General Crawford, at the head of four British 
regiments, hastened from Castello Branco to join 
hirn. The Marshal was confident that he was 
capable of arresting upon the frontier any French 
corps which might attempt to penetrate into Por-
tugal; and that he could easily contrive to keep 
it in play till we should be able too arrive, by way 
of Abrantes, to his assistance. This assurance, 
together with the absence of all immediate maní-
festations on the part of the enemy of a desigil to 
advance beyond Plasencia, induced Sir Arthur 
Wellesley not to relinquish with precipitation his 
defen~ive line of the Tagus, but to remain quietIy 
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inhis present attitude, untilthe progress of things 
in other parts of the country should furnish him 
with better reasons, either to advance or retire. 
By acting thus, we still retained command of the 
great road to Seville; and by keeping theenemy 
in doubt touching our future intentions, we hin-
dered him from directing his undivided attention 
to other points; whilst, at the same time, our re~ 
treat was secure, and an escape to the Spaniards 
as far as Monasterio, was by no means imprac-
ticable. 
- Matters were thus circumstanced, when the 
recall of Cuesta from the command of his army 
was announced. N otwithstanding the general 
. confidence which appeared to be entertained in 
his honest integrity, and devotion to the cause of 
hiscountry, he had exhibited, of late, too many 
proofs of incapacity to direct a campaign, to be 
permitted any longer to fill his high situation. 
He was superseded-though not with any marks 
of ignominy; and the guidance of the troops de-
volved,as a matter of course, on General Eguia, the 
next senior in rank. An idea had prevailed 
amongst us, sometimes, that the command would 
be conferred on Albuquerque; at other times, 
that ii would be offered to Sir Arthur Wellesley ; 
hut the surprise of the former at Arzobispowas 
supposed to have stood in the way of one of 
these arrangements; and to the other, the national 
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pride of the Spaniárds opposed insuperáble ob-
stacles. Had the case not been so, and had such 
an offer been actually made, Sir Arthur Wellesley 
must have experienced consÍderable embarrass-
ment either in accepting or declining it: it was 
probably quite as advantageous to the general 
cause, as it was certainly much more agreeable to 
the private feelings of our leader, that no such 
difficnlty of choice was submitted to him. 
During the first few days of our sojourn atJa-
raicejo, we were tolerably well supplied with bread; 
and cattle being pJenty, we had' no cause to com-
pIain; but as no regular system of furnishing the 
army had been entered into with the Spaniards, 
this state of comparative abundance was not oÍ' 
long continuance. The country immediate1y round, 
from which all our necessaries were drawn, socm 
becameexhausted, and we were again' reduced 
to subsist upon a very scanty and uncertaiÍl allow-
ance. The forage for the horses, likewise, became 
scarce, and many of them died in consequence. 
In the means of transport, too, for OUf sick, our 
wounded, and even Cor our ammuilition, we were 
deflcient. N o horses, mules, or cars, were sent to 
us, notwithstanding repeated and earnest requi~ 
sitions, till it became, at last, a questioÍl, whether; 
in the event of a compu]sory movemeht, we should 
not be under the necessity of abandoning aIl to the 
enemy. Our sickness, moreover. was not di-
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minished. The hospitals received fresh occupants 
as fast as those who had previously filled them 
returned to their duty; nor could we, by any 
exertion, muster on parad e more than 1 have al-
ready specified as our effective force, namely-
seventeen thousand meno With respect to Cuesta's 
or rather Eguia's army, again, aIl accounts agreed 
in representing it as reduced to twenty thousand 
firelocks, . and these rather diminishing than in-
creasing, But it was not in our own imrnediate 
neighbourhood alone, that affairs began to assume, 
every day, a more unpromising aspecto InteIli-
gence reached us, upon authority which we could 
not dispute, that Venegas had suffered two great 
defeats from Sebastiani, strengthened by two di-
visions from Victor's arrny; that the first occurred 
at Aranjuez, on the 5th; the second on the 11th, 
at Almoriand. The truth is, that the enemy, as 
soon as he found that we had escaped hirn, coun-
termarched, with accumulated force, upon Vene-
gas; who, taken in sorne degree by surprise, was 
beaten with heavy 10ss, and compelled to retreat 
to Santa Cruz, in the mountains. 
These circumstances, coupled with a persuasion, 
that in case Venegas should be closely followed, 
Eguia would be ordered by the junta to move to 
his support, created in the minds of aH a thorough 
conviction that our stay in the position of the 
Tagus could not be very protracted. The COIl-~ 
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templation of a retreat was not, however, a very 
enlivening one, accompanied as it was with fears 
for the safety of our hospitals; whilst the smallest 
mishap upon the occurrence of which it was pos-
sible to calculate, consisted in the abandonment of 
two 01" three brigades of artillery, and many stores. 
To Sir Arthur WelIesley, in particular, such a 
necessity could not but appear in colours the most 
distressing; for he had adventured upon great 
things by his forward movement; he had achieved 
a great victory; and it was mortifyillg in the ex-
treme, to relinquish the hold which these gave 
him upon the confidence of Europe. Yet, with 
his means, how could he act? The handful of 
troops whom he now commanded, was composed 
of second battalions-of many youths,both officers· 
and men, made certainly of different stuff, andin-
ferior in stamína, to those whom Sir John Moore 
had Jed; indeed, the guards, the buffs, the 48th; 
and 61st, with the light division which had 18.tely 
joined under Crawford, were the only portions of 
the anny which,· at other periods, would have 
been regarded as fit ror active service .. Oí ihe 
cavalry, again, it is impossible to speakin higher 
terms. . They were dropping off daily; and both 
men and horses suffered from sickness, to adegree 
even moreappalling than that which befen tlle in-
fantry. 1 consider it as no reproach upon any 
officerin the service, when 1 here record my con-
VOL. I. 2 E 
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viction, that there was but one who did not abso-" 
Iutely despair at this juncture-and that one was 
Sir Arthur Wellesley. But Sir Arthur was far 
from despairing; he had already declared his 
conviction, that even in the event of Spain's sub-
version, Portugal could be defended. Into Portu-
gal he accordingly prepared to remove, where, in 
comfortable cantonments, the health of his sick 
might be restored, and the strength of his weary 
and convalescents re-established. 
That this resolution wasnot taken upon trivial 
grounds, the slightest survey of the occurrences, 
both political and mUitary, which distinguished 
the latter months of 1809, will suffice to proveo 
With respect to poli tic al transactions, the supine-
nessor treachery of the SupremeJunta became 
every day more and more conspicuous; --and the 
duplicity of all the authorities" with whom "we 
were necessitated to confer, rose, at last, to a 
height which nothing could justify. General 
Eguia, full of professions, dec1ared over andover 
again, that, let happenwhat might to his own 
soldiers, the wants of the English should be made 
good; and on" the very day, perhaps,on which 
these assurances 'Yere "penned, he would permit 
parties of his troops to seize and appropriate to 
their ownuse, stores ofbiscuit,or other articlesof 
food,. which had" been collected forour use, and 
were on their wayto our cantonments. In per-
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fect keeping with these transáctions,' we were' day 
after day urged, both by him and by the Supreme 
Junta, to' resume the offensive, whenall parties 
knew that we possessed no' means whatever' of 
transport, and when they refused to suppIy us 
with any portion of the mules or draft anima]s, of 
which they possessed so large a quantity, as to be 
able to employ inany in dragging emptycars, 
merely that theymight bereadyin case of any 
unlooked-for emergency. From all these circum'" 
starices no ground remained, for us to doubt that 
the Spanish government were either imable oÍ' un.;; 
willing to support us; and thattheywere per<. 
fectly indifferent as ,towhat OUT fate might be; 
provided some paltry' benefit might accrue .indivi-
dually to themseIves. 
In a 'military point oí view, again, our I¡ttIe 
army wal3 at this moment· threatened on all sides 
by a force of full seventy thousand French troops; 
and there was 'not a Spanish or Portuguese corps, 
with the exception of that of Eguia, with which 
we, werein communication. U po~ Eguia, how.; 
ever, we could not'count, even for a momento "In 
the first place, his troopswere of the very worst 
déscription, undisciplined, unfriendly, arid' dis-
heartened by repeated reverses; and in the next 
place we were aware that orders had cven thus 
early reached him, to march for the support of 
Venegas, taking us alongwith him, could he pre-' 
vail upon us to move, but, in the event of our re-
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fusal, proceeding without uso The enemy, too; 
were reported to be making preparations for an 
incursion into Portugal, by way of Ciudad Ro-
drigo and Almeida; and although Beresford had re-
pres~nted his own force as sufficient to deJay, ifnot 
to obstruct, their progress, such a report, coming 
in at such a moment, was not to be neglected. 
AH. these causes combined to induce Lord Wel-
lington (for hehad by this time been raised to the 
peerage by that title) to fall back; and he díd so 
with the less reluctance, that he felt himself bet-
ter able to give support, even to the Spaniards, 
from a position which promised to furnish, at least, 
necessaries to his troops, than he could pretend to 
do whiJst enduring all the miseries of sickness and 
want at J araicejo, 
. In pursuance of this determination, the army 
broke up from its position on the 20th, and not 
being harassed by any portion of the enemy's 
force, made good its retrogression, in five marches, 
by Truxillo, Meajadas, Medellin, and Merida, 
upon Badajoz. Here, for the present, Lord Wel· 
lington proposed to halt; and fue troops were 
disposed in cantonments along the line of the Gua-
diana, in a position which at once se.cured their 
further retreat, should it become necessary, upon 
Lisbon; renewed their communications with Beres· 
ford, .left open to them the meaos of advancing 
again, at will, into Spain, and furnished tbem 
abundantly with forage and provisions. But the 
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sickness which had raged so long, instead of aba-
ting, increased in violence, till before many weekli 
had passed away, there were computed to be not 
fewer than eight or nine thousand men in the hos-
pital. Severa,l causes, each of thero, perhaps, 
sufficient of itself to produce the effect, were as-
signed for this inerease of sickness. By sorne it 
was attributed, in no slight degree, to a sudde,n 
change from a state of violent exertion to a state of 
perfeet repose; by others, to the unripe fruit, ,in 
which the troops too freely indulged; and by ,a 
third party, to the malaria, or unhealthy fogs, 
which, during the dry season, hang over the coun-
try in the vicinity of the Guadiana. Probably the 
last was more conducive than either of the others, 
to the resu1ts which we had so much cause to 
deplore; but there can be little doubt that all 
exérted their baneful inHuence over men, to whom 
such things were new,and who, in consequence, 
were more liable to suffer from them than either 
the natives of the country, or troops better sea .. 
sonedagainst hardships and relaxation. 
The army remained here, notwithstanding the 
inconveniences to which' it was subjected, till to-
wards the middle of December. Though both its 
own sufferings, and the condition of the Spanish 
provinces, precluded all hope that a forward move-
ment could be attempted, ,Lord Wellington, was 
extremely unwilling to withdraw entirely from the 
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vicinity oí the- seat of war; and he was desirous, 
at the sametime, that the resources ofthe district, 
upon which he foresaw that in the end he must 
needs retire, should not be wasted and impaired 
by a . premature arrival of his army. But though 
the troops continued without occupation aH this 
while, the case was widely different with respect 
to their commander. The entire season of rest 
was' devoted by him to continual exertions, both 
for the' advancement of the discipline and efficiency 
of the Portuguese levies, and to infuse, if it were 
possible, something like wisdom andvigour ¡nto 
the councils of the Spanish government; whilst·he 
wasquietly preparing, in his own rear, measures 
for the construction of that stupendous lioe of 
works, which :more than once baffied the efforts of 
the French arrnies, and proved the salvation ofthe' 
Peninsula . 
. In the mean while the Spaniards, with their 
accustomed want of prudence and discretion, were 
rushing at all poiots into collision with the enemy, 
and were in all paints suffering defeat. Eguia 
had not filled his new office many days, when, 
leaving Albuquerque with ten or twelve thousand 
mén towatch the banks of the Tagus~ aod straiten 
the French foraging parties there, he hurried 
away to the support of Venegas, of whose reverses 
llotice. has already be en taken. Venegas, how-
ever, was already superseded. and General Arre-
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zaga comrnanded in his stead. He was an im-
petuous and rash officer; who finding himself, on 
the :arrival of Eguia, at the head of fifty thousand 
men, weakly conceived. that . no French. army 
would. be able to make head against him. In the 
misplaced confidence which anirnated their leader, 
the Spanish troops largely partook; they required 
to be led immediately to battle, and they spoke of 
bririging back the junta, in a few days to hold its 
sittings in Madrid. . Arrezaga hastened to comply 
with their wishes. He led his columns forward 
to, the plains of Ocana, near Aranjuez, where he 
was attackedby Marshal Mortier, at the head of 
his own and Sebastiani's corps, and defeated with 
terrible 10ss. . The enemy boasted of having taken 
twenty thousa~d prisoners, and represented the 
number of slain at four thousand: probably these 
were exaggerations; .but that the Spanish army 
was annihilated, admitted of no doubt. 
_ This disaster took place upon the 17th of N 0-
vember; it was succeeded by another hardly less 
ruinous; which occurred in a different part of the 
country, on the 28th of the same month.· The 
Duke del Parque, at the head of a corps of sorne 
twenty thousand rnen, had. for sorne time back 
kept his ground in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo; 
where,. being joined by Sir Robert Wilson, he 
endeavoured, in a desultory war of posts, to harass 
and confound the projects of the enerny. His 
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immediate opponent had been N ey ; . but tbat 
officer, indignant at the appointment of Soult t<;> 
the chief command of the French armies, which, 
on the recall of Jourdan, had taken place, requested 
and obtained permission to return to Paris. He 
was succeeded in his trust by Marshal Marchand, 
who, holding the Spaniards in utter contempt, 
hastened to bring the Duke to action. A battle 
was accordingly fought on the 18th of October, 
upon the heights of Tomames; which,owing to 
the improvident impetuosity of the French leader, 
ended in favour of the Spaniards. The enemy 
fled to Salamanca, whither the Duke instantIy 
followed, and he entered the place on the very 
morning of that night, in which General Marchand 
found himself under the necessity of precipitately 
abandoning it. 
It was the disposition of the Spaniards to ex-
perience so much elevation at the occurrence of 
every little instance of success, that they forgot 
not only how to improve it, but how to preserve 
the superiority which they had for the moment 
obtained. The Duke del Parque differed little in 
this respect from his fellow-patriots. Delighted 
.with the applauses of the people of Salamanca, 
and regarding his victorious followers as invincible, 
he remained inactive in his advanced position, till 
the corps which he had beaten received reinforce-
ments from Valladolid, when it, in its turn, be-
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came the assailant, and moved towards him. A 
triRing affair took place at Carpio, where, upon 
sorne rising ground, he ventured to abide the as-
sault-and it was not unfavolirable to the Duke; 
but the enemy only retired upon their strength; 
and it soon becarne evident that a force was op-
posed to him, which he could not hope success-
fulIy to withstand. He accordingly retreated, with 
all haste, towards Alba de Tormes, where he took 
up a position, and where, on the morning of the 
28th, he was attacked with great impetuosity. 
The Spaniards were worsted, and compelled to 
abandon their strong ground; and they retired 
for a while upon Tomames in tolerable order; but 
just as the scene of their former victory began to 
open upon them, abody of French cavalry 
charged their rear, and threw them into utter con-
fusiono '{hey thought no more of resistan ce, but 
casting away their arms, Red in all directions into 
the mountains. 
By these two victories, the last remnants of the 
Spatiish army were destroyed; and the French 
were left at liberty both to push theirconquests 
into thesouthern parts of Spain, and to threaten 
Portugal through the province of Beira. Of the 
former of these opportunities they hastened irnme-
diately to avail themselves. Joseph put himself 
at the head of the arrny w hich was destined to 
overrun the kingdom of Andalusia; and having 
/~. 1;.; 
j .~ 
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under him Soult, as his major-general, with Vic-
tor, Mortier, and Sebastiani, each in command of 
his own corps, he moved towards the passes of the 
Sierra Morena. _ Hither the fugitives from the 
battle ofOcana had Red. But neither they nor 
their leader had recovered from the dismay which 
that defeat occasioned, and neither offered, nor 
pretended to offer, any obstinate resistance to the 
invaders. _ The passes were carried, without the 
necessity once occurring of halting the columns, 
or forming in order of attack; and on the 21st of 
January, 1810, the intruders' head-quarters were 
established in the town of Baylen. 
Though .. in- following the progre ss of this army 1 
shaILneces~arily.anticipateevents, which, in order 
of time, occurred later than others that yet remain 
to be narrated, it may not be amiss if~in the pre-
sent stage of my. narrative, 1 remind the reader of 
the fortune which befell both it, and that portion 
of the Spanish nation against which it carried on 
operations. 
As 'soon as the junta became aware that Anda-
lusia _ was on· the point of being invaded, they 
began to think of securing, not the manysteep and 
rugged defilesby which the approach to that pro-
vince is guarded, but the safety of their own per-
sons,and thepreservation of their own property. 
They issued decrees and proclamations, it is true, 
by which they at once'endeavoured to deceive the 
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people into a notion of their.· own security, and 
professed to rouse the little energy of which they 
seemed to be possessed, into action; but they 
neither exerted themselves Oto re-organise their 
routed armies, nor took any steps to bring to the 
post of danger Albuquerque's corps, though it was 
the only one upon which, reliance could now· be 
placed. On the contrary, they directed the latter 
to act u pon such a plan, as promised most effectu-
ally to render its operations unprofitable; and 
they :paid to the repeated and urgent entreaties 
forsupplies,· which poured in from the com-
maIiders, of the' former, no more regard than the 
worst 'enemies ofthe country would have desired 
tbero to pay. But wbilst they were thus heedless 
of other matters~ they.passed a resolution, in w hich 
the Islé of Leon was declared to be the fittest and 
most convenient spot at which to hold their. future 
sittings; and they decreed that, on the 1st of 
February, the members should assemble there for 
the despatch of business. 
- Thoúgh the junta: hado by this time lost, and 
deservédly 10st, thegeneral confidence' of the 
nation, the idea that they were about to be 
abandoned by their Tulers, not unnaturally excited 
among the p"eople of Sevill~ both indignation and 
despondency. This, was not long in exhibiting 
itself, by numerous movements among the popu-
lace; and when the ,members of the junta pre-
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pared tó withdraw in' accordance with this decree, 
they were arrested. A cry was raised, that Se-
ville shoúld be defended to the last, and that th~ 
chief command should be assumed by Don Fran-
cisco Saavedra, at that time minister oC finance, 
and president of the junta. A scene of indescri-
bable confusion ensued. Saavedra exerted him-
self to the utmost, in arder to les sen it, and rea-
dily assumed the power which the people had 
thrust upon him; but it was only to secure his 
own escape, and the escape of his partners in the 
government. The junta fled; and Romana, whom 
the people sought to detain by violence, that he 
might assume once more the command of his own 
army, eluded their notice, and retired to Badajoz; 
and . Seville was left, without magistrates. or rulers 
of any class, to make its own terms with the con-
queror. It opened its gates to Joseph as soon as 
he presented himself, and received him, not only 
without resistance, but with acclamations. 
Whilst these things were going on, and whilst 
the different towns and eities of Andahisia were 
vieing with one another in their expressions of 
loyalty to King Joseph, and satisfactionat bis 
arrival amongst the.m, Soult on the one hand, and 
Albuquerque mi the other, were making the. most 
strenuous efforts, the one to reach Cadiz before it 
could be put in a posture of defence, the other to 
throw himself and his army into that important 
PENINSULAR WAR. 445 
city, and to secure ¡t. 1 t has been observed that 
Albuquerque had received, from time to time, 
such orders from the junta as must have brought 
about, had he chosen to obey.them, the destruc," 
tion of the only Spanish corps to which Spain 
eould now look for defence. He had been direeted, 
in the first instance, to move from Truxillo, and 
the posts which he was left to defend along the 
Tagus, upon La Plata, for the purpose, as it was 
stated, of frustrating the enemy's intention of 
penetrating in that direction into Andalusia. He 
had hardly begun his preparations for obeying that 
. order, when a second arrived, to require that he 
would merely hold himself in readiness to aet on 
the offensive, should such a coursebe deemed 
advisable. Albuquerque, most fórtunately· for 
Spain, and highly to his own honour, was not a 
man to stand iu fear of responsibility, and he paid 
to the last order no regard. He pushed forward 
as he had previously intended to do, and took 
post, with his infantry at Guadalcunal, and his 
eavalry and artillery at St. Olalla and Ronquillo, 
in readiness to move in any direction where· his 
presence might seem to be needed. 
He was thus situated, when further instructions 
reached him, requiring that he should withdraw 
the' greater part of the garrison from Bad~joz, 
and, with all the force which he could eolleet, act 
vigorously against the enemy. Albuquerque 
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knew that, even if he were to obey this absurd 
order, and leave the important city of Badajoz 
unguarded, he would not be able to muster such a 
force as would authorise his entry upon any course 
of active operations, against an enemy whose 
strength, at the most moderate computation, 
tripled his own. He therefore not only set the 
order of the junta at· defiance, but strengthened 
thevery garrison which he had been req uired to 
weaken. This was hardly done, when fresh 
instructions reached him. One day he was com-
manded to march upon Cordova, because the 
enemy had made themselves masters of the pass 
of Puerto· del Rey. On the· next he was sum-
moned to Seville, with al1 speed, for the purpose 
of covering it. The last order reached him in the 
morning ;. before night another arrived, by which. 
the command of thepreceding day, to hurry on 
towards Cordova, wasrenewed. Albuquerque was 
thoroughly disgusted, as he had good reason to be, 
with conduct so disgraceful and so extraordinary. 
AH the while that thejuuta was thus misdirecting 
him, he was in the habit of receiving authentic 
information respecting the movements and desig ns 
of the French; and he knew perfectly, that nei-
ther Cordova nor 'Seville were with them object!i 
of the slightest importance, but that their designs 
were upon Cadiz. He knew, moreover, that at 
the very moment when the junta were recom-
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mending to him a rapid marehuponCordova,' 
they were themselvespreparing to make good 
their.Hight to the Isle of Leon ; and he was but too 
well aware, that if thatisland~ and the important 
eity whieh eovered it, were left to their guidanee, 
and' to the protection of the weak garrison which 
at present held them, a very few weeks would 
suffiee to put both' into the possession of the 
French. Albuquerque loved his country and its 
independenee; and among all the Spanish gene.:. 
raIs, there were few whose talents and fine feel-
ings hetter. qualified them to direet the ·means 
which were to proteet the one, and seeure the 
other; hut he was an object of e~eessive jealousy 
to the paltry party whieh at this moment guided 
the destinies of Spain, and to that jealousy he at 
lasLfell a martyr. On the present oecasion .he 
det-ermined to aet for him~élf. As 800n· as he 
had aeeurately ascertainedhow matters stood, he 
broke up from his position, and marched with 
rapid strides, not upon Cordova or SevilIe,' but 
upon Cadiz .. · By dint of the most praiseworthy 
exertions, . he reached it just two days before 
Marshal SouIt and his· army appeared under the 
walls; . and he regulated its means of defence 
with so mueh judgment and energy, that not aU 
the exertionsof the Freneh Marshal, unremitting 
as these were, proved adequate to its reduction. 
Whilst these;successesattended the Freneh arms 
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in the south, their operations were hardly less 
propitious to them either in the east or in the 
north. In the east, Gerona, after enduring the 
miseries of a protracted siege, was reduced, .and 
the army of Blake, defeated in more than one 
encounter, found itself in no condition to keep the 
field, and was fain to retire into the fastnesses with 
which Catalonia abounds, leaving all the towns 
and level country in possession of the F.rench. In 
the north again, Astorga, after a gallant resistance, 
was compelled to capitulate; and the French were 
understood to be in full preparation for a fresh in-
vasion of Portugal. To render· this the more 
decisive, reinforcements were poured in fr<hn Ba-
yonne in great numbers; and Marshal Massena 
was stated to be on his way from the Danube, for 
the purpose of taking upon himself the chief com-
mand of the troops by which the conquest of the 
Peninsula was to be effected. Towards the close 
of 1809, therefore, and in the beginning of 1810, 
Spain, regarded in a military point of view, was 
almost entirely reduced. Her fortresses were~ 
with few exceptions, in the enemy's handsj her 
eities, open towns and villages, had almost . all 
submitted; there was no army in existenee to 
which the patrio·ts could.look; and Joseph was 
once more established, with perfeet authority, in 
the capital. But that which, at the present june-
ture, gave to the general aspect of affairs 1ts darkest 
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hue, was the submÍssion of Austria, and the con-
sequent deliverance of N apoleon froID aH appre-
hension in the north of Europe. The battle of 
Wagram, in deciding the fate" of Germany, was 
supposed by most men to have decided the fate oí 
the Península likewise; for no one could doubt 
that an the strength of the empire would now be 
directed to the attainment of one object, namely, 
the expulsion of the English fr.om the continent, 
and the consequent subjugation of Spain and Por-
tugal. 
Affairs were in this sta te, when Lord Welling-
ton, alaimed for the safety of Lisbon, threatened 
as it was in the only quarter from whence danger 
lllight be seriously apprehended, determined upon 
abandoning his position on the Guadiana, and 
taking up another, which might enable him to 
watchthe progress .{)f any force that might Bit 
down before Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. With 
this view, the troops were put in motion on the 
1Mh of December, and after a march which, with 
occasional halts, occupied twenty-one days, estab-
lished themselves on a new line, which; in a some-
what extended and not wholly connected manner, 
covered the frontier between the two rivers, the 
Tagus and the Douro. The advance, under Ge-
neral Crawford, consisting of the first baUalions 
43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments. the 1st and 2nd 
r{lgiments of Portuguese ca~adores, detachments 
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from the 15th and 16th light dragoons, the 1st 
hussars King's German Legion, and one brigade 
of horse artillery, took post in front of Almeida, 
and sent patrols as far as Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst 
General Hill, with one division, remained on the 
south of the Tagus, to watch the motions of any 
French force which might be disposed to act 
againt Badajoz, and threaten Lisbon through the 
Alentejo. Head-quarters were fixed first at Vizeu, 
from whence they were afterwards removed to 
Celerico; the cavalry, with the exception of those 
already specified, and a few squadrons necessary 
for relieving the outposts, found cantonments at 
Abrantes, Santarem, Thomar, &c.; and the park 
of artillery was established at Vizeu. With res-
pect to the Portuguese troops, they had their head-
q t:tarters at Thomar; and they were stationed 
partly in that town, and partIy in the villages 
near, as convenience or necessity pointed out. 
The first good effect resulting from this change 
of situation showed itself in the rapid recovery of 
the sick, and the no less rapid restoration to fuH 
strength of such as were already convalescent. 
The country into which the troops were now 
moved, is as salubrious as any in the Peninsula ; 
and as they contrived, for the most part, to obtain 
comfortable. quarters, neither the cold of winter, 
nor the variable temperature of the spring, were 
felt by them. Provisions, likewise, proved abun-
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dant; and forage, if not so plentiful as could have 
been desired, was at least less scanty than it had 
been, either at J araicejo or Badajoz. On all these 
accounts, both Lord Wellington and his followers 
had ample reason to congratulate themselves on 
the movement which had been made; whilst the 
condition both of the French and S panish armies-
the former too formidable to be attacked with any 
prospect of success--the latter dispersed and 
broken, if not absolutely añnihilated-Ieft no 
ground to regret the state of temporary inactivity 
to which they were compelled to submit. 
1 have said that, whilst Lord Wellington, with 
the main body of his army, too k post between the 
Douro and the Tagus, General Hill was left on 
the southern side of the latter river, to keep open 
a communication with Badajoz, and to watch the 
movements of the enemy on the side of Alentejo. 
This latter arrangement was the more necessary, 
as Mortier and Regnier, at the head of nineteen or 
twenty thousand men, threatened the southeru 
frontier from Merida; and though Romana was in 
Badajoz,and Elvas was understood to be held by 
a respectable garrison, it would have been unrea-
sonable to expect that either the one or the other 
could arrest the progress of the enemy, should 
they see tit to advance by this road upan Lisbon. 
General Hill's main position was at Abrantes. and 
it was of a nature to render him perfectIy secure, 
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as long as the waters of the Tagus should continue 
full; buthe stationed himself usually at Porta-
legre, and he even marched, from time to time, 
forward to Campo Major, as often as Romana saw, 
or fancied that he saw, reason to believe that he 
was about to be attacked in force. There was, in 
this manner, a good de al of inexplicable, and, as 
it appeared, profitless manreuvring between the 
French and English corps. Mortier, whenever 
the humour took him, would advance, as if with 
the design of investing Badajoz; certain, that by 
so doing, he would draw Hill from his quarters ; 
whilst Hill no sooner showed himself,than Mor-
tier would again retire, and take up his former 
positions. 
In the mean while, though both Lord Welling-
ton and the French generals might have appeared 
to' an ordinary observer to be passing the first 
months of the yearin a state of inaction, neither 
the one nor the other suffered a single day to 
escape without turriing it to sorne account, 
and causing it to exert a greater or less degree 
of influence over the final issues of the cam-
paign. Lord Wellington, contented to keep the 
enemy as long as' possible in check, was devoting 
a' large share of his attention to the fortification 
and proper armament ofthe lines at Torres Vedras; 
whilst the greatest exertions were made both by 
him and Beresford, to put the regular army and 
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the militia of Portugal into a state of effieiency. 
Reinforeements accordingly eame in to him every 
hour, respeetable, not froro their numbers alone, 
but from their discipline, til}" he saw hiinself at 
last at the head of twenty-seven thóusand British, 
and fun thirty-one thousand Portuguese, troops of 
the lineo The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon 
which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much re-
lianee was placed for bafRing and retarding the 
advanee of the French army, let it begin when it 
might, was put ina state of excellent defenee. 
The old walls were repaired, and fresh outworks 
added to it; and a garrison of five thousand men 
being thrown in, with ample stores of every de-
scription, and a British officer, Brigadier-general 
Cox, at their head, no doubt was entertained that 
it would make a very obstinate resistanee. That 
Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of 
time, no one in the present stage of affairs ven-
tured to hopeo The Spaniards were, indeed, full 
of protestations; they spoke of burying them-
selves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling 
the glory of Saragoza and Gerona; but as yet 
they were not invested; and to boast of what 
they would do, doing in the end nothing, was no 
uncommon practice among our allies. Still we 
might, in the present instance, be deceived; they 
miglit, by some accident or another, fulfil their 
promises; and if so, we had but littIe cause to 
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rear ror our own safety, or that of the Portuguese 
capital, for sorne time to come. 
The army remained in this situation till the sum-
mer of 1810 was far advanced, holding completely 
in command the main approaches through Beira, 
and carefully watchíng the others. It occupied aIl 
this while the position of Guarda, of which Lord 
Galway has spoken as presenting the only defen-
sible line between Lisbon and the frontier; and 
though Lord Galway lived in an age when the 
military science had not arrived at the perfection 
which it has since attained, he cannot be said 
greatly to have overrated the excellence of that 
lineo We were now distributed over the ridges. 
and along the deseent of the Sierra de Estrella; 
a range of rugged mountains, which extend froro 
Coimbra to Guarda, and end at last in the exten-
sive plains of Castile. By this means we cut off all 
approach by the two great roads which run to the 
north and south of the Sierra, and which alone are 
passable to an army w hich moves with its roate-
r~el of stores and guns. Our advanced posts, as has 
already been stated, were pushed beyond Almeida, 
and covered by the rivers Aquida and Coa; both 
of which are in winter formidable from their depth 
of water and rapidity of current, and in summer; 
not easy of passage, in consequence of the accli-
vity and ruggedness of their banks. Our right, in 
the mean while, was protected by the Tagus, 
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watched and rendered impassable by the presence 
of Hill's corps at Abrantes; whilst our left could 
be threatened only from the side of Oporto, where 
we had no reason to apprehend that the enemy 
meditated any inroad. Thus were we justified in 
considering ourselves secure, as long as the Tagus 
should continue unfordable; and as this chanced 
to be the case up to a period quite unprecedented, 
we held our ground even beyond the season, when 
we might have fairly anticipated either a volun-
tary advance. or a compulsory retreat. 
In the mean while there were co1lected, so early 
as the month 'of May, in our front, no fewer than 
three corps d'armée; one, under Ney, composed 
of three divisions, one under Kellerman, of two 
divisions,and one, containing a like number of di-
visions, under J unot. Besides these, General 
Montiniere was understood to be in Valladolid 
with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of 
cavalry; and last, though not least, Massena ar-
rived, and took upon himself the command of the 
whole. If the several divisions be estimated at 
ten thousand each-and no accounts which we 
received rated them at less-then would the 
total of the force immediately opposed to us amount 
to fuU seventy-nine or eighty thousand meno To 
. this we could oppose no more than twenty-seven 
or twenty-eight thousand British, and abont thirty 
thousand Portuguese troops; and the latter being, 
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for the most part, as yet untried, an absolute con-
fidence could not be reposed in them. Yet, in 
spite of odds so tremendous, the best spirits and 
the highest hopes pervaded all ranks. The num-
ber of our sick had diminished from nine to less 
than two thousand, and we were daily and hourly 
increasing in efficiency. A few skirmishes, more-
over, at the outposts, in most of which o.ur peo.ple 
were eminently successful, tended to keep alive 
that confidence in themselves and in their leaders, 
which is so. essential to. the welfare o.f an army; 
and it was no matter of trifling congratulation to 
find that Qur Portuguese allies, in all such affairs, 
behaved with a gallantry not inferior to. that exhi-
bited by. our own troops. There were, indeed, 
many perso.ns in the army, who. saw so.mething of 
risk in our advanced situatio.n. It was no.t to be 
supposed that Lord Wellington, with a fo.rce so. 
inferior, would attempt any o.ffensive operatio.ns, 
o.r that he would even risk a battle, in case he 
sho.uld himself be attacked; why then, it was 
asked, remain in the immediate presence of an 
enemy, before whom, whenever he mo.ved, we 
must of necessity faH back? It is needless to an-
swer this 01' any other of the numero.us questio.ns 
which about that time began to. make the ro.und of 
the canto.nments. Lo.rd Wellingto.n was not afraid 
to manamvre even the Portuguese tro.ops, tho.ugh 
the enemy might hang upon their rear; he saw 
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no necessity for falling backupon Coimbra, till 
the measure should become indispensable; he was 
desjrous of protracting the war as long as possible 
upon the frontier, anrl therefore'he remained where 
he was. That he had not judged erroneously, 
future events sufficiently proved; it would there-
fore serve no good end to enter here into any ela-
borate defence of a policy which requires none. 
During the early months of spring, though the 
enemy were in considerable force in the vicinity of 
Ciudad Rodrigo, they made no serious attempt 
to besiege the place. Occasionally, indeed, they 
did here what Mortier was in the habit of doing at 
Badajoz; that is to' say, they put themselves in 
motion, from time to time, as if with a view to 
commence operations; but our advanced corps 
was no sooner reported to be in march, than they 
again retired. lt was at such times, and under 
such circumstances, that parties found an occa-
sional opportunity of exchanging a few shots with 
the enemy; and that the ca~adores were enabled 
to satisfy their comrades in the British ranks, that 
when tbe hour of tbe grand push came, they would 
not be deserted. 
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CHAPTER XVIII. 
Low state of the finances of the Briti5h army, and apprehen-
sions entertained by many respecting the issne of the war-
Massena opens the campaign by investing Ciudad Rodrigo 
-Skirmishes at the outposts, and retreat of the light division 
on Almeida-Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which surrenders-
Affair of cavalry in front of the British outposts-Rumours 
of the enemy's intended operations, and dispositions to meet 
him. 
W HILST these things were going on, events daily 
occurred, sorne of thern calculated to excite our· 
spirits, and increase our hopes ofultirnate success; 
others, as might be expected, having a tendency 
widely the reverse. Arnong the agreeable inei-
dents just referred to, rnay be noticed the arrival 
at head-quarters of Lieutenant-general Sir Brent 
Speneer, an officer to whose merits every one 
bore testimony. In addition to this, assurances 
poured in upon us, that large reinforcements, both 
from Sicily and N orth Arnerica, were 011 their 
way ; whilst nurnerous desertions from the French 
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army served to convince us. that the enemy's 
troops, in spite of the proclamations and profes-
sions of the generals, were far from finding them-
selves comfortable in their· present situation. 
From the month of January to the month of May, 
J 810, there carne in near]y 500 men, all of them 
fulIy armed, and not a few bringing along with 
them their horses and appointments; and as they 
were principally Germans and Italians, the cir-
cumstance led to a persuasion, that the foreigners 
in the French service were beginning to grow 
tired, either of the particular war in which they 
were engaged, or of French supremacy in the ab-
stract. It is true that we could not boast of the 
total absence of this military vice from among the 
mercenaries who took rank under our own stand-
ards. A German dragoon would, from time to 
. time, pass over from us as well as from the enemy ; 
but the 10ss which we sustained by desertion was 
trifling indeed, and carne not up, by one hun-
dredth part, to that endured by the enemy. 
Among the sources of uneasiness, again, to which 
we were subject, none affected us more seriously 
than the low state of our finances, and the dif-
ficu1ty which we felt in recruiting them. The 
army was universally in arrear for subsisten ce ; 
many regiments had received nothing during seve-
ral months; and at one period there were but a 
few thousand dollars in the military chest. Now, 
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ina country where nothing was, or could be taken, 
without being paid for, and wheré the people, 
accustomed to look with suspicion upon the paper-
money issued by their own government, serupled 
greatly in reeeiving our bills and promissory-notes, 
the absence of bullion was felt as an evil which 
hardly any ingenuity or attention could ameliorate. 
Our expenditureamounted on an average to 
30,000l. monthly, and we drew daily rations for 
forty thousand men and twelve thousand animals ; 
yet at no time were we able to colleet in our own 
neighbourhoodmore than 150,0001.; and the re-
mainder was consequently brought, at a heavy 
los s and with immense labour, from Cadiz and 
Gibraltar. But when the funds of these places 
were at length declared to be exhausted, as to-
wards the middle of May proved to be the case, 
our prospects became melancholy. By great ex-
ertions, however, on the part of Lord Wellington, 
the credit of the army was so far preserved, that 
it never suffered from an absolute deficiency in 
articles essential to its existence; but individuals 
unde:rwent numerous privations, and it was at one 
moment apprehended that, unless large supplies 
of gold and sil ver should speedily arrive froro 
England, our movements might be cramped at a 
moment when, aboye aH others sinee the com-
mencement of hostilities, it was of consequence 
that they should be free and unfettered. 
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The reader, after this dénouement, will not be 
surprised to learn that, a1tbough the very best 
spirit prevailed, in general, throughout our ranks, 
speculations, not of the most cheering or consola-
tory nature, were at this period entered into here 
and there, as to the ultimate destiny which awaited 
uso It is part of the English character to look, 
under all circumstances, at events in the darkest 
colours of which they are susceptible; and the na-
tional disposition was not slow in being brought into 
play on the present occasion. By many it was 
esteemed a project utterly hopeless to attempt 
keeping possession of Portugal for any length of 
time after the enemy should have fairly entered 
upon his course of operations for its subjugation. 
Men accordingly began to inquire respecting the 
tonnage and capacity of the fleet, whether it,were 
capable of"removing, when the moment ofretreat 
should arrive, the troops and stores now in the 
Península; and a question was even taised, 
whether an effort would not be made to withdraw, 
not our own soldiers only, but the Portuguese 
army likewise. By such as started these ques-
tions, it was satisfactorily ascertained that, ex-
clusively of four ships of the líne andtwenty-three 
frigates, there lay at anchor in the Tagus, trans-
ports possessed of ample stowage for forty thousand 
meno This, it was concluded, would suffice for 
the removal of the whole of the British army, with 
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its women and followers; and it was sagaciously 
enough surmised that the vessels of war would 
not be permitted to sail, occupied by their own 
crews only; but that they would be given up, as 
far as might be practicable, to the accommodation 
of our faithful allies. 
Whilst sorne were thus amusing themselves, in 
speculating about events which were not destined 
ever to receive their accomplishment, the enemy 
was vigorously collecting their means, and pre-
paring to open the campaign with a force which 
might bear down all opposition on the part of Lord 
Wellington and bis army. Massena, who had paid 
a short visit to Salamanca, returned again to Val-
ladolid, for the purpose of hurrying forward to 
the frontier every battalion and company which 
could be spared froro the internal management of 
the country. Columns were accordingly reported 
to be on the advance, both froro· the Asturias and 
Gallicia, whilst the Estremadura corps, strength-
. ened by a fresh division of five thousand men from 
before Cadiz, was stated to be approaching Bada-
joz in force. As yet, however, the only direct 
indications of active operations being at hand, 
were found in tho freq uent movement of cava1ry 
patroIs along our front, and their daily atternpts to 
discover sorne fords by which the rivers might be 
crossed. With these, when they became too da-
ring in their approaches, our outposts would from 
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time to time skirmish; but nothing was done upon 
a great scale, nor had we any good ground to sur-
mise upon what plan, after his arrangements should 
be =complete, Massena intended to acto That he 
would hazard all upon a direct attack in front, the 
nature of our own position, as wel1 3S the opinion 
which we entertained of his military skill and 
talents, forbade us to believe; it was rather to be 
expected that he would support his movement in 
this direction, by corresponding movements upon 
our flanks; but of any dispositions so to do which 
he might be making, we were ignorant. The truth 
is, that in spite of all secret intelligence, Il:nd the 
expense incurred in securing it, our information 
was still far frorn being accurate. This aros e, not 
from any want of energy on our parts, but from 
the natural disposition of the Spaniards, who never 
dream of hazarding conjectures, or enteringupon 
speculations, beyond the occurrences of the day. 
When a French force was actualIy in motion, or 
rather when it had already arrived within a short 
distance of its point of destination, we seldom failed 
to hear of it; but the mere assembling of troops in 
the interior, they rarely took the trouble to report; 
and hence we were not unfrequently left to guess 
at the enemy's probable intentions, from consider-
ing how we ourselves would act, in case their and 
our situations were reversed. 
In themean time~ a few changes took place in 
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the disposi~ion and management of portions of our 
troops; that is to say, Lieutenant-general Payne, 
to whom the cavalry had hitherto been intrusted, 
returned home, and Lieutenant-general Cotton 
succeeded to the command. The first di vis ion of 
infantry likewise, which had previously acted 
under the orders of General eotton, was trans-
ferred to General Spencer; but the position of 
the army continued unaltered up to a late date in 
the summer; nor was it till the month of May had 
been considerably advanced, that the enemy 
showed any disposition to molest it. 
His arrangements being at length. complete, 
Massena prepared, at the head of the 2nd, 6th, 
and 8th corps, to invest the fortress of Ciudad 
Rodrigo. For this purpose he pushed on several 
strong divisions, which, driving in our patrols and . 
flying posts, established two bridges across the 
Agueda, and took possession of sorne commanding 
heights that lay between our position and the 
town. It ~as not without the deepest reluctance 
that Lord Wellington carne to the conclusion, 
that any attempt on his part to interrupt the 
progress of the siege, could be productive of no 
good. In point of numbers alone, the enemy 
surpassed us by at least one-third; and their 
troops were aH admirably disciplined, ably com-
manded, and inured to war. Of our force, on 
the other hand, the larger proportion were new 
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Ievies, which looked well, nodoubt, upon parade, 
but which never having as yetcome under fire, 
could not be expected to behave like veterans. 
Besides, were the enemy' to suffer a defeat, 
though he would doubtless be compelled to aban-
don his designs for the present, his retreat was 
perfectIy secure; and there were ample resources 
at hand .from which to 1ill up the gaps which the 
fortune of a battle might have produced in his 
ranks. The case' was widely different with re-
spect tous. Were we defeated, our ruin was 
irretrievable; and were we even to succeed, 
the success couJd not be purchased except at 
an expense of life, which must cripple our 
means during the remainder of the season, and 
prove in the end more injurious to ourselves than 
to the enemy. U nder these circumstances it was 
determined, to the great grief both of our General 
and his followers, that our attitude of watchfulness 
must still be preserved; and to render it the more 
imposing, head-quarters were transferred to the 
town of Almeida. 
N o great while elapsed, however, before the 
inconveniences attending this latter arrangement 
were found to overbalance any b~nefit which 
could arise out of it. By taking post a:t Almeida, 
LordWellington was doubtIess at hand to direct 
every manreuvre which the advance might be re-
quired to make, and to observe with greater facility 
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the movements and operations of the enemy; but, 
on the other hand, he was in continual and immi-
nent danger. Should our pickets, by accident, 
suffer a surprise, and their supports be over-
thrown, he might, before sufficient warning had 
been given, find himself shut up within the walls 
of Almeida, and exposed, along with the fortress 
itself, to the risk of capture. These were serious 
considerations; and they induced him, after 
having spent a few days onIy in his advanced 
situation, to withdraw as far as Alverca, six 
Ieagues in the rear. 
1 have· said that a corps of French troops, 
having driven in our patrols and flying posts, 
threw two bridges over the Agueda, and esta-
blished itself between Ciudad Rodrigo and the 
British arroyo The movement in question was 
effected earIy in June, and it completed the in-
vestment of the place, which had been begun as 
far back as the 26th of April. At first, indeed, 
the several divisions which closed around the city 
attempted nothing more than an occasional and 
irregular bombardment; whilst they intermitted 
from time to time in the strictness of their block-
ade, as often as the appearance of an advance on 
our parts led to the belief that we had determined 
upon raising the siege. Now, however. matters 
assumed a different aspecto The corps aboye 
alluded to consisted of thirty-one thousand men : 
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it was cornmanded by Marshal¡ Ney, and taking 
post upon some high and advantageous ground, 
appeared determined to cover with effect opera-
tions which were conducted' both with firmness 
and science; and as it was supported by fuU thir-
ty-eight thousand, under the irnmediate orders of 
Junot, to whom the prosecution of the siege was 
more immediately intrusted, it could not but feel 
itself secure. N othing, therefore, remained for 
either party to perforrn, except to watch, with 
equal earnestness, the progre ss of an undertaking 
in which both were equalIy interested. 
That the reader may the more easily enter into 
the detaiIs which must by and by be laid before 
him, it may not be amiss if 1 here make him ac-
quainted-even though, in so doing, 1 may be 
compelled to recapitulate a little-with the exact 
situation in which the allied and French armies at 
present found themselves. 
There were, in the position ofGuarda-that is to 
say, on the right of the Tagus, and on the left of 
the Douro-four divisions of British infantry, the 
greater part of the British cavalry, with the mass 
of the Portuguese troops, horse, and foot, under 
the irnmediate orders of Lord Wellington. Head-
quarters being established at Alverca, the out-
posts, which were principally supplied from the 
light division, extended along the Azava; a sman 
stl'earn which, rising among the hills near Alber-
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garia, falls into the Agueda, at a líttle distance 
from Cesmiro. In rear of the light division, which 
lay chiefly in and about Gallegos, though con-
siderably to its right and left, were the divisions 
of General Cole and General Picton, the former 
of which occupied Guarda, whilst the latter was 
in cantonments at Pinhel. There were detach-
ments at Sabugal, on the right, and for a time, at 
Sto Felices, on the left; though the latter was 
soon withdrawn, and the place occupied by a por-
tion of J unot's corps. Guarda, however, ando the 
stupendous heights around it, formed the key of 
the position from which the retreat lay, either 
towards the left, and so by Mondego, or to the 
right, and so by the Zezere, to Marcello, Thomar, 
Santarem, and ultimately to Torres Yedras. 
Whílst the maín bod y retained this situation, 
General HilI, at the head of the second division, 
sorne cavalry, and a corps ofPortuguese, making 
up, in aH, abont thirteen thousand men, was on 
the left of the Tagus, employed, as has already 
been hinted, in guarding the approach to Lisbon 
by way of Alentejo. His position was more 
moveable, and necessarily so, than that of Lord 
Wellington; but the majn point to be defended 
was Abrantes, in case the enerny should make 
any desperate attempt to pass the river, and 
threaten our communications. In like manner 
General Leith, with a corps of ten thousand men, 
PENINSULAR WAR. 46.9 
of whom not more than two thousand were British, 
was behind the Zezere, ready to support either 
Hill or Lord Wellington, according as circum-
stances might require; whilst Romana, with his 
division of infantry, strengthened by a few squa-
drons of Portuguese cavalry, kept post at Badajoz, 
and in the country round. 
On the side of the enemy,again, the 2nd, 6th, 
and 8th corps, otherwise known by the appella-
tion of the army of Portugal, were oceupied, partIy 
in eondueting the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and 
partIy in showing a front towards the four British 
divisions at Almeida, Pinhel, Alverea, and Guarda. 
On the other side of the Tagus, thel'e were the 
corps of Regnier and Mortier, formerly estimated 
at nineteen thousand men, but since increased by 
a reinforeement of five thousand. The latter di-
vision, leaving seventeen thousand men to eontinue 
the bloekade of Cadiz, had hastened to take part 
in the subjugation of Portugal; and the whole 
were now manreuvring, so as to threaten Badajoz, 
and ultimately to aet against Hil1. Besides these 
there was a divis~on, estimated at eight thousand 
men, whieh, under General Bonnet, threatened 
the province of Entre Douro e Minho; whilst de-
taehments were quartered here and there, between 
the frontier and Burgos; and from Burgos to the 
Pyrenees, fol' the purpose of keeping up the com-
munication between Massena and France. On aU 
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these heads'Qur information was fu1l, and as the 
event proved, tolerably accurate; whilst there 
were other rumours afioat, wbich, though sorne of 
them rested upon no sure ground, exerted consi-
derable infiuence over the feelings of the troops, 
and on the p1ans of their leader. 
We learned about this time, first, that the Ma-
tagorda fort before Cadiz had fallen into the hands 
oi' the enemy, and that the city itself, crowded 
with inhabitants, was not expected to hold out for 
any length of time. This was alarming enough ; 
but it was hardly more alarming to us, situated as 
we then were, than a second report which came 
in, that the French, wearied with the resistance al-
ready offered, and harassed by sickness brought on 
by the exhalations from the Isle of Leon, had de4 
termined to raise the siege, and bring the whole of 
their force to bear against Portugal. N ext we 
were assured, upon what appeared to be good aU4 
thority, that the Emperor N apoleon was in fuIl 
march towards Spain; that large divisions of his 
guard had already entered Madrid; and that he 
himself was expected to arrive there in a few days 
at the farthest. Then carne an assurance, that 
Souchet's corps likewise, which had been directed 
upon Valencia, was stopped, and that it was hur-
rying on to join the arrny destined for the conquest 
of Portugal. AH· the communications at present 
made were, however, not of a nature so discoura-
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gmg. To counterbalance these recorded aboye, 
we were told that General Bal1asteros was on the 
banks of the Guadalquivir at the head often thou-
sand men, and that he was conducting himself 
with so much spirit and judgment, as seriously to 
impede the projects of Massena, by compelling 
him to detach Regnier for the purpose of keeping 
him in check. In like manner the mountains and 
forests of Spain were represented as full of gueril-
las, who cut off every small detachment of French 
troops that carne in their way, plundered the con-
voys, interrupted the communications, and kept 
the whole of the enemy's post on the alerto These 
bands were made up chiefly of Spaniards, into 
whose hands Joseph saw fit to put arms, and who 
never failed, as often as a favourable opportunity 
came in the way, to deserto Then again Castile 
was said to be in a state of extreme commotion; 
insurrections breaking out in every quarter, and 
adventurous bodies of armed peasants destroying 
the garrisons of all the villages and open towns in 
the province. So bold, indeed, had the insurgents 
become, that aI\ aide-de-camp of General Keller-
man was fairly carried off from the gates of Val-
ladolid; and no man could consider himself safe 
in the open country, unless attended by a powerful 
escort. In a word, Spain, though overrun, was re-
presented as far from being subdued; and it ap-
peared to us that thegeneral who should attempt 
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to conquer Portugal, leaving a country so deci-
dedly hostile in his rear, must either advance with 
a force so overwhelming as to carry everything 
before him, or he must be in danger of having his 
resources cut off, and of being himself placed in a 
situation as perilous as that experienced by the 
troops against whom he was preparing to acto 
In the mean while, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo 
was proceeding with a languor which gratified not 
less than it surprised uso The enemy broke 
ground before the place on the 11th of June, and 
on the 25th their batteries opened. Though the 
means of the assailants were known to be ample, 
and though littIe hope of being relieved existed, 
the resistan ce offered by the garrison was such, as 
to place them on a level with the brave defenders 
of Saragoza and Gerona. They obstinately dis-
puted every inch of ground, making frequent 
sorties, and attacking the covering and working 
parties in the trenches; whilst they kept up from 
the ramparts an unceasing fire, which occasioned 
a heavy los s both of life and materiel to the be-
siegers. It was a galling thing to us, that we were 
compelled to be mere spectators of so much bra-
very. The sound of their very musketry couldbe 
heard within our lines, yet could we not venture 
to aid them; we could only admire their heroism, 
as we sincerely did, and lament that no ability 
rested with us to second it. And it is but fair to 
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acknowledge that the gallantry of General Her-
vasti and his brave garrison excited our admiration 
the more decidedly, as we h~d looked for no such 
exertions at their hands. Of the former we had 
be en led to thínk as of a weak old man, who 
would rather anticípate the wishes of Massena, 
than disregard hís surnrnons; whilst frorn the lat-
ter, more especially when under such a chief, we 
expected nothing. Both the one and the other 
showed by their conduct that we had done them 
injustice; and they gained upon om: respect and 
esteern, in exact proportion to the unworthy no-
tions which we had be en induced to form of 
them. _ 
That the reader rnay affix its true value to the 
obsttnacy of this defence, it is necessary to inform 
him that Ciudad Rodrigo was far from being 
either a very regular or a strong fortification. It 
was surrounded by a wall, and the wall was made 
up, in rnany parts, not of embankments or ma-
sonry, but of rubbish. An arrny of not less than 
sixty thousand men lay around it, largely pro-
vided with arnmunition, stores, battering train, 
and intrenching tools; and the works were pushed 
on by thousands of men in each relief, all of them 
Well skilled in the business in which they were 
employed. The garrison, on the other hand, was 
composed of less than four thousand soldiers; and 
the inhabitants, including women and children, 
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barelyamounted to five thousand. The odds were 
tremendous; but the Spaniards were true to the 
cause of their country; and even women and 
children took their turns in the labours of the 
siege. At last, however, in spite of the most stre-
nuous exertions of the defenders, a practicable 
breach was made, and the enemy advanced to the 
assault, in the nlght between the 30th of J une and 
the 1st of July. They were mel olÍ this occasion 
with the same devoted bravery which had so 
often fOlled them in the trenches. Blue-lights, 
hand-grenades, and missiles of every description, 
were showered down upon them when covering 
the glacis, and crowding the ditch; and they were 
finally repulsed with a 10s8 more heavy than many 
general actions might have occasioned. But the 
enemy were not to be foiled. They renewed their 
attack, causing science and skill to perform the 
work which bare bravery had failed in effecting; 
and it soon became apparent that not all the gal-
lantry of Hervasti and his troops would be able 
to continue the defence of the place many days. 
The British army, all this while, was resting 
in its position, and watching, with deep anxiety 
and bitter regret, the gradual but sure destruction 
of the city and its defenders. lt happened, how-
ever, that in proportion as the siege drew towards 
a conclusion, the enemy became every day more 
and more pressing; and encounters at the out-
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posts were events of constant recurrence. Of 
these the greater number produced no other effect, 
than merely to enable a few individuals on both 
sides to display their gallantry; but sorne were 
more important in their consequence; and it may 
not be arniss if 1 make the reader acquainted with 
the circurnstances which attended one of thern. 
On the 3rd of July, General Crawford reviewed 
his division; and· for the purpose, no doubt, of 
impressing the enemy with serious notions of its 
strength, he caused the regiments to be forrned 
and drawn up in rank entire. The spectacle was 
not lost upon the French Marshal, who, with the 
view of ascertaining exactIy the arnount of our force 
between the Agueda and the Coa, and perhaps to 
convince the besieged that thE'y had nothing to 
expect from us, ordered a recognisance to be 
made. - It took place on the following day, and 
it brought on an affair which, under aH cir-
cumstances, possibly, might have been as well 
avoided. 
At an early hour on the morning of the 4th, 
the enemy were seen to be in rnotion; with. five 
regiments of cavalry, sorne battalions of infan-
try, and several guns. They passed the Azava at 
sun-rise, and their cavalry, driving in our advanced 
videttes, carne on with great rapidity, three regí· 
rnents on the direct road frorn Gallegos to AI-
meida, and t wo by a path to the left, with the 
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view of turning our right flank. Thel'e Wel'e two 
pieces of cannon, of the horse-artillery, stationed 
at a small brook, about half a miIe to the rear of 
Gallegos. These instantly opened upon the French 
column; but though the tire was well directed, 
and evidently galled them, it did not succeed in 
stopping them. Our cavalry, in the mean while, 
formed in real' of the guns, sending out three or 
four squadrons, with the hussars, to skirmish; and 
rather a sharp contest took place near a bridge 
which crossed the brook .. The French made a 
dash to secure it, and passed sorne officers, with 
about thirty 01' forty men, to the other side; in 
accomplishing which, however, as the bridge was 
extremely narrow, they were 90mpelled to defile 
from column. An opportunity was thus afforded 
of attacking them to advantage, which was not 
permitted to escape. Captain Crackenbourg, of 
the German hussars, an officer of gallantry and 
high character, saw in a moment the predicament 
into which they had thrust themselves. He in-
stantly drew out two divisions of the hussars, and 
eharging the body which had passed the bridge, 
cut down their officer, and drove the rest, with the 
loss of several killed and wounded, back upon the 
column. The affair was accomplished in an in-
stant, but the promptitude and vigour which eha-
racterised its execution, both merited and received 
the approbation of all presento The brave men, 
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were saluted by the cheers of their comrades as 
they returned, and the officer's name was justly 
and honourably mentioned a~ head-quarters. 
N otwithstanding this momentary success, the 
enemy's force, especially in cavalry, was too great 
to be successful1y resisted, and the light division 
retired. It was with sorne difficulty, indeed, that 
the troops contrived to carry off the guns; for the 
French, having discovered other parts by wlÍich 
the brook could be crossed, pressed upon them in 
overwhelming numbers; but both artilIery and 
cavalry fell back in good order; and being sup-
ported by the infantry, whose fire from among the 
rocks and woods told heavily, they suffered but 
little. By this movement, however, Gallegos, 
Almeida, and the ground occupied on the preced-
ing day, were given up; and a new position was 
assumed immediately in front of the town of AI-
meida, and in rear of Port Conception. 
From this date up to the 1st, no event occurred 
of any momento The fire from the fortress having 
destroyed sorne of the enemy's magazines~ they 
were compelled to intermit the siege till fresh sup~ 
plies could be brought up; and the garrison were 
not slow in turning the breathing space· to good 
account, by repairing, as fast as t~eir means would 
allow, the injuries sustained by their walls. AH 
this was prodigiously in our favoun~Could the 
opening of the campaign be delayed till autumn 
478 NARRATIVE OF THE 
was drawing to a close, little doubt could exist 
that it would produce no results capable of seri-
ously affecting our tenure of the country; for then 
the fields would all be bare, the roads would be-
come impassable, and everything would be against 
the invader, as it would be advantageous to the 
invaded. It was to delay, indeed, that we mainly 
looked for our best prospects of success;. and 
should Almeida hold out as Ciudad Rodrigo had 
done, our fondest wishes would be accomplished. 
Then might we retire with perfect confidence, 
either to Ponte de Marcella, or by a different 
route to the intrenched position at Torres Vedras; 
and from either of these strong-holds we might 
look down in perfect security upon the French 
troops perishing in- our front. How different might 
have been the fate of tbe war, had Massena suc-
ceeded in commencing vigorous operations, whilst 
yet the entire summer was before him ! 
In that case, though we might have repelIed, 
even with the lines as yet imperfect, any direct 
attempt to drive us back upon Lisbon, or ¡nto the 
sea, our means of holding the country would have 
been at least not greater than tbey afterwards 
became; whilst the subsistence to be procured 
by the enemy being abundant, tbe issue of the 
struggle must, to say the least of it, have been 
doubtful. But now there was not an individual in 
the army who appeared not to feel, that, let the 
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enemy be delayed only one month longer, and the 
chances were all in our favour; for Lord Wel .. 
lington had taken tbe wisest and most prompt 
precautions to render tbe sojourn of tbe French in 
Portugal more inj urious to tbem tban a sanguinary 
engagement. It is well known tbat the French 
armies moved unattended by convoys, and un'" 
provided witb stores of forage or provisions. They 
depended, in all cases, upon the resources of the 
country through wbieh tbey passed; and wben 
these became exhausted, they could no longer 
keep thefield. Lord Wellington had issued striet 
injuilctions to the inhabitants to withdraw, with 
aIl their effects, as soon as his troops should begin 
to march upon their positions in the rear; and 
could the peasantry but succeed in carrying along 
with them the corn now growing in the fields, the 
case of the enemy would be desperate. 
Before matters came to this, however, many 
chances were yet to be run; and these proved, .in 
more than one instance, less favourable than we 
had cause to expect. Ciudad, Rodrigo, ¡ndeed, 
did its duty nobly. It held out a full month 
against open trenches; and its governor capitu-
lated only when it would have been an act of in-
sanityto resist any longer. But the faH of Ciudad 
Rodrigo came not unaccompanied by other evils, 
nor was it the most severe calamity which befen 
us at this time. 
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The enemy having supplied the ammunition, 
which had been expended, resumed their efforts 
against the place; and on the 10th of J uly, a 
second and more formidable breach was effected. 
The columns of attack were already formed-they 
had even taken their stations in the tren ches, and 
were waiting for the word to advance, when 
General Hervasti, seeing that all hope of relief was 
at an end, hung out a white flag, and proposed a 
capitulation. It is said that Ney, by whom the 
force actually employed in the siege was com-
manded, refused to grant any other terms than 
those of unconditional surrender; but that Mas-
sena, more generous, or more poli tic, consented 
that the troops should march out with the honours 
of war, and that the officers should retain their 
swords and baggage. Be this as it may, the place 
surrendered, and one obstacle to the advance of 
the French army into Portugal was removed. 
On the morning after Ciudad Rodrigo fell, an 
affair took place between a portion of our light 
division and a party ofthe enemy, which gave rise, 
at the time, to a good deal of speculation. The 
enemy's patrols were in the daily habit of visiting 
the several villages and hamlets in our front, and 
of committing in them acts of barbarity and griev-
ous plunder. General Crawford determined, if 
possible, to put a stop to this; and he made ar-
rangements, on the rright of the 10th, for cutting 
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off the next party which should show itself near 
his pickets.. With this view he took with him six 
squadrons of cavalry, amounting to upwards of six 
hundred men; and set off, soo~ after midnight, in 
the direction by which he expected that they 
would advance. General Crawford's object was to 
arrive before daylight with a portion of his cavalry 
in their rear, and to attack them in front with the 
main body, which should be drawn up for the 
purpose. Unfortunately for the success of his en-
terprise, he lost his way, and instead of pushing 
sufficiently to· the left, fell in with the French 
patrol at a moment when he was least prepared to 
take advantage of the meeting. The enemy's 
force did not exceed thirty cavalry and two hun-
dred infantry; but they were advantageously 
posted in an open space, just beyond a narrow 
defile; and to reach them it was necessary to 
thread that-defile in a loug lineo The consequence 
was, that though the hussars, who led, formed up 
in succession as they got through, and charged their 
opponents with great gallantry, they effected no-
thing m~re than the dispersion of the handful of 
horse; for the infantry had time to form a square, 
and not all the efforts of our people succeeded in 
breaking it. The hussars rode brave]y up to the 
bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely 
thrown in, which killed or wounded upwards of a 
dozen meno The remainder wheeled off, and pur-
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suing the French cavalry, made way for a sq uadron 
of the 16th. These galloped forward, but al so 
took to the left, and leaving the infantry unin-
jured, joined in pursuit of the cavall'y. When the 
last charge was made, the French square were 
without fire, every man having discharged his 
piece, and none having be en able to load again ; 
but when a third attempt was made, they were . 
better prepared to receive it. It feH to the lot of 
Colonel Talbot of the 14th to lead this attack. It 
was made with daring intrepidity; but the enemy 
remained perfectly steady, and reserving their fire 
tiU the bridles of the horseR touched their bayonets, 
gave it with such effect, that Colonel Talbot and 
several of his men were killed on the spot. The 
rest drew off, upon. which General Crawford, 
despairing of success by the exertions of cavall'y 
alone, despatched an orderly to bring up a detach-
ment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no great 
distance. 
Whilst this was doing, the enemy's littIe coIumn 
began its retreat, which it conducted withslnguIar 
steadiness and great order. The 14th dragoons 
seeing this, prepared to Iaunch another squadron 
against it; and it was already in speed for the 
purpose, when ColoneI Arenschild, of the hussars, 
observed cavalry advancing both in front and flank, 
and checked the movement. It was much to be 
regretted afterwards that he took this step, for the 
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horse which alarmed him, proved to be detach-
ments from our own peopIe, on their return f.-om 
pursuing the enemy's dragoons, the whole ofwhom 
they had captured. The French infantry lost no 
time in availing themse]ves of the indecision of our 
cavalry. They marched on, and returned to 
their main body, without having lost a single pri-
soner, or suffered in killed or wounded. 
It is probably needless to ndd, that when intel-
lígence of this affair reached head-quarters, a feel-
ing of extreme vexation pervaded the bosoms of 
all to whom it was communicated. That six hu n-
dred British dragoons should have been baffied by 
two hundred French infantry, was a circumstance 
for which no one appeared able to account. But 
the chagrin arising out of this little defeat, though 
abl.!-ndantly palpable at the moment, soon ceased 
to exert an influence over uso Events of much 
greater moment were at hand; and rumours 
poured in, one after another, each calculated to 
engross our deepest attention, and to excite our 
liveliest ¡nterest. 
The fate of Ciudad Rodrigo was hardly authen-
ticated, when we heard that Regniel' had been 
ordered to cross the Tagus, and that he was in 
full march to form a junction with Massena, by 
way of Almaraz and D'Alameta. General Hill im-
mediately adopted a policy correspondent with that 
of the enerny, by moving upon Villa Velha. These 
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manreuvres, it lS scarceIy necessary to add, Ied to 
conjectures amongst us, as to the course which 
the enemy proposed to pursue, as soon as he 
should be freed from his remaining difficulties by 
the capture of AImeida. My humbIe opinion led 
me to believe that Massena would di vide his 
army into three or four columns; and that with 
the first and strongest he would march direct 
upon Guarda, from whence he could push by 
Cavilhao and Sevo]a, for Pampelhoza. In the 
mean while, it was probable that the second ,co-
lumn would penetrate by Belmonte to Turdao, 
and along the miIitary road to Cardejes and 
Abrantes; for though orders had been issued to 
render it impassable, it was far from being certain 
that they had been properly obeyed. By the 
march of these two, columns, the strong country 
about Castello Branco would be avoided, and the 
still stronger defences of the Zezere turned; whilst 
a communication would be immediatelyopened 
with Regnier, and a junction formed at Thomar. 
The third column, again, would, in all probability, 
push direct upon Castello Branco and Abrantes; 
whilst the fourth, if a fourth were employed, might 
be expected to follow US, in the event .of .our re-
tiring by the Ponte de Marcella road, communi-
cating' all the whiIe with the troops directed upon 
Pampelhoza, and uniting with the rest at Thomar. 
Were this plan adopted, it appeared to me that 
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we should be. driven back as far as Villa Franca 
and Torres Ved ras ; for there were no impedi-
ments in the way to check the enemy, and as we 
had such a position in our rear, it would not be 
judicious to risk an action on any other ground, 
from which, e\ren if we should be successful in it, 
no permanent advantage could be expected. 
1 have said that, in -case the enemy should de-
termine to advance in the order abo ve specified, 
there was but slender proba9ility of our" being able 
to arrest thei1' progress, or offer to them any steady 
front, till we should have taken up the fortified 
line at Torres Yedras. Of that line, and of the 
state of defensibility in which it now stood, it may 
be necessary to take a little notice. 
The position of Torres Yedras forms the gorge, 
or neck of a peninsula, at the extremity of which 
the city of Lisbon is placed. It measures in ex-
tent, from the mouth of the Zezandra on the sea to 
Alhandra on the Tagus, about twenty-five English 
miles; and it embraces in its profile every species 
of ground calculated to assist the operations of 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Along tbis line 
were erected, at convenient distan ces, no fewer 
than one hundred and eight redoubts, differing in 
dimensions according to the extent of the ground 
allotted for them, and the purposes which they 
were severaIIy in tended to serve; and the whole 
were armed with a train of four hundred and 
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twenty pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre. 
To protect these redoubts, and to give to their 
occupants ample space for offensive as well 
as defensive operations, mountains were per-
pendicularly scarped, rivers were dammed up, 
and inundations formed; whilst of the roads 
which once crossed the isthmus, many were 
cut up and destroyed ; and many more, adapted to 
the movements of troops, were rnade. The truth 
is, that art, in the present instance, only filled up 
the outlines, which nature had already drawn, of a 
battle field, as formidable as ever was occupied by 
troops. But the strongest positions must always 
have their weak points; and even the lines of 
Torres Vedras, though approaching as nearly to 
tbe ímpregnable as it is possible for lines to do, 
were not without their assailable corners. In 
sorne place s the redoubts were unavoidably placed 
at íntervals from one another so considerable, that 
should there not be powerful reserves at hand, 
and moveable columns to block up the chasms, the 
enemy might, without 10ss 01' difficulty, penetrate 
between them. This was peculiarly the case on 
the flanks~ in the space between Mafra and the 
sea on the one hand, and between Torres Yedras 
and the Tagus 011 the other; and as illluck would 
have it, these very spaces were, aboye aU others, 
the most favourable to the operations of au" attack-
lng force. The froní" of the centre was completely 
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covered by Monte Junto, which, extending its ra-
mifications to the very works, would necessarily 
render the enemy's movements in that direction 
both tedious and difficult; but the two flanks were 
without such shelter, and must therefore depend 
much upon the valoUl' of those who occupied them. 
Of that, however, no doubt could be entertained ; 
and hence we felt that, in falling back thither, we 
were withdrawing to a stupendous fortification, 
which nothing but a regular siege, of which the 
duration was incalculable, could possibly reduce. 
The sole risk, indeed, which we ran, was from 
want of supplies. Were the French themselves 
amply provisioned, and were the Alentejo to be 
occupied, as it was probable that it would, by 
Mortier's corps from Valencia, then indeed an 
army of 60,000 men, thrown back upon a city 
cémtaining at least 250,000 inhabitants, could not, 
it was to be apprehended, hold out many months ; 
but on these heads we saw no reason to be appre-
hensive. The enemy, we were well aware, car-
ried few supplies with him. We had either taken 
care already, or were busily exerting ourselves, to 
hinder any from being provided by the country 
into which he was about to enter; and aboye ~1l, 
the sea was open to uso Though, therefore, there 
was something not flattering in the idea of retreat-
ing to the most remote corner of the Peninsula, we 
prepared to retire thither with the feeling that it 
. 
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was " reculer pour mieux sauter ;" and we already 
looked forward with confidence to the moment 
which should enable us once more to resume the 
offensive. 
PENINSULAR WAH. 
CHAPTER XIX. 
Preparations proceed, and plaos are formed-The light divisiou 
attaeked at Alrneida, ami falls baek towards 1\ ¡verca-Ge· 
Ileral movement of the British army towards the rear-Inde-
cision of .M assena-DiffieuIties ag'ainst whieh Lord 'VeIling-
ton is called upon to struggle-Almeida besieged and takell 
- The garrison enter the French serviee""':" The enemy ad-
vanee, and the British army retires towards Busaeo. 
THE intervening period between the 11th and 
18th of July, 1810, was spent chiefly in receiving 
reports touching the further movements of the 
army, and in making such dispositions as the turn 
which afi'airs were threatening to take appeared 
to demando We learned at this time that tlle 
rumour already mentioned, as to the march of 
Regnier's corps, for the purpose of forming a 
junction with Massena, and acting in connexion 
with him, was correct. Regnier had arrived at 
Coria and Moraliga, and had unavoidably opened 
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a communication with _ the General-in-chief, by 
Abego and the pass of Perales. To render it the 
more secure, Massena turned to his left, whilst at 
the same time he threwa corps to his right, which, 
under J unot, established itself at San Felice. 
Regnier's movement naturally drew our attention 
chiefiy to that quarter, and General Hill was, in 
conseq uence, ordered from Villa Velha to Castello 
Branco, where he arrived on the 20th. But this 
was not the only effect which it produced. It 
led us into further surmises respecting the ene-
my's future plans; and it induced us to make 
such arrangements, as promised most effectually 
to baffle him, should they be carried jnto effect. 
From the. system which he had lately ádopted 
in distributing his force, it appeared that Massena 
was about to attempt one of two momentous 
undertakings. He would either strengthen Reg-
nier so much as to render him superior to Hill, 
with the view of moving him immediateIy upon 
Castello Branco, and so forcing round our right; 
or he was manceuvringto join him, by the pass of 
Perales, to his own troops, and then, with very 
superior numbers, to attack us on the Coa. There 
was little ground f9r doubt as to which of these 
arrangements would prove mo~t advantageous to 
uso In case he should adopt the former plan, 
there was a risk of Hill being disabled, in which 
case our situation in the position of Guarda would 
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become extremely precarious; whilst in the event 
of any disaster befalling us here, Hill must retreat 
upon the Zezere, and we foll<;>w, with all the speed 
of which we were capable. Were he, on the other 
hand, to collect his whole force in our front, Hill 
might be brought up to our line in three or four 
marches, and other benefits might arise out of a 
battle on the Coa, such as would not probably 
attend a similar operation at a point nearer to the 
capital. In the first place, the enemy must ap-
proach to the attack across the rivers in our front, 
of which the banks were extremely rugged, and 
in sorne places quite inaccessible; so that, if he 
failed, his annihilation was almost unavoidable. 
In the next place, it was probable that the Portu-
guese troops would fight with greater spirit on the 
frontier, than after they had re ti red a considerable 
way through the country. In their present situa-
tion, they felt that they were posted to protect 
their wives, their families, their homes, and their 
possessions ;-carry them further to the rear, and 
they would see that, all these were already com-
promised. Whilst in the last place, it was not 
going too far to believe that an action fought upon 
the Coa would be entered upon, even by British 
soldiers, with greater spirit and livelier zeal, than 
one forced upon them when arrived within view of 
their shipping. AH these consideratiol1s com-
bined tú- produce a hope that Massena would 
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choose the bolder and more perilous course of as-
saulting- us in our position aboye the Coa. But to 
counterbalance this, there was the knowledge 
which we possessed, of the great sagacity and 
experience of the officer opposed to us; who had 
been taught, moreover, in more instances than 
one, that it was not by open force that he could 
ever hope to overthrow a British al'my of not very 
inferior numbel's. The prcbability, thel'efore, was, 
that he would not 9azard the attack in question; 
but that moving round us, and accumulating 
forces upon us in all directions, he would endea-
vour to wear us out by constant watchfulness, 
and so make a pl'ey of us 3.t last, with líttle hazard 
to himself. N 01' was it a thing impossible, that he 
would, by a false attack upon our fl'ont, endea-
vour to draw off Hill fl'om the defence of Castello 
Bl'anco, whilst he moved, at the same time, stl'ong 
columns by his real', and thl'ew himself between 
us and oul' line of retl'eat. These several schemes 
wel'e aH, to a certain degree, feasible; and aH, 
therefore, required attention. But we were headed 
by one who was not behind Massena either in 
clearness of foresight, 01' multiplicity of resources ; 
and we well knew that he would direct no move-
ment which the circumstances of the case might 
not demando 
1 have said that the light dívision under Ge-
neral Crawford, to which the care of furnishing 
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the pickets was assigned, feH back, after the af-
fair of the 4th, to a new position between Almeida 
and Fort Conception, where it fixed its head-
quarters, and established the rnass of its infantry 
at a little village caBed Valdelamula. Our people 
rernained here in quiet for some days, the enerny 
rnaking no dernonstrations bf a move; but, on the 
morning of the 16th, the infantry were ,still further 
witbdrawn, ,and took shelter under the guns of 
Almeida. It is worthy ofremark that Lord Wel-
lington had positively prohibited all fighting on' 
points further in advance than the Coa. His or-
dersto General Crawford, which, that they might 
not be misllnderstood, had been twice distinctIy 
repeated, were, that he should by every possible 
rneans ayo.id an action; and that as soon as he 
becarne aware of the approach of an enemy, he 
should retire, with ample space between, to the 
opposite bank of the river. Crawford, however, 
conceived that the French would respect the for-
tress of Almeida, that they would not push him 
very rapidly, and hence that he would be able to 
rnake a regular retreat at any momento He ac-
cordingly made up his mind not to retire on the 
first intelligence of a movement, but to wait the 
arrival of the French columns, and then to fall 
back, slowly, orderly, and with some resistance, 
in their presence. N o great wbile elapsed ere 
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the prudence of his determination was put to the 
test. 
On the 21st, the enemy put themselves in mo-
tion, and entered, without opposition, Valdela-
mula, Sto Pedro, and Villa Formosa; upon which 
the garrison was withdrawn from Fort Conception, 
and the fort itself blown up. Another pause of 
three days now ensued, after which a force com-
posed of twenty-five squadrons of cavalry, ten 
thousand infantry, and a correspondent train of 
artillery, pushed forward in the direction of AI-
meida. General Crawford was advertised of this 
movement at an early hour on the morning of the 
24th. The resolution which he had formed, how-
ever, of holding as long as it should be defensible, 
his present position, remained unshaken, and in-
stead of retiring, he drew up his division in line, 
resting his left upon Almeida, and having his right, 
as well as his rear, covered by the Coa. Here he 
prepared to give battle; and here, before many 
hours elapsed, he was attacked in force. 
There were three British pickets, t\yo ofinfantry 
and one of cavalry, about half-way between Villa-
mula and Almeida. The sun had not yet risen 
on the 24th, when they found themselves assailed 
by the enemy's skirmishers, which in whole swarms 
covered the advance ofthe columns of cavalry and 
infantry. Our people retired, but they re ti red 
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slowly and in good order, disputing every inch of 
ground; and both suffering themselves, and caus-
ing their assailants to suffer, no inconsiderable 10ss. 
The skirmish was the more interesting, as it is 
impossible to conceive any piece of ground better 
adapted for a rencontre of the kind,-an extensive 
plain, intersected continually by hedges, stone 
walls, and ellclosures, stretching all the way from 
Villamula to the Coa; and it was through this 
that our soldiers feH back, retaining with obstinacy 
each successive fence, till the superior numbers of 
the enemy compelled them to abandon it. Dur-
ing the continuance of this skirmish, the French 
cavalry made more than one attempt to cut off 
portions of the British infantry, and they were not 
always unsuccessful. A division of hussars dash-
ing forward into a part of the plain more open 
than the rest, threw themselves between the inter-
vals in a company of the 52nd, and in spite of a 
heavy tire with which they were saluted, suc-
ceeded in making prisoners of an officer and about 
fourteen meno 
The skirmishers being now driven in, the French 
prepared to follow up their successes, by vigorous-
ly assaulting Crawford's position. They bore down, 
with a dense column, upon his centre, where 
the 95th, with two Portuguese regiments, were 
posted; and in spite of a desperate resistance, 
particularly from the 95th, and one of the foreign 
496 NARRATIYE OF THE 
battalions, pierced it. By this time our cavalry 
had witbdrawn to the opposite side of the Coa, 
and our infantry being in sorne disorder, affairs 
assumed rather an unpromising aspect; Crawford, 
accordingly, determined upon a retreat; but it 
was undertaken under trying and ticklish circum-
stances; and it wa" not executed without a heavy 
10ss, both in killed and prisoners. The only route 
open to General Crawford's division, was by a 
bridge across the stream; which, as it 1ay upon a 
leve1 considerably beneath the ground now occu-
pied by the enemy, was unavoidab1y exposed to a 
heavy tire from most of their guns. Thither, how-
ever, it was necessary to proceed, and thither regi-
ment after regiment was moved, covered in suc-
cession by the corps in the rear, and 1ast of a11 by 
a body of skirmishers. The French made severa1 
brave attempts to force the bridge; they charged 
towards it repeated1y, as our peopIe were descend-
ing, and endeavoured to push a body of their ca-
valry across in our rear; but the opposite bank 
rising abruptly, and being covered both with arti1-
1ery and infantry, they were on each occasion 
stopped. At length the firing ceased; and Craw-
ford, having halted ou his new ground till evening, 
retreated, under cover of the darkness, to a posi-
tion within four leagues of Alverca. 
There can be no doubt that in this skirmish 
the British troops fuUy supported their character 
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for gallantry and coolness; but it was to be re-
gretted that the action had taken place at aH. It 
was not our wisdom to waste our strength in par-
tial encounters, particularly when these must be 
followed, as in the present instance, by a retrograde 
movement; and of this Lord Wellington was, 1 
believe, fully satisfied, as he had cautioned any 
such to be wantonly incurred. Yetwas Crawford 
an officer of singular ability and bravery, and cer-
tainly one of the best in the army, as all his pro-
. ceedingsshowed; and even here he did as much, 
or perhaps more, than most men in a similar 
situation could have performed. But 1 doubt if he 
was strictly within his orders; and certainly con-
siderable dissatisfaction was felt at head-quarters 
when the report of Jhe affair carne in. 
The enemy having thus begun to move, our 
attEmtion was powerfully called to the next steps 
which they should take; because it was concluded 
that from these a tolerably accurate judgment 
might be formed, as to the plan upon which they 
proposed to conduct the campaign. AH eyes were 
consequently turned upon them; but though they 
showed themselves during both the 25th and 26th 
on our side of the Coa, it was not in force sufficient 
to authorise our coming to any conc1usion as to 
their future proceedings. The question which 
interested us most deeply at present was, whether 
they would halt to besiege Almeida in force; or, 
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leaving a corps to mask it, would push on with 
the strength of their army into Portugal. In case 
they should adopt the former lineof policy, then 
might we continue where we were, watching their 
progress, and striving perhaps, as opportunities 
offered, to impede it ;-were they to pursue the 
latter course, then must we remove elsewhere. 
Lord Wellington, however, was desirous of obtain-
ing fuU information on these heads befóre he 
moved his arrny, 01' !ook any other decided step; 
and the 25th and 26th were, in consequence, spent 
by us in a state of quieto 
On the 27th the French pushed forward several 
strong patrols as far as the river Pinhel. Though 
there was nothing in this absolutely decisive of the 
question at issue, still it gave rise to a belief that 
they might perhaps' advance in force; in which 
case Lord Wellington appeared to feel that the 
army, situated as it now was, would fill rather a 
precarious situatioll. As it was not illtended to 
risk a general action here, we should, of course, 
fall back to avoid it; but were we hurried in that 
movement, sorne 10ss and much confusion would 
be the consequence. It was accordingly resolved 
to march some leagues to the rear, and having 
opened free space for the British troops, by sending 
on the Portuguese brigades in front, to establish the 
head-quarters at Celerico. This place, situated at 
the head of the gorges of the Estrella, presented a 
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post of much greater strength and importance to 
an arrny threatened by superior numbers, than the 
extended line on which it had hitherto acted; 
where it was liable to be forced at aH points, 
should it attempt to defend itself throughout, or 
where, should it concentrate, it could only assume 
a position exposed to a fhousand haza~ds by turn-
ing. Nor was this aH. By falling back, in good 
order, upon Celerico, we had it in our power to 
despatch the whole of our divisions, which must 
necessarily retire by the same road at perfect lei-
sure, and with proper intervals between thern; 
• 
because having the start ofthe enemy byseveral 
marches, they would find it a hard rnatter to over-
take Dr annoy uso 
As soon as this determination was formed, no 
time was permitted to elapse before it was carried 
i'nto effect. The cava:lry, amounting in aH to 
twenty-four squadrons, were moved up to Alverca, 
where they held themselves in readiness to cover 
the retreat. The light division marched to Cele-
rico; the first to Penhancas; the third to Cara-
pentra, Fares, and the vi'llages near. With re-
speet to the fourth division, it continued to occupY 
Guarda, because it was deemed essential to retain 
that place for sorne time longer, in order to keep 
open the eommunication with General HiIl, whose 
corps was still in position at Alalay; but General 
Cole received instruetions, in the event of our re-
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trog-rading- beyond Celerico, to retire by a moun-
tain road and rejoin uso Of the enemy's inten-
tions, however, we were still ignorant. It was 
confidently asserted, indeed, that all design of 
acting- upon our right had been abandoned, and 
that Regnier had attached himself to Massena, 
merely for the sake of adding- to his weigbt, and 
enabling- hirn to move with greater effect upon our 
front; but the arrang-ement appeared in itself so 
improbable, that we were scarcely disposed to 
believe it. We were, however, equally prepa,red 
for either emergency; and as our marches to the 
rear were conducted without any interference on 
the part of the enerny, we soon found ourselves 
in a position from which it was in our power to 
move, either forward or still further back, in com-
parative safety, and at our own convenience. 
When we began our retrog-ression, it was with a 
fun assurance on our minds, that a few days, at 
the furthest, would suffice to throw sorne certain 
lig-ht upon the enemy's plan s and intentions. To 
our g-reat surprise, however, day after day and 
week after week elapsed, and they still continued 
as inert an:d undecided as ever. A1meida, tbough 
invested, was not threatened with a siege, neitber 
were corps in movement against us; though a full 
fortnight had passed since the affair with Craw-
ford's division on the Coa, and a month since 
Ciudad Rodrigo submitted. There was, of course, 
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but one line of poliey for us to pursue; we eould 
only wait, with patienee, till Massena should see 
fit to do something; whereas it appeared as if the 
f'rench Marshal were either completely at a 10ss 
how to proceed, or that his means and resources 
were inadequate to the objects in contemplation. 
The reader will easily believe that so great an 
appearance of diffidence on the part of the French, 
tended not a little to inspire us with sentiments 
diametrically the reverse. Lord Wellington, in 
particular, augured the best results írom a eonsi-
deration of matters around him; and if there were 
any who still continued to harbour apprehensions 
touching the final issue of the campaigo, these ap-
prehensions had eertainly lost mueh of their 
strength and plausibility. No doubt there were 
moments when a consideration of the existing 
state of Europe-everywhere in submission to the 
influence of France, and everywhere in arms 
agaiost us - would renew those ~larms which 
present events had a tendency to smooth down; 
but with such speculations we felt that we had 
nothing to do, and therefore we resolutely looked 
forward with a hope, which we were willing to 
believe rested on no insecure foundation. 
Whilst our bodies were kept at rest, our minds 
were from time to time occupied by rumours 
which came in, in great numbers, from different 
parts of the country. We heard one day that 
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Regnier' had advanced as far as Castello Branco, 
and that Hill hOO fallen back upon his strong po-
sition at Largedas. There had been a little skir-
mishing on this occasion; and it gave us satisfaction 
to be told that the Portuguese cavalry had been 
brought into play, and had acquitted itself well. 
N ext we were informed that the peasantry were 
furming t;hemselves into bands of guerillas, and 
that they had already taken and killed several 
straggling parties of the enemy in the vicinity of 
Guarda. But the most pleasing intelligence of all 
which reached us at this time, reported the suc-
cess which Silveira's followers had obtained over a 
body of Fl'ench troops at Parba de Sanatrice. A 
Swiss bat&lion in the French service fiad, it ap-
peared, attacked a Spanish post at the above 
}place. The Spaniards gave' way, and fled; but a 
body of Portuguese mili tia belonging to Silveira's 
eorps, adva~eed against the enemy, and shut them 
up in the town .. Having sustained a blockade 
for sorne days, the enemy were glad to surrender 
llpon terms; and they were sent, to the number of 
four hundred, to their own eountry, on eondition 
that they woufd not serve again in the Peninsula. 
Considered in itself" su eh a vietory, followed by 
such eonsequences, was not, indeed, an event 
very highly to be spoken of; but it promised to 
be produetive of effeets more important than the 
mere removal of a few hundred of the enemy from 
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{he scene of operations. It gave the militia con-
fidence in themselves and in their leaders; and it 
would doubtless induce others to emulate the deeds 
of their fellow-countrymen, whenever fitting op-
portunities might come in the way. 
AH our rumours were not, however, of a de-
scription so cheering. It was stated, upon autho-
rity which appeared to be good, that Mortier had 
broken up from the neighbourhood of Seville, and 
that he was in full march to replace Regnier's 
corps on the left bank of the Tagus. That su eh a 
movernent had been in contemplation, we were 
well aware, and the chief source of astonishment 
on our side was, that it had not long ago taken 
place; but we.understood now, that sorne differ-
ences between Joseph and Victor onthe one hand, 
and Massena on the other, had hitherto prevented 
it. The former chiefs were unwilling to spare 
Mortier from the support of the force employed 
before Cadiz; whilst the latter insisted upon his 
being despatched into Portugal, as essential to the 
great operations in progress. The dispute, it 
appeared, had been referred to Paris, and now 
the Emperor's decision having arrived, Massena's 
wishes were preferred to those of the King of 
Spain and his lieutenant. To us this was rather 
an alarming piece of news. We were already op-
posed by numbers so great, as to keep our utmost 
vigilance and skill in action, for the purpose of 
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effectual1y watching them; there was no need of 
an addition to the sources of aJarm by which we 
were surrounded; nor was it a cause of inconsi-
derable annoyance to reflect, that a large portion 
of our nominal army was placed in a situation 
where it could prove of no real service. The 
reader is doubtless aware that under the common 
head of the Peninsular army were included, not 
onIy the divisions immediately commanded by 
Lord Wellington, with such detached corps as 
might be employed in operations along the coast 
of Alicant, but the garrison of British troops shut 
up in Cadiz, to the number of eight thousand meno 
Unquestionably it was a wise precaution to intro-
duce so me British regiments into that important 
place; without them it is at least problematical 
whether Cadiz would have sustained, as itdid, a 
tedious blockade of many months. But the ques-
tion is, whether two thousand men would have 
sufficed for that service, whilst the remaining six 
thousand could have. been employed to unspeak-
able advantage elsewhere. As yet, however, the 
tact of conducting a continental war with the spirit 
which was necessary, was new in England. Not 
only were we deprived of this large portion of our 
own force, and that, too, for a purpose which ap-
peared nugatory,-but of the reinforcements which 
had been promised from Halifax and Sicily, one 
regiment alone arrived; and even the vacancies oc-
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casioned in the ranks of the different battalions in 
Portugal, by death, sickness, and other casualties 
of war, were either not filled up at all, or were 
filled up very imperfectly. . This was doubly dis-
tressing, at the present moment" when the uu-
healthy season having returned, our sick began 
daily to increase in numbers, and when, 1 regret 
to say, instances of desertion, particularly from the 
German cavalry, became frequent. Lord Wel-
lington, 1 apprehend, felt, though he carefully 
strove to conceal it, tha-! he was not supported, as 
he ought to have been, from home; and there 
were few officers in his army, possessed of pene-
tration, who did not likewise feel it. 
Though it falls not in with the plan of the pre-
sent narrative to enter minutely iuto the order of 
affairs purely political, 1 may be permitted to ob-
serve that Lord Wellington found himself, at this 
critical juncture, beset with many other difficulties 
besides those which originated in the insufficiency 
of his own force, and the tremendous superiority 
of the enemy. AH responsibility was thrown upon 
him. The instructions which he received were 
generally so expressed, as to leave him ground for 
doubt respecting the course which would be mos! 
agreeable to his employers; whilst hints were 
thrown out, that he ought to look aboye all things 
to the preservation of the force intrusted to him. 
In few words, the ministers were alarmed at the 
crisis to which affairs had arrived, and their con-
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duct partook of their fears. N or was the govern-
ment of Portugal to be depended upon. A variety 
of intrigues were going on there, augmented and 
renewed from time to time by arrivals from the 
Brazils; and a thousand impedimenfs were thrown 
in the way of every useful suggestion, provided it 
ñappened to come from the English General or his 
friends. At last a new form of government was 
invented, in which both the British minister 
ando Lord Wellesley were included; and by 
which Admiral Berkeley was advanced to the 
chief command of the fleet, as Lord Wellington 
had been to the chief command of the army. 
Yet even then,-even at a moment when Lord 
'Vellington was enabled to mark out, as it were, 
a situation for himseIf, he was far from being 
emancipated from trouble. Continual referen-
ces were made to him on the subject of civil 
arrangements, and he found himself almost una-
voidably involved in the many petty cabals and 
jealousies, ofwhich he had so lIluch reason to com-
plain. lt is not going too far to affirm, that a 
Britisn commander has seldom, if ever, stood in 
a predicament more harassing and more un-
satisfactory than that occupied by the Duke of 
WeIlington during the summer of 1810; and that 
probably not a single individual in the service of 
the crown could have carried himself through the 
difficulties arising out of it, except the man who 
stntggled with and overcame them. 
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The indecision which had marked the enemy's 
movements, ceased at length to exert its· influence ; 
and on the 14th of August, 1810, they sat down 
in force before the fortress· of Almeida. On the 
following day, ground ,,'as broken; but the works 
proceeded so slowly, that the 25th arrived before 
the first batteries were constructed. At one point, 
however, owing to the faulty nature of the fortifi-
cation, the approaches had been pushed, without 
rnuch interruption from the fire of the place, to the 
foot af the glacis; but the batteries just spoken of 
were erected at a prodigious distan ce, and carne in 
only with the line of the first parafIel, far beyond 
the proper range of battering cannon. Almeida, 
regarded by the Portuguese as one of the principal 
bulwarks of their country, was garrisone.d at tbis 
time by two regiments of militia, and one of the 
Hne, which were placed under the orders of Briga-
dier-General Cox, an officerofmerit and resolution; 
and it was confidently expected that the resistan ce 
made by it would not at least faH short. however 
much it might exceed the resistance offered by the 
feebler fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
Lord Wellington, as soon as he learned that the 
enemy had begun the siege, once more moved his 
arrny to the position w hich it had occu pied pre-
vious to the late retrogression.· His object in this 
was not only to encourage tbe garrison to a des-
perate defence, by creating in it tbe hope of a 
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speedy relief, but to draw off the troops whenever 
the place should become untenable, avoiding, at 
the same time, a general action; and had the 
garrison acted with even moderate determination, 
there is every reason to believe that he would 
have effected the latter objeet, even though he 
should have failed in the former. But the garri-
son did not do its duty. lt yielded on the :first 
appearance of ealamity, and aceompanied its sur-
render with proeeedings which left no room to 
doubt that the aceident alluded to was not the sole 
cause of a sllbmission so unlooked-for and so ill-
timed. 
The enemy's batteries opened at a long range 
on the 26th; and in the evening of that day a 
magazine, in whieh was deposited the ehief part 
of the powder in the place, unfortunately blew up. 
lt happened that sorne cars were in the act of 
couveying ammunitiou from the building, when a 
shell exploded at the door, and the loose powder 
having ignited, the :fire was communieated to the 
whole depot, aud it instantIy exploded. This was 
indeed a heavy calamity; and Lord Wellingtou 
and Marshal Beresford, iu their publie despatches, 
attributed to it, aud to it alone, all the events 
whieh followed; but the conduct of the garrisou 
was sueh as to couvinee every unprejlldieed 'ob-
server, that iu so doing they spoke, uot from feel-
ing, but from poliey; and that, even had uo su eh 
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misfortune befallen, little was to be expected at 
their hands. It was no sooner known in the town 
that the principal magazine had been destroyed, 
than the whole of the office"rs, with the Tenente 
Rey, or second in command, at their head, pro-
ceeded to Governor Cox in a body, and insisted 
upon his instantly surrendering. General Cox 
warmly remonstrated against the measure, and 
ordering them to repair to their several posts, in-
formed them that he ¡ntended, as soon as affairs 
should become desperate, to cut his way through 
the enemy's lines, and join Lord Wellington. The 
"officers withdrew in evident displeasure; but 
when the Governor came forth to instruct the 
soldiers in the duty expected from them, he found 
that aUhad laid down their arms, and that there 
was not aman willing to obey his commands, or 
follow his footsteps. U nder such circumstances, 
but one measure remained for him to adopto He 
accepted the terms offered by the French through 
the Marquis D'Alorna; and on the following day, 
being formally summoned, he most reluctantly 
surrendered. 
This was bad enough: it was sufficiently mor-
tifying to find that our allies, when left to them-
selves, could not be depended upon as friends; it 
was a thousand times more mortifying to be con-
vinced that with unaccountable fickleness they 
were prepared, on suitable occasions, to becom~ 
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0urenemies. The Freneh army entered Almeida 
on the 26th, and the garrison being paraded be-
fore him, Massena behaved towards them with a 
degree of good poliey, not gene rally pursued either 
by him or his brother marshals. From the militia 
he exacted nothing more than a solemn assurance 
that they would 110t again take arms against the 
French, and tben dismissed them tu~their homes; 
whilst to the soldiers of the line he offered various 
advantages, provided they would ·consent to take 
service under the banners of N apoleon. To the 
eternal disgrace of the persons thus tampered 
with, aH, both officers and men, embraced the 
proposal, and all passed over, without the slightest 
apparent reluetanee, to the ranks of the enemy. 
True, it was industriously given out that the mea-
sure in question had been adopted with Que -view 
only-namely, that they might be preserved from 
certain captivity in France, and find opportunities 
of again desertiug to their countrymen; but it is 
hardly neeessary to observe that no 0Ile dreamed 
of again plaeing relianee on men who could thus 
set all honourable and proper feeling at defiance. 
For my own parto 1 looked upon the ci-devant 
garrison of Almeida as a band of contemptible 
cowards, or barefaced tn¿itors; and 1 believe ~that 
the sentiments which 1 entertained towards them, 
were, without a single exception, entertained by 
every man and officer in the British_army. 
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1 have rnentioned the Marquis D'Alorna as 
taking part in this negociation, so little creditable 
to the persons who were the subjects of it. 
D'Alorna was a Portuguese of talent, though a 
deterrnined and uncomprornising partisan of the 
French. When they entered the country before, 
under Junot, he declared warrnly in their favour; 
and having been governor of the province of Beira, 
was enabled to render them sorne important ser-
VIces. It is but fair to state, however, that 
D'Alorna's treaehery arose, not frorn any motives 
of personal arnbition, but out of an hereditary 
abhorrenee of the reigning farnily, from whorn his 
ancestors, for rnany generations baek, had suffered 
great oppression. Many of them, indeed, had 
been beheaded as traitors, when, according to his 
statement at least, they had committed nodeeds 
deserving of the punishment; and the hatred 
stirred up by sueh cruelties descended, like an 
he ir-100m, frorn father to son, till it broke out, at 
length, in the person of the present Marquis. 
D'Alorna was, as 1 have said, a ruan of ability"; 
but he was something more than this. He knew 
intimately all the parties wrueh existed in his 
native country, and all the seeret springs by which 
they were severally guided; and he was more, 
perhaps, than any other individual, competent to 
direet the Freneh in the operations which they 
might desire to undertake for its subjugation. 
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Such aman, actuated by such feelings, was not 
overlooked by the politic N apoleon, who gave him 
the ral1k of general of division in the French 
armies, and sent him, in this capacity, against the 
land of his fathers. 
As 800n as the faH of Almeida becarne kl1own, 
Lord Wellington lost no time in retracing his 
steps, and again placing his divisions in the posi-
tion which hé had assurned previous to the late 
advance. They had not, however, long resumed 
their station, when they were called upon once 
more to abandon it; for the enerny advancing on 
the 1st, with a few squadrons of cavalry and sorne 
infantry, attacked our outposts at Alverca, and 
drove thern in. Lord Wellington was not willing 
to risk a general action here, if it could be avoided. 
He was desirous, on the contrary, of stretching 
further to the rear, in order to bring his divisions 
into closer communication with General Hill, to 
be nearer to the position of the Ponte de Marcella, 
and, if the case should require it, to take it up; 
and all this he was anxious to effect for the pur-
pose of hindering the enerny frorn pressing be-
tween our corps, or pushing hard upon our right, 
which, as 1 have already hinted, we looked upon 
. as his probable course of operations. He accord-
ingly issued orders for the whole army to faH 
back, and fixed his head-quarters on the following 
day at Gouvea. By this· movement he kept in 
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check any troops which n1ight endeavour to 
advance from Sabugal by way of Covilhos, and he 
threw an insurmountable obstacle in the way of 
all attempt to alarm both Hill's and our corps, by 
turning the fortified position of the Zezere. 
It soon appeared, however, that in the plan of 
operations which sorne had drawn out for the 
enemy, they had fallen into many errors. In-
stead of manreuvring upon our right, Massena 
moved the whole of his force, no( excepting the 
corps of General Regnier, towards our left, and 
drew us off, almost as soon as we had taken up 
our new position, to fresh ground, and more active 
undertakings. How this was effected, it will be 
necessary to state at length. 
The reader has been already iriformed that 
Massena, instead of employing Regnier on the left 
of the Tagus, called him in, and united him to 
himself. The surrender of Almeida no sooner set 
him free from the last remaining encumbrance in 
his front, than he prepared to enter upon his 
grand undertaking-the invasion of Portugal; and 
contrary to all surmises, he resolved to commence 
his campaign as follows :-Whilst Regnier moved 
by the route which we had taken, with a view of 
threatening the position of Ponte de Marcella in 
front, two other corps, one under the command of 
N ey, another headed by Junot, marched in par al-
VOL. I. 2 K 
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lel columns to the right, and directed their steps, 
the former by the upper road from San Felices, 
through Trancoso, tbe latter by Celerico, and 
across the Mondego, near that town, upon Vizeu. 
His object in these movements evidently was, to 
turn the position of tbe Ponte de Marcella, and to 
compel us to abandon a line, wbich, had we been 
followed by the main body instead of by a single 
corps, would have afforded an éxtremely desirable 
situation for a general action. How it came about 
that Massena determined upon tbis plan, 1 confess 
myselfunable to form even a conjecture. Perhaps 
he entertained, an idea that tbe passage of the Ze-
zere would be difficult, that Abrantes would pre-
sent to him a formidable obstacle, and that the 
country between Castello Branco and tbe Tagus 
would suppIy his troops with nothing requisite for 
their subsistence; or perhaps he apprehended 
serious obstructions from Romana's army, as well 
as from the garrisons of Badajoz and Elvas in h'is 
rearo Whether any or all of tbese motives had 
weight with him, 1 know not; but there can be 
little doubt that, in relinquishing the line of tbe 
Tagus, he gave up some advantages; such, for ex-
ample, as a close .communication with Mortier, 
and the army before Cadiz; for which, nothing to 
be obtained by his new plan of operations would 
seem to compensate. Be this however as it may, 
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we were soon informed that he had actualIy 
moved in the order aboye described; and we 
instantly prepared, by marching upon Cortico, 
near the Ponte de Marcella, to meet him upon 
the fresh arena which he had chosen to mark 
out. 
In former parts of this narrative, 1 have taken 
occasion to particularise the amount both of our 
own force and of that of the enemy. Our esti-
mates respecting the French were generally drawn 
froro the reports of deserters, who are invariably 
disposed rather to overrate than underrate the 
strength of the party whom they have abandoned ; 
but at this time we discovered, from certain 
intercepted retums, that the effective strength of 
the three columns aboye specified amounted, in 
the whole, to rather more than 70,000 meno Our 
numbers, again, were as follows: of British infan-
try there were in the field 23,868; of British 
cavalry 2870; of British artillery 2000; making 
a total of 28,738 British soldiers: of Portuguese 
there were infantry 21,712, cavalry 1696, and 
artillery 1000. The grand total of the allied 
army accordingly carne up to 53,136. But of 
these full 25,000 were at a distance, so me under 
Hill, others under Leith, so that we too k up our 
ground at Ponte de Marcella with littIe more than 
28,000 meno We took it up, however, in such 
time as to authorise a well-grounded expectation, 
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tbat before any serious attack could be made, they 
would be enabled to join; yet were we far from 
being at our ease, especially when intelligence 
arrived, that the whole of Ma~sena's ariny bad 
crossed the Mondego. The truth, indeed, ¡s, that 
against odds so tremendous, more particularly 
when it was considered that one-half of our troops 
had never seen an enemy, no man could be very 
sanguine of success. Had all within our camp 
been Britons, then, indeed, tbough the victory 
would have doubtless cost us dear, we should 
have still, counted upon it as certain; but with 
every disposition to think well of the Portuguese, 
we were unable to persuade ourselves, that when 
the moment of triál carne, they would be found 
equal, 1 say not to their allies, but to their ene-
mies. Our object therefore, was to avoid a ren-
contre, unless upon ground so favourableas almost 
to insure success; and for the attainment of that 
object, all Lord Wellington's movements were 
henceforth directed. 
As soon as he had positively ascertained that 
the French were passing the Mondego with their 
third column, Lord Wellington threw two divi-
sions, the líght and the fourth, to the north bank 
of that river. In the mean while, the first divi-
sion, consisting of six British and two Portuguese 
brigades, advanced from Coimbra, where it had 
latterIy been stationed, as far as Mealhada, on the 
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great road to Oporto. The third division, Ge-
neral Picton's, with the cavalry under Cotton, 
were thus the only force left on the southern side 
of the Mondego; and they posted themselves, 
the one behind the Alva, the other in front of the 
Ponte de Marcella. It is, perhaps, unnecessary 
to add, that the Iatter corps were left in these 
situations, merely to keep open the communica-
tion with Generals Hill and Leith; and that they 
received orders, as soon as these üfficers should 
have formed their junction, to follow the rest of 
the army across the river. From these various ar-
rangements, it became sufficientIy manifest that 
Lord WeHington was even now Iooking out for a 
convenient field on which to offer his adversary 
battle; and we were not slow inarriving at the 
conclusion, that the first great struggle would 
take place at a point not very remote from the 
position now occupied by the left of the British 
arrny. 
As 1t will be necessary for me, in giving a de· 
tai! of future operations, to describe minutely the 
nature of the ground just referred to, 1 will not 
detain the reader by laying before hirn any pre-
mature or imperfect sketch of the position of Bu-
saco. It will be better, perhaps, to close the pre-
sent chapter with a recapitulation of certain un-
propitious rurnours, which, at this critical moment, 
carne upon us with even more than their usual 
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exaggeration. We heard, to our extreme rnor-
tification, that Romana, having improvidently 
quitted his strong-hold, and advanced as far as 
Puente de Castro, haIf way between Seville and 
Badajoz, had risked an action with Mortier, and 
suffered asevere defeat. So complete,· indeed, 
was the ront represented to have been, that 
nothing except the distinguished gallantry of a 
corps of Portuguese cavaIry, which Lord Wel-
lington had lent to Romana sorne time before, 
saved the Spanish army frorn utter annihilation ; 
but a11 the bravery of these rnen was unáble to 
restore the fortune of the day; and the whole had 
retreated in disorder to Badajoz. The battle was 
stated to have been fought on the 15th; and as 
Mortier was represented as fo11owing up the fugi-
tives with great vigour, it became with us a ques-
tion of some moment, whether he rnight not arrive 
in time materially to assist Massena, by threaten-
ing our right from Alcantara, or even from 
Abrantes. This was an idea pregnant with alarm 
to many, and productive, as a11 ideas in these 
times were, of a thousand idle conjectures and 
specuIations. But our chief seemed entirely to 
disregard' it. Whether he doubted the authen-
ticity of the report, or calculated upon the igno-
rance of his adversary, or upon his want of ability 
to takeproper advantage of the circumstance, 
should it be real, 1 know not. This, however, 1 
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do know, that he continued to issue his commands, 
and to arrange his plan s, with the same unbend-
ing firmness; and that all things went on as cooUy. 
as orderly, and with as much deliberation, as if no 
such rumour had reached uso 
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CHAPTER I. 
Battle of Busaco-The British army retires upon Torres Ve-
dras, slowly foIlowed by the French-Description of the 
lines-General review of the campaign, and condition of the 
two armies-Lo1"d Wellington receives reinforcements. 
h has been stated in the former volume, that the 
whole of the troops which composed the French 
arrny of Portugal, advanced, in pursuit of us,by 
columns of corps, between the Mondego and the 
Douro. Instead, however. of continuing their 
maTch, as we had anticipated, by these distinct 
routes, they soon struck into a single line, and 
proceeded, in one immensebody. along the Vizeu 
road, on the right bank of the MondegQ. It 1S 
worthy of remark, that the road thus selected IS 
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one of the worst in Portugal, and that it presented 
at this time so many natural difficulties to the 
transport of guns and wheeled carriages, as to be 
by us esteemed quite impassable. Yet by that 
road were the French troops pushed forward, and 
though they were followed. by an enormous train 
of carriages, of artillery, ammunition-waggons, 
and other materiel, they nevertheless contrived to 
make way with considerable rapidity and order. 
As soon as the first intelligence of these move-
ments reached us, we retired from Celerico, and 
took up fresh ground in the viciníty of Gouvea. 
This was done under a persuasion that the enemy 
would make his principal attack upon our right; 
but it was no sooner ascertained that the road 
by which we had fallen back remained unoc-
cupied, than Lord Wellington directed his columns 
upon the point threatened, and in a very masterIy' 
style of manreuvre, threw the whole of his army 
across the Mondego, between the 25th and 26th. 
At the same time, the corps of Generals Hill and 
Leith were moved, the one from Largedas, the 
other from, Thomar, by the Espinhel road; and 
they both arrived on the latter day at the river. 
Lord Wellington's corps crossed at the Bavia de 
Pina Cova, and a1: the fords in the neighbourhood 
of Ponte de Marcella. The light division, with 
the cavalry,· were then pushed forward to meet 
the enemy's advance as far as Santa Comba Dao; 
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the first division was placed at Mealhada, on the 
great road w hich leads froro Coimbra to O porto; 
the fourth occupied the left of the position of Bu-
saco, which it was now arranged to take up; 
whilst the third, leaving sufficient room for the 
first to form betweeo, in case the attack should 
be made exclusively 00 the heights, unsupported 
by anyattempt to turn our Hank, took post in con-
tinuation ofthe line thus marked out. Such were 
the general arrangements entered into on the 
25th; it remains now to describe the nature of 
the ground on which it was pr-Oposed to risk an 
. aetion. 
The position of Busaco consists of one huge 
mountain, which extends from the edge of the 
Mondego to the great Oporto road, and supports 
upon its summit the convent of Busaco, inhabited 
by Plonks of the order of La Trappe. It measures 
nearly sixtéen miles in width from the right, where 
it eases itself off by gradual falls towards the Mon-
dego to the left, where it ends in a variety of 
tongues of land, each as lofty, craggy, and rugged 
as itself. It is covered in front by gorges of inde-
scribable depth, and defiles barely passable for 
sheep. The principal inconvenience attending it 
as fighting ground for our army, arose out of its 
extent; for it was manifestly too capacious to be 
occupied aright by sixty thousand men; whereas, 
it is essential to the consitution of a military post, AfI'.~~ 
\¡~- ' 
'"'~"" .,:, 
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that it be as easy of egress as it is difficult of ac-
cess, and that its flanks as well as its centre be 
well secured. But where ground is too extensive 
for the troops destined to hold it, the latter object 
can never be perfectly attained; and in the pre-
sent instance we could not but feel that any seri-
pus endeavour to tum our left by the Mealhada 
road, must in the end be attended with success. 
Strange to say, however, Marshal Massena,-an 
officer whose reputation carne second to that of no 
marshal in the French service, -made no effort of 
the kind. On the contrary, he led his columns 
through the passes aboye described, and up the 
face of heights approximating very nearly to the 
perpendicular, and thus devoted them to destruc-
tion, froID the hands of men, posted, as has been 
already mentioned, on their summits. Had he 
acted by the advice of Lord Wellington,· 1 think 
he could not have adopted a course better calcu-
lated to insurE~ a defeat, and that too with a 10ss to 
the conquerors trifling, even in proportion to what 
usually attends upon success. 
- On the 25th, th~ enemy's advanced-guard took 
possession of Santa Comba Dao, and pushed on to 
Martigao, were Crawford had strongly posted his 
corps. As it was· Lord Wellington's wish that no 
affair of advanced-guards should take place, in-
structions had been issued for the light division to 
retire, on the first alarm, to the mountain of Busa-
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co; and the movement was executed in admirable 
order, and in the pre8ence of the enemy. Our 
troops could not, however, fall back so rapidly as 
to avoid; entirely, coming into .occasional contact 
with their pursuers, and a good de al of firing, with 
a tolerab1y smart cannonade, was the consequence. 
But the 10ss on either side was trifling; although 
1 had to regret the IOS8 of a fine young manmy 
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Hoey, who was killed 
by a cannon-shot atmy side. The light division 
now threw itself upon some high and commanding 
ground just aboye the great road to Vizeu, so as to 
. communicate with the fourth division on it8 left, 
and with the first upon its right. For the latter 
division had been moved up from its station at 
Mealhada, and now took post upon the hejghts~ 
where room had been allotted t6 it; ·and Hill and 
Leith . being in full march over the Mondego, the 
line was in excellent progress towards formation. 
At length the arrangements were complete, and 
on the 27th, at day-break, the army was an drawn 
up in the following order. 
On the right of the whole stood the second 
division, commanded by General Hill, guarding 
thedeclivities towards the Mondego, and flanked 
by tbe stream. N ext to it came General Leitb's 
corps, then General Picton's third division, tben 
General Spencer's first division, then General 
Crawford's light division; and last of an, upon 
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the extreme left, stood the fourth division, under 
the eommand of General Coleo The eavalry were 
sent to the plains in front of Mealhada, where 
there was room for them to act; and the artillery 
was distributed at different points, aceording as 
convenienee of ground, or the prospect of an ad-
vantageous range direeted. 
1 have said that the light division drew up 
upon some high and· broken ground aboye the 
great road to Vizeu. The road in question, which 
conducts from Coimbra to the town just named, 
winds round the right of a projeeting tongue· of 
land, and passing through the village of Mortea, 
skirts the convent wall; from which, to the sum-
mit of the mountain, there is the spaee of barely 
half a mile. ' On the 26th the enemy showed a 
'strong force in this direction, as welI as in front of 
that part of our position which was oceupied by 
General Picton. Though they did nothing more 
than show themselves, it became very evident that 
Massena was really making ready to attaek our 
formidable position, and we heartily congratulated 
one another on a prospect so satisfactory: for it is 
impossible to conceive a pie ce of ground more de-
fensible from aH attempts in its front. The glacis 
of a fortress is not more bare nor open to the fire 
of its defenders; whilst the abruptness of the as-
eent was of itself suffieient to render powerJess, at 
least for a time, the heavily-Ioaded troops which 
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might accomplish it. N o great while elapsed ere 
our wishes received their full accomplishment; for 
on the. following morning, soon after our line had 
been formed, the enemy advanced to the attack. 
At six o'clock in the m'orning two heavy 
columns were seen to approach, the one along the 
road, so as to fall in with the light division, the 
other through a defile, in the direction of General 
Picton's post. Both attacks were made with 
great spirit and determination; but the latter was 
evidently that upon which Massena mainly relied, 
and to insure the success of which he had taken 
every imaginable precaution. lt was intrusted to 
an élite corps, appointed expressly for the service; 
and it was headed by three of the most distin-
guished regiments in the French army; the 32nd, 
36th, and 70th. These were placed under the 
command of General Merle, an officer who had 
acquired a high reputation from his behaviour at 
Austerlitz; and they certainly gave proof that 
neither they nor their leader had won a name 
which they were not worthy to wear. They 
pressed forward with a gallantry whieh drew 
forth the hearty plaudits, not of their friends only, 
but of their enemies; and in spite of as heavy a 
shower of grape, round shot, and musketry, as it 
is easy to imagine, they actually gained the summit. 
They gained it too in good order, that is to say, 
they were formed in an instant after the aseent 
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was won; and had they been supported, they 
would have doubtless stood their ground for sorne 
time; but there was no support in their rear; 
and the 45th British,. with the 8th Portuguese, 
met them with a bravery not inferior to their own, 
or that of any other corps in· either army. The 
contest was warm, but it was ¡lOt of long continu-
ance; for the 88th arriving to the assistance of 
their cornrades, instantly charged, and the enemy 
wete borne over the cliffs and crags with fearful 
rapidity, many of them being lite rally picked out 
of the holes in the rocks by the bayonets of our 
soldiel's. The troops ernployed in this attack CQfi-
sisted oftwodivisions ofthe corps of Regnier, one 
of which, under Merle, suffered the fate just 
described,whilst the other remained in reserve at 
the defile. 
Whilst these things were going on in front of 
Picton's post, twodivisions of the corps of Marshal 
Ney, oue commanded by Loisón, and the other 
by Mermot~ bore down· in like manner upon 
General Crawford. Both of these divisions took 
part in the assault, a third being left. in reserve; 
and they advanced with great intrepidity over 
half the ascent, exposed only to a trifling fire 
frOID a few pieces· of cannon. The 43rd, 52nd, 
and 95th, were in line there, and they permitted 
the enemy to approach till less than one hundred 
yards divided thern; and then one volley from 
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fight to left, coolly and deliberately given, thinned 
the ranks of the assailants; after which our troops, 
giving a loud and simultaneous cheer, rushed 
forward with the bayonet. N ever was rout more 
complete than that which followed the movement. 
The enemy, unable to retreat and afraid to resist, 
were roUed down the steep Iike a torrent of hail· 
stones driven before a powerful wind; and not 
the bayonets only, but the very hands of some of 
our brave fellows; became in an instant red with 
the bIood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more 
decÍsive charges than those executed this day by 
the two divisions which bore the brunt of the 
action, were never perhaps witnessed; nor could 
anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of 
our rilen throughout, except, perhaps, the hardi-
hood which had ventured upon so desperate an 
attack. 
The 10ss of the French in these encounters was 
estimated at somewhere between five and six 
thousand men; Qurs fell considerably short of one 
thousand; but as one of their corps, that of J unot, 
had not yet been engaged, we naturally expected 
a repetition of the battle on the following morning. 
In this, however, we were deceived. Massena 
had :already erred sufficiently in risking one at-
tempt to force our heights; and he had learned a 
lesson which it was not probable that he would 
speedily forget. Instead, therefore, of again di-
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recting his troops against our impregnable rocks, 
he was observed, soon after daylight on the 28th, 
to be drawing off from the late points of attack, 
and it was found that he was moving, with his 
entire force, upon the Mealhada road, with the 
evident intention of turning uso It was a move-
ment for which we were not only prepared, but 
for which we had aH along looked, as a measure 
of common prudence on the part of the enemy; 
and as we never calculated upon being able to re-
tain Busaco after it should be executed, we now 
made· ready to abandon the high grounds, and 
continue our retreat. As soon, therefore, as the 
dusk of the evening set in, we defiled to our left, 
throwing Hill's division once more across the 
river; and the rest of the corps marching during 
the 29th, on Decentecio, Botao, Eiros, and Meal-
hada, the line of the Mondego was, on the 30th, 
assumed. 
As it was not Lord Wellington's design to make 
any stand, or risk a second batde on the Mondego, 
the army was put in motion again on the 1st of 
October; and the head-quarters, having halted at 
Redenha that night, carne in on the 2nd to Leira. 
During these marches, the divisions of the army 
were kept as near aS'possible to one another: the 
right retiring by the main road, pushed directly 
upon Leira; the left, passing the river somewhat 
·lower in it8 course, came in, under the guidance 
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of General Spencer, to the same tine of march 
near Pombal; by which arrangement one wing 
was throughout at hand to support the other, had 
circumstances occurred to require it. But the 
enemy showed no disposition to harass uso Though 
they entered Coimbra almost at the moment of 
our quitting it, they suffered our rear-guard to 
march on without molestation; and they even 
halted during the remainder of that day, and the 
whole of the next, in the place. On the 3rd, 
however, they pushed forward strong patrols into 
Condeixa, towards Leira. Here, part of our 
magazine, containing corn and provisions, fell into 
their hands; but the magazine was captured, not 
because we were unable, but because we were 
unwilling to defend it. The faet is, that Lord 
Wellington had strictly prohibited the rear-guard 
from engaging in any affair which could, without 
compromising its own safety, be avoided; and the 
!'ltores in question were abandoned, rather than 
that a loss of life, however trifling, should be ex-
perienced in their defence. 
The army rested in Leira till the morning of the 
5th, when Lord Wellington, having ascertained 
that the enemy were coming on in force, gave 
orders that the retreat should be resumed. This 
was done along the two great roads which lead to 
Lisbon, by Rio Major and Alcoba~a, and on the 
same evening head-quarters were established in 
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the last-mentioned place; but though no skir-
mishing occurred, nor any seriolishardships feH 
to our lot, it was altogether one of the most dis-
tressing journeys which any individual in the army 
was evercalled upon to perform. The proclama-
tions which had been issued, requiring the inha-
bitants to abandon their homes as wefeU hack, 
were very . generaHy attended to, and spectac1es 
more affiicting than this prompt obedience on the 
part of the Portuguese presented, it were a hard 
matter even to imagine. Crowds of men, women, 
and childrell; of the sick, the aged, and the in-
firm,as well as of the robust and the yonng, co-
vered the roads and the fields in every direction. 
Mothers might be seen with infants at their 
breasts, hurrying towards the capital, and weep-
illg as they went; old men; scarcely able to totter 
along, made way chiefly by the aid of their sons 
and daughters; whilst the whole way-side soon 
became strewed with bedding, blankets, and other 
species of household furniture, which the weary 
fugitives were unable to carry further. During 
the retreat of Sir John Moore's army, numerous 
heart-rending scenes were brought before us;. for 
then, as now, the people-particularly in Galicia 
-fled at our approach; but they aH returned, 
sooner or later, to theirhomes, nor ever dreamed 
of accumulating upon ourline of marchó or follow-
ing our fortunes. The case was different here. 
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Those who forsook their dwellings, forsook them 
under the persm¡.sion that they should never be-
hold them again; and the agony which such an 
apprehension appeared to excite among the majo-
ritf, exceeds any attempt at' description. N or 
was it on aceount of the immediate suffering of the 
eountry people alone that we were disposed. on 
the present occasion, to view the measure with 
regret. 1t could not but occur to us, that, though 
the devastating system must inevitably bear hard 
upon the French, the most serious evils would~ in 
aH probability, arise out ofit, both to ourselvesand 
our allies, from the famine and general distress 
which it threatened to bring upon a crowd so 
dense, shut up within the walls of a single city. 
There cán be no question now,that this very mea-
sure, more perhaps than any other, preserved Por-
tugal from subjugation, and England from defeat; 
but, at the moment, there were few amongst.us, 
who seemed not disposed to view it with reproba-
tion; because, whilst they condemned its appa-
rent violation oí. every feeling of humanity and 
justiee, they doubted the soundness of the poliey 
in whieh it originated. 
Whilstwe were thuscondueting ourselves, march-
ing with deliberation, and sweeping before us all 
the reSOurces of the country, the enemy had ad-
vanced as far as Leira, and. seemed disposed, to 
foHow us up with the fuH vigour of the sehool in 
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whieh their leader had learned his tacties. Their 
videttes entered Leira about a eouple of hours 
after our rear-guard quitted it, and they had, in 
consequence, before them a choice of two roads to 
Lisbon, one by the Tagus, the other bX the Sála. 
But on both we were equally well prepared to re-
ceive them, as the following description of the new 
arrangement of our forces will show. 
It has been stated aboye, that in continuation of 
the retreat from Leira upon the lines, the head-
quarters of our army were established, on the 
evening of the 5th, at Alcoba~a. From Aleoba~a 
a further falling baek was made upon Torres Ve-
dras and Rio Major; and from the lattei' of these 
pIaees the troops began, on the 10th, to move into 
the position. On that day General Hill's corps, 
whieh had returned from the Ponte de Mareel1a 
upon Thomar, arrived at"Villa Franca; and on the 
followillg morning every division occupied the 
ground marked out for it, and aU were in readiness, 
at a momenfs notice, to assume the posts which 
they might be required to defend. 
Though 1 have already laid before the reader 
something of a rude outline of tbe position of 
Torres Yedras, 1 am tempted at the present stage. 
of my narrative, that he may he the better able to 
understand the plan of operations upon whieh it 
was proposed to aet, to go rather more at length 
into its localities and general disposition. 1 am 
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willing to believe, likewise, that ihe repetitions 
which may be necessary, will be perused, even by 
the unmilitary reader, without disgust; because it 
is to the wise occupation of that position, and to 
the judicious method pursued in maintaining it, 
that the ultimate success of the Peninsular war is 
to be attributed ; and because it will long continue, 
even in its rude outlines, to present to future gene-
rations an enduring testimonial to the sagacity and 
unconquerable firmness of our leader. With this 
preface, 1 proceed now to describe, in as accurate 
terms as 1 am able to employ, both the arrange-
ment of the troops, and the nature of the champ 
de bataille, upon which the fate, not of Lisbon 
onIy, but of Europe itself was to be decided. 
Along the neck of the Peninsulaat the extre .. 
mity of whichLisbon is bui!t, there extend severa! 
ranges of high and rugged hills, intersected ~ere 
and there by narrow passes, and covered, for the 
most part, by deep ravines and defiles, in the 
usual acceptation of the term, impassable. Along 
these, at the distance of perhaps 25 English miles 
from, the city, Lord Wellington had selected two 
lines, one considerably in advance ofthe other, but 
both of tremendous strength; and he had bestowed 
upon their fortification so much of care, and dili.;. 
gence, 'and science, as to place them almost equally 
beyond the reach ofinsult from any assailing force, 
however numerous and well supplied. Jfhe sys-
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tem pursued onthis occasion was quite novel, and 
the works erected were altogether such as were 
not to be met with under similar circumstances in 
any part ofthe world. It will not be necessary to 
enter at muchlength into the merits of the second 
line, because its strength was never tried; but of 
the first or more advanced force, the following will 
be found to contain a tolerably correct sketch. 
This line rested its right upon the acclivities of 
Alhandra, on the summit of which several for-
midable redoubts were erected, and was flanked 
by the fire of adozen gun-boats, at anchor in the 
Tagus. The faces of these hilIs were all carefuIly 
scarped; the road which led through them. was 
destroyed; and it was with' perfect justice con-
cluded, that here, at least, our position might be 
pronounced impregnable. On the left of these 
heights laya ravine or gully, called the pass of 
Maltao, the gorge of which was effectually blOcked 
up by .two formidableredoubts; whilst it was 
completely comrnanded, on one hand by the hilIs 
of Alhándra, and o~ the other by those of Armeda. 
Thelatter, like the forrner, were. scarped, and 
otherwise rendered inaccessible; and they com-
municated with the centre of the position, which 
was a huge mountain, crowned bya redoubt more 
extensive than any other in the lineo As this 
mountain overhung the village of Sobral, its castle 
kept cornpletely at command the great road which 
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conducts from thenoe to Lisbon, and rendered it 
utterly hopeless for any body of men so much as 
to attempt a passage in that direction. On the 
left of this redoubt, again, some high and broken 
ground looked down upon Zebreira, and stretched 
in formidable shape towards Pataneira. J ust 
behind that village there is a deep glen, succeeded 
by other hills, which cover the roads from Ribal-
deira to Exara de los Cavalleiros and Lisbon; 
whilst on the left of the whole was a lofty moun-
tain, which crowded up all the space between 
these roads and Torres Vedras. Such is a brief 
detail of the leading features in this position; than 
which it wiU be seen that, independently of all 
that art had done for it, few can be imagined more 
formidable; but when it is further undel'stood 
that the ascents were all steep, rugged, and rocky ; 
that -strong vineyards and deep ground everywhere 
covered the front; and that, wherever natural ob-
stacles chanced to be fewer in numbel', or Iess in-
superable in kind than couId have been desired, 
labour had not failed to suppIy them; and when 
these things are taken into consideration, an army 
once brought thither must either be faIse to itself, 
or it might defy aH the force of the French em-
pire seriousIy to molest it. 1t remains now to 
state in what order, and with what design. tIte 
troops were arranged for its defence. 
On the right of the whole was posted General 
VOL. n. B 
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Hill's corps, the British troops occupying the vil-
lage of Alhandra, where they were kept ready to 
be moved to any point which seemed most to be 
threatened ; whilst the Pórtuguese stood prepared 
to throw thernselves into the redoubts, and to 
defend thern to the last extremity. Next to Hill's 
carne Crawford's division, having the heights of 
Arruda, and the works attached to thern, pecu-
liarly intrusted to its careo Then carne General 
Pack's Portuguese brigade; the whole of which 
were stationed in the great redoubt of which 1 
have aIread y spoken. as crowning the hill aboye 
Sobral; whilst Sir Brent Spencer's division garri-
soned the high ground aboye Zebreira, as far as 
the village of Pataneira. General Picton's right 
joined itself to Spencer's left, in rear of the last-
named place, at the ravine which there broke in ; 
and Cole's division, connecting itself with Picton's, 
carried on the line across the hills, as far as the 
road to Exara de Cavalleiros and Lisbon. Last 
of aH came General Campbell's corps, which occu-
pying the mountain between the· road and Torres 
Yedras, formed the extreme left of our arrny. 
1 have spoken of redoubts and other works, as 
giving additional s.trength to this stupendous posi-
tion; it is right that 1 should refer to thero in 
terrns sornewhat more explicito The reader is 
not, perhaps, ignorant, that in fortifying a line, 
su eh as that of Torres Yedras, for the· support of a 
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large army in the field, the ordinary practice is to 
construct batteries and other points d'appui, 
which shall present as imposing a front as may be 
to . the attacking force, but shall be open and 
-utterly defenceless from the rearo In the present 
instance, however, the redoubts thrown up were 
not so much field-works as regular castles, many 
of which were capable of containing several hun-
dreds, whilst one required no fewer than three 
thousand men to form its garrison. These were 
built as if each had -been intended to stand a 
. siege of s~x weeks, at the most moderate computa-
tion; they were placed in situations which ren-
dered them quite as defensible froro one side as 
from another; and they were aH, to a certain ex-
tent at least, independent of those near them, and 
well sheItered from their fire, should they fall into 
the-hands of the enemy. It wasLord Wellington's 
design to garrison these posts chiefiy with the 
militia and least disciplined regiments; whilst he 
kept the whole of the British troops, and the élite 
of the Portuguese, free and unencumbered, to be 
employed as circumstances might require. By 
this arrangement he secured to himself the double 
advantage of a moveable army and a fortified 
place. Supposing the position to be forced, the 
forts were still there to interrupt the enemy's com-
munications, and cut off their supplies ; whilst the 
columns need only to be marched a few miles to 
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the rear, in order to assume ground even more 
defensible than that which they abandoned. 1 am 
not willing to detain the reader by any remarks of 
my own, at a period of the narrative so replete 
with interesting oecurrences: but 1 cannot pro-
ceed further, without desiring to draw the atten-
tion of my brother soldiers in a particular manner 
not only to the subject of which 1 am now speak-
ing, but to the whole plan of this campaign; be-
cause 1 am sme that a British army never took 
part in one better adapted to. instruct it in the art 
of manreuvring 'on a great scale, nor consequenUy 
so well calculated to make efficient officers of those 
who shared in it, or are disposed to take the trou-
ble of studying it as it deserves. 
In the course of this narrative 1 have, in general, 
eonfined myself so much to the movements of the 
troops placed immediately under the orders of 
Lord Wellington, that the reader, were he not 
instructedfrom different sourees, might remain 
ignorant that there were other corps of greater 01' 
less efficiency employed at different points in our 
favour, during the entire summer. These were, a 
body of mili tia under Colonel Trant, which moved 
hither and thither as eircrimstances seemed to re-
quire; General Silveira's army, consisting of sorne 
eight thousand irregulars; a portion of the Lusi-
tanian Legion, under Colonel Wilson; besides 
bandsof guerillas in all directions. It is deserving 
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of record, that Lord Wellington kept the whole of 
these irregular troops among the mountains and 
fastnesses, in points of perfeet seeurity, till the 
ópportunity arrived for bringing them into play. 
At what moment this oeeurred, and to what uses 
they were eventual1y turned, will best be under-
stood by glaneing back through the whole of the 
eampaign, from its opening' up to the present hour. 
The faH of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Almeida, instead of disclosing at once the plan 
upon whieh Massena was preparing to aet, left us 
for some time as mueh in the dark as ever; inas-
much as Regnier's eorps remained on the left of 
the Tagus, and seemed still to threaten the division 
of General HiB. The eonseqllence was, that an 
opinion generaIly prevailed in our army-and 1 
have reason to believe that it was embraced by the 
Commander-in-ehief-that he would make his 
main push upon our right flank, and amusing us in 
front, follow up our movements with one corps 
onIy. The defences of the Zezere were, under 
these eircumstanees, naturally looked to by us as 
of paramount importance; and it was chiefly to 
secure them, that General Leith's eorps was formed 
at Thomar, and kept in reserve. Contrary to all 
expectation, however, and in direet defiance of 
every ordínary rule ofmilitary manreuvre, Massena 
left our right unmolested; and thoughhe was 
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compelled to move upon a much larger portion of 
the circumference of the circle than we were f he 
threw his whole army~ in masterIy style, to the 
north bank of the Mondego. He was quite aware 
that, did we perceive this movement, Hill could be 
brought into junction with us within a shorter 
space of time than would be requisite to connect 
Regnier with himself; and he knew also that the 
movement could hardly be made witbout our 
knowledge.· Massena, therefore, adopted his plans 
up~m principIes more deep and more ~ubtile than 
usualIy guide men in theirundertakings. By the 
less observing, it was affirmed that he had chosen 
the only road which was impassable for artillery; 
and that he moved his arrny in·· one line, merely 
that a reasonable excuse D1ight be made for the 
delay on which he had already determined. There 
is not, however, justice in these notions. Massena 
took a road by which, and by which alone, he was 
enabled to avoid the whole of the defences of the 
Zezere, the strong positions of Sarsedas and Ponte 
de Marcella, and, 1 may add, thevery rock upon 
which he chose to make temporary· shipwreck of 
his prospects, the line of Bnsaco; for had he per-
si$ted in his prudent course, and followed at once 
the path by the Sierra de Caramala, he might have 
arrived at the point where he now stood, within 
a few leagues of Lisbon. N ow let attention be 
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paid to the plan of operations, by which Lord 
Wellington contri ved to render aH the ta lent and 
prudence of his skilful adversary ofno avail. 
The first measure which our .chief adopted was 
this: he caused an excellent road to be made on 
the 80uth side of the Mondego, which extended an 
the way from Celerico to Ponte de Marcella, and 
beyond it to Coimbra. His next step was to pro-
vide against the delays and confusion to which the 
enemy, who moved in a single continuous column, 
were subject. FoI' this purpose, as he had deter-
mined, on many accounts, not to risk an action on 
the fI'ontier, he took the precaution to throw his 
divisions and brigades along the great gorge, ex-
tending from Celerico to the Alva; and he so ar-
ranged them, as that when the army began to 
move, the troops followed one another by stages, 
in tbe utmost regularity, and without any of that 
bustle which a march en masse unavoidably occa-
síons. Possessed of these advantages, Lord Wel-
lington saw, clearly enough, that it was in his 
power, ~n the event of Massena's advance by any 
single road, to cross the Mondego with his whole 
force, and to throw himself, whenever he chose, 
between the enemy and Coimbra. As soon, there-
fore, as Massena's designs were satisfactorily as-
certained, he fixed, with a master's eye, upon the 
banks of the Dao and the Criz, as the proper spots 
at which to cast impediments in the way ofthe 
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French; whilst he should perform the arduous 
and enterprising operation, of throwing the entire 
of his infantry, artillery, and stores, by wretched 
fords, and still more wretched bridges, across a 
river of no ordinary dimensions or difficulties. 
AH was .accomplished in the very order and 
manner which he had in his own mind chalked 
out. The bridges on the Dao. and the Criz were 
then destroyed with astonishing celerity. Craw-
ford and Pack, with the advanced-guard, were 
thrown across at Santa Comba Dao, and the rest 
of the army accomplished a very brilliant ~a­
nreuvre with the utmost accuracy and perfection; 
fuI' not a gun got out of its place during the con~ 
tinuance of the march, and when the moment of 
inquiry arrived, everything was found in the exact 
spot which it had be en intended to occupy. But 
the most extraordinary feature of all remains yet 
10 be noticed. From the instant when he fixed 
upon the position of Busaco, Lord Wellington ex-
pressed his firm conviction that he would be at-
tacked there; and he adhered to that opinion, in 
opposition to the sentiments of every fUllctiollary 
by whom he was surrounded. There was a de-
gree of prescience in this for which it is impossible 
accurately to account"; for there cannot be a ques-
tion as to the course which the enemy ought to 
have adopted, alld which it was their wisdom to 
adopto Instead of dashing themselves madly 
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against US, they ought to have continued to take 
ground to their right, and so gone round a stu-
pendous mountain, which the slightest exercise 
of milital'y penetration might. have shown that 
they need not hope to pass. It is true that at 
this time Colonel Trant, with his corps, ought to 
have taken post at Sardao: he had received orders 
to proceed thither, with a view of strengthening 
our left; and it may be that the enemy had been 
]ed to think of him as actually in that situation. 
But had the case been so, it requires no depth of 
discernment to discover that aH the resistance 
which it was in his power to offer, would have 
availed nothing against three French corps; more 
especially when it is considered that there are 
numerous· passes from Mortagao, by the Vouga, 
into the Oporto road, which Trant possessed 
neither force nor means adequate to watch. It 
were absurd, therefore, to speak of this notion, as 
at the time it was not unusual to speak of it, as in 
any degree inHuencing Massena in the comse 
which he pursued; for it requires only a glance 
over the map to convince any one that all effort to 
stop the enemy in the Hat country between the 
Busaco and the sea, must have be en fruitless. 
Had they chosen to bring their united force into 
that arena, we could have done nothing to arrest 
their progress; and hence it is, that 1 speak of 
Lord WeUington's prescience as something quite 
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out of the ordinary course of events, inasmuch as 
Busaco was a position simply and solely because 
the enemy thoughtfit by attacking to give to it 
that character. 
That the success which crowned our efforts at 
Busaco was productive of the most beneficial con-
sequences, and that the manreuvres which pre-
ceded the- battle were all admirable in their kind, 
admits not of a doubt. By means of these _the 
enemy's arrival at Coimbra was delayed, and time 
given for the removal of the inhabitants; an advan-
tage which became the more vital, as we had been 
disappointed in our expectation of an attack upon 
the position of Ponte de Marcella. Far be it from 
me, therefore, to throw out so much as an insinua-
tion that everything was not conducted with con-
summate ability and admirable foresight. Yet is 
it as clear as the sun at noon-day, not only that 
Massena might have passed us by without fight-
ing, but that, when we abandoned the ground of 
our victory at Busaco, we did so, not because 
Trant had failed in reaching his allotted station, 
but because the ground was in itself indef~nsible. 
The truth ¡s, that Massena, in this campaign, by 
no means supported the reputation whichhis 
previous services had obtained for him, or carne up 
to the opinion which we had formed of him, as a 
master of the military arto Throughout our 
retreat, he scarcely ever followed us up with the 
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vigour which gene rally attends the movements of 
a pursuing army, and all his operations were 
marked by a languor and supineness which sur-
prised not less than they gratified uso It seemed 
as ifthe Fren~h soldiers had already learned to 
stand in fear of us, or that they had ceased to be 
the men before whom the nations of the north 
one after another gave way. Had we been at all 
pushed, hampered as we were with the whole 
population of the country, it would have been 
impracticable, at more than one place, to hinder 
stores and even stragglers from falling into the 
enemy's hands; but from .the hour of our first 
movement, up to the moment of our arrival in 
the lines, not an effort was made so to harass 
uso It is time, however, that 1 should cease from 
this somewhat technical dissertation, and resume,'-
where 1 permitted it to slip, the thread of my 
story. 
During the last week of our retrogression the 
rain fell in uninterrupted torrents; flooding all the 
plains, cutting up the roads, and swelling every 
mountain-stream to a roaring cataract .. In spite. 
however, of the difficulties thence arising,· and 
nothing daunted by the numerous privations 
which threatened to befall his army in· an ex-
hausted country, Massena continued his march; 
driving us back upon our strength; our re~ources, 
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our magazines, and our provisions, whilst his own 
were suffering continual diminution, and his com-
munications with therear becoming daily more and 
more msecure. The truth is, that both parties 
were now committed to a desperate game. On 
our side the chances of success were, doubtless, 
infinitely greater than on the side of the enemy, 
inasmuch as our position was excellent, our 
troops were fresh and in high spirits, our supplies 
were abundant, and the capital in our rear was 
tranquil ;but we could not conceal from our-
selves that the game was still desperate, as well 
with us as with them. Were we, by any fatality, 
to suffer a defeat; were the French to force our 
lines, and make themselves masters of our intrench-
ments, through the imbecility 01' treachery of their 
defenders, or through any other of those accidents 
to which war is ever liable, the chances were, 
that neither army nor ships would ever escape 
from the Tagus .. We were thetefore in the situa-
tion of men about to make their last throw, and to 
stake upon it, not temporary prosperity, but actual 
existence. The French, on the other hand, whilst 
they advanced against us, plunged into a district 
where means of subsistence must soon be wanting 
to them, and left their rear to be acted upon by 
clouds of irregulars, whom Lord Wellington now 
surnmoned from their fastnesses for the purpose. 
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The bodies to which I anude were, five thousand 
men under Trant, which were hurrying along the 
road [rom Oporto to Coimbra; a similar force of 
militia under Wilson, which had already arrived 
at Busaco, and had taken sorne prisoners; two 
distinct corps, the one estimated at fifteen thou-
sand men, under Silveira, the other at eight or 
ten thousand men, under Bacillar, which were 
advancing from the north; besides numerous 
straggling bands, aH animated by the same feeling 
of deadly hatred towards the French. Now these 
. corps, .though very inferior to regular ttoops, were 
still capable of creating constant alarm; inasmuch 
as they were ever at hand to cut off convoys, to 
destroy stragglers, to surprise magazines, al1d to 
harass the rear-guard ; whilst in front the prospect 
of a resistance was held out, which Massena could 
notcontemplate without the most serious appre-
hensiol1. That the enerny considered their situa-
tion one of extreme peril and hazard, Wás dis-
tinctly proved by the state of inactivity into which 
they saan fell; as if they felt their inability to 
perform that which their wishes prompted, and 
yet were unwilling to resign all hope without at 
least ane effort to rea1ise it. 
In the mean while Lord Wellington, whose 
exertions were unintermitting, and whose activity 
of body al1d mind surpassed all that could have 
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been expected even from him, was receiving every 
hour fresh encouragements to persevere in the 
judicious system which he had adopted. For 
sorne time back he had been very urgent with his 
own government, to send such reinforcements as 
his circumstances required; and he was about 
this time gratified by the arrival in camp of six 
battalions from England, and four from Cadiz; 
amounting, in aH, to between seven and eight 
thousand men. By this happy addition, the effec-
tive strength of the British army was increased to 
thirty-three thousand soldiers; whilst th~ SUill 
total of its strength upon paper fell not short of 
forty-one thousand. Nor was this the only addi-:, 
tion which he received to his force at a moment 
so critical. He prevailed upon Romana, whose 
continuance on the southern frontier was proved 
to be productive of no serious advantage, to join 
him with as large a portion of his corps as he 
could venture to remove; and fhere came in, in 
consequence, about three thousand Spaniards, the 
élite of the Spanish army, under that officer. The 
corps in question marched from Badajoz and 
Campo Major, and reaching the Tagus at Aldea 
Gallega, was brought over from thence, and took 
post at Exara de los· Cavalleiros, as a support to 
our centre. Thus, with thirty-three thousand 
British, thirty thousand Portuguese, and three 
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thousand Spaniards, the allied arrny could muster 
nearly seventy thousand men; of which the com-
parative inefficiency of sorne of its parts was more 
than cornpensated by the nature of the ground 
which it occupied. 
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CHAPTER n. 
Massena halts before the lines, which are industriously strength-
ened by the British troops-Lord WeIlington, alarmed ror 
Abrantes, sends a corps across the Tagus to secure it-For-
tifies a new position on the south side of the harbour-The 
enemy construct hoats on the river-Retire to 8antarem, and 
take up a position-The allies follow, and go into canton-
ments in front of them-V arious movements of detached 
hodies, and many rumours touching the future. 
LITTLE occurred in our irnmediate presence par-
ticularly deserving of notice, for some time aftel' 
we finally took up the position of the Zebreira. A t 
first, indeed, a few affail's· of cavalry took place, 
most of which ended in oul' favour; but latterly 
this force was removed to the real', as well be-
cause their services were not needed, as beca use 
they could there be hetter supplied with forage, 
than among the rugged defiles in front. There 
\Vere also two partial rencontres of infantry; one 
in which sorne Portuguese regiments, attached to 
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General Cole's division, behaved well whilst re~ 
tiring from Ribaldusa towards Guaxara; and ano-
ther, which gave to the 71st regiment, assisted 
by a company of the 95th and ~ few Germans, a 
brilliant opportunity of distinguishing themselves. 
On the 14th, a strong body of French troops at· 
tacked a redoubt at Sobral, which the 71st were 
appointed to hold. That gallant regiment not 
only repulsed the assailants, but following them 
beyond the lines, drove them, in their turn, from a 
work which they had begun to construct on a 
height opposite, and kept possession of the gronnd 
which they had gained. These, however, were 
the only instances in which large bodies of men 
carne into contacto The pickets, particularly oa 
our right, would, from time to time, engage, and a 
good deal of desultory firing was the conseq uence ; 
but such skirmishes produced no memorable re-
sults, and were, in general, productive of few ca-
sualties. The only person of note, indeed, that 
feH on either side, was the French General St. 
Croix, who was killed by a cannon-shot from one 
of our gun-boats, as he was reconnoitring. . He 
was an ófficer of distinguished gallantry and higb 
character-one of the best in the cavalry servÍce 
-Of the Emperor; and 1 Qwn that we sincerely 
lamented the sorry manner in which a brave so}, .. 
dier, who came with honour and safety through 
VOL. 11. e 
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the perils of Austerlitz, Esli~g, and Wagram, lost 
his Jife. 
But though all remained quiet in our camp, 
and in that of the enemy, the latter were begin-
ning every day to experience more and more se-
verely the difficulties of the undertaking in which 
they had embarked. Their communications be-
carne hourly less and less open; sickness began 
to spread itself through their ranks; the stock of 
provisions whch, in spite of our exertions to pre-
vent it, they had, on their first arrival, contrived 
to discover, was rapidly wasting; and desertions 
were exceedingly frequent. Their regular tr90PS in 
the rear, were, moreover, singularly active; and 
their enterprises proved to be, for the most part, 
not more spirited than successful. A corps of 
Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant and Ge-
neral Miller, entered Coimbra on the 7th, where 
they captured a considerable depot of stores, as 
well as four thousand sick and wounded, who had 
been lodged there in hospital. This done, they 
made ready the bridge over the Mondego for de-
struction; and then pushing their cavalry towards 
Condeixa, harassed Massena's rear with continual 
skirmishes. In entering upon the latter under-
taking, they felt theÍnselves perfectly secure; for 
it was in their power, at any moment, to retire, if 
attacked by superior force, across the river, and 
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breaking down the bridge in their rear, to set all the 
enemy's efforts to molest them at defiance. The 
consequence was, that their attacks were both bold 
and well managed; and the enemy lost not a few, 
as well of those who met the assailants face to face, 
as from the stragglers and plundering parties, which, 
in spite of all risks, persisted in straying from their 
eolumn. 
A delay so continued, and so little expected 
from the French Marshal, not unnaturally led to 
a variety of conjectures, on our parts, as to its 
originating causes and probable results. The 
whole of Massena's operations,considered merely 
in a military point of view, appeared to be so ¡n-
explicable, that we found ourselves under the ne-
eessity of regarding' them in a different light, and 
referring them to political considerations entirely. 
Hehad acted, from his first assumption 'Of the 
eommand, as if he were embarked in an under-
taking, of the ultimate success of which he was 
far from being sanguine; and in which he ha-
zarded his reputation on no other aceount, than 
because he knew ~t to be a business, in the prose-
cution of which the Emperor was deeply in-
terested. There feH into our hands, during this 
interval, several letters; sorne of instruction to 
Massena from N apoleon; others, on private busi-
ness between Massena and his brother marshals. 
Many of these were curious and interesting docu-
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ments; and those of the former class showed 
that the sources of information open to the enemy 
were more ample and more correct than could 
have beensupposed. The Emperor's directions 
to Massena, which had reference to the opening 
of the campaign, required him to enter Portugal 
without delay, and to bring the English to battle 
wherever he should find them. It was stated 
that there were but sixteen thousand British 
troops under Lord Wellington iil person, and only 
four thousand under Hill; that the whole united, 
inclusive of the Portuguese, could not exceed 
thirty thousand men; that the Portuguese were 
little better than brigands; and that there could 
be nothing capable of arresting the progre ss of a 
French force, which counted sixty thousand in-
fantry and twelve thousand cavalry, between 
Ciudad Rodrigo and the capital. The probability 
that four thousand men would shortly be brought 
from Cadiz, was, moreover, urged as a reason why 
Massena should sufrer no delays on his march; 
whilst it was added that the spies in London 
wrote strongly of the intentions of the English to 
embark as soon as they should be hard pressed, 
and abandon the country. Now it is worthy of 
notice, that the nmnbers specified aboye, corres-
ponded exactly with the effective state of our, 
army during the ear]y summer; and there is no 
doubt that, at the moment when Buonaparte 
PENINSULAR \VAR. 37 
wrote, serious thoughts were entertained, if not in 
Portugal, certainly in London, of relinquishing the 
contest as profitIess, and beyond the means of 
England to support. 
From the tenor of this communication we were 
Ied to believe that Massena had, as 1 have already 
hinted, embarked in a series of operations which 
his j udgment condemned; and that he now found 
himself reduced to the mortifying alternative of 
either risking all upon the chances of a battle, or 
of remaining where he was, in spite of the nume~ 
rous privations to which he was subject, till fresh 
instructions should reach him from Paris. Had he 
confined his views, if not previously to his defeat 
at Busaeo, at all events after that event oeeurred, 
to the north of Portugal, taking up the line of the 
Mondego for the winter, and detaehing a corps to 
occupy Oporto, he would have made himself mas-
ter of a portion of the country; and making the 
most of his successes at Ciudad Rodrigo and AI-
meida, would have optained credit for having ac-
complished a tolerably brilliant campaign. But 
that opportunity was gone by. He had be en re-
pulsed at Busaco; he had passed the Mondego, 
with a perfeet knowledge all the while, that his 
communications would beco me at every step more 
uncertain; he saw the whole militia of Portugal 
rising in his rear, and yet leít his sick at Coimbra, 
without a sufficient garrison to proteet them. He 
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had done all this, not that he might follow us with 
vigour, for the pursuit was so delibera te, that all 
our stiagglers and almost aH our baggage escaped 
uninjured; and now he lay perfectly inactive in 
our front. lt was quite impossible to imagine that 
an officer of Massena's character could have acted 
thus, had he not acted under the influence of com-
pulsion. To that, therefore, we unhesitatingly 
attributed the proceedings of our opponent. We 
had reason to believe that he had despatched mes-
sengers to demand, either that strong reinforce-
nlents should be sent to him, or that fresh instnic-
tions, suitable to the turn which affairs had taken, 
might be granted; and we accordingly looked 
forward to a continuance of the procrastinating 
system for sorne time to come; for reinforce-
ments, supposing the plan of reinforcing to be 
adopted, could not arrive in a day. It is true that 
the French corps in Galicia, augmented by every-
thing in Castile, would prove formidable; and 
that the space between Galicia and Massena's en-
campmen1, might be traversed with perfect ease 
in a fortnight. But the garrisons could not be 
·withdrawn from Galicia and Castile ti11 others 
arrived to replace them; and of the movement of 
any force adequate to that purpose we knew no-
thing. Our minister at Lisbon, Sir Charles Stuart, 
spoke indeed of fun forty thousand men as on their 
way through Spain; but the only corps of which 
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our intelligence took notice, consisted of no more 
than nine battalions of infantry, and two thousand 
cavalry, on its march from Vittoria, towards the 
Portuguese frontier. There WélS, no doubt, a pos-
sibility that the blockade of Cadiz might be inter-
mitted; in which case the arrny hitherto employed 
there, uniting itself to Mortier's corps, might enter 
Alentejo full twenty-five thousand strong,; and if 
to this twenty thousand more could be added, on 
the route from Galicia to Oporto, then indeed we 
might expect sorne severe service belore long. 
But however judicious all these measures might be 
in themselves, there was nothing before us calcu-
lated to excite an apprehension, that they were 
really in process of completion. On the con-
trary, we were led, from a variety of oc curren ces, 
to guess that Massena's views leaned more to a 
retreat than to an advance; and that he delayed 
the former movement only till the sanctioll of his 
master should be obtained, and his own credit 
should be thereby saved. 
The advanced parties of the Portuguese being 
pushed on as far as Leira, and the garrison of 
Abrantes seriously incommoding the French, the 
latter moved in forceupon Salvatierra, where they 
succeeded in establishing a bridge across the Ta-
gus, and so laid open to themselves the province 
of Alentejo. This might be for the purpose of 
securing those supplies which were no longer to 
~_ .. ~~.-:--If~": ~ ~ ,l",· " 
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be had from the north; but taken ill connexioll 
with a rumour which prevailed of an intended at-
tack upon Abrantes, it appeared to us that Massena 
was anxious to keep the Alentejo open as a line 
by which his escape wouldbe secured. Abrantes, 
however, was so well supplied and garrisoned, as 
to leave us little ground to apprehend any misfor-
tune there, unless, indeed, it were attacked by a 
force greater than the enemy could well spare from 
our front; and hence we reflected, that if he 
should retreat l?y the Alentejo, he must march by 
a single toad, and that the means were still in our 
hands of intercepting him, should we fee1 ourselves 
sufficiently strong; or at least of harassing him 
dreadfulIy, should that course appear "more advisa-
ble. To s-peak with candour, however, it must be 
confessed that Massena's designs were as mysterious 
to us as they were probably vague and undefined 
even to himself; and we accordingly remained to 
watch the result, not in id lenes!'!, hut in security, 
upan our line ofimpregnable hilIs and fortifications. 
There arose, at this time, 80mething like a 
question amongst us, whether a movement on the 
offensive, entered upon at this critical j uncture y 
ll1ight not bringabout the most favourable results. 
By su eh as argued in favour of the movement, it 
was urged that the French were diminished in 
numbers, broken in spirit, and devoid of confidence; 
that the soldiers distrusted their leaders, and the 
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leaders distrusted the soldiers; and that a spirited 
attack made at such a moment, would not only 
not be resisted, but that it would probably end in 
- a victory more complete than had been obtained 
during the war. Fortunately for the cause of 
which he was the main support, our chief saw 
matters in a very different light. We estimated 
the losses of the French army at the highest, when 
we put down the amount, by deaths, sickness, de~ 
sertion, and the casualties of battle, at fifteen thou~ 
sand meno Now, as they moved into the country 
with fuIl sixty-two thousand, this would still leave 
tbem forty-seven thousand with which to meet us; 
and as we could not pretend to bring more than 
fifty thousand beyond the lines, our numerical 
superiority would be an advantage hardly worth 
calcuJating upon. To counterbalance it entirely, 
again, it was to be considered that the enemy 
were aIl veteran troops; whilst of ours, the larger 
proportion were raw levies of Portuguese and 
Spaniards, in many instances wretchedly officered, 
and in aIl, but little accustomed to fleld movements~ 
i~' ThePortuguese had, indeed, behaved gallantly at 
Busaco; and we were disposed to place in them 
as much confidence as could be re po sed in any 
soldiers as yet so imperfectly instructed in their 
duty; but we should have hardly looked to them 
for that regularity of manrellvre over a broken and 
varied traet of eountry, which we should be sure 
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to find in the well~ained troops to whom they 
would be opposed. Besides, our attack, if made 
at aH, must be made without cannon; for we had 
so completely destroyed the roads, and scarped the 
faces of the heights, that artillery could not be 
advanced, either by the one or the othel', as long 
as an enemy lay befóre us to impede its progress. 
The enemy, therefore, ifbeaten at all-which was 
surely, under such circumstances, problematical-
could not be beaten without a heavy 10ss on our 
side; and that 10ss would, as a matter of course, 
faH upon the best men; because sueh only would 
. be found at their posts. N ow ir, again, the defeat 
were not perfeet, if it amounted to anything less 
than a total rout and dissolution ofthe al'my, where 
would be the benefit arising from it? Massena 
would retire upon sorne strong positions, disputing 
with us every inch of the country, and finally 
make his escape to the reinforeements in his real' ; 
whilst we should have exhausted ours, and erip-
pled our whole resources; fol' the attainment of 
only a momentary advantage. N ay, it was far 
from being impossible, that whilst we wel'e follow-
ing up the eorps opposed to us, othel's might ad-
vanee upon the lines, of neeessity feebly manned ; 
and should these be carried, not even the total de-
struction of Massena and his army would compen-
sate for the misfortune. On all these aceounts, 
and wi th the firm conviction on his mind, that 
PENINSULAR WAR. 43 
things were working as advantageouslyas he could 
desire, Lord Wellington determined to adhere to 
his defensive system; and the event proved, that 
as his reasoning had not proceeded upon mistaken 
grounds, so the results to which it led were not 
fallacious. 
N either the time of our soldiers nor that of 
their chief was, however, wasted in idleness. The 
former were busily employed in the construction 
of new works, wherever their erection appeared at 
all desirable, and in giving additional solidity to 
those already thrown up; till the lines became as 
perfect aspecimen of a fortified position as it was 
possible for nature and art to produce. The latter 
was indefatigable in his exertions to bring his 
army into a condition of general efficiency, and 
his exertions were too judiciously applied not to 
be erowned with success. The Portuguese being 
now thoroughly amalgamated with the British 
troops, learned from them aH those lessons which 
in after campaigns they turned to an excellent 
account; and Beresford, to whom the entire merit 
of their first trainingis due, was in consequence re-
lieved from all further responsibility in field opera-
tions. Every day brought in its improvements 
among them; and the General was soon rewarded 
for all his trouble by the conviction that he might 
rely upon them almost as perfectly as upon his 
countrymen. N or was Lord Wellington inattentive 
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to the comforts, and even luxuries of his followers. 
Provisions were abundant; there was no want of 
wine; and sports and amusements went on as· if 
we had be en, not at the seat of war, but in Eng-
land. Officers of all ranks, and in every depart-
ment, from the Commander-in-chief down to the 
regimental subaltern, occasionally enjoyed the 
field-sports of hunting, shooting, and fishing. The 
men, too, had their pastimes when not employed 
on duty; in a word, seldom has an army, occupy-
ing ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so 
many hours of relaxation, or contrived to uniteso 
completely the pIe asures of country life with the 
serious business of war. It is probably needless 
to add, that so great a show of security in their 
leader had the best possible effect upon the tem-
per of the troops; or that the morale of the army 
was sustained, not more by a contemplation of 
things as they really were, than by a conviction 
that they must be going on prosperously, other-
wise so much relaxation could not abound. 
1 have said that, in this interval of quiet, a 
variety of intercepted letters, as \vell private as 
official, feH into our hands. Among others, we 
were fortunate enough to become possessed of 
Massena's account of the battle of Busaco, given 
in a demi-official communication addressed to 
Berthier. It was rather a curious despatch, but 
contained, upon the whole, more of truth and can-
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did admissions than were usually to be found in 
French reports of actions. He acknow1edged 
that he had been repulsed in both attempts upon 
our position, with the 10ss of fO\lr thousaryd men, 
besides a large proportion of his best officers, 
whom he requested Berthier to rep]ace without 
delay; and he stated the force with which he had 
attacked, almost exactIy as it had been repre-
sented by Lord Wellington. Where alone he fell 
into error, was in representing Regnier's corps as 
having been opposed by a "colonne serrée" of 
twenty thousand rnen under Hill; whereas it is 
weH known to every militar y man in our army, 
that the colonne serrée was á mode of forrnation of 
which Lord Wellington constan tI y disapproved. 
He had succeeded in overthrowing it at Virniera, 
Ta]avera, and in this very affair of Busaco, and 
was -not, therefore, 1ikely to have adopted it on 
either occasion himself. But it was then so much 
in favour with the French generals, that they put 
no faith in any other method of fighting; and pro-
bably when Massena wrote his detail, he believed 
all that he was writing. 
So passed the time, from the beginning of Oc-
tober, when we took up our ground at Torres 
Ved ras, to the rniddle of November, when we 
were called upon to quit it. Rumours in abun-
dance poured in upon us during this interval, sorne 
of them exhilarating enough, others sufficiently 
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gloomy; but as we seldom paid to such more at-
tention than was their due, ~e rarely permitted 
them to exert any permanent influence over our 
feelings andexpectations. The circumstance which 
served most decidedly to impress us with a belief 
that the enemy were far from being at their ease, 
was, that desertions from their army occurred 
daily; indeed, we received as many as 200 and 
250 deserters in one week. Latterly, however, 
these became less frequent, and strange to say, 
several instances of the kind occurred amongst 
ourselves. We had, moreover, abundant sourCes 
of private gratification, in the many little fétes and 
galas which from time to time occurred; more es-
pecially after the arrival of a king's messenger with 
crosses and medals for the army. But the gayest 
by far which took place at this time was held at 
Mafra, on the 7th of November, on which occasion 
Marshal Beresford was formally invested with the 
order of the Bath. The thing was conducted with 
great state and singular decorum, and gave univer-
sal satisfaction, both to the British officers and to 
the Portuguese inhabitants. At length, however, 
we were roused from this state of pleasurable in-
activity, by a piece of intelligence which we were 
hardly prepared to receive, and which, in conse-
quence, carne upon us with a degree of surprise, 
of which 1 confess. myself inadequate to convey 
any just idea. 
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On the 13th of November advices reached us, 
that a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand 
men wason its way to join the army of Massena ; 
that it had already passed the frontier; and that 
the advance had arrived that day in Sabugal. At 
the same time we were perfectly aware that the 
enemy had for some time back been busily em-
ployed in the construction of a multitude of boats 
at Santarem; 'and that these, with manyalready 
built, which had fallen into their hands, were 
mounted upon wheels, and put in a condition to 
be transported overland to any point where they 
úlight be needed. Whilst we were wavering 
between the belief that Massena meditated a re-
treat, and the notion that very possibly he might 
be disposed to make an attempt upon ,the fort of 
Lisbon from the opposite bank of the Tagus, intel-
ligellce carne in, that not aman was to be seen, 
either .at the outposts, or along the position which 
the French arrny had lately occupied. They broke 
up, it appeared, on the night of the 14th, and were 
departed; but whether in fuH flight with a view to 
abandon Portugal, or merely for the purpose of 
taking up a winter's line, no one appeared to 
know. The movernent was altogether as sudden 
and as unlooked-for as frequently occurs in war; 
and it threw us, for a time, into a state of amaze-
ment, which instantly set all our speculating pro-
pensities into full play. 
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One idea, and not entirely a visionary one, was, 
that Massena despairing of su cee ss, at least during 
the present season, had determined to faH back 
upon Spain ; that his wheeled boats were destined 
to supply the place of bridges over the Zezere, or, 
in case of need, over the Tagus; and that in the 
mean while he was retrograding by Thomar and 
Estrada-nova, for the purpose of meeting and car-
rying along WiLh him the corps which had arrived 
at Sabugal. 1t was objected, however, to this, 
that nothing short of the most pressing necessity 
could justify a measure, which, besides the imme-
diate abandonment of Portugal, must produce the 
very worst effects upon the French interests in 
Spain; and the objection, to say the least of it, 
was not more wanting in force, than the supposi-
tion which it was· brought forward to combato 
True, the army might have exhausted, and they 
probably had exhausted, the supplies which their 
confined situation furnished; and hence it became 
necessary to shift their ground, for the purpose of 
meeting the force now on its march, and the stores 
it was supposed to convey; but a flight into Spain 
was, upon more mature deliberation, pronounced 
improbable; and hence other and no less feasible 
theories were started to supply the place of that 
rejected as soon as proposed. 
1t was supposed, first, that Massena, guessing 
that we might be informed ofhis coming reinforce-
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ment, had become apprehensive of a disposition, 
on our part, to attack him before it arrived; and 
that he deemed it a wise measure to fall hack 
upon stronger ground, there to- await its junction. 
Secondly, and this was the most general opinion of 
the whole, it was surmised that he intended to at-
tempt the reduction of Abrantes by bombci.rdment 
andassault, the fall of which would supply him 
with numerous means of every sort for the future 
prosecution oí a scheme, upon which, at present, 
he was manifestly too weak to think of embarking. 
_ It was therefore believed that the French army 
designed tB place itself in position behind the 
Zezere ; from whence it might oppose aformida,ble 
barrier to any efforts on our part, for the relief of 
a fortress, the possession of which would be of 
incalculable advantage to them, whenever they 
should find themselves sufficientIy strong to -ad-
vanee again upon the capital. 
Abrantes had long been put in an excellent state 
ofdefence, and it was garrisoned by no fewer than 
two regiments of the line and three of militia ; 
had it been left, therefore, entirely to its own re-
sources, there was every prospect of its holding 
out vigorously. This, however, was not the first 
occasion on which we had been alarmed for its 
safety; and measures had in consequence been 
adopted, which placed it further beyond the risk, 
noí only of cápture, but ofinsult. General Fane, 
VOL. JI. D 
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with a brigade of Portug-uese cavalry, accompanied 
. by several guns and a howitzer, had been passed 
Qver the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march 
along the southern bank of the river, and to des-
troy, if p'ossible, any boats which he might observe 
in progress of preparation at Santarem or else-
where. He had obeyed these orders, and kept up 
a long and warm cannonade on the enemy's inei-
pient flo~~lla; but his howitzer having been disabled. 
his round-shot proved of little utility; and as no at-
~empt was madewith the Congreve rockets, whieh 
now, for the first time, might llave been brought 
into play, the enemy suceeeded in completing the 
task which they had begun, and in furnishing 
themselves. with ample means to cross the rivers 
at their pleasure. This was certainly unfortunate, 
. seeing that all the bridges had been carefulIy des-
troyed in their rear; and they were, to a certain 
degree, hemmed in b~tween unfordable streams on 
one hand, and our impassable lines on the other; 
but there was no help foc it; and Fane, finding 
his exertions profitless, went into cantonments. 
He was thus circumstanced in quarters opposite 
10 Santarem, when the retreat of the French be-
gan, and aecordingly"in a situation to render to the 
garrison of Abrantes, in case of an attack, the most 
powerful and opportune assistance. 
The enemy's movement commenced from the 
right of the line from Ribaldeira, Sobra1, and Villa 
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Franca; consequently the first alarm was given 
by General Campbell's division upon our left. 
Lord Wellington instantly wrote to Admiral Berke-
ley, to request that he would send up the launches 
and boats of his fleet, in order tbat means migbt 
be at hand to pass over General Hill's or any otber 
corps wbich might be selected, to the left bank of 
the Tagus. At the same time, General Crawford's 
divisibn was ordered to advance from the Arruda 
heights to Alenquer; and General Hill's, from 
Alhandra to Villa Franca, with directions to feel 
their way futther to the front, but to act with 
caution. On the 15th, it was discovered that the 
enemy were moving the whole oí their force on the 
great road by the Tagús, a sniall detachment on]y 
being left to protect the path which leads by Al .. 
cantara and Rio Major to Santarem. As soon as 
this' was known, General Spencer's division pushed 
into Sobral and Alenquer; whilst Crawford, press-
ing forward from the latter place to Villa Nova 
and Azembaja, discovered the enerny's rear-guard 
in position between it and Cartaxo. These last-
mentioned movements occurred on the J 6th; on 
which day likewise the head-quarters were trans-
ferred to Alenquer; but as it was of essential 
importance" that we should be fully informed re-
pecting the enemy's probable designs, before we 
committed ourselves too far by any more rapid 
pursuit, a halt was ordered to take place on the 
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17th, in order that time might be granted for 
the arrival of a report froIl). General Fane, whose 
situation gave him excellent opportunities of 
watching with etfect the" movement of Massena's 
columns. 
The report in question arrived in due thne, and 
it led us to believe that the enemy were conti-
nuing their retreat from S antarem , and that no-
thing more than a. strong rear-guard remained be-
hind for the purpose of covering the movement. 
It may be advisable to state bere tbat tbe position 
of Santarem is exceedingly formidable, and tha1" it 
cannot he turned eXGept by a very large army, 
andat tbe exp~nse of mueh time and fatigue in 
making a lengthened detour. We were, therefore, 
far" froIl). experiencing regret, that Massena had 
not deemed it advisable to offer us battIe on tbat 
line, more éspecially as his abandonment of the 
strong groun~ left us at liherty to look to tbe pro-
tection of Abrantes, and to throw such a force 
there as might act witp eff'ect upon the enemy's 
flank, under cover of the pace. ) L nder these cir-
cumstances, Lord Wellington determined to" esta-
blish his head-quarters at Santarem, to push on 
Crawford further in fr:ont, and to hring up the 
whole of.his army in" tbe same" direction, except 
Hill's corps only, which, crossing the river at Vee-
lada in boats, and returning again by the bridge 
below Abrantes, would be ahle to harass and im., 
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pede the enerny's communicatíons" and render 
great assistance to us in our projected operations. 
This was the more to be reekoned upon, because 
Massena possessed but a single bridge across the 
Zezere; and as he must move his entire army in 
one column, it was not probable that he could do 
so with su eh rapidity as to insure its passage un-
molested from either quarter. 
The troops being put in motion for these several 
purposes, it was soon discovered that General 
Fane's first report respecting the enemy's designs 
was not likely to be realised, and that they had 
assurned the positíon from whieh we thought they 
would have retired. The advance, under Craw-
foro, found Sahtarem occupied by what appeared 
at first to be a strong rear-guard,but which 
proved in the end to be the second corps which 
had there taken up its cantonments. Upon this 
the head-quarters, attended by Spencer's division, 
were established at Cartaxo; General Cotton's 
cavalry were sent forward to join the lightdivi-
sion; General Anson's brigade took the road to 
Aleventre and Río Major ; and the fourth and fifth 
divisions fixed themselves at Alenquer and Sobral ; 
whilst the sixth remained stationary at Ribaldeira, 
and the third at Torres Yedras. 
Our army had not long taken up its new align-
ment, when it was satisfactorily ascertained that 
the enemy were strengthening and disposingthem~ 
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selves in a very judicious mannery for the double 
purposes, as it appeared, of securing cornfortable 
winter-quarters, andprotecting, from the side of 
Abrantes, all such supplies and reinforcements as 
might be on the way to join them. Whilst the 
second corps garrisoned Santarem, the eighth 
took possession of a line of cantonments on the 
right, extending by Torres N ovas all the way to 
Thomar. Here part of the sixth corps was es-
tablished; and about four thousand infantry, with 
three hundred cavalry, passed the Zezere, for t~e 
purpose of establishing a téte-de-pont; for the 
bridge; it appeared, w'as already ·aH but complete. 
though boats· continued to be constructed in San~ 
tarem, and were hourly in movement towards the 
river. With re8pectz again, to the reinforcements, 
their advance was reported to be at Pinhel, 
whither they had arrived after sustaining 'a sharp 
action with the corps of General Silveira. The 
latter having come upon them at Valvarde some-
what by surprise, succeeded i~ killing three hun-
dred, and taking many prisoners; but as the 
enemy were reported to amount to fifteen thou-
sand meny Silveira could not venture to follow up 
thesuccess which he. obtained. On the contrary, 
he very prudently retired behind the Douro, as 
800n as he had struck his blow; and theFrench, 
leaving a detachment to watch him, pushed on 
with the main body in the direction of Massena's 
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army. From all these particulars, we were led 
tQ the conclusion, that Massena. entertained no 
design of evacuating Portugal; but that he would 
remain where he was, till the. junction of fresh 
troops, and the arrival of a more favourable sea-
son, should enable hirn once more to act upon the 
offensive. 
Affairs continued in this state without the oc-
currence of any event calculated to interrupt our 
tranquillity, up to a late date in Decernber. For 
sorne time the weather was so boisterous, and the 
rain feU in such constant torrents, as effectually 
to hinder any military operations from being un-
dertaken; and when these obstac1es ceased to 
exist, the policy both of the English and French 
general s equally restrained theru. frorn entering 
upon a winter's campaign. Inforrnation, in the 
mean while, continued daily to accumulate upon 
us, and much of it was from a source which left 
no reason to doubt of its authenticity; whilst the 
burden of the whole tended to strengthen our 
conviction, that another struggle for the preserva-
tion' of Portugal must take place in the spring. 
Of the various rumours which reached us, it will 
be necessary to repeat only such as most deeply 
interested us at the moment; and these 1 'proceed 
to give in the order in which they carne in. 
We learned that the head of the enemy's rein-
forcement, which Silveira had encountered by the 
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way, was now in communication with Massena's 
line, and that it had c10sed in somewhere between 
the extreme right at Leira, and the extreme left 
at Santaremó Of the numbers which composed 
the entire force, a variety of accounts were in cir-
culation, sorne rating it as high as lifteen or twenty 
thousand men, others taking it considerably below 
that estimate; but whatever its aggregate strength 
might be, no more than five tho.usand men had as 
yet arrived; nor were the remainder, as far as we 
could learn, ascertained to be near at hand. The 
reinforcement in question had, it appeared, been 
obtained by a forward movement of the ninth 
corps under Drouet ;which, taking possession of 
the posts and cahtonments on the frontier, hitherto 
occupied by detachments from Massena's army, 
enabled these detachments to proceed to their 
several corps. We had no reason to believe that 
any part of Drouet's corps was actually employed. 
in Portugal; by maoy, indeed, it was imagined, 
that being under the orders of Joseph, it could not 
be moved out of Spain unless by express directions 
frorn Paris; bl\t one of its divisions' had certainly 
marched :to the very extremity of its province; 
and thus the whole of Massena's three corps were 
rendered effective. At the same time other corps, 
which had been scattered through Castile, were 
represented as having fallen back upon Madrid; 
and the province, thus relieved from the presence 
PENINSULAH WAR. 57 
of the enemy, was again in a state of rebellion. 
Don J ulian, the gallant partisan, whose services at 
Ciudad Rodrigo obtained for him so much well-
merited renown, was once more in· arms. He was 
preparing to attack Zamora, where a very feeble 
garrison had been left; and the probabilities were, 
that unless fresh forces speedily carne up to take 
the stations which Drouet had abandoned, that 
part of Spain would become as hostile as ever. 
With respect to Portugal, we heard that Sil-
veira's affair had occurred with a detached corps, 
which had been thrown across the Coa to protect 
the march· of the main body hither, by way of 
Sabugal, CasteUo BÍ'anco, and Cardijos. The 
Portuguese general, though deeming it prudent to 
retire, stilI held Francola wÍth his outposts; and 
the enemy continued to maintain a small bodyof 
troops' on the other side of the Coa, on purpose to 
watch him. J n the mean while, Trant was at 
Coimbta, where all remainedperfectly quiet; 
thóugh his advance, under Wilson, had lately 
fallen back to Espinhel; whilst General Hill's 
movernent on the left bank of the Tagus had been 
arrested at Chamuca. The necessity for his 
entrance into Abrantes no longer existing, Lord 
Wellington did not consider it prudentto push 
him on thither, as long as theenemy abstained 
fmm making sorne decided demonstration of their 
design to attack the place; and all their late ope-
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rations seemed to imply that they meditated 
nothing more than defensive operations during 
the winter. It was very evident, likewise, that 
General HilFs march had seriously alarmed them 
for the safety of theÍr expected reinforcements; 
and that they looked to Abrantes with apprehen-
sion, ratber tban with any hope of being able to 
make themselves masters of it; for they broke up 
the roads willeh lead from thence to Punhete, and 
otherwise strove to interrupt aH communication 
between the Zezere and the town. 
1 have spoken hitherto of the dispositions ofthe 
French general in terms more vague perhaps than 
their nature, and the re.sults to which they promised 
to lead, seem,J;e demando • The line which Mas-
sena..at -present occupied was one of great extent 
-insomuch that it might, at almost any point, be 
pierced, and the position of Santarem. and the 
troops cantoned there, eompletely isolated; yet 
wasit one, taking into consideration certain disád-
vantages under which we laboured, demonstrative 
of judgment in the individual who selectedit. 
Were we disposed to try its strength,we must ad· 
vanee to the attack over a country low· and flat, 
and at present everywhere under water, leaving, 
at the same time, IÍumerous openings by which a 
spirited enemy might, in the mean while, pene ... 
trate into our lines in the rearo Now, in spirit and 
enterprise, no one can accuse French soldiers of 
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heing deficient, and as they w~re aware of our 
difficulties, little doubt could be entertained that 
they would greedily take advantage of them. On 
the other hand, Massena had possessed himself of 
a district rich in corn; he possessed ample stóres 
of cattle; and he enjoyed the prospect of living 
at least as well as he could do in any part of Spain. 
Bis communications with his rear were now more 
secured by meansof the troops whom he had lately 
brought up j his flanks were equally safe, notwith-
standing the proximity of Abrantes; and as most 
oC the country people whom we had swept aw;;ty 
with us had litde by little returned to their homes, 
there appeared to be no difficulty whatever in bis 
establishing himself where he was during the win.., 
ter. But if ~uch were really his design, why con-
tinue to crowd forward so many masses, which, 
weré it intended to pass any length of time in a 
state of quiet, had much better be dispersed in 
cantonments more- remote from one another? His 
present mode of proceeding must lead to a con-
sumption of his means more rapid by far than was 
accordant with sound policy j-could it be that 
Massena entertained serious thoughts of resuming 
the offensive at once? This was a grave question 
at the moment; and it involved many other con-
siderations, not less important and weighty than 
itself. 
It was not to be expected that the enerny would 
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a second time make their attempt upon Lisbon by 
one side of the Tagus only, leaving to us the undis-
puted command of that river, and of both of its 
banks". " They had already suffered so much froro 
thelr neglect on this head, that nothing short of 
infatuation could lead them into it again. On the 
contrary, it required but a moderate degree of 
foresight to discover, that let the attempt be made 
when it would, a strong corps would be pushed 
along the left of the river, and the most strenuous 
exertions set on foot to molest the harbour, and aU 
that came out and io, (rom the point of Almada. It 
accordingly became a matter of serious importance 
to us, thatapo"Sition should be marked out and 
strongly fortified on the one ban k as well as on the 
other. This was the more necessary. as, although 
AdmiralBerkeley, when first consulted, had given 
it as his decided :apinion, that the lines of Torres 
Yedras with the inoer circle óf works about Fort 
Sto Julien would; at any moment and under any 
eircumstances, secure,incase ofneed, the safe em-
barkation ofthe troops,.the late alarm induced him 
to come to a different persuasion; and he now 
conceived, that unless something were done to 
fortify the left as well as the right side of the har-
bOllr, the shipping,. Íncase ofa reverse at our lines, 
would be exposedtó danger. Guided in part by 
this consideration, and in part by the conviction, 
that such a chain of posts would enable him to 
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employ Hill's or any other corps with perfeet se-
eurity on the opposite bank, Lord Wellington de-
termined to construct t here an intrenched position, 
similar to that whieh he had constl'ucted at Torres 
Vedras; and earIy in the winter the engineers, 
with as many troops and artificers as eould be 
spared fol' the purpose, were emploJ ed in its for-
mation. 
The new line of redoubts extended across that 
neck of land whieh is formed by a bed of the river 
on one side, and by an inHexion ofthe seaon the 
other; and it was of a formidable nature. In ad-
dition 10 this, great eare was bestowed in strength-
ening the inner circle of Fort Sto J uIien, and at 
both points the heaviest ordnance at our command, 
chiefly twenty-four pounders, were mouoted. By 
this means oul' capabilities of defence were brought 
to a state of perfection, as high as was compatible 
with the end ptoposed, and the difficulties to be 
ovel'come. But after a1l, the great question was, 
whether, in case of an extl'emity, any works wouId 
. suffice to covel' the escape of an army so numerOU8 
as that now under Lord Wellington's command. 
Thel'e could be no doubt thatboth banks of the 
-river were well guarded-that ls to say, the new 
lines around Almada effectually covered the 80uth-
ern side; whilst the fortifications about Sto J uIien 
protected the bay and place of embarkation in all 
directions; but the question still remained to be ~'.""'. 
.J~ ,~\ té: -
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answered~-was it possible for a force of forty 
thousand men to escape in the face of such an 
army, as should be capable of drívíng it fromthe 
double line of Torres Ved ras, back to the sea? 1 t 
was quite evident that nothing short of an over-
whelming superiority in numbers eould ever force 
our first lines of defence. That superiority,how-
ever, were it su eh as to obtain this advantage, 
would likewise be competent to bear down an 
oppositíon whieh -might afterwards be offered; 
and therefore our surest hope, 1 say not of ultimate 
triumph, but even of safety, lay in our succes's in 
the field. Of success, however, we must be doubt-
fuI, unlesssupport should be given to us with the 
same unsparing liberality with whieh it was af-
forded to the enemy; and henee aH felt, even now 
when the tide seemed to haveturned slightly in 
ourfavour, that at no period since the commence-
ment of the struggle did we stand in greater need 
of fresh troops of all arms and descríptions from 
England. Thereeould be líttle doubt that N apo-
leon would, at length, be roused from the appa-' 
rent apathy with whieh he had hitherto regarded 
the affairs of Portugal. The probability was, that 
the return of spring at the latest would bring to 
Massena such an addítion of strength as we, with 
our present numbers, could not hope successfully 
to oppose in the field; and then we should be 
compelled to retire once more within our lines, 
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and the war would become one, not of personal 
contests, but of resources. Now, though we had 
heretofore sustained this species of warfare suc-
cessfully, it was not to be expected that we could 
continue to do so for ever; and hence our most 
fervent wishes were, either that Massena might 
find ·himself under the necessity of abandoning 
Portugal before his supplies could reach him~ or 
that we rnight receive such an addition to our 
means, as would enable us to bring matters to the 
issue of a battle, with something like a faÍr pros-
pect of victory. 
Whilst we were thus speculating, and whilst 
part of our people were employed in giving addi-
tiona1 strength to the works in our rear, few events 
took place calculated to exert any degree of in-
fluence over the final issue of the war. 1 have 
rnentioned the arrival of five thousand men at 
Massena's cantonments, and spoken of them as 
forming part of a considerable divisioll, which the 
advance' of Drouet's corps, and its occupation of 
the posts upon the frolltier, set at liberty to rnove 
towards the front. The remainder followed theÍr 
leading brigades, but after reaching the Zezere, 
retreated again, with the 10ss of many hundred 
men, through the operation of parties of guerillas 
upon their rear and flanks. For sorne days they 
were not heard of; but at length a report came in, 
that a corps had made its appearance on the Coa, . 
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and that having crossed that stream, itwas in full-
march towards the front. Whether this were the 
same body which, after re'aching the Zezere, had 
fallen back without so rnuch as opening a commu-
nication with Massena, we found it impossible ac· 
curátely at this time to ascertain; indeed, our 
information went no further than to establish the 
faet, that it eonsisted of about sixteen thousand 
men, and that its march was conducted with· great 
deliberation, as if to protect a convoy.But the 
impressionmade upon us was, that the corps in 
question either consisted solely of the same troops 
who had formerly made an attempt to join, or that 
they and part of'Drouet's corps had united to 
rnake the 'number; arid the information whic'h we 
afterwards received went to satisfy. U8 that the 
latter instructions had been correcto Though ha-
rassed as the rest had been, they succeeded in 
. reaching their destination; and they made up the 
wholé of the additional force which Massena re-
ceived during the winter. 
In the mean while, the Freneh Marshal was 
waiting anxiously for advices from Paris, whither 
he had despatched General Foy, sorne weeks pre-
viously, with a stateÍnent of the 'situation and 
prospects of his ariny. [ 
1 1 have noticed this.mission, chiefly because it furnishcs me 
• with an opportunity of saying a few words touching statemeuts 
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The position which he had taken up at Santa-
rem, however, he carefully and industriously im-
proved, by covering the face of the hill with three 
lines of abbatis, or otherwise intrenching the corps 
. to which its defence was intrusted. It ought to 
be observed here, that though Santarem lay consi-
derably in ad vance of the rest of h is line, and was, 
as 1 have already hinted, to a certain degree, iso-
lated and detached, it was not on that account the 
less favourable tohis general defence. On the 
contrary, though other points might be easily 
pierced, no advantage could be taken of the suc-
cess obtained, whilst this projecting post remained 
in the hands of the enemy; whilst its natural and 
artificial strength were both such, as to render any 
attempt upon it, with our present means, in the 
highest degree hazardous and uncertain. -Thus 
which have appeared in a History of the Peninsular 'Var by 
General Foy, and which has of late attracted sorne attention 
aroong his countrymen. The General, on his arrival at Paris, 
publishéd in the MOlliteur a variety of accounts, relative to the 
conduct of his fellow-soldiers, and the dispositions of the English 
arroyo In these 1 can by no means concur. For example : 
He assured the ,French public, that whilst multitudes daily 
carne over froro our carop, the crime of deseltion was hardly 
known in tIte French army; whereas the returns in my posses-
sion distinctly prove that,we took in no fewer than 733 deser-
ters in the course of three months. But 1 feeI delicacy in 
pressing, as an ad verse roilitary writer, our differences of opinion 
further. 
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were we kept at bay by a line, abundantly acces-
sible in every, direction save one; because from 
that one our own flanks and rear were in danger, 
should we venture to try the fortune of an action 
in any other q uarter. 
There is but one other circumstance to which 1 
consider it necessary to allude before closing this 
chapter, and with it the history of the eampaign 
of 1810. December was far advaneed, when an 
offieer attached to the staft' of Massena's army, 
who was proceeding towards Ciudad Rodrigo in 
the disguise of a peusant, fell into the hands· of 
sorne of our flying pa~ties, and was brought in to 
head -q uarters. Frorn him we learned that the 
Marshal had received no eornmunieations from 
Franee since be first entered Portugal, and that he 
was now labouring llnder the greatest anxiety for 
the arrival both of intelligenee and instructions. 
Our prisoner had been sent, it appeared, to meet 
whatever corps or messengers might be upon the 
way for the purpose of hurrying them on with as 
few delays as possible; and though he was evi-
dently a man in whom no confidence had been 
reposed, he spoke with so great an appearance of 
eandour and openness, that we felt little disposed 
to doubt the truth of his assertions. He informed 
us that Massena had resolv~d not to attack our 
lines, unless he shouldbe reinforced by a eorps of 
twenty-five or thirty thousand men; and tbat in 
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case these faiIed in arriving, he had determined 
tofall back, for the winter, by Castello Branco 
and Alcantara, into Spain'. The advantages which 
he proposed to obtain by this movement were, a 
concentration with the armies operating in that 
portion of the Peninsula, and the redriction of the 
city of Badajoz, which would enable him, on the 
return of spring, to debouch once more into Por-
tugal, with two large armies, one in the Alentejo, 
and the other on the right bank of the Tagus. 
Our informant further assured us, that instead of 
having corn and supplies in abundance at their 
. command, the French were suffering grievously 
for everything. Their ammunition, their medicines, 
their shoes, theirclothing, and provisions, were 
an at the lowest ebb; whilst their linen, an article 
upon which the welfare of an army depends in 
no ordinary degree, was almost entirely exhausted. 
Finally, he said that Massena was on bad terms 
with all his generals, Loison and Freire being the 
only individuals among them with whom he kept 
up any great intimacy; that there were full ten 
thousandsick in the hospitals; and that the entire 
force of infantry and cavalry which they were 
capable of hringing under arms, did not exceed 
forty thousand meno 
The only fact in aU this information which we 
felt disposed to question, was, the reported design 
of Massena to abandon Portugal. . There ap-
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peared to be no necessity for this measure, and 
many good reasons against it; and, therefore, we 
stiU inclined to the opinion, that whether he with-
drew behind the Mondego or not, he would not 
withdraw further, but endeavour, keeping his 
communications open all the while with his 
real', to obtain possession oCas large a portion of 
the country as might be practicable. This, how-
ever, he would do, only provided he were left to 
the guidance of his own judgment; for, should 
a peremptory order to advance arrive from Paris, 
advancE' he must and would at all hazards.ln 
the latter case, we were aware, from othersources, 
that he was prepared to sacrifice twenty thousand 
men in the attempt to possess himself of our lines; 
and that the attempt would be made both with 
judgment and vigour, we c1early foresaw. But 
of the result of any such endeavour, no one could 
for a moment doubt; and hence no one looked 
forward to the probability of its occurrence with 
the slightest alarm, or even anxiety. 
Such was our state, and such our prospects and 
expectations, during the winter of 1810. On the 
side of Abrantes aH was safe; the French having 
resolved, and wisely resolved, not to besiege it; 
whilst Silveira, wh6 on the approach of the rein-
forcements had retired across the Coa, was again 
in readiness to act, as soon as an opening should 
be given on the rear of the enemy. In the mean 
PENINSULAR WAH. 69 
while, Trant and Bucellar were on the alert at 
Coimbra; and Wilson, retreating frorn EspinheI, 
threw himself with his corps on the other side of 
the Mondego. The latter rnovernent, was, indeed, 
on one account, a subject of regret to us, inas-
much as it deprived us of our readiest and surest 
source of intelligence, which could henceforth be 
obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was 
made under the impression that a further conti-
nuance in Espinhel would be hazardous, and 
could not be risked. With respect to the French, 
again, they, like ourselves, rested quieto Their 
position was, as 1 have already stated, a good one, 
and it was now greatly improved by their obtain-
ing permanent possession of one bank of the Mon-
dego; bywhich not only their flank, but all their 
marches from the rear were, to a certain degree, 
secured. But there were a variety of causes at 
work competent, in due time, to disturb this state 
of apparent tranquillity; and the spring can hardly 
be said to have set in, ere they carne powerfully 
into operation. 
Before closing this chapter, which terminates 
the carnpaign of 1810, it would be injustice not to 
record the extraordinary zeal, ability, and activity, 
which were displayed in two departments of our 
army; 1 mean, the commi8sariat under Sir R. 
Kennedy, and the medica1 department under Dr. 
Frank. It i8 not my province to eulogise; but as 
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the existence and life ofthe soldier depended upon 
the direction of the latter with his valuable assist· 
ants, and the comfort and sustenance upon the 
former, it is impossible that 1 shouJd refrain, as 
adjutant·general of the army, from adding my mite 
of gratitude to these two very meritorious public 
officers. And 1 must say that, when Dr. Frank 
afterwardR from illness left the arrny, it occasioned 
one general sentiment of deep public regret. 
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CHAPTER III. 
8tate of affairs on the southernfrontier-Advance of 80u1t 
against Badajoz-Capture ofOliven~a, and inve~tment ofBa-
dajoz-General Mendizabaldefeated, and Badajoz taken-
Campo Mayor reduced-Massena breaks up from Santarem, 
and retreats into Spain-Marshal .Beresford marches towards 
Badajoz-Attack of a French convoy at Campo Mayor-
The British corps passes the Guadiana, reduces Olivens:a, 
and invests Badajoz-Lord 'Vellington "isits this corps, and 
gives directions for the siege----Is recal1ed to the north, where 
the army remains in position round Fuentes de Honor. 
BEFORE pursuing further the fortunes of Massena, 
• and the movements of the divisions immediately 
opposed to him, it will be necessary, in as few 
words as possible, to make the reader acquainted 
with certain transactions which ;had been going on 
elsewhere .. 
Whilst the whole of the allied army was col-
lected in the lines of Torres Yedras, and its atten-
tion turned almost exclusively to the defence of 
Lisbon, Soult, having assembled about thirteen or 
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fourteen thousand men in the south of Spain, ad-
vanced on Badajoz, for the purpose of effecting 
adiversion on the side of Alentejo, and opening 
a communication across the Tagus with Massena. 
Generals Ballasteros and Mendizabal, who, on the 
departure of Romana, commanded in that quarter, 
found themselves unable to oppose him. The 
former accordingly moved to his right upon Salva-
tierra and the lower parts of the Guadiana; whilst 
the latter, leaving seven battalions with a brigade 
of field artillery in Oliven~a, retreated across the 
river. Oliven~a was not a place of extraordinary 
strength; and had the reverse been the case, the 
neglect of Mendizabal to supply it with a compe-
tent store of provisions would have rendered the 
strength of its fortífications profitless: it was 
blockaded on the 11th of January, and on the 
22nd famine compelled the garrison to surrender. 
Having taken measures for rendering Oliven~a 
a place of arms in support of his future operations, 
Soult detached Mortier's corps on the 26th to in- , 
vest Badajoz; and the· investment was at once 
completed on the left of the Guadiana by the in-
fantry; whilst the cavalry, under General Latour 
Maubourg, patroled round the right. N o great 
while elapsed ere the investment was converted 
into a siege. Ground was broken on the 28th, and 
an attack directed against the Pardaleras outwork, 
which was battered from the Sierra del Viento, 
PENINSULAR WAlto 73 
and enfiladed from a paralleI at two hundred and 
fifty yards distant; and a breach being effected on 
the 11th of February, the Pardaleras was, on the 
same night, stormed, and carried with very little 
opposition. 
As soon as the movement of Marshal Soult was 
known at Cartaxo, Lord Wellington despatched 
his Spanish corps into the Alentejo, that it might 
co-operate with Mendizabal for the protection of 
that frontier; and he pointed out a position to the 
north of Badajoz, having its right protected by 
Fort St. Christoval, and its front covered by the 
Gevora, as the best which the Spanish army could 
take up, for the purpose of keeping open a com-
munication with the town in case it should be at-
tacked. Unfortunately, the brave Romana, who, 
more than all the rest of the Spanish generals put 
together, had obtained and merited our confidence 
and respect, was unable to accompany his corps. 
He was now labouring under asevere malady, 
which, on the 27th of January, terminated his ex-
istence. But the division made good its position; 
the post recommended was assumed on the 9th of 
February; and it proved a constant source of 
anxiety to the besiegers, and of confidence to the 
besieged, by covering the introduction of numerous 
supplies ¡nto the place. The enemy saw its im-
portan ce, and determined, at all hazards, to carry 
it; and the improvidence of the Spanish General 
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was not long in furnishing them with the oppor· 
tunity which they so much desired. 
It happened that a h,owitzer or two, from the 
opposite bank of the river, were enabled to throw 
a few shells into the ground of the Spanish en-
campment, which, without doing much real mis-
chief, harassed and annoyed the meno Mendizabal, 
very unwisely, paid to the matter a degree of at-
tention which it did not merit; and to get rid of 
the nuisance, moved the whole of his army to its 
left, completely out of the protection of Fort St. 
Christoval. The enerny perceived his error, and 
lost not a rnoment in availing thernselves of it. 
Mortier established a flying bridge _ tlpon the 
Guadiana aboye the town, and crossed over iil the 
night of the 18th; whilst six thousand men from 
the besieging army forded the Gevora, and at-
tacked the Spaniards at daylight. The resistance 
made was as trifling as might have been expected 
from bad troops, deprived of all the advantages of 
position; and out of nine thousand infantry, and 
a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, of which Mendi:' 
zabal's corps had consisted, only three thousand 
five hundred made their escape. - Three thousand 
fled-to Badajoz, where they were shut up with 
the rest of the garrison; whilst five húndred re-
tired upon Elvas, under the cornrnand of Don 
Carlos de España. 
The siege was now carried on with renewed 
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vigour,-and the Governor being killed, the command 
devolved upon General Imaz, an officer who felt 
no disposition to emulate the renown of Palafox 
and Alvarez. A breach, exceedingly imperfect in 
kind, was no sooner effected, than Imaz proposed 
a capitulation; and on . the 11 th of March, at a 
moment when he knew, froID telegraphic de-
spatches, that Massena was in fuIl retreat, and 
that forces were on their way to relieve the place, 
he marched out nine thousand troops into the 
ditch, who layed down their arms to a similar 
number of French infantry, with sorne six or eight 
hundred cavalry, the total amount of the besieging 
army. Had the slightest resolution existed in the 
breast of that man, Badajoz might have been pre-
served; and all the blood which was aíterwards 
spilled in retaking it, might, as a necessary conse-
quence, have been saved. 
Mortier's next business was to invest Campo 
Mayor, with a corps of five thousand infantry, and 
six hundred cavalry. Campo Mayor is a large 
frontier town, supplied originally with tolerable 
fortifications; but which had oí late be en sadly 
neglected, and were oí course íalling to decay. 
Five thousand men is the smallest number which 
would be required to garrison it; but at present 
it was held by no more than two hundred militia, 
undei the command oí Major Tallaia, of the Por-
tuguese engineers. That officer's means in cannon 
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and stores were as feeble as his force in men; 
there were but five pieces of artillery mounted on 
the ramparts; yet he compelled the enemy to 
proceed against him with all the order of a siege; 
nor was it till a practicable breach had been 
formed in the body of the place, that he would 
listen to any proposal of surrender. At last, how-
ever, seeing his defences ruined, and the enemy 
prepared to storm, he stipulated for a delay of 
twenty-four hours, in the hope that relief might 
arrive; and none appearing, he very reluctantly 
gave up the townon the 23rd of March. 
In the mean while affairs were drawing rapidly 
to a crisis on'the north side of the Tagus. Though 
their change of situation conduced, for a short 
time, very considerably to the cornforts of lVIas-
sena and his army, it was quite impossible that a 
country already exhausted could longsupport the 
burden which the presence of some fifty or sixty 
thousand men, besides horses and other animals, 
laid upon it; and this the French General began, 
by degrees, to feel very sensibly. His troops be-
carne every day more and more sickly; provisions 
became every day scarcer, and forage was not to 
be procured by any exertions. The reinforce-
ments, too, for which he had waited so long and 
so patiently, carne not up, by any means, to his 
wants or his wishes; indeed, the fresh regiments 
marched into his line were not sufficiently nume-
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rous to fill Up the gaps which the casualties of 
war had already occasioned there. Massena felt 
that the moment for offensive operations had 
passed away. Whether he regretted that he had 
not hazarded an attaek upon our lines, at a mo-
ment when their yet imperfect state held out sorne 
ehances of success, 1 know not; but eertain it is, 
that he soon began, after his assumption of the 
position at Santarem, to prepare for a retreat. 
Parties were eontinuallyemployed upon the Ze-
zere, eonstrueting bridges, and throwing up works 
for their defence ; his siek and wounded were gra-
dually, quietly, and cautiously, transferred to the 
rear; and at the beginning of March 1811, there 
remained in his eamp, besides sorne heavy artillery 
of little value, only the men and horses fit for 
duty, with as many stores, guns, aml11unition~ 
waggons, and tumbrils, as appeared necessary for 
their use. Everything, however, was done with 
so much address, that exeept of the faet that two 
bridge s instead of one were now upon the Zezere, 
we were kept in profound ignoranee as to his pro-
eeedings, and we eontinued to the last to cast an-
xious g]ances towards Abrantes, for the safety of 
which we conceived that there were still good 
grounds of apprehension. 
1 have stated that, on the breaking up of the 
French army from before the lines of Torres Ve-
dras, General Hill's division was sent across the 
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Tagus, for the purpose of giving additional security 
to the garrison of Abrantes, and of embarrassing 
Massena's movements, should he either attempt to 
retire by the Alentejo, or take the route of Pun-
heteo As soon as the operations of Soult's army 
became known, Marshal Beresford's corps was 
likewise thrown across the river, with a view of 
raising the siege of Badajoz, and giving relief to 
the Spanish corps, already hard-pressed upon the 
frontier. Beresford had not yet begun his march 
southward, when ceftain indications of a move-
ment on the part of Massena, induced Lord Wel-
lington to delay his progress. Instead of march-
ing towards Badajoz, he was directed to advance 
upon A brantes, and, repassing the Tagus there, to 
threaten the enemy's posts at Punhete ; and a por-
tion of his corps, under Major-general the Honour-
able William Stewart, had actually obeyed these 
instructions, . when the enemis designs became 
suddenly developed. On the night of the 5th of 
March, Massena decamped frorr.. his position at 
Santarem, and concentrating the whole of his 
army about Pombal, made demonstrations there, 
as if he were not only willing, but anxious, to rest 
the fate of the campaign upon the issue of a gene-
ral action. 
On the 6th of March the head-quarters of the 
allied army were established at Santarem, and 
dispositions were made for pursuing the enemy 
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along the road which his main body had taken, 
and disIodging him from the several posts which 
he retained in other quarters. General Stewart's 
brigacle passed the Zezere, and advanced, together 
with the 4th, the 6th, and part oí the 1st divisions, 
towards Thomar, where the French seemed at first 
disposed to collect in force; whilst the light divi-
sion, supported by the 1st German huzzars and 
royal dragoons, proceeded at a quick pace to-
wards Pombal. At Thomar no encounter took 
place, the enemy retreating, on the appearance of 
our people, towards the Mondego; but at Pombal 
there was some fighting, and hopes were at one 
moment entertained, that there would be a good 
deal more. Our leading brigade came up with 
the fugitives on the 9th, and succeeded, after a 
brief but smart skirmish, in capturing about two 
hundred prisoners; and on the 11 th dispositions 
were made for bringing the enerny to action, by 
the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light divisions, 
assembled for the purpose. But Massena, instead 
of waiting to be ass'ailed, broke up during the 
night, and feH back, covered by the whole of 
Montbrun's cavalry, by the 6th corps of infantry, 
and by part of the 8th, in the directioll of Re-
denha. On the I2t~, a strong rear-guard was 
se en posted at the end of a defile, in front of the 
vilIage. It was immediately attacked by three 
divisions of il1fantry, by General Pack's Portu-
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guese brigade, and the cavalry; and after an ob-
stinate resistance, was driven through the defile 
to the plain beyond. It next retreated to some 
high and broken ground, where it again showed a 
front; but from this position also it was compelled 
to retire with some loss; and finally it withdrew 
to Condeixa, where the main body had established 
itself. . 
The enemy's force assembled here consisted of 
the 6th, 8th, and 9th corps; of the whole of Mas-
sena's army in short, except the 2nd corps, which 
continued still at Espinhel. The ground which 
they occupied was singularly commanding; and 
as it could not be attempted in front, without a 
sacrifice of Jives mueh greater than either his feel-
ings or policy induced Lord Wellington to risk, 
arrangements were made for turning it. The 
third division, under General Picton, made a long 
and tedious detour to the right; but it succeeded 
in throwing itself upon the left of the enemy's 
line, which instantly broke into column of march, 
and fell back. Similar movements were effected 
with similar results during several successive 
days; and the enemy, diverted from his original 
intention of passing part of his force over the Mon-
dego at Coimbra, cOlüinued his retreat, in a single 
continuous column, along the road which winds 
between the river and the Sierra de Estrella. 
The consequence was, that he passed over little 
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else than a succession of admirable positions; ánd 
as he took care to cover his marches with the best 
of his cavalry, with a force of infantry which never 
feH short of ten thousand rnén, a,nd with only one 
brigade of guns admirably horsed, his retrogres-
sion was conducted in good order, and with as 
little 10ss as could well befall an army whilst ex-
ecuting a rnanmuvre of the kind. On one occa-
sion onl y were the French in danger of being 
dragged into a general action, at manifest disad-
vantage to themselves. Whilst crossing the 
Coera, the alIies pressed so closely upon them, 
that to save his main body, Massena was content 
to sacrifice a considerable portion of his rear-
guard, which, halting to be attacked, was cut to 
pieces; whilst the columns escaped, with the loss 
of sorne artillery and a great deal of baggage. It 
¡s, however, extremely probable that all Mas-
sena's precautions would have failed to preserve 
hirn, had it been possible to transport stores and 
provisions as rapidly as our troops were capable of 
rnarching; but on the 19th, it was found that the 
columns had outstripped their supplies, and a halt 
of sorne days was necessary, to give the latter 
time to overtake them. 
As it was not my good fortune to be an eye-
witness of this memorable retreat, having be en 
obliged to leave the army froID severe illness for 
three IDonths, 1 shall not pretend to enter IDl-
VOL. n. F 
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nutely into details of which 1 could speak only 
upon the reports of others. It is sufficient to ob-
serve that Massena finally escaped to a position 
on the Spanish side of the Agueda, after having 
exhibited nurnerous proofs of capacity to direct the 
rnovements of a retreating force, and leaving be-
hind him sorne sad memoriaIs of the absence of 
an humane feelings frorn arnong his soldiery. The 
line of the enemy's march could, indeed, be every-
where traced by the smoke of cottages, hamlets, 
and towns, which they reduced to ashes; and 
even those which escaped the ravages of the Hames, 
were left in a state of total dilapidation and abso-
lute destitution. Of the acts of personal violence 
which they committed, 1 would rather not from 
hearsay give a relation; but this much may be 
said, that the Portuguese must cease to feeI as 
men cornmonly feel, if they ever forget the con-
duct of an army, which entered their country 
with the warmest protestationsof friendship, and 
in whose promises of protection too many were 
tempted to place reliance. Even the towns which 
had given shelter to the head-quarters of the French 
generals were not spared. Torres Novas, Thomar, 
and Pernes, were all of them sacked on the eve-
ning previous to their evacuation; the convent of 
Alcoba~a was burned to the ground; the Bishop's 
palace, and the whole town of Leiria, shared the 
same fate ;-in a word, it seemed as if these men 
PENINSULAR W AR. 83 
had resolved to make a desert ofthe country which 
they had failed to conquer; and that the war, 
which they professed at first to wage only with 
the Englísh and their armed partisans, had been 
lurned against its peaceable inhabitants. 
The last stand which the enemy made on the 
present occasion, took place near Sabugal, and 
proved hig-hly honourable to the British arms. On 
the 3rd of April, the second corps was seen in po-
sition, with its rightimmediately aboye the bridge 
and town of Sabugal; and its left extended along 
the road to Alfayates, so as to command all the 
approaches from the fords of the Coa towards the 
upper part of the town. Lord Wellington made 
his dispositions to attack it in front, flank, and 
rear, at the same moment; and but foro the unfor-
tunate occurrence of a sudden shower of rain, it 
would have been, in all probability, annihilated. 
But though it escared being surrounded, it made 
not good its retreat till after it had suffered asevere 
los s in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and an 
opportunity had be en given to one brigade of the 
light division, which, single-handed, maintained the 
uneq ual contest for sorne time, of increasing the 
welI-earned reputation which that pecllliarly-
distinguished division had already acquired. After 
this, Massena withdrew entirely into Spain; AI-
meida was blockaded; and Lord Wellington, 
leaving Sir Brent Spencer- to conduct that service, 
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as well as to provide against emergencies in front , 
hurried away towards Badajoz, where his presence 
began about tbis time to be seriously needed. 
It has been stated tbat Marshal Beresford was 
already moving to raise the siege of Badajoz, and 
arrest the ptagress of Soult in that quarter, when 
the unexpected concentration of Massena'g fOf(~es 
at Pombal, induced Lord Wellington to recall him 
to his assistance. On the 17th, however, when 
all hope of fighting a general battle was laid aside, 
the Marshal prepared to resume his original under-
taking; andputting himself at the head of the 
2nd and 4th British, and General Hamilton's 
Portuguese division, with the 13th 1ight dragoons, 
sorne heavy cavalry, and two brigades of artillery, 
he crossed the Tagus at Tancos. Marshal Beres-
ford proceeded by way of Ponte de Lor, Oralo, and 
Portalegre, to Campo Mayor, where he an'ived on 
the 25tb. The euemy bad just evacuated tlle 
town; and a considerab1e convoy of artillery, am-
munition-waggons, and strings of loaded mules, 
was seen travelling under tbe escort of three bat-
talions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, to-
wards Badajoz. An immediate pursuit was ordered, 
and the allied cavalry was not long in overtaking 
the convoy. which' made ready to receive them. 
General Latour Maubourg, who eommallded on the 
occasioll, formed his infantry into two solid squares, 
which he supported by placing his cavalry on the 
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right; but a brilliant charge fmm two squadrons 
oí the 13th, in which a similar force of Portuguese 
took part, overthrew the French cavalry, and gave 
to the allies momentary possession of the entire 
convoy. The ardour of pursuit, however, canied 
the conqueror8 too faro They followed the flying 
cavalry under the guns of Badajoz, and suffered, in 
consequence, sorne los8; whilst they gave to the 
squares an opportunity of retiring in good order, 
against which theycould not, in their scattered 
state, make any impression. The consequence 
was, that before any portion of the British infan-
try was enabled to come up, the whole of the con-
voy escaped within the gates, leaving Qnly a single 
howitzer, with one or two ammunition-waggons, 
in the handS' of our dragoons. 
The enemy having thus withdrawn entirely 
from -the right bank of the Guadiana, it became an 
object of consideration how that river was to be 
passed, in order that Badajoz might be put in a 
state of blockade before it shouldbe provisioned, 
or the damage caused in the late siege repaired. 
There were but two bridges, one at Merida, the 
other at Badajoz; and both were in possession of 
the French; whilst the only practicable ford,--
and that too~ during the present season of the 
year, practicable for cavalry alone,-lay under the 
guns of Fort J uramenha. U pon it, however, no 
reliance could be placed, as the sole channel· of 
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communication between different portions of our 
army; for the first fIood would close up the pas-
sage entirely, by rendering the ford for a time 
quite impervious. A bridge upon tresseIs was 
accordingly directed to be formed, and put down 
at a convenient point; whilst five Spanish boats, 
with four pontoons, then in store at Elvas, were 
converted into rafts, to be used, when circum-
stances should require, as fIying bridges. 
It is not necessary to enter at much length into 
the various obstacles which the army was com-
pelled to surmount, before it succeeded in efféct-
ing its passage across the Guadiana. Having 
carried in its train no pontoons or other materials 
for bridge-making, it was reduced to the necessity 
of depending upon such supplies as the country 
round, and the inefficient magazine at Elvas, were 
enabled to furnish; and these proved so inade-
quate, that several heavy showers causing the 
waters to rise on the very inorning after the 
tressel-bridge had been completed, the whole was 
swept away, and the labour of several anxious 
days annihilated. It was at length determined 
not to wait any Jonger, but to pass the troops at 
once upon the rafts; and after they should have 
taken up their graund of investment, to erect 
another bridge at their leisure. The resolution 
was promptly carried into effect. During the 
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, the troops were ferried 
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across in detachrnents as nurnerous as were at all 
consistent with their personal safety; and on the 
latter day, Marshal Beresford established his 
head-quarters at a srnall village on the left bank 
of the river. He had hardly done so, when an 
attack was made upon the village, which so far 
succeeded, that the cavalry picket stationed there 
was surprised and destroyed; but a company of 
infantry, which were in reserve to support thern, 
carne up, and theenerny were finally driven out 
with sorne loss. 
Before these arrangernents could be accorn-
plished, the enerny were enabled to fill in their 
trenches, to rebuild the breaches, and to throw 
considerable stores of provisions and arnrnunition 
into Badajoz. This done, Mortier returned 
towards Seville; but he endeavoured to cast an 
additional irnpediment in the way of our projected 
siege, by placing a garrison of four hundred rnen 
in Oliven!(a. The nurnbers thus shut up, thougb, 
neither adequate to rnake a proper defence, nor 
very formidable when considered as a post upon 
our flank, were not altogether to be neglected; 
and Marshal Beresford accordingly resolved to 
comrnence his opemtions, by making hirñself 
mast{lr of OIiven~a. 
The care of conducting this attack was in-
trusted to General Cole, who sat down before the 
place on the 11th. On the 15th, the batteries 
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beiug in readiness to open, the Governor was sum-
moned, and honourable terms offered, in case· he 
should be' disposed to capitulate; but as these 
were rejected, the firing began, and before noon 
a practicable breach was effected. The Governor 
now, in his turn, proposed terms of capitulation, 
but was refused. The firing was resumed, and in 
half an hour the place surrendered at discretion. 
General Cole then has tened to join Marshal Beres-
ford, who, having established a bridge of casks 
over the ford at J uramenha, and secured it by a 
téte-de-pont, capable of containing fifteen hundred 
men, was now in position at Sto Martha. Rere the 
corps established itself; and from this point the 
different objects were attended to, of our com~ 
pleting the investment of Badajoz; of alarming 
General Latour Maubourg into a further retrogres-
sion; and of watching the motions of SouIt, who 
was using his best endeavours to open a comrnu-
nication with the city. 
Things were in this state, when, on the 20th of 
April, Lord Wellington arrived from the north, 
and gave directions for the immediate cornmence-
ment of active operations against Badajoz. The 
great difficulty, however, was to fall upon sorne 
such plan of attack, as might hold out a promise 
uf speedy success, and at the same time should not 
require the employmentof great means in its exe,.. 
cution. Jt was a matter ofthe first consequence t~ 
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reduce Badajoz quickly; because, if a greater 
space of time were allowed than sixteen days of 
open tren eh es, besides the period requisite in pre-
paring materials, our informatio.n assured us that 
Soult would be able to collect a suffieient force to 
relieve it. On the other hand, seldom has a siege 
been undertaken, in modero times, with resourees 
less adequate to the design, either in intrenching 
tools, ammunition, or guns. Lord Wellington had, 
it is true, ordered an ampIe suppIy of everything 
requisite to be forwarded from Lisbon; and an 
ample supply of everything requisite was actually 
prepared; but when the stores began to be put in 
motion, it was found that means of transport were 
wanting; and hence not one-tenth part ofthe ma-
teriel promised ever reaehed the ca;mp of the 
besieging army. N otwithstanding these disad,. 
vantages, our engineers set steadily to the ope-
ration of reducing the place; and the preliminary 
steps to the breaking of ground before the Parda-
leras, the Castle, and Fort Christoval, were taken 
so early as the 22nd df April. 
Before, however, any use could be made of these 
preparatory arrangements, a despatch from Sir 
Brent Spencer summoned Lord Wellington to his 
original station on the northern frontier. Having 
drawn out directions for the future conduct of the 
besieging force, and recommended to Marshal 
Beresford, in case of any ~ttempt on the part of 
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Marshal Soult, to risk an action, Lord Wellington 
departed from the Guadiana, and arrived at the 
position in the vicinity of Almeida, just in time to 
meet the danger with which his troops were there 
menaced. Jt will be necessary here to describe 
somewhat at large the situation in which our army 
at this time stood, on the banks of the Agueda; 
and as 1 happen to be enabled, from personal ob-
servation, to enter upon my task, 1 do so with 
greater readiness than if, as in the earlier pages of 
the present chapter, 1 were obliged to write from 
the statements and observations of others. 
Between the Duas Casas and Touron rivers, 
there extends a range of heights, which formed, 
on the present occasion, the main feature in our 
position. Our right, though placed directly upon 
Nava d'Avel, might be said, in strictness, to rest 
upon the Coa; for the country between the Coa 
and the village being extremely impracticable, 
little danger was to be apprehended from any at-
tempt made in that quarter. Our centre extended 
along the heig"hts just alluded to, between the vil-
lages of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa; 
whilst our left, which embraced Fort Conception 
and Valdelamula, circled round by Almeida, so as 
tocomplete the blockade of that important place, 
at the same time that it appuyed upon ground 
extremely favourable. With respect to the ar-
rangement of the troops, a few words will suffice. 
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On the extreme right of the line, General Hou-
stoun, with the seventh division, took post; the 
cavalry being formed next to him, though some-
what in .advance. After the seyenth carne the first 
division, thrown considerably forward, and upon 
very advantageous ground, and communicating on 
its left with the third, which again heldcon-
nexion with the light, as it did with the sixth and 
fifth. The fifth division, under Sir William Ers-
kine, formed the extreme left of the line; whilst 
the blockade of Almeida was, in an especial man-
ner, committed to the sixth division, under Gene-
ral Campbell. Every division and brigade was, 
however, in a situation to move at a- moment's 
warning, and by short and direct paths, to any 
post in the entire line which might be threatened; 
and hence, though to external appearance our 
flanks were far removed from one -another, the 
space of three hours would have brought the most 
distant battalions in position to the same ground, 
at any given point. Such was the local state of 
our army, from the day when Massena retreated 
across the frontier, up to the end of April; and such 
it continued to be, when Lord We1lington, after 
having examined the condition of affairs in the 
south, returned to direct the series of operations 
which were impending. 
When Massena finally withdrew from the Por-
tuguese territory, it was confidently anticipated 
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that he would scarcely be in a condition to re-
sume offensive operations for severaI months to 
come. Rumours of his excessive unpopularity 
began aIso to make their way within our campo 
We were told a variety of tales touching a quarrel 
which had occurred between the Prince of Esling 
and MarshaI N ey, into which, it was added, that 
the whole army had entered, with a decided lean-
ing towards the latter officer; and it was repea-
tedly rumoured that Massena was on the eve of 
his recall, and that some new chief would shortly 
appear upon the stage to supply his place. Whe-
ther these reports were we11 or ill founded, we 
hardly cared to inquire; but wecontinued to pre.,. 
serve an attitude of extreme watchfulness towards 
the front, at the same time that the blockade of 
Almeida was kept up with a11 the diligence and 
vigoQr of which we were capable. With respect, 
again, to the enemy's position, we were not so well 
informed. We were aware that they occupied Ciu-
dad Rodrigoand the country round in force, whilst 
their outposts extended along the Agueda, and 
their patrols occasionally passed it; but whether 
they had sent any of their divisions to the towns 
in therear, as some of our communications asserted, 
we possessed nó means of accurately ascertaining. 
The first days ofMay, however, brought in a tole-
rahly explicit declaration of the enemy's designs ; 
and _we found that any noticins which we might 
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have be en led to form, as to the disorganisation and 
consequent inefficiency of Massena's army, were 
quite as groundless as many other reports which 
daiJy poured in upon uso 
1 have said that the centre of our line extended 
at this time along the heights between the villa-
ges of Fuentes de Honor and Villa Formosa; a 
few words more respecting the localities of the 
former ofthese villages may not be amiss. 
Fuentes de Honor was not, strictly speaking, 
embraced in our position, and though occupied by 
the light troops of the 1st and 3rd divisÍons s.up-
ported by the 7th regiment, it was he Id merely 
as an advanced post. Yet, in spite of its advanced 
situation, it possessed so many defensible features, 
as to form, in point of fact, one of the main bul-
warks of our ground; and its strength came fairly 
into trial on two separate occasions, at the period 
to which 1 now refer. On both was the judgment 
which directed its selection distinctly shown; and 
therefore 1 will endeavour to detail its particular 
features and bearings. 
Fuentes de Honor stands at the bottom of a 
valley, and on the bank of a small rivulet or brook. 
On either side are rising grounds; and through it 
passes the main road to Caseja, Gallegos, and from 
thence to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the Ciudad Ro-
drigo side, an extensive morass is bounded at sorne 
distance by a thick wood; and though the ground 
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certainly rises there, as it does in rear of the vil~ 
lage, still the troops which advance in a hostile 
attitude froro that quarter, must pass over a con~ 
siderable tract, where they will be exposed to a 
heávy and destructive fire from almost every point. 
The village itself is crossed in various directions 
by walls, which afforded excellent cover for infan-
try, and were not altogether profitless against 
artillery; whilst in its rear arise sorne rocky heights, 
which at once covered the troops whilst in posses~ 
sion of the place, and afforded them a safe place 
of retreat, in case they should be driven out. Above 
these rocky heights was our main line arrayed ; 
from whence., in case of need, reinforcements could 
be continually sent to the troops in the village; 
whilst, in the event ofthe village itself being car-
ried, the conquerors would find that their Iabours, 
so far from being completed, were only beginning. 
To sum up all in few words ;-it would be ex-
tremely difficult to conceive a post so well adapted 
to give to its defenders a superiority quite unusual 
over any force which might attack them; so easy 
of defence from its local situation; so secure, in 
point ofretreat; and withal so extremely impor-
tant to the line which it was designed to cover; 
as furnishing an arena of con test quite distinct 
from the main position, and totally independent 
of it. This post, as 1 have aIread y stated, was 
held by the light troops of the third and first divi.,. 
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sions; and it became, as soon as. Massena found 
himself 5n a condition to renew hostilities, the 
theatre of operations, hardly less sanguinary, or 
less gIorious, than the hills of Busaco, or-the plains 
of Talavera. 
Before 1 proceed, however, to give any account 
of the operations which may be said to have marked 
the opening of another campaign, it may not per-
haps be amiss if 1 offer a few remarks, in addition 
to those already recorded, touching the present 
prospects of Lord Wellington's army, as compared 
with those which were before it at the correspond-
. ing period in 1810. 
In the month of February, 1810, Lord Welling.,. 
ton formed himself in position, on almos! the same 
ground which he occupied now. His was then 
the only thing in the shape of an army throughout 
the Peninsula; for the Spanish corps had been 
aH, one after another, overthrown; and there re-
mained no force capable of keeping the field, 
except about twenty-seven thousandBritish, and 
an equal number of Portuguese troops. lt unfor-
tunately happened, al so, that both the British and 
Portuguese were suffering dreadfully from sick-
ness; whilst the latter, as is well known, ne-
ver havingas yet found an opportunity of prov-
ing themselves, could not, even if efficient in 
other respects, be perfectly relied upon. The ene-
my had just made themselves masters of Andalu-
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sia, without being under the necessity of striking 
a blow ;-Cadiz was in a state of blockade ;-and 
Regnier and Mortier, threatening Portugal through 
the Alentejo, were but feebly opposed by a mi-
serable levy under Romana. Massena,likewise, 
was around Ciudad Rodrigo with upwards of 
seventy thousand veterans; and from the fortress, 
garrisoned only by Spaniards, and superintended 
by a Spanish governor, no very obstínate resist-
ance was expected. 
1t is not, perhll:ps, going too far to affirm that 
few men, situated as Lord Wellington then was, 
would have regarded bis case as otber tban despe-
rateo He was opposed, with less than fifty thou-
sand effectives, to the undivided strength of the 
French empire; for there was no diversion going 
on in the nortb of Europe, nor any prospect of 
such diversion being speed·ily effected. It is true 
that the lines were in his rear, fortified as care-
fully and skilfully as time and circumstances would 
allow, and that his retreat thither could never be 
prevented; but formidable as the lines were, no 
one ventured to pronounce them impregnable, es;' 
pecially if assailed by the. whole of the French 
corps then in the Peninsula. The truth, indeed, 
is, that among the' heads of departments, and 
throughout the army at large, there were at this 
time few, who did not look forward with some-
thing like anxiety to a speedy re-embarkation. 
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Portugal has no gates, it was said, by closing which 
thirty thousand British soldiers can pretend to 
shut out the French army; and to talk of defend-
ing it, now that Spain has been subdued, is as 
idIe as it could be, to talk of defending the solitary 
province of Galicia, Andalusia, or Arragon. Em-
bark we must, before long ;-and happy shall we 
be, if our embarkation be not impeded or pre-
vented. Such, however, were not the senti-
ments of our chief; and it must be so interesting 
to posterity to record what passed in his mind at 
the period 1 allude to, that 1 hesitate not to give 
his opinions, in nearly his own words,as commu-
nicated to myself: 
" There is no doubt that the task which 1 have 
uridertaken is Herculean, particularlynow, that 
the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that 
there is nothing in the shape of an army in the 
field but ourselves. 1 think 1 am, however, in 
such a situation, that 1 can retire and embark 
whenever 1 please; and if that be the case, the 
longer 1 stay, the better for the cause, and the 
more honourable to the country. Whether 1 shall 
be able to hold my ground at last, must of course 
depend upon the numbers and the means by 
which 1 sh:!l be attacked; and adverting to the 
difficulties ofsubsistence even for small numbers 
in this country, 1 hope that 1 shall not be at-
tacked by more than 1 shan be able to manage. 
VOL. n. G 
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The necessity of keeping my real' open to the 
Tagus is· a difficulty; and 1 should be able to 
effect my object with gl'eater ease, if 1 was not 
\lnder the necessity of effecting everything, not 
only without 10ss, but without risk 01' even the 
appearance of risk, in order to please the good 
people of EngIand." 
These are memorable sentiments, contrasted 
with those which, it must be admitted, were gene-
rally felt by the army. - How well and how accu-
rately all our commander's calculatíons had been 
formed, the turn which events took speedily de-
monstrated. The enemy advanced-they over-
carne the obstacles opposed to them-and we re-
tired, as it had been previously arranged, to Torres 
Ved ras. Here then, at the very extremity of the 
Peninsula, Lord Wellington took his stand; and 
here he remained till the results of his own pro-
. found combinations compelled the enemy to fall 
back into Spain. 
How different wasour situation now! Instead 
of acting solely on the defensive, we were engaged 
in two offensive operations at once, both of them 
ofthe very fil'st importance. We had even ven-
tured to divide our strength in the faces of those 
very corps which but ayear ago th-reatened us . 
with annihilation; and we were carrying· on two 
sieges, and covering the divisions which conducted 
them, at the mouths of the two gl'eat roads which 
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touch upon the Portuguese frontier. Thus by the 
unbending firmness of one man, aided by the admi-
rable discipline and courage of his troops, had 
the course of a war, of late so alarming, been 
arrested; and the French, instead of overrunning 
Portugal, and bringing under their yoke the last 
portionof the continent of Europe, were held in 
check in a country where their superiority ex-
tended no further than over the spots of ground 
.covered by their several bivouacs. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Battle of Fuentes de Honor-Re-investment of Almeida-The 
French garrison blow up the place, and escape-Massena's 
army retires into Spain, and Lord Wellington's into canton-
ments-Siege of Badajoz by Marshal Beresford-Is raised 
in consequence of the advance of Soult-Lord Wellington 
,sends off reinforcements to Marshal Beresford, and sets out 
to join him-The Marshal's corps assemble in position at 
Valverde. 
ON the 1st and 2nd of May, several large bodies 
of French troops were observed to pass the 
Agueda and the Azava, and to make a movement, 
as if with the design of threatening our communi-
cations, and, if possible, effecting the relief of the 
fortress of Almeida. Towards the evening of the 
3rd, the sixth corps showed itself in. three lines on 
the ridge which overhangs Fuentes de Honor, in 
a direction parallel to that occupied by us; and 
they shortly afterwards opened a heavy can-
nonade, which they followed up by a desperate 
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assault upon the village. Lieutenant-colonél 
Williams, who commanded a battalion of light 
companies, gallantly sustained the attack for sorne 
time; but it was found necessary, at last, to sup-
port him with tbe 7 J st, under Colonel Cadogan, 
as it again was supported in succession by the 
79th and 24th regiments. The battle had not 
lasted long, when Colonel Williams teceived a 
wound, which compelled him to quit the field, 
and things were in s()me disorder; but at tbis 
moment Colonel Cadogan pressed forward with 
the 71st, and driving the enemy with the bayonet 
from all the ground which they had won, restored 
the fortune ofthe day. It is scarcely necessary 
to add, tbat tbe 7lst were ably supported by tbe 
79th and 24th; upon tbe senior officer among 
whom, Colonel Cameron of the former corps, tbe 
command of the whole devolved. 
Though checked in their first advance, the 
enemy repeatedly renewed their attack, bringing 
up, on each occasion, fresh troops; and on every 
occasion were they driven back with a heroism 
which has never been surpassed, and but rarely 
equalJed. They fought, however, with great gal-
lantry, and more than once stood to be bayoneted 
by our soldiers in the main street of the village; 
but their success, whenever obtained, lasted but a 
moment, and they were instandy swept away by 
adesperate charge from the men whom they be-
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lieved that they had DverCDme. The 71st, which 
had repeatedly attacked and DverthrDwn cDlumns 
.of French trDDps Dn the rDad, were tempted, tD-
wards dusk, by the appearance Df what they CDn-
ceived tD be a gun .on the Dpp.osite acc1ivity, tD 
I'ush acrDSS the rivulet? and becDme the assailants 
in their turno N.othing c.ouldbe m.ore impetu.ous, 
and yet mDre DrderIy, than this charge. They 
lite rally b.ore d.own everything befDre them, till 
they reached the .object Df their search; when, tD 
their m.ortificati.on, they discDvered that it was 
nDt a gun, but .only a tumbril .of ammunitiDn. ·Of 
that, hDwever, they made themselves masters ; 
and thDUgh· severely galled Dn their return by a 
murderDUS fire .of musketry and grape, they re-
gained Fuentes de HDn.or with their trDphy. and 
spent the night there in quieto 
As may readily be imagined, the dawn Df the 
4th had n.o! yet appeared, when the whDle Df Dur 
line gDt under arms, and waited in. anxiDus expec-
tatiDn fDr a renewal Df the cDmbat. Day broke, 
hDwever, without disclDsing any disp.osition, .on 
the part Df the enemy, t.o resume the .offensive; 
and as h.our after h.our stole Dn, a belief naturally 
ar.ose, that n.othing wDuld be attempted, at least 
fol' the presento . Inthis persuasi.on we were 
str.ongly c.onfirmed by the rep.ort .of several de-
serters, wh.o this day carne in t.o us, and fr.om 
wh.om we leárned that Massena, Dverawed by the 
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obstinacy of yesterday's resistance, had resolved 
to attempt nothing further, till he should be re-
inforced by a body of the imperial guard, which 
was understood to be 011 its march to join him. 
That the statements of the deserters were not to 
be disregarded, a variety of circumstances led us 
to believe. In the first place, clouds of mounted 
and staff officers might be seen, riding, from time 
to time, along the opposite ridge, and examining, 
with apparent care and minuteness, into our dis-
positions. In the next place, as evening ap-
proached, we observed no inconsiderable addition 
to"the enemy's cavalry, particularly to their hus-
sars and lancers, arrive. The reader need scaréely 
be reminded that our force was greatly weakened, 
more especially in cavalry, in consequence of the 
formation of the separate corps, which was now 
acting under Marshal Beresford. Of the latter 
description of troops we could not muster, at 
present, more than fifteen or sixteen hundred in 
the field; and the total amount of our effectives, 
including Portuguese of all arms, fell short of 
twenty-nine thousand. On the side of the enemy, 
again, the cavalry were computed to exceed four 
thousand; whilst the sum of the effectives fell 
not 8hort of forty-five thou8and. These were 
fearful odds, especiaIly when it is considered that 
we were fighting for the attainment of one specific 
object, and that we were not only calIed upon to 
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resist with effect this tremendous superiority, but 
tó continue, at the same time, the blockade of 
Almeida. Yet had the men confidence in their 
leader, as their leader had confidenee in them; and 
that feeling, aided by the judicious choice of 
ground, and the able manreuvres which our divi~ 
sions severally exeeuted, carried us safely and 
gloriously through all our difficulties. 
At three o'clock in the morning of the 5th, our 
advanced parties sent in to state that the enemy's 
columns were in motion; and before six they had 
commenced a desperate attaek, as well upon the 
vi.llage of Fuentes de Honor as upon the 7th 
division, which oceupied a wood and sorne broken 
ground on the right of our lineo In Fuentes tha 
assailants were met with the same spirit of deter-
mined resistance which had frustrated all their 
efforts on the 3rd; and if for a moment they 
seemed to have made an impression, they were 
almost immediately. afterwards driven with 10ss 
from the ground which they had won. 011 the 
right, affairs went on with rather more of apparent 
peril; though even there the danger was never 
very imminent. It was here that they deemed it 
expedíent to employ the mass of their cavalry, 
which carne on, stróngly supported both by in-
fantry and guns; and asevere loss was on our 
part experienced, before a final check was given 
to the progress of men who fought like troops 
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habituated to victory, and as yet unaccustomed to 
reverses. 
The first attack fell upon· General Sontag's 
brigade, which had been especiaUy directed to 
defend the wood, but which, overwhelmed by 
numbers,retired, after a gallant and obstínate re-
. sistance. Our cavalry seeing this, and anxious to 
cover the retreat of their comrades, q uitted a very 
commandingand yet open posítion on which they 
had been drawn up, and descended, with two or 
three pieees ofhorse-artillery, into the low ground. 
It was an unfortunate movement, and opened·to 
the enemy the only prospect ofpermanent suecess 
which they enjoyed during the whole of the day ; 
for they immediately occupíed in force the heights 
wbich had been abandoned, and pressed our peo~ 
pIe so vigorously, that it was found necessary to 
give to this partor our line a new direction. The 
light division, which had advanced to support 
tbe cavalry, finding the post aIread y evacuated, 
~. wheeled to the right, and made arrangements to 
. protect a fresh movement of General Houston's 
division, which they ~xecuted in masterly style. 
rrhey drew up in squares of battalions, received 
:aud repulsed repeated charges of the French caval-
:ry, and then marching through our own sq uadrons, 
susÚlined a cannonade as galling as has frequentIy 
fallen to the share of troops in that dense order. 
1n tbe mean while~ no formidable force of Blitish 
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dragoons could be brought together, for our infe-
riority in that arm was too decisive to warrant 
any granddisplay; but a few squadrons charged 
from time to time through the intervals of the 
squares with. greater 9r less benefit, according as 
opportunities offered. In the end, however, this 
species of manreuvre threatened to be productive 
of more harm than good. Our troopers, in re-
tiring, got among our owri squares, and threw 
them into confusion, from which, but for the judi-
cious conduet of the ehasseurs Britanniques, mueh 
. misehief might have aeerued. These, however, by 
a well-directed Ranking fire, hindered the enemy 
from taking advantage of the opening made, and 
henee our retrogression was effeeted with but little 
10ss on our part, and a heavy sIaughter among the 
Freneh. 
The right was now appuyed by a strong hiIl, on 
the summit oí whieh stood an old tower; and the 
enemy finding that the newalignment had be en 
taken up without the slightest disorder, paused 
before they ventured to assail it. Their successes 
he re amounted to nothing more than the oecu-
pation of some ground, whieh, at the eornmenee-
ment oí the action, had been held by us; they had 
in no respect broken our ranks, and they were as 
far from turning them as ever; whilst in the direc-
tion of Fuentes de Honor, upon whieh a variety of 
attempts had been made, they were beaten baek 
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at all points. They had attacked it in front, and 
on both flanks, with infantry, artillery, and caval-
ry; but the steady valour of the 71st and 79th 
regiments, supported by the 24th, set all their 
efforts at defiance; and now, after several hours of 
severe fighting, not the slightest impression was 
made. Massena seemed to feel that our troops 
were made of more obstinate stuff than even he 
had anticipated, and towards evening he relaxed 
in his exertions. His columns on our right halted; 
those which had been employed in the assault of 
Fuentes drew off; and the whole army prepared . 
to bivouac, in the order in which it stood at the 
close ofthe action. Similar arrangements were 
entered into on ·our side .. The pickets were sta-
tioned along the front of the position; and large 
fires were lighted across the ridge; and both 
parties lay down to rest with a confident assu-
rance on their minds that the battle was inter-
mitted ónly till the return of daylight. 
We were, as usual, under arms long before 
dawn appeared; but it brought about no such re-
sults as we had anticipated. The enemy were 
before us, indeed, in the same force as ever, and 
in the same attitude which they had assumed on 
the preceding evening; but they exhibited no dis-
position to renew the struggle; whilst we were 
content to retain our attitude of watchfulness, and 
to act as we had hitherto done, entirely on the de-
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fensive. In this manner the whole of the 6th 
passed away, no movernent of any importance 
being made on either side; and night again closed 
in, bringing with it an increased persuasion, that 
the morrow must, at all events, lead to sorne more 
decisive issues. But those amongst us who anti-
cipated another battle, found, on the return of day, 
that they had rniscalculated the enemy's courage 
'or resources. The dawn of the 8th showed their 
columns in full retreat; and towards noon it was 
satisfactorily ascertained that they had taken the 
road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Massena; with his who]e 
arrny, reinforced by every battalion aÍld squadron 
wbich he had be en enabled to bring up from Cas-
tiJe and Galicia, was thus foiled by three divisions 
of our divided force; he was compelled to retreat 
before men over whom he had calculated on ob-
,taining an easy and brilliant victory ; and Almeida, 
for the relief of which he had shown hirnself 
deeply interested, was left to its fate. It may be 
worth while to inquire into sorne of those circurn-
stances which tended to produce a failure so re-
markable, and to place fresh laurels on the brows 
of one, to whose renown all Europe was already 
beginning to bear witness. 
There can be no doubt that the general arrange-
ment and disposition of the aUied troops was 
marked by aH that judgment and military saga-
city, which so eminently cháracterise the tactics 
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of the Duke of Wellington. Every species of 
force, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, was 
posted where it could act to the best purpose and 
with greatest effect; whilst due advantage was 
taken of all the natural inequalities which pre- ' 
sented themselves, to shelter our people, as far as 
might be, from the enemy's fire. Yet our line was 
in many places unavoidably exposed, and open to 
the attacks both of cavalry and artillery; whilst 
the thick woods in our front afforded to Massena 
the most convenient plateau which he could have 
desired, for the distribution of his columns unseen, 
and therefore disregarded. Had be rightly availed 
himself of tbis advantage, be might bave poured 
the mass of his force upon any single point, and 
perbaps made an impression befare we could bave 
bad time to support it. There were, besides this, 
otber and equally obvious modes of proceeding, to 
which be bad no recourse. Massena's superiority 
to us, both in cavalry and artillery, was very great. 
Had be commenced his attack witb a violent can-
nonade, jt must bave produced sorne bavoc, and 
probably considerable confusion in our lineo He 
might tben have moved forward bis cavalry en 
masse, supporting it by strong columns of infantry; 
and had eitber tbe one or the otber succeeded in 
piercing tbrough, our situation would bave been 
by no means an enviable one. It is, indeed, 
higbly probable that his 'Cbarges would have been 
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repulsed; but in this case, a third resource was 
left to him, of which he might al so have availed 
himself. Had he thrown his cavalry round our 
right flank,-a movement which we should have 
found it no easy matter to prevent,-crossed the 
Coa, advanced upon our lines of communication, 
and stopped our supplies, at the moment when, 
with his infantry, he threatened to turn us; then 
pushed upon Sabugal and the places near, he 
might have compelled us to pass the Coa with all 
our artillery at the most disadvantageous plac.es, 
and cut us off from our best and safest retteat. 
There was, indeed, a time during the continuance 
of the affairof thé 5th,·.when his design of acting 
in this manner was )eriously apprehended; and 
Lord Wellington was, in consequence, reduced to 
the necessity of deciding whether he should relin-
quish the Sabugal road, or raise the blockade of 
Almeida. But Lord Wellington's presence of 
mind never for a moment forsook him. He felt no 
distrust in his troops; to retain his hold over a 
secure and accessible }ine of retreat was, ~there­
fore, to him, a éonsideration of less moment than 
to continue an operation of which the ultimate 
success could be now neither doubtful nor remote; 
and he at once determined to expose Sabugal, 
rather than throw open a communication with 
Almeida. It was a bold measure, but it was not 
adopted without due consideration ; and it received 
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an ample reward in the successful termination of 
this hard-fought battle. 
The 10ss experienced by our army during the 
operations of these two days was very conside-
rabie; for the actions, a1though partial, were 
maintained with signal obstinacy on both sides. 
It fen chiefly upon the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions 
of infantry, and upon the cavalry, and amounted 
. in aH to nearIy sixteen hundred meno That of the 
enemy was much greater, and carne not short, on 
the most rnoderate computation, of three thousand. 
They left four hundred dead in the village of 
Fuentes de Honor alone, and a large proportion of 
prisoners fell into our hands. N otwithstanding all 
this, however, they retrograded soslowly, that on 
the 9th it was stil1 doubtful whether some fresh 
efforts might not be made. They had taken, as 1 
have -stated, the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and ap-
peared about noon on the preceding day to be in 
full retreat; but their retreat was conducted with 
the utmost leisure, w.hieh the peeuliarity of our 
circumstanees WQuld not permit us to interrupto 
On the contrary, we applied ourselves sedulously 
to the double task ofstrengtheningour own ground 
by means of intrenchments, and resuming the 
striet blockade of Almeida, in which late events 
had compel1ed us to relax; and on the 10th we 
were relieved from a11 further uneasiness respect-
ing Massena, by the diseovery that he had leftno 
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more tban a few cavalry pickets on the banks of 
tbe Azava. Thus was an end put to a variety of 
conjectures, o which some had begun to hazard, 
touching the probabilities of another action in this 
quarter; and Lord Wellington was left at liberty 
to pursue such plans as he should consider best 
adapted to the situation of the country, and most 
suitable to his own means and resources. 
In addition to giving security to _his position 
aboye Fuentes de Honor, by directing certain 
field-works to be thrown up here and there for its 
defence .. Lord Wellington issued orders that °the 
blockade of Almeida should be resumed. On first 
arriving in this province, the British general caused 
Almeida to be reconnoitred, with the view, ir pos-
sible, of carrying it by a coup-de-main. As, how-
ever, it was found too formidable for any such 
attempt, and as the arrny was not possessed of a 
battering train, or other materials necessary for the 
conduct of a regular siege, he was, per force, 
obliged to content himself with its investment; 
and confident hopes were entertained, that famine 
would, before long, do the work of war. It had 
now been blockaded sorne time, and its stock of 
provisions, originally scan'ty, was drawing, we 
were well aware, rapidly to an end; it was there-
fore of the utmost importance. not only to prevent 
fresh supplies from being thrown in, but to hinder 
the garrison from effecting its escape; a measure 
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which the governor was known to have in contem-
plation. On this aecount, Massena's eQlumns had 
no sooner abandoned their ground, than the sixt,h 
division, on whom the duties of the blockade de-
volved, were commanded to resuQ}.e their labours ; 
and they marched for the purpose, uÍlder the ord~rs 
of General Campbell, back upon their canton-
menís. 
Gener;:JJCampbell, a zealous and enterprising offi-
cer, was exceedingly desirolls that the arrangement 
of the blockade should be intrusted entirely to 
himself; and being ambitious, as it was but natu~ 
fal that he should, of the honour of reducing this 
important place through hi~ own.~kill, he requested 
and ()b\ained permis$iQn 10 condllct all details-
withoqt any interference. Whether it was; th,at 
GeQeral Campbell felt too confident, or, wheth~l' 
any other circumst_ances bad weigilt with him, 1 
know ·Ilqt; but tl!e Qven,t proved that, in making 
his dispoliitions, he adopted a system of incau\ion, 
which led to resul~ IIWftifying to 4ims,elf, ~~ f,LU· 
noying to the wllOle al'my. Instead of coverÍI)g 
with troops t4e l~ft fa,ce of Almeida, th~ h,anks Qf 
the ¡\gl,lep,a, ~I;ld the bridge ~t ll~rba <lel Puerc,o, 
the~e . ppint¡; rePlain~ un,guard,ed; an,d he p~~t~ 
a Qrig~dE} .a.t·Jun~a a11dMalp~rteda, thr(};w l>a.qk 
General P~ck tQ Ci¡;¡co V ~IJI~s,l,\nd watc~~d; with 
a degre,e ~f atteijt~(;m, $,e right, faqe qf the. tO,,"11, 
frOID whi~h 110 mOyet;nellt was likely to be made. 
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with a probability of success. Of Barba del 
Puerco in particular, it behoved him, in the opinion 
of aH, to be excessively jealous, because, through 
it ran the most direct and shortest road towards the 
enemy's outposts; indeed, so conscious were all 
parties of this, that on the 11th the 4th regiment, 
from Sir William Erskine's division, was, in spite 01' 
the late agreement, ordered up to take possession 
of the heights aboye that place. But the ar~ange­
ment came too late, for matters were already in a 
train for an attempt, the success of which, whilst it 
speaks nothing· in favour of our prudence, must 
ever redound to the honour of General Brennier, 
the brave man who condllcted it. 
A little before midnight on the 11th, animmense 
explosion was heard in the vicinity of the fortress ; 
though our head-quarters weretoo far removed to 
be aware of thé circumstance. Soon afterwards 
General Pack, who chanced to be at Malparteda 
with the pickets of his brigade, spread an alarm 
that the place was blown up, and that the Frel1ch 
garrison was marching in good order towards 
Barba del Puerco. General Pack's pickets of-
fered as much resistance as they were capable of 
offering; but the enemy soon broke through, and 
passing along the flank of the reserve, our people 
were unable to arrest their progress, even for a 
momento General Pack sent immediately to sum-
mon General Campbell, who, on the first noise, 
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had hurried frorn his quarters; but the latter has-
tened to the front, not leaving, as it was said, posi-
tive orders behind him, and carne up whilst his 
own troops were yet dispersed. and in disorder. 
Great delay occurred in consequence, in bringing 
thern to the point threatened; whilst the 4th regi-
ment failed in its attempts to head the flying gar-
rison; by which rneans Brennier was enabled tB 
lead his troops in a close and compact column from 
Almeida as far as the Agueda, without having ex-
perienced any serious rnolestation by the way. 
General Pack, indeed, by great exertions, con-
trived to hang with a few of his men upon the 
enerny's rear. and pointed out, by the flashes of 
hisrnusketry, the exactpath which they had taken; 
but Brennier conducted all things in a manner so 
cool and soldier-like, that not the slightest symp-
tom of confusion was manifested throughout tbe 
night. He had given positive directions to his 
soldiers, from the instant oftheir quitting the town. 
to continue their march in profound silence; how-
ever heavy might be the fire of the besiegers, they 
were not to return a shot; "and when daylight 
arrived, in case they should find themselves sur-
rounded, they were to make an opening wherever 
they best could, with the bayonet. N o commands 
could have beenmore punctually obeyed. The 
sound of a voice was not heard among them; and 
they never once returned the desultory tiraillade 
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with which General Pack's men endeavoured tó 
gall-them. 
Having reached the Agueda, they made a halt, 
in order that sorne stragglers who had lagged be-
hind, might regain the column. This measure af~ 
forded an opportunity to the 36th, 2nd, and 4th 
regiments, to close upon them; and as the French, 
when they resumed their march, mistook their 
way by diverging a little too much to the left, 
these regiments were enabled to reach the bank of 
the river just as the fugitives were crossing the 
bridge at Barba del Puerco. A destructive tire 
was immediately thrown in, by which between 
one and two hundred men weremQwed down; 
whilst two squadrons of the royals having fianked 
them, succeeded, in conjunotion with Pack's Por-
tuguese, in seeuring ten officers and two hundred 
men as prisoners. Thus about oIíe-third of the 
garrison of Almeida was cut off. But the remain-
ing two-thirdseffected their escape, not less, in 
all probability, to the astonishment of Marshal 
Massena, than to tha regret of Lord Welliogton 
and his followers. It seemed as if, by t11,i8 unto-
ward event, all the advantages obtained by tbe 
battle of Fuentes ele Hónor were tbrown away. 
N ot that we very deepJy regretted tbe escape of 
the individuals: they were brave men, had made 
a bold venture, and deserved that it should be 
~rowned with suceess; but it was mortifying to 
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reflect that now Massena might, with sorne show 
of reason, speak of his late operations as a victory, 
and not as a defeat. He might, in a specious man· 
ner, inform Europe that he had manreuvred merely 
for the purpose of bringing off the garrison of AI-
meida; and as the garrison had actually escaped, 
how could we contradict him? It is not wórth 
while to dwell longer on this affair; but 1 will 
venture to affirm that no one who witnessed the 
effect this disappointment produced upon our army, 
will ever be able to forget it. 
General Brennier left Almeida in a state of sad 
diJapidation. On examining it next day, we found 
that three out of the five bastions of which it was 
composed, had been blown to atoms; the crests 
were thrown down into theditch; and the stenes 
ofwhich they had principally bean composed, were 
burlad, by the violence of the explosion, in all di-
rections, and to great distances. Whether the 
foundations were materially shaken, we had not 
the means of immediately ascertaining; but the 
revetments and ravelines were equally untouched2 
and the main outline of the rampart and ditch 
remained entire. The other two bastions had not 
beeninjured, the mines having by mere accident 
faiied to expIode. Yet was the whole a complete 
ruin; and though we jurlged that it might be so 
far restored, for a moderate expense, as to be ren· 
dered secure against a coup-de-main, we saw 
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plainly cnough, that to put it again in a state of 
defence, and render it capable of withstanding a 
siege, would require much time, much labour, 
and much money. In this country the expenses 
oí mason work are very hea vy, and Almeida was 
entirely constructed of masonry; whilst the Iapse 
of six or eight months-the smallest space of time 
that its re-erection would require-would, in all 
probability, produce events calcuIated, either in 
one way or another, to render its existence or non-
existence a question of very littIe importance. 
On these accounts, Lord Wellington determined 
not to interfere respecting it, but to Ieave it to the 
Portuguese 'government to determiue whether it 
shouId be rebuilt or not; and ir it were, in what 
form, and after what plan, the repairs shouId be 
applied. 
, The sensation produced by the escape of the 
garrison, and the destruction of Almeida, having 
subsided, we began again to give our undivided 
attention to the reports w hich arrived from various 
quarters, relative to the French, as weIl as to 
speculations and surmises touc1ting ourselves. Of 
the French, it was confidently asserted that they 
had 'retired upon Salamanca, Zamora, and Toro; 
that Massena had 'received his recall from Paris ; 
and that Marmont, of whose junction we had pre-
viously received accounts, was now in the chief 
command. Their generals, moreover, were said 
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to agree in opinion that nothing could be under-
taken' against Portugal or the English, till the 
army should be completely reorganised, and 
strengthened by large supplies, both of men and 
means. ,AH likewise, combined, it was said, in an 
outcry against Massena, whose conduct towards 
Ney had been warmly condemned, not only by 
the corps of N ey himself, but by the oftic'ers of 
the army in general, and whose measures were 
characterised as having been, from the first,. with-
out object, and destitute of judgment.. A strong 
sense of discontent was thus said to be general 
throughout their ranks, and discipline was stated 
to have become, in consequence, grievously re'-
laxed. As to ourselves, though our credit might 
not, perhaps, stand on ground quite sO'elevated as 
that which it occupied previous to the late failtire 
at Almeida, yet it must be admitted by an that 
the British army had established for itself a repu-
tation such as it had not, at any other period of 
the war, obtained; and there were few who 
looked . forward without a sanguine and welI-
grounded expectation, that future events would 
only add to the glories of the troops and their 
illustrious leader. We had now be en fairly pitted 
against the warriors and chiefs before whom the 
powers of Europe gave way; and we had come 
forth from the struggle in a manner which could 
hardly fail to satisfy all that we were at least not 
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inferior to them in any qualification befitting sol~ 
diers. Everyindividual in the army felt this, and 
every one felt to whom the praise was due. The 
consequencé was, that Lord Wellingtonwas looked 
up to with a degree ofenthusiastic devotion, which 
'it may not, perhaps; be easy for a common reader 
to understand; whilst aU his proceedings showed 
that in hisanny, in itsvalour and patienee, disci-
pline and coolness, he reposed a eonfidence of 
which the soldiers knew themselves to be worthy, 
and which .it 'Was their principal boast, that they 
had in no instance ahused 01' betrayed. 
As BOOIl as Almeida feU, and it became satis-
factorily ascertained. tbat nothing of sny impor-
tance W<nHd. be attempted on this side oí Portugal, 
Lord W~lingtol1 began to direet a large share of 
bis attention to the eampaign in the south, and 
made ready lo assist Marshal Beresford, not only 
with strong reinforcements, but with his own coun-
sel and presen'Ce. For this putpose, he pol hvo 
divisiOllS~ the 3rd and the 7tb, under GeneraIs 
Picton and Houston, in march towards the Gua-
diana, directing thero to move by Campo Mayor. 
The rest ofthe army was then ordered into can-
ton'menti!!; the sixth division at Mealhada, Jueda, 
and Frenada; tire' nfth at Fuentes de Honor, 
Ponte Vilhe, and· Nave d'Avel; the first at Aldea 
de Ponte and Albergaria; the ligbt at Gallegos~ 
and along the banks of the Agueda; and the ca-
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valry at Cesmeo and the villages near. Along 
this line, by the extraordinary exertions of Mr: 
Kennedy and the comm:issariat department, the 
troops were, upon the whole, well supplied; and 
though forage was rather searee, still the cavalry 
contrived not only to keep up the condition in 
which they previously stood, but even to improve 
upon it. Sir Brent Spencer, likewise, on whom, 
in the event of Lord Wellington's absence, the 
eommand of the whole devolved, was unremitting 
in his exertions to provide for the wants of the sol. 
diera, and to guard them against surprise. But 
on the latter head no great risk was apprehended ; 
and therefore Lord Wellington; as soon: as he had 
seen his arrangements in a train towardstheir 
eompletion, set oft: accompanied by the heads of 
departments, for Badajoz. 
It may be necessary here to advert to circum.~ 
stances which, during the last fortnight, had be..: 
fallen Marshal Beresford and his corps. 
On the 22nd of April, in consequenee of diree-
tiOO8 given by Lord WeHington himself, measures 
were taken for completing the investment of Ba ~ 
dajoz, and for preparing fascines, gabions, and 
other implements neeessary for the conduct of the 
siege. These were somewhat interrupted by thé 
sudden rise of the river on the 24th; which sweep~ 
ing away the bridge of casks, which had been 
thrown across, cut off all cornmunication between 
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the investing army and Portugal. On the 29th, 
however, the communications were restored by 
means of flying bridges; and on the 1st of May, 
the bridge of casks was replaced more firmly and 
more conveniently than ever. 
On the 4th, General William Stewart invested 
Badajoz on the left bank of the river; having 
marched from Talavera la Real with five thousand 
men at midnight, and taken up his ground without 
any loss at nine in the morning. By some mis-
take, however, and the occurrence of several 
disasters,' the investment on the southern side was 
not effected till the 8th, and then only after a good 
deal of skirmishing, and with considerable difli-
culty. But a flying bridge was, in the interim, 
established on the Guadiana, immediately below 
the mouth of the Caya; roads of communication 
were formed round the place; and the guns and 
stores were moved froro Oliven!;a according to 
orders; and as those intended to act against Fort 
Sto Christoval were brought up on the same day 
which saw the investment completed, prepara-
tions were made to break ground, and commence 
the siege with vigour, that evening. 
Without going into a regular journal of this 
siege, it may be' proper to advert here to the 
amount of the rneans with which a handful of 
British troops endeavoured to reduce one of the 
strongest and IDOst regularly fortified places in 
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the south of Spain. For the attack upon Fort 
Christoval-to the results of which they looked 
for success in the undertaking at large-there 
were provided five hundred intr~nching tools, two 
thousand sand-bags, a few planks, and about two 
hundred gabions. The artillery consisted of three 
brass twenty-four pounders, provided with three 
hundred rounds per gun, and two eight-inch 
howitzers, supplied each with two hundred rounds. 
The besieging corps was made up of Qne British 
brigade, two battalions of Portuguese of the line, 
and a battalion of militia, mustering in all about 
four thousand men; one hundred men of the line 
were appointed to act as overseers; forty-eight 
carpenters, and thirty-six miners, were attached 
to the engineers; and there were present twenty-
seven rank and file of the corps of royal military 
artificers. • . 
The soil upon whieh the working parties began 
their operations proved so rocky and unyielding, 
tbat though· ground was broken on tbe Digbt of 
the 8th, and four hundred men were employed in 
breaking it, ten men only were enabled to work 
under cover, when daylight appeared; and the 
progress made was in consequence both slowand 
~ 8ee an extremely interesting work by Colonel Jones, of 
the Engineer~, called "A Journal of the 8ie~es ill the 
Peninsula." 
124 1\1 A RItA TIVE OF THE 
unsatisfactory, On the 10th the garrison madea 
sortie, which was at first attended with success-
the troops employed making their way, in spite 
of the covering parties, into one of our advanced 
works; but the guard of the trenches soon reco-
vered the ground which was lost, and drove the 
enemy back with considerable slaughter within 
the walls. On this occasion the indiscreet valour 
of sorne of our officers tempted them to lead their 
men up to the very glacis of the fort; and they 
sustained, for no purpose, a 10ss, which might 
have been well avoided, of nearly four hundred in 
killed and wounded. On the 11th the breaching 
battery being completed, and the guns and 
howitzers prepared for service, our artillery opened 
the attack, attempting, with the howitzers, to 
keep under the fire. of the place; whilst with the 
three twenty-four pounders, they strove to batter 
in breach thé smalIer flank of Fort Sto Christoval. 
But our gunnel's were Portuguese recruits, who 
knew little of their duty, and exhibited abad 
specimen of practice; whereas the fire from the 
fort was both well directed and warmly kept up. 
The consequence was, that long before evening 
our batteries were silenced; and the three guns, 
and one of the howitzers, were rendered unser-
viceable. 
N othing intimidatedby these reverses, Marshal 
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Beresford prepared to renew his efforts with aH 
the means which he was able to bring together. 
Other guns were moved round to Fort Christoval, 
and a new battery constructed and armed; but 
before a fair trial could be made of its efficiency, 
reports reached the General, which caused him to 
suspend, for the present, the whole of bis under-
taking. He learned that Soult, having collected 
an army .of fifteen or sixteen thousand, men, in 
communication with General Latour Maubourg at 
the head of six thousand more, was in full march 
for the relief of the place; and as the corps with 
wbich be covered the siege was by no means com~ 
petent to oppose that force, it becáme indispensa-
ble to relinquish every other object, for tbe sake 
of effectually meeting the danger which threat.; 
ened. On the night between the 12th and 13th, 
therefore, when a fresh parallel bad just beeo 
Qpened, and upwards of fourteen hundred men 
were paraded, for the purpose of briskly carrying 
on the work, an order arrived that the under-
taking should be relinquished, and that tbe troops 
should march, without delay, to the position at 
Valverde. The orders were promptly obeyed. 
On the night of the 13th, all the batteries were 
distilounted; and on the ] 4th, such materíals as it 
was found impossible to remove, were bumed, or 
otherwise destroyed. On the. night of the 15th, 
the lastcorps which had halted to complete these 
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operations, tóok their departure; and the first 
siege ofBadajoz was formalIy raised. 
Such was the substance of the information 
which reached us; part of it whilst we were yet 
at Villa Formosa, and part whilst wewere prose-
cuting our journey towards the Guadiana. That 
Marshal Beresford's situation was one of extreme 
difficulty and delicacy, any one who reflects must 
percelve. There was submitted to him no other 
alternative than either to fight with the Guadiana 
in his rear,over which his communications were 
precarious and indifferent, or by a retreat, to abán-
don Badajoz entirely, and permit the enemy, by 
taking possession of the course of the river, to 
strengthen and consolidate himself in Estremadura 
and the south of Spain. He knew, indeed, that 
Lord Wellington was hurrying to his assistance, 
and he was aware that two divisions had begun 
their march for the purpose of supporting him: 
had it been practicable, therefore, to protract mat-
ters, and to avoid an action till the reinforcements 
should arrive, it would have been his policy to do 
so. But the enemy pressed forward ",ith so much 
rapidity, and manifested so decided an intention 
of overwhelming him at once, that in point of fact 
he can hardly be said to have possessed a choice. 
He accordingly concentrated his troops, as has 
been aboye related, at Valverde, whither likewise 
the Spanish generals~ Blake and Castaños, with 
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twelve thousand men, hastened· to join him; and 
the three chiefs having concerted their plans, and 
made every disposition to receive the enemy, 
awaited that battle which appeared to be inevi-
table. 
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CHAPTER V. 
Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz-Battle of AI-
buera-Retreat of 80ult, and renewal of the siege-It is 
pressed with vigour, and a breach in Fort 8t. Christoval pro-
nouneed prácticable-Movements of díe enemy to relieve 
the plaee-Brilliant cavalry affair at Usagre. 
lw consequence of the advices which he received 
from the south, Lord Wellington, as soon as he 
saw matters in a proper train upon the Agueda, 
set off to join Marshal Beresford, and to superin-
tend in person the operations which that officer 
was conducting. We quitted Vil1a Formosa on 
the 15th, and travelling at the rate of sixty miles 
a day, without baggage or impediments of any 
description, arrived in Elvas before dark on the 
19th. Whilst performing this arduous journey, 
a variety of rumours relative to late transactions 
met us at every stage. At one place it was stated 
that the enemy were coming on in force, and that 
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a battle might hourIy be expected; at anothel", 
that Marshal Beresford had resolved upon a re-
treat, not feeling himself equal' to oppose the 
French; and, at a third, that a great action had 
been fought, and that it had ended in favour of 
the allies. It will readily be imagined that the last 
rurnour, though it entered in no respect into parti-
culars, tended, in no sligbt degree, to elevate our 
spirits, and quicken our pace. On reaching Elvas, 
however, more accurate details were given; for 
Colonel Arbuthnot, from the Marshal's head-
quarters, met us here, and from him we received 
an official account of one of the most obstinate, as 
well as sanguinary actions, in which British troops 
were ever engaged. 
The most advantageous position which it is pos-
sible for an arrny to assume, which desires to check 
the advance of a hostile force froll1 Seville to 
Badajoz, is beside the village of Albuera, among 
sorne undulating heights which stretch towards the 
rear, and are covered by two small streams run-
ning in parallel directions upon the flanks of the 
plateau. On this ground Marshal Beresford de-
termined to take post, and fOl" that purpose ad-
vanced his troops towards Albuera on the 14th 
and 15th; but Soult, having hurried from Seville 
by forced marches of not less than six leagues a 
day, was beforehand with him; and the cavalry, 
which had been sent on as far as Almendralejo to 
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reconnoitre, was driven back in disorder. It was 
accordingly found, on arriving at the village, that 
an extensive wood, of which it had been Marshal 
Beresford's intention to avail himself, was in pos· 
session of the French; and hence, that whatever 
dispositions he might deern it advisable to make, 
must be entirely restricted to the country on the 
western bank of the Albuera. 
The position selected for the army was accor· 
dingly behind the litt1e river Albuera, where 
the road from Seville to Badajoz and OIiven~a, 
after passing the stream by a bridge close to the 
village, separates into two branches. Here the 
ground rises from the river in gentle undulations, 
which, extending to the right, afford no single point 
d'appui more favourable than another, but tempt 
him, who has already arranged his line along their 
summits, to draw it out from hill to hill, and emi-
nence to eminence. It was here that the allied 
armies were posted on the evening of the 15th; 
their left resting upon Albuera, and covered by the 
stream, the steep banks of which, together with 
sorne walls and buildings, afforded to it a good 
deal of shelter; whilst their right, extending to a 
considerable distance, found no commanding fea-
ture on which to lean. 
Marshal Beresford had on this occasion under 
his orders !L corps of Spaniards, whom he stationed 
in a double line upon his extreme right, between 
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two hillocks, one somewhat in advance of the 
other; next to them carne the second British di-
vision, which, under General Stewart, composed 
the centre; and on the left of aU were the Portu-
guese of General Hamilton's division, supported by 
General Alten's brigade of light Germans. The 
fourth division, under General Cole, which did not 
reach its ground till after the battle began, formed, 
as a reserve, in rear of the second; whilst the 
main body of the cavalry took post upon the right, 
so as to cover the Spaniards, and hinder them from 
being turned. With respect to the exact numbers 
of this army, it is not very easy to form a correct 
judgment, bécause the Spaniards are proverbial 
for the great inaccuracy of their returns; but 
taking these at 12,000, the Portuguese at 8000, 
and the British at 7 flOO, the total amount will 
reach about 27,000. That it could not exceed 
this is certain, however much it tnight fall short of 
it. In cavalry, Marshal Beresford's corps was ex-
tremely -weak, and his artillery amounted to no 
more than thirty pieces. 
The force with which Soult prepared to raise 
the siege of Badajoz was, in point of number, in-
ferior to that of the allies; but in cavalry, artillery, 
and the general character of the troops, it was 
greatly superior. Twenty thousand French in-
fantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty pie ces of 
cannon, bivouacked, on the night of the 15th, in 
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the wood; and the whole advanced next day in 
the finest order to the attack. 
It might be about nine o'clock in the morning 
of the 16th, when a heavy force of cavalry, sup-
ported by t~o large columns of infantry, were 
seen moving towards the bridge, with a view, as 
it was supposed, of piercing the allied line in that 
quarter, and making themselves masters of AI-
buera. AH eyes were instantly turned to the 
point threatened, and the most effective prepara-
tions were made to meet and repel the attack; 
but before the excellence of these could inany 
degree be put to the test, a new source of alarm 
disclosed itself in another direction. The enerny, 
instead of corning on as had been expected, ra., 
pidly changed their plan, and under cover of their 
cavalry, and favoured by a thick fog, filed off 
towards our right. Rere they pressed forward 
with an impetuosity which the Spaniards, who 
were stationed there, could not withstand ;and in 
a few minutes they were in possession of the 
most cornmanding heights, upon which our right 
Rank depended for support. The Spaniards be-
haved, on this occasion, with considerable gal-
lantry. They gave way, it is true, and fell back ; 
but their retreat was conducted without confu-
sion, and though repulsed, they were far from 
being defeated. But their retrogression threw 
open to the enemy, not only the key of Marshal 
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Beresford's position, but the only good road by 
which, in case of a disaster, he could retire; for 
it laid bare his line of communication with Val-
verde, and exposed him to the risk of being 
hemmed in between the river and the enemy's 
eolumns. It became, therefore, an objeet of the 
first importanee to reeover the heights which had 
been lost; and it was in striving to attain thatend, 
that the chief portion of the loss occurred. 
Marshal Beresford endeavoured at first to bring 
back tIte Spanish troops to the eharge; but find-
ing them extremely unwieldy, and little eapable 
of executing a nice manreuvre, he passed the 
whole of General Stewart's division through them, 
towards the right. This done, General Stewart 
immediately deployed his first brigade, consisting 
of the buffs, the 66th, the 2nd battalion 48th, and 
the 31st, into line, and pushed them, under Co-
lonel Colbourn, up the hill, against the enemy's 
columns. Their advance was spirited, and their 
tire admirably directed; but before they could 
approach within charging distance, the enemy's 
cavalry broke in upon their right. One wing of 
the buffs was now directed to be thrown back; 
but the regiment, confused, in part by the ap-
proach of the cavalry, and not rightIy Ullderstand-
ing the orders given, fell in upon the second bri-
gade, which, under General Houghton, was ad-
vancing in eolumn to support its comrades. The 
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movement unavoidably threw that brigade like-
wise into confusion, as it happened at the moment 
to be in the act of deploying into line; and henee 
it could afford no adequate assistance, for sorne 
time, to the leading regiments, which were now 
engaged under the most fearful disadvantages. 
The consequence was, that the first brigade suf-
fered terribly, as well by a tremendous fire of 
grape whieh was poured upon them from the 
height, as from the cavalry whieh rode through 
and cut them up at their leisure. The buffs, 66th, 
and 48th, were, indeed, annihilated, and the 31st 
escaped a similar fate, only because, being on the 
left, it had time to form, and was thus enabled to 
sbow a regular front to the enemy. 
In the mean while General Houghton's brigade 
had completed its formation, and advanced gal-
lantly to the charge, the General himself animat-
ing his troops forward, and setting them an exam-
pIe of the most devoted bravery. He was thus 
employed, cheering them on, and waving his hat 
in front of the line, when three balls pierced his 
body, and he fell. The brigade, however, was not 
daunted by his fall; it still pressed forward, and 
the regiments of which it was composed, namely 
the 57th, 1st battaIion 48th, and 29th, vied with 
one another in deeds of heroism. The 57th and 
29th in particular, the former under Colonel ln-
glis, the latter under Major W ay, performed pro-
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digies of valour ; but notwithstanding their utmost 
exertions, nobly seconded by those of the 28th, 
34th, and 39tb, under Colonel Abercrombie, the 
enemy succeeded in maintaining their post. At 
tbis moment we had lost a whole brigade of artil-
lery, a large number of prisoners. and eight stand 
of colours, belonging to the buffs, the 66th, the 
48th, and 57th regiments; and affairs began to 
wear an unpromising appearance. But Marshal 
Beresford determined to make one effort more for 
victory, and happily it was not made in vain. 
General Cole's division had not yet been en-
gaged; it reached the ground after the battle 
began; and having rested for a space in rear of 
the centre, was moved towards the right, where it 
formed en potence. Jt was now ordered down 
into the valIey, for the purpose of carrying this 
formidable height. N othing could exceed the 
gallantry of the fusileer brigade, to which the 
arduous task was mainly iÍltrusted. Though de-
prived, at an early stage of the action, of their lea-
der, Sir William Myers, the fusileers pressed on 
without a moment's pause, or even hesitation, and, 
amidst terrible slaughter, drove the enerny from 
the ridge which he had so long and so obstinately 
defended. They were, however, ably seconded 
by Colonel Abercrombie's brigade, as well as by a 
brigade of Portuguese under Colone] Hervey, 
which repeatedly resisted ana repelled attacks 
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froro the enerny's cava1ry; and they retook the 
whole of the captured guns, with the exception of 
a single howítzer, and three out of the eight stand 
of colours which had been lost. In this grand 
assault General Cole, with almost every individual 
attached to his staff, was wounded; General 
Stewart received two contusions; and few of the 
senior officers, either of regiments or brigades, 
escaped unhurt; but its success was decisive of 
the fortune of the day, which now declared in our 
favour. The enemy made no fresh eflorts to 
regain his post, but retiring in good order across 
the rivulet, took up for the n1ght the ground from 
which he had advanced in the morning. 
Whilst this trernendous conflict was going on 
upon the right, several attempts were made to pene-
trate into the village, and to break through our left 
in the direction of the bridge. The latter were 
bravely met by the Portuguese troops, who con-
stantly droye back the colurnns asrast as they carne 
on; whilst General Alten's light Gerrnans, lining 
the walls about the village, hindered the assailants 
from making any irnpression there. Sorne cavalry, 
which showed thernselves here, were watched by 
the 13th light dragoons, and by a Portuguese 
brigade, under Colon.el Otway; but the rnass of 
the enerny's horse, independentlyof those squa-
drons which committed so much havoc arnong the 
infantry, was extended beyond üur right, and 
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threatened to take us in rearo It was judiciously 
opposed by General Luroley's heavy brigade. 
which, moving as the eneroy moved, and con ti-
nually presenting to them a front of resistance, 
hindered thero froro effecting 'a design which 
must have be en productive to us of the most se-
rious consequences. Our artillery, likewise, was 
admirably served: its fire was very destructive, 
and the men stood to their guns till many of them 
were sabred; indeed, there was not an officer or 
soldier in any department of the army who failed 
this day in doing more than his duty. 1 have al-
ready spoken of the daring intrepidity of the fu-
sileers and it deserves to be held up to remem-
brance; but the bravery of the 57th and 31st feH 
in no degree short of that of their comrades. These 
regiments having ascended the height, stood their 
grOl;md nobly against all the efforts of a column of 
French grenadiers. The enemy's fire thinned their 
ranks, but never once broke them; for at the 
close of the action, the dead and wounded were 
found in two distinct lines, upon the very spots 
which they had occupied whilst alive and fighting. 
They fought, too, in every imaginable order which 
infantry can be called upon to assume. They re-
sisted cavalry in square, deployed again ¡nto line, 
received and returned repeated volleys, whilst a 
few yards only divided them from their oppo-
nents; and at last carried everything before them, 
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by a charge with the bayonet. AH this could 
not, of course, be done without a prodigious 
slaughter on both sides; indeed, thekilled and 
wounded lay in masses so compact~ that full 
seven thousand bodies occupied the· space of a 
fewhundred feet; and our artillery, when ad-
vancing towards the close of the day, were com-
pelled to pass over them, deaf to their cries, and 
averting their gaze from the brave fellows thus 
laid prostrate in the dust. 
The victory was a highly important one, but it 
was purchased at arate dearer than had been re-
quired to secure any other victory in the Penin-
sula. Out of 7500 British troops engaged, 4158 
were placed hors de combat, the Portuguese lost 
389, and the Spaniards nearly 2000; so that 
there fell of the allies this day no fewer than 
6577. Of the enemy's 108S we were necessarily 
unable to form a calculation equally exact, but it 
was estimated to amount to full 8000, among 
whom were three generals killed, and many supe-
rior officers wounded. The latter fact we learned 
from our prisoners, who asserted that the casual-
tíes among their leaders had been such as to leave 
the troops in many· instances at a loss from whom 
to receive orders, and that this circumstance, more 
than ally other, led to the retreat from the height, 
and the abandonment of further operations. 
During the batUeof Albuera, a number of little 
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events occurred, some of them honourabJe in the 
highest degree to individuaJs, and others, not dis-
graceful, but somewhat ludicrous. It is not ne-
cessary for me to add my tribute of respect to the 
memory of the brave youth, Ensign Thomas, of 
the Buffs, who refused to resign the standard of 
his regiment except with life, and whose Jife paid 
the forfeit of his devoted gallantry. Though young 
in years, and holding but an inferor rank in his 
profession, his name will be recorded in the list of 
those ofwhom England has just cause to be proud; 
and his example will doubtless be followed by 
others, as often as the chances of war may leave 
them only a choice between d~ath and dishonour. 
But there were one or two circumstances besides 
this, of which little notice has elsewhere been 
taken, and which appear to me to be deserving of 
some passing record. 
During the hottest of the action, Marshal Beres-
ford exposed himself with a degree of intrepidity, 
which could hardly fail of spreadirig an example 
of heroism around. He repeatedly dragged the 
Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them 
to lead their men forward, and show them the 
way; and when individually charged by a Polish 
lancer, he grappled his adversary by the throat, 
and threw him from his saddle. A very different 
fate attended the personal exertions úf the Portu-
guese staff. They too were charged by a single 
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lancer, who knocked down one with the butt of 
his pike, overset another man and horse, and gave 
ample employment to the entire head-quarters 
before he was finally despatched. These heroes 
declared that the man seemed possessed by an 
evil spirit; and that when he fell at last, he lite-
rally bit the ground. The lancers, as is well 
known, were peculiarly daring in their attacks, and 
mereiless in their operations. They seldom paused 
to offer quarter, but speared our men without 
merey, whether offering resistanee, or giving proofs 
of submission. 
Sueh is the substanee of an official report, whieh 
was communicated to us at Elvas on the 19th; 
and it must be eonfessed that a 'diselosure of the 
los s sustained too k away, in sorne degree, from the 
satisfaction which would have otherwise accom-
panied the announcement ofa fresh vietory. 'Vhen 
the amount of casualties suffered at Albuera carne 
to be added to those experienced before Badajoz, 
and in the affair of Fuentes de Honor, it appeared 
that, unless powerful reinforcements should arrive 
speedily from England, the plans for the rest of 
the campaign must receive serious interruption 
from the absence of adequate means to carry them 
into effect. We had, it in contemplation, be it 
remembered, at this time to reduce the two for-
tresses of Badajoz and Rodrigo, and to keep the 
army of Portugal oceupicd in thc north; whilst 
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80ult should be threatened in the south, and 
an effort made to raise the blockade of Cadiz; 
and to effect these different ends, we possessed onIy 
the force which had followed Massena from Torres 
Yedras, diminished by fuIl nine thousand men, 
who were hors de combat in the late encounters. 
It was impossible to think of this without expe-
riencing the liveliest anxiety, or to cast our re-
gal'ds homewards without an ardent hope that a 
proper spirit might animate the counciIs of those 
in whom the power of right1y carrying on the war 
was vested. That we were commi tted in the 
eyes, not of the Peninsular nations only, but of 
Europe at large, couId no longer be questioned ; 
all now 100ked to us and to our fortunes as the 
criterion by which to try the wisdom of their own 
resistance or continued submission to the French 
yoke; and hence, if we should either reIinquish 
the contest, 01' conduct it with languor and indif-
ference, the prospect of a secure peace was felt to 
be as remote, as when arms were first assumed 
against the aggressions of Buonaparte. 1t was our 
business, however, not to speculate upon proba-
bilities, or to waste time in idly wishing for an 
increase of means, but to turn those already at our 
disposal to the best account; and Lord Wellington 
was not aman to permit present opportunities to 
be negIected, merely hecause the future happened 
to be not quite sobright as he either desired, 
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or had reason ,to believe that it ought to have 
been. 
On the retreat of the enemy after the battle of 
Albuera, Marshal Beresford sent back General 
Hamilton's Portuguese division, with orders to ob-
serve Badajoz upon ¡ts southern side, whilst he 
himself ad vanced with the rest of his corps, and 
too k post at Almendralejo. The troops were thus 
distributed when Lord Wellington arrived; and as 
it was essential that SouIt's columns, which were 
understood to have concentrated at Fuente del 
Maestre, should be narrowly watched, he did not 
interfere with the material parts of this arrange-
mento But the reduction of Badajoz being the 
object in which he felt most deeply interested, he 
applied to it all the resources and numerical force 
at his disposaI, and earnestly urged forward every 
measure which promised in any way to accelerate 
the undertaking. No great while elapsed befo re 
the siege was regularly renewed; . and ifthe means 
applied were still very inferior to what they ought 
to have been, they were at least more respectable 
than any which it had been practicable to apply 
during the late investment; and not less respect-
able than the circumstances of the army, and the 
general resources of the country, were adequate to 
procure. 
As soon as the two divisions carne up, of whose 
march from the position of the Agueda notice has 
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already been taken, Lord Wellington proceeded to 
invest the place anew, upon both banks of the 
river. For this purpose, the seventh division, under 
General Houston, drove in on ,the 25th an the 
enemy's posts upon the right bank, and established 
its pickets within a short distance of Fort Christo-
val, at the same time that a fiying bridge was 
thrown across the Guadiana as at the last attack, 
and the stores and materials forwarded from Elvas 
to the depots before the place. On the left bank, 
again, the Portuguese corps was aIread y at its 
post; but it was strengthened, on the 27th, by the 
arrival of, the third division, which, marching from 
Campo Mayor, crossed the Guadiana at the ford 
aboye the town. The garrison was thus shut com-
pletely within its works, and the business of the 
siege began. 
1, have said that the total amount of men and 
means employed in this service, though certainly 
greater than had been employed before, was not 
such as to raise any very lively expectations, in 
the breast of an ordinary observer, ofa speedyand 
successful termination to our labours. There sat 
down before the place a besieging army offourteen 
or fifteen thousand men, including three thousand 
Spaniards, and two thousand Portuguese militia; 
and the artillery to be employed amounted to forty 
pieces, among which are to be numbered four ten-
inch and six eight-inch howitzers. Of mortarswe 
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possessed none; eight, therefore, 01,lt of the ten 
howitzers, were directed to be used as such; and 
our guns, of which two were twenty-four poun-
ders, and four sixteen pounders, were all brass, 
and oí Portuguese manufacture. The engineers' 
stores col1ected on the occasion comprised 3500 
intrenchiilg tools, 60,000 sand-bags, 600 gabions, 
a very few fascines, and an extremely inadequate 
quantity of splint~r-proof timber and planks; 
whilst, independently oí the officers, there were 
attached to the department, 169 men of the line, 
to act as overseers, 48 carpenters, 48 miners, and 
25 rank and file, of the corps of royal artificers. 
The chief engineer and principal director of the 
operations was Lieutenant-colonelFletcher. Major 
Dixon, oí the Portuguese artillery, was at the 
head of that department; and Captains Ross and 
M'Leod were put in chargeof two depots, which 
were established on each side of the river. 
To oppose this force, there was understood to be 
in Badajoz and in its outworks, a garrison of three 
thousand men, amply provided with food and other 
stores for two months' consumption. Their artil-
lery, too, was oí a very excellent description. It 
numbered flin 150 pieces; from which a fire might, 
at almost any point; be thrown out, infinitely su-
perior to that which we could bring against it ; 
and though, at first, we were led to believe that 
the stock of ammunition was scanty in the place, 
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a short experience of its uses served to convince 
us that in that rumour there was no foundation. 
In spite, however, of these disadvantages, our 
engineers appeared sanguine as' to the results. 
They determined to make two attacks upon two 
sides at the same time, directing one against Fort 
ChristovaI, and the other against the old castle. 
That the reader may the better understand the ob-
ject of these, it will be necessary to inform him, 
somewhat more minutely than has yet been done, 
how Badajoz, Fort Christoval, and the Castle, 
were respectively s~tuated. 
The large and fortified town of Badajoz stands 
upon the left bank of the Guadiana, having one-
fourth of its enceinte washed by the river, which 
variesfrom about three hundred to five hundred 
yards in width, and secures aH the spaee whieh it 
embráces froin insulL Towards the land side its 
defences consist of eight regularly construeted 
fronts, connected by a good eovered way and 
glacis. The ravelines are, however, unfinished; 
but the fronts possess whole revetments, .and the 
escarpe of the bastions Ís thirty feet in height, 
though that of the curtains is considerably lower. 
In advance ofthese fronts are two detached works, 
namely, the Pardaleras, a crown work, about tWQ 
hundred yards distant, and the Pecurina, a strong 
redoubt, four hundred yards removed from the 
glacis. On the north-east side, again, where an 
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angle is formed by the junction of the river Revel-
las with the Guadiana, there is a hill, measuring, 
perhaps, 120 feet in height, the summit of which 
is crowned by an old castle; and the walls of that 
castle, naked, weak, and only partialIy flanked, 
form part of the enceinte of the place. The castle 
itself embraces an area ofvery considerable extent, 
and might, if proper care were bestowed upon it, 
be rendered exceedingly formidable; but its de-
fences have, by sorne accident, been most unac-
countably neglected, and, at the period of which 1 
am now speaking, it was defici~nt even in an ordi-
nary parapet to shelter its guns.· It was against 
this point that oUr engineers determined to conduct 
one of their attacks, and it was he re . that they 
seemed to possess the best, if not the only chance, 
of ultimately succeeding. 
On the opposite bank of the Guadiana, and in a 
direct Une with this ancient building, stand the 
heights of St. Christoval, which measure in alti-
tude little less than the hill of the castIe itself, and 
may. from the peculiar shape and bearing of the 
latter eminence, be said completely to command 
it. The castle hill, it will be observed, forms a sort 
of inclined plain, which eases itself off towards the 
edge of the water; and hence a spectator from the 
summit of the heights of St. Christoval is enabled 
to see, with perfect accuracy, anything which may 
harren to be going cm withín the walls of the 
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castle. To hinder an enemy from availing himself 
of this advantage, a square fort, of aboye three 
hundred feet per face, has been constructed. It is 
strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp 
twenty feet in height; and it i8 capable, from the 
rocky nature of the ground on which it stands, to 
offer a stout resistance, even when methodically 
besieged. Between it and the town, however, the 
communication is far from being good; inasmuch 
as it is carried on entirely by mean s of a long 
bridge, subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more 
precarious and insecure instrumentality of boats. 
Against this fort was the second attack directed ; 
and the obstacles to be encountered soon proved to 
be as serious as from the general appearance of 
the place might have been expected. 
Every preliminary measure having been duly 
adopted, large working parties were ordered out 
on the night of the 31 st, and ground \Vas broken 
both before the Castle and Fort Sto Christoval. 
The former operation went on wholly unobserved 
by the enemy, till daylight disclosed our people, 
already well covered by their embankment; but 
in the latter we \Vere immediately detected, and 
an incessant fire of grape and round shot kept up 
in the direction of the noise. In spite, however, of 
this interruption, the men toiled on; and four dis~ 
tinet batteries, at different rlistanccs from the place, 
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were marked out, and in part completed. From 
that moment reliefs reguIarIy succeeded one ano-
ther by day as well as by night; and though the 
enemy, by shifting two or three of their guns, con-
trived to throw shot into our very trenches, still all 
the batteries, including one against the angle of 
the castle, were completed and armed by the 2nd 
of June. On the 3rd they opened; and a heavy 
fire was kept up on both sides, during several days 
and nights, without the smallest intermission. 
It was now that the inefficient nature of Portu-
guese artillery, as well as the inferiority of Portu-
guese ammunition, became conspicuous. Our 
guns, one after another, became disab~ed by their 
own fue; whilst our breaching batteries. though 
they caused the masonry both of Fort Christoval 
and the Castle to peel off, were far from producing 
that effect which had been anticipated from them; 
On the side of the castle all that couId be said 
was, that at the end of several days of open bat-
teries, the waU and rampart appeared to be a little 
shaken; but of a practicable breach the com-
niencement had not yet been made ;. llor could it 
be surmised how far it was ever likely to be ef. 
fected. On the ~ide of Fort Christoval, however, 
our progress, though not what it was expected to 
have been, seemed more certain. Two bastions at 
Iength fell, apparently filling up the ditch with 
PENINSULAR WAR. 149 
their ruins, and on the 6th, the breach being re~ 
connoitred, it was conceived that an assault might 
safely be hazarded. 
There were a variety of reasons'which combined 
to produce an inclination in Lord Wellington, 
rather to risk an attack before the place should 
have been laid perfectly bare, tban lose even 
anotber day in distant cannonading. We heard 
from a11 quarters that the enemy were moving. in 
great force, for the relief of the place. So early, 
indeed, as the 25th, the very day on which the 
re-investment took place, cireumstances occurred 
to produce a suspicion of the kind, and every hour 
gave to it greater force, and an increased degree 
of credibility. On that day an affair took place in 
front of our covering corps, which, though credit-
able in the highest degree to the troops engaged, 
could- not be regarded by us, at head-quarters, 
without uneasiness, since it clearly indicated a 
disposition, on the part of Marshal Soult, to re-
sume the offensive, and led to the conclusion, 
either that reinforcements had already arrived, or 
that they were close at hand, and therefore to "be 
securely counted on. 
The advanced station of our cavalry was, at this 
time, in Usagre, a small town, distant about two 
leagues from Almendralejo. Rere General Lum-
ley, who commanded the allied squadrons, took 
up his quarters; and here an opportunitywas af-
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forded him of distinguishing himself. . On . the ~ 
25th, about nve hundred of the enemy's cavalry 
crossed a líttle stream which runs before the vil-
lage, and filing through the street, which our 
peopIe, on their approach, had evacuated, de-
bouched at its extremity, and formed with a wall 
in their rearo General Lumley seized this favour-
able opportunity, by ordering out the 3rd dragoon 
guards, and 4th dragoons, to charge. They exe-
cuted the movement in good style, and overthrow-
ing the French in a moment, cut down about one 
hundred, and made many prisoners. The rest 
fled in every direction; whilst their comrades, in 
large numbers, stood upon the opposite bank of 
the rivulet, to witness a defeat which they could 
not interfere to prevent. The affair naturally pro-
duced the best effect upon the spirits of our troop- . 
ers, who had ~almost beglln to consider themselves 
inferior to the French; and it hadan effect diame-
trically the reverse upon the enemy. The latter 
came not on again whilst our squadrons retained 
their attitude of defiance; but as it was not 
intended that we should keep this place by dint 
of hard fighting, that attitude was gradually laid 
aside.' Our men f~ll back upon Los Santos, Vil1a 
Franca, . and Puebla; and the enemy too k quiet 
possession of Usagre. . . 
Had the report of this rencontre come alone, it 
would have been treated byus as an indication of 
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nothing more than a desire on the part of the 
French Marshal to feel how we wer~ disposed, and 
whether it might not be practicable to alarm us 
into an abandonment of our present undertaking; 
but it did not come alone. We soon learned that 
Drouet had actual1y set out from Salamanca for 
the south, with seventeen battalions and several 
squadrons; and that a large proportion, if not the 
whole of Marmont's army, was expected to foHow. 
Lord Wellington instantly despatched orders for 
General Howard's brigade of the first division, as 
well as for a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to 
hasten from the Agueda, in order to reinforce liS at 
Badajoz; and instructions were, at the same 
time, conveyed to other divisions, that they should 
hold themselves in readiness to undertake a simj-
lar journey. By and by a rumour carne in that 
Drouet was near at hand, and that his arrival at 
Cordova was confidentIy expected on the 9th of 
June at furtbest. Nowas Soult was at this time 
at Llerena, Villa Garcia, and the villages near, 
there could be little doubt as to bis being able to 
eolleet a force upon the Albuera by the 12th; and 
then the question arose, whether it would be pos-
sible for us to continue our operations against Ba..: 
dajoz beyond the 10th. lt wás quite evident that 
the covering army, even after it should have been 
strengthened by the troops called in from the 
north, would not be competent to oppose Soult, 
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. thus inereased to fuU thirty thousand men ; where-
as, should Marmont himself appear upon the stage 
in this quarter,' to risk a battle with the covering 
and even besieging corps combined, would have 
been most injudieious. On all these aceounts 
Lord Wellington determined to try the effeet of an 
assault on the very first opportunity whieh should 
hold out the slightest prospect of success; and 
hence the breaeh in Fort Sto Christoval was no 
sooner pronounced practicable, than preparations 
were made to storm it. 
. 
In the mean while a few changes occurred . in 
the distribution both of the men and officers em-
ployed in this part oftbe country. The Portuguese 
government had become, of late, so little attentive 
to the eondition of ¡ts arroy, that the troops, desti-
tute of pay, and miserably supplied with necessa-
ries, were sinking fast into tha state of inefficiency 
from which they had been so lately delivered. 
The men, after enduring privations more severe 
than eouldhave been borne by the natives of 
almost any otlter country, began at last, sorne of 
them to desert their colours, and the rest to lay 
aside allthat esprit de corps, with which Marshal 
'Beresford had taken so much pains to inspire 
them; and the offic"ers, as many at least as were 
not Englishmen, or thoroughly imbued with the 
English system, hardly endeavoured to restrain 
them in their proceedings. U nder these circum-
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stances, it became indispensable to relieve Marshal 
Beresford from his command of the covering corps ; 
because it was felt that, if he could not restore 
something like alacrity an.d discipline to tp.e Por-
tuguese legions, no other officer in either service 
need attempt it. Marshal Beresford was accord-
ingly called in, and General Hill proceeded to 
take upon himself the charge thus rendered vacant. 
At the same time, General Howard's brigade was 
incorporated into the second division; whilst the 
remains of the brigade lately commanded by Ge-
neral Houghton, as well as of the buffs, the 31st, 
and the 66th, being formed into a single battalion 
of detachments, and placed in the brigade of Ge-
neral Lumley, were attached to the same divi-
sion. The brigade of Portuguese, likewise, which 
marched from the Agueda at the same time with 
General Howard's regiments, took its station in 
the second division. Thus, whilst the third and 
seventh divisions, with one corps of Portuguese, 
and another of Spaniards, under the immediate 
orders of Lord Wellington, pressed the blockade, 
and carried on the siege of Badajoz, the second 
and·fourth divisions, with the light brigade of the 
King's German Legion, supported by General Cot-
ton with the cavalry from the north, as well as by 
the cavalry of the south under General Erskine, 
covered their operations; the infantry holding the 
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poslhon of Albuera, as being the most advanta-
geous in this neighbourhood, and the cavalry 
keeping watch at Almendralejo, Los Santos, Villa 
Franca, and the country round. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
Siege ()f Badajoz-Fort Sto Christoval twice stormed without 
effect-Movemcnts of the enemy to relieve the town-Lord 
lVellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into Por-
tugal-Blake crosses the Guadiana to effect a diversi()o, aod 
retires to Cadiz-The British army takes post behiod tlle 
Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas-Intercepted letter 
from Marmoot to nerthier-The aIlies go into cantonments. 
THE breach in Sto Christoval having been ex a-
mined by Lieutenant Foster of the engineers, and 
pronounced practicable, orders were issued that 
an assault should take place on the night between 
the 6th and 7th of June; and the forlorn hope, 
consisting of twenty-five men, advanced about 
midnight under the guidance of that officer, and 
directed their operations against the part which 
'appeared most assailable, namely, the right salient 
angle of the fort. By the fire of our batteries the 
palisades had all been destroyed; and as the 
counterscarp was here little more than four feet in 
depth, it proved no obstacle to the assailants : they 
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sprang into the ditch, and marched straight to the 
foot of the breach. But here asad reverse awaited 
them. 'The enemy, labouring incessantly between 
dusk and the hour of attack. had removed the rub-
bish, and the escarpe was found to stand c1ear 
nearly seven feet from the bottom of the ditch. 
Our men, though totally unprepared for such an 
occurrence, made· repeated effort$ to surmount the 
obstac1e; but all were unavailing. They accord-
ingiy,det~min~ to relinquish the attempt, and 
they might have retired with a very trifl.ing IOS8, 
had they not been met by the main bod y of the 
storming party, amounting to 155 meno These 
having brought with them a few ladders, insisted 
~pon trying the effect of an escalade; and they 
unhappily planted their instruments against a point, 
the '. summit of which overtopped the longest of 
them by full five feet. The consequence was, that 
the enemy, roused to a sense of their danger, 
hurled down into the ditch a shower of shells, 
grenades, atones, and other missiles, which taking 
effect among men unavoidably crowded together. 
produced considerable slaughter aúd great con-
fusiono The partyat length retired. leaving behind 
them twelve dead. artd carrying away upwards of 
'ninety wouúded. 
From this' period up to the 9th, our people 
sedulously employed themselves.in constructing 
ne.W batteries, and making better preparations for 
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a fresh assault. There arrived upon the 8th 
seven iron guns, which having been transported 
from Lisbon to Elvas, were from the latter place 
forwarded to our camp; and these, with the whole 
of our serviceable artillery, amounting to no more 
than seven cannons and two howitzers, played in-
cessantly upon the breach, and the batteries which 
commanded and defended it. But the practice 
was far from being accurate, and the walls seemed 
to be made of materials more than ordinarily du-
rabIe; for after expending a considerable portion 
of ammunition, it was found that the breach could 
not be made by many degrees more promising 
than it was before .. Still, as a good deal of rub .. 
bish lay under its gorge, so as to form, in our view ... 
a sort of rude path up the face, it was again de-
termined to try the fortune of an assault, andthe 
determination was formed on grounds not Yery 
dissimilar from those which guided our Tesolutitms 
on the previous occasion. 
We heard, upon authority.which left us<. no room 
to doubt the truth of the raport, that Drouet fiad 
actually reached Cordova on the 7th and 8th;;1\Illd 
that his divisioR ofeight thousand menWll8:¡·in 
communication with the corps of Marskal Soalt¡ 
The latter, too, hOO, as it appeared, refused·'his 
left, and was manreuvring that he might com~i by 
Medellin, into connexion, either with a part;:.« 
with the whole ofMarmont's army; farol·the 
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movement of the latter towards this quarter of 
Spain we were now c.redibly informed, andwe 
saw at once that the main effort of the enemy 
would be directed to the preservation of Badajoz. 
N or, in truth, was this at all to be wondered ato 
Situated as their forces now were, Badajoz was to 
the French a point of paramount importance, in-
asmuch as it formed the key of all their intended 
operations in the Alentejo, and a connecting link 
with Seville and their divisions before Cadiz. Jt 
was but natural, therefore, that they should use 
every effort to preserve it; and that such was their 
intention, a despatch received on the 8th from 
General Spencer, together with other information 
collected elsewhere, sufficientIy assured uso The 
following is an outline of the details contained in 
that despatch, in which, as the reader will éasily 
believe, we felt ourselves deeply interested. 
The enemy, it appeared, entered Ciudad Ro-
drigo on the evening ofthe 5th, with 2,500 cava1ry, 
14 rieces of artillery, and 16,000 infantry ~ and 
our light division retiring, on the 6th, as far as 
Nave d'Avel, the French pursued their march in 
h~o columns, composed chiefiy of cavalry, along 
the roads which lea,d to Gallegos and Carpeo. 
The rnass which moved by the latter road seemed 
to be the stronger of the two, and it was accom-
panied by six pieces of cannon. Our cavalry, ob-
servingthcm aH the while, feH back to thc high 
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grounds, and formed a line between Espeja and 
Gallegos; upon which the enemy pushed through 
the wood, in two bodies, with great impetuosity, 
and made a daring attempt to cut off a large pro-
portion, if not the whole, of the force opposed to 
them. The cavalry, however, saw through the 
manceuvre, and skilfully defeated it. By inclining 
to their right, they avoided the left and front at-
tacks directed against them, and coming down 
with great gallantry upon the column on the Es-
peja road, overthrew and repulsed it with 10ss. 
On this occasion the royals particuIarly distin-
guished themselves. Our people then retrograded 
to Sabugal, whilst the French having merely en-
tered Fuentes de Honor, and patroned as far as 
Almeida and the Coa, withdrew their troops, and 
ended their recognisance. 
Whilst the preceding operation was going for-
ward, another and more important movement, 
which this was intended to cover, received its ac-
complishment, though not unnoticed by uso De-
spatches from Colone] Grant, who occupied posts 
about the Puerto de Banos, informed us that two 
divisions of Marmont's infantry with 500 cavalry 
had passed along the real' of the reconnoitring co-
]umns, and arrived on the 6th-the very day on 
which the recognisance was made-at Los Santos 
and Fuentes .. They were commanded by Regnier, 
and continued their march upon Banos, at which 
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place their leader 81ept on the night of the 9th. 
But it was not from the reports of our own officers 
alone, that we obtained, at this time, a pretty ac-
curateinsight into the enemy's designs and opera-
tions. Froro intercepted letters which feH into 
our hands, we leamed that Marmont fully in-
tended to co-operate in raising the siege of Bada-
joz-though whether with the whole or onlya part 
of his force, we had no opportunity of accurate-
Iy determining. AH our speculations, however, 
tended to excite a belief that, if he moved at aU, 
he would move with his army en tire ; and we 
were the further confirmed in this opinion by va-
fious hints,which, though in their more direct 
allusions inexplicable, were yet sufficiently clear 
to put us generally upon our guardo It was stated 
in these letters that as soon as Badajoz should be 
relieved, the two Marshals would proceed to aet 
upon the plan originally formed; and henee, though 
of the object of that plan we necessarily remained 
in the dark, we were not slow in discovering that 
it required for its aceomplishment a perfeet union 
of force. U pon these grounds we came to the 
conclusion that Badajoz must either be reduced 
at once, or not at aH;. because we eould hardly 
pretend to continue the siege in presence of Mar-
mont's and Soult's armies combined; and as littIe 
could we hope to fight them to advantage on the 
south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city in a 
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state of blockade. That we might not, however; 
be exposed to greater hazard than was necessary, 
General Spencer received directions to move by 
Penamacor to Castello Branco~. which place he 
was commanded to reach on the 12th, and to hold 
himself in readiness to form a junction with our 
corps at the shortest notice. 
Such ''las the general state of our affairs, when 
the breach in Fort Sto Christoval was .pronounced, 
for the second time, practicable; and it may not 
be amiss, before proceedingto narrate the par-
ticulars of the assault, if 1 give a brief review of 
the relative strength and prospects of the cont~nd-
. . 
mg armles. 
There were now, on the south and no1'th fron-
tiers of Portugal, two large and effective French 
armies,-that of Marshal Soult in the province of 
Estremadura, that of Marshal Marmont in La 
Mancha. The former, by dint of extraordinary 
exertions, was enabled, when reinforced by Dr6uet's 
and Sebastiani's divisions, and by two or three 
batt~lions, which he did not scruple to withdraw 
from· before Cadiz, to muster full thirty thousand 
men; of which not fewer than four thousand were 
cavalry; the latter having reorganised the army of 
Portugal, and arranged it into'Sixdivisions, posses:-
sed thir.ty thousand infantry, besides cavalry and 
artillery. Allowing, therefore, for casualties on the 
march, and for those little' niis-statementswhieh 
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are unavoidable in making up all returns, the gross 
amount of the two corps, whenunited, would not 
faH short of sixty thousand meno N ow, on our 
parts, aIthough our force upon paper showed nearly 
fifty tbousand British troops, we were quite un-
able, from sickness (and there were at this time 
12,500 upon the list) and other necessary deduc-
tions, to bring more than thirty thousand men into 
the fieId. The Portuguese, again, having become, 
in every respect, far Iess efficient than they were 
wont to be, could not be calculated at more tban 
twenty-five thousand ;whilst the Spaniards, who 
spoke of themselves as twelve thousand strong, 
might muster perhaps eight or nine thousand. 
Thus, in point of gross numbers, the opposing 
genera1& were almost on a footing of equality. But it 
ought to be remembered that, whilst the French pos-
sessed ample means of reeruiting their losses, and 
were enabled, after every reverse, to make head 
again with almost undiminished strength, our rein-
forcements eame in slowly, and by small detaeh-
ments at a time. '1'0 pursue the siege of Badajoz, 
therefore, leisurely, and with a striet attention to 
rule, would be to lay ourselves out for a general 
and decisive aetion, in which. we must fight in an 
open ~ountry,with .our Hanks exposed, and the 
Guadiana closing. us in upon the rearo It is true 
that, at the present season, the waters of the river 
were low ; that it might be forded in various points,. 
PENINSULAR WAR. 163 
and could not, therefore, cut off our retreat, sup-
posing us to be worsted; but the question was, 
whether it were worth while to cast all upon the 
hazard of one throw; more e~pecially when the 
stake on the side of the enemy was not, and could 
not be made, equal1y desperate with our own. To 
act thus had never yet been Lord Wellington's 
policy; and he saw nothing in present circum-
stances to bring about a change in his plans. On 
the contrary, he resolved to make oue effort more 
to possess himself of the beleaguered city; and in 
case that should faíl, either to prosecute the un-
dertaking, provided he were left to do so at his 
leisure,or to retire from before the place, and take 
up a convenient position somewhere on the north 
side of the Guadiana. 
Actuated by these motives, and anxious to avail 
himself of the opportunity still within his reach, 
Lord Wellington gave orders that Fort St. Chris-
toval should again be stormed, on the night of the 
9th of J une. On this occasion, the storming party 
consisted of two hundred men, twenty-five of 
whom, as formerly,formed an advanced-guard, or 
forlorn hope, under Lieutenant Hunt, orthe royal 
engineers. They marched from the trenches at 
the signal given, and pushed for the ditch; but 
the eIiemy were far better prepared to receive 
them no"," than they had been before, and opened 
a heavy tire upon· them as soon as they arrived 
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within range of musketry. U nfortunately. Lieu~ 
tenant Hunt was killed upon the glacis; and 
though the troops leaped into the ditch with their 
accustomed gallantry, and pressed ·forward as 
they imagined towards the breach, they had no 
longer a leader capable of guiding them, and in 
consequence 10st their way. They went forward, 
provided with two ladders fmm twenty-five to 
thirty feet in length; but they applied them, not to 
the breach, but to the face of a bastion which was 
not in ruins, though considerably injured by stray 
shot. The consequences were such as might be 
anticipated. After persisting in their efforts to 
escalad e with the most daring bravery during a 
full hour, they were finally compelled to retreat, 
with the 10ss of forty men killed, and no fewer 
than one hundred wounded. Thus ended the se-
cond attempt on Badajoz; for on our parts nothing 
further was tried at thistime. During. the 10th, 
a truce was agreed upon, for thepurpose of carry-
ing off the wounded, and burying the .<lead; and 
in the evening our guns and stores began to be 
removed. On the 11th, all that could be done, 
without attractíng notice, towards the attainment 
of the same end, was effected; and on the 12th, 
the siege was finally raised, after it had cost the 
allies 9 officers and 109 men killed, with 25 officers 
and 342 men wounded and taken prisoners. 
But though the stores and materíe} were thus 
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removed from before Badajoz, it was not esteemed 
prudent to withdraw the covering army fromits 
position on the Albuera, till the enemy, by sorne 
movement more deeisive than they had yet made, 
should throw further light upon their future inten-
tions. In spite of the extreme probability of the 
rumours whieh had reaehed us, it wouId have 
been something more than prudent, had we 
ehanged our whole line of operations upon their 
authority alone; and henee the eorps of whieh 
Marshal Beresford had originally been in com-
mand, but whieh was now under the orders of 
. General Hill. kept its ground, and retained its at-
ti tu de of watehfulness, up to the 16th. Upon 
that day, however, we reeeived offieial information 
that Regnier, with the advanee of Marmont's 
corps, was at Truxillo; and that the main body 
was in the act of passing the Tagus at Alcantara; 
whilst Soult's army was observed to be feeling its 
'Yay, with the eavalry and light troops, from 
Llerena towards Medellin and Merida. It was 
. therefore impossible any longer to doubt that the 
object of the enemy was a combined operation for 
the relief of Badajoz; andas they refused their 
left, and· marched strongly towards their right, 
our left became of eourse the probable point of 
attack. Under these circumstances, the position 
of the Albuera was pronouneed wholly untenable ; 
nor was there any other on the left of the Guadiaria 
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which offered the slightest advantages, or held 
out to us the smallest inducement to take it up. 
It would have been quite unnaturaI, had Lord 
WeHington; thus situated, felt otherwise than 
mortified and gl'ieved to a great degree. In spite 
of aH the exertions which he had marle, and the 
numerous successes which he had obtained, he 
saw himself, at the present juncture, in a situation 
at least not more enviable than that which he 
filled on the opening of the campaign; for the re-
sources of the enemy,instead of diminishing, ap-
peared to increase, whilst his own were becoming 
daily more and more enfeebled. 1 have said 
that the Portuguese army -\vas "not now in the 
state of efficiency in which it appear~d to be 
twelve months before. On the contrary, without 
pay, without provisions, without sufficient means 
of transport, the troops seemed to be rapidly fall-
ing back into their original disorganisation; whilst 
"the commanders were involvedin continual di&-
putes and quarrels, as well with one another, as 
with the Regency and the court of Brazil. With 
respect, again, to the Spaniards, nothing could be 
more disgusting than the apathy with which they 
regarded passing events, unless, indeed, it was 
their excessive and "mistaken jealousy of English 
interference. Though we had drawn upon our-
selves last year aH the French armies ofthe north, 
neither Castile, nor Galicia. nor Biscay, nor Na-
PENINSULAR WAR. 167 
varre, nor· the Asturias, nor Lean, made the 
faintest effort to take advantage of the diversion ; 
andnow, when the armies of the south and of the 
centre were collected in our front, both the in-
terior . and northern provinces of S pain remained 
perfectIy quieto Madrid, which was at this time 
freed from the presence of French soldiers, was 
actually guarded by the citizens in the name of 
Joseph, and with arms and ammunition given to 
them by the French; whilst the Cortes and the 
Regency had become objects of contempt, as 
general and as complete as ever was heaped upon 
the government of this or any other country. In 
every department cabal and party spirit were at 
work. Each cornmander of an army had his own 
pIans and his own adherents, both in the Regency 
and in the Cortes; whilst among themselves there 
existéd but one point of union, and that was to 
be found in a universal distrust of their alIies. 
From Spain, therefore, little was now to be ex-
pected; indeed, it was confidently given out 
that Joseph had retired from the Peninsula, and 
that Ferdinand was about to return with Marshal 
Berthier* for the purpose of allaying all misgivings, 
and reconciling the nation at large to the wishes 
of N apolean. N or were OUT prospects by many 
degrees more bright, when we looked only tb the 
defence of Portuga1. By the capture of Badajoz 
in the south, and the destruction of Almeidain the 
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nOFth, the two great roads ¡nto the heart of the 
Mímtry were laid open; for the government hav-
ing refused to advance money for ¡ts repair, AI-
meida was blown up; and hence it was in the 
power of Buonaparte, whenever he shouldthink 
tit strongly to reinforce his armies here, to march 
upon Lisbon by the route which to himself should 
appear most advantageous. . lt is true that OUI' 
works about the capital were capable of a long .. 
and obstinate defence, and that if EngIand chose 
to turn her undivided strength to that point, she 
might unquestionably preserve it; but it admitted 
of serious douht whether the preservation of Lis-
hon would repay the cost of defending it, espe-
cially when it must be defended by suhjecting the 
richest provinces in the kingdom to devastation .. 
These were gloomy and somewhat dispiriting COh-
siderations. Whether they occurred to Lord Wel-
lington or not, 1 take it not upon me to determine; 
but before the rest of the army they rose in full 
force; there were few who looked far into the 
future without serious misgivings. 
Lord Wellington having maturely weighed all 
the reasons for and against his proposed proceed-
ing, at last sent for Castaños and Blake at AI-
buera, and opened to. thero the views which he 
entertained, and the determination to which he 
had come. He díd so, prefacing his declaration 
by a statement, that nothing which they cOllld do. 
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or say would induce him to depart from his own-
pIans; leaving it~ at the same time, to themselves 
to choose whether they wouId foUow us in om; 
movements, or act independently; and when they 
adopted the latter alterna ti ve, . he explained to 
them his own sentiments as to the best course 
which they had it in theirpower to pursue. This 
done, he dismissed them, and immediately issued 
orders for the breaking up of the army from Al-
buera and Badajoz. The movement took prace 
on the 18th; and all the stores and baggage being 
safely conveyed to the rear, the columns moved 
without impediment or confusion upon their new 
ground. On the 20thof June the following was 
the disposition oí the allied British and Portu-
guese arIl,lies. 
At Torre del Mouro, on the line of the river 
Caya, an extensive encampment was formed, which 
rested its right flank upon Elvas, and had its left 
covered by Campo Mayor. It was occupied, 1st, 
by the cavalry under Sir Stapleton eoUon ; 2ndly, 
by the second and fourth divisions, by Major-ge-
neral Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry, 
by Major-general Alten's light brigade, and by 
two brigades of nine pounders. These troops were 
all under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-ge-
neral Hill, and held the right wing 01' Elvas moiety 
of the encampment .. The third and seventh divi.,. 
sions again, which moved from the trenches, di-:-
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rected tbeir steps towatds Campo Mayor; wbere 
on the ·left of tbe camp tbey reported to General· 
Picton, as tl~e/genior officer. In the mean wbile 
General 'Spencer's corps; which, in obedience to 
directions previous1y given, had advanced to Por-
talegre, formed a separate encampment for itself. 
It was kept there, because Portalegre con8tituted 
a convenient centre froID whence it might either 
be brougbt, in case of need, into tbe camp at 
Torre del Mouro, or thrown back across the Tagus, 
should Marmont demonstrate in that quarter; 
whi1st tbe communication between the two, which 
happened to be neitber remote nor intricate, was 
sufficiently preserved by patrols and flying parties. 
It is to beobserved tbat the object of tbi~ new 
alignment was pure1y one of defence. It was as-
sumed under tbe persuasion tbat tbe enemy, wbo 
had collected in strength, would not content them-
selves with the relief of Badajoz, but press forward 
with a view to besiege E1vas, and probably make 
an ilTUption into Alentejo. N ow, as the 108s of 
Elvas would have been productive to us of conse-
quences the most disastrous, inasmuch as it wou1d 
nave supp1ied tbe French with an additiona1 pivot 
on wbich to turn, and comp1eted tbe exposure of 
too fichest and most fertile districts in Portugal, 
Lord Wellington made up bis mind to risk every-
thing for its preservation; and with this view he 
disposed his army in such order, as that it might 
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selze the first favourable opportunity of striking a 
blow. Should Marmont, previously to sitting 
down before the place, choose to risk a great battle 
by attacking us in our position~ the nature of the 
ground which we occupied would give to us ad-
vantages the most decided; should he, on the 
other hand, commence his operations before the 
town, leaving us to observe or molest him as best 
sllited our own convenience, we might wait with 
patience till the fitting moment had arrived, and 
then become ourselves the assailants. Thus were 
we provided against either extremities, supposing 
the notion formed touching the enemy's designs to 
be wen~founded; whereas, if no forward move-
ment were made on their parts, then might we 
either remain q llietly where we were, till general 
events should take a turn more favourable, or 
resume the offensive as soon as our own circum-
stances,and the distribution of the enemy's force, 
might appear to authorise the measure. That 
Lord Wellington himself anticipated a general 
action is, 1 believe, true; he spoke of its probable 
occurrence, and took all the precautions to insure 
a vlctory, which his genius pointed out; and as 
he possessed sources of information to which no 
other individual had access, there can be little 
doubt that he carne to that conclusion on grounds 
perfectly reasonable. As to myself, 1 own that 1 
considered the enemy had gained a great deal by 
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the successful resistance of Badajoz; more, per-
haps, than in the present state of the campaign 
they had any right to expect; and as their troops 
stood at least as much in need of repose and re-or-
ganisation as ours~ it appeared somewhat impro-
bable that they would, for the sake of harassing 
us, deny to themselves that of which they strongly 
experienced the want. 
But whilst Lord Wellington thus distributed his 
own forces, he was neither unmindful of the ad-
vantages to be derived from a diversion, nor care-
less of the condition of the strong-holds which he 
had fallen back to protecL 
To effect the former of these objects, General 
Blake was directed to put his corps in motion, 
and, marching down the right bank of the Gua-
diana upon the Conde q.e Unebla, to cross at Mer-
tola, so as to threaten, at once, Seville, the camp 
befare Cadiz, and the rear of the French arroyo 
For the purpose of prosecuting the latter, nume-
rous working parties were employed every day, 
not only at Elvas-where, in truth, their exer-
tions were múch needed-but likewise at Campo 
Mayor,· and the fortress of Juramenha. 1 have 
said that the exertions of our artificers were in a 
peculiar manner needed at Elvas, and 1 said tru]y. 
By the negligence of the Portuguese government,' 
that city-the most important by far upon the 
southern frontier-had fallen ¡nto a state of mise-
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rabIe dilapidation. The walls were in mány pIaees 
broken down; the ditches filled up; and the few 
pieces of artillery mounted upon the ramparts 
were all of the worst deseription; whiIst, to add 
to its general disabilities, it was heId at this time 
by a garrison composed entireIy of Portuguese 
troops; and the Governor, though one of the best 
of his class, was still onIy a Portuguese officer. 
On these several accounts it became sufficientIy 
manifest, that if the place were intended to offer a 
moderate resistance, great eare must be taken to 
remedy so me, at least, of its defects; and since it 
. suited not the poliey of the times to change the 
garrison, or displace the' Governor, Lord Welling-
ton determined that the excuse of ruineddefences 
should not be at hand to sanction a tooready sub ... 
rnlSSlon. . Its works were carefully and scienti-
.ficaUy repaired, and rendered capable, under 
proper management, of holding out for a very con-
siderable length of time. Besides these opera-
tions, however, which, thoughdoubtless very lIseful, 
were .certainly not very interesting, nothing was 
attempted on our part; and as the enemy, with a 
few trifling exceptions, continued as peaceably dis-
posed as ourselves, we were left, somewhat to oU\, 
surprise,and not a little to our mortificabon, to 
spend the bestof the summer months in idleness. 
From the 20th of June to the 21st of Ju]y, our 
army remailled in its double encampmellt, at Por-
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talegre and Torre del Mouro. Few incidents 
occurred, during the whole of that time, calculated, 
in a military point of view, to arrest our attention, 
or rouse us from our lethargy; and of these few, 
it unhappily occurred that almost aH proved of 
an unsatisfactory nature. The enemy, instead of 
following us up, as had been anticipated, confined 
their operations entirely to the southern side oí 
the Guadiana, never venturing upon anything 00 
our bank ofthe river, except an occasional recog-
nisance; and these recognisances, being conducted 
generally by cavalry, were generally successful, 
as far as success was desired. On one occasion, 
in particular, they contrivcd to make prisoners oí 
nearly one hundred and twenty men, belonging to, 
the 11th light dragoons, and twenty hussars oí the 
German legion; and as this was tbe most serious 
affair which took place during an entire month, 
it may not be amiss if I give a particular account 
of it. 
It has been stated that, in forming our present 
encampment, the line of the Caya was taken up: 
it may be necessary to remind the reader, that in 
making use of this expression, no more is meant 
than that, our troops were posted in the rear oí 
that river, and in' a direction parallel with its 
general course. The Caya is a shallow and wind-
ing s.tream, which runs in one of its branches, 
nearly north and south from the mountains near 
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Campo Mayor, to t-he Guadiana. Its banks are 
in general low and open, though on our side there 
was a range of commanding heights, not vel'y fal' 
removed frorn the stl'eam. It ~o happened that 
our cavalry pickets, instead of being posted upon 
this rising ground, were l'anged along the margin 
of the river, sorne of them in the very angles 
formed by its detours, and in spots where no vigi-
lance could enable the videttes to observe an 
enemy till he was close at hand. In one of these 
most inappropriate spots was a considerable party; 
of the 11 tQ. stationed, on a morning, when the 
French thought fit to push a large force acl'Oss the 
river, for the purpose of ascertaining how we were 
employed. Our cavalry behaved with their accus-
torned gallantry, charging the Ieading squadron oí 
the force irnrnediately opposed to them, and 
driving it back with precipitation upon its support; 
but they were ignorant all the while that other 
squadrons had turned them, and that overwhelming 
numbers were already formed jn their real'. The 
consequence was, that the whole partywas su1'-
ro'unded, and with the exception of a few indivi-
duals, who contrived to cut their way through, all 
were taken. It is scarcely necessary to add, that 
the disaster gave rise to a variety of reports, and 
to much condemnation; but 1 consider it not 
worth while to repeat it. 
. In addition to such occurrences as this, the only 
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sources of public interest which we possessed, 
arose from the various reports which, from time to 
time, carne in, of the movements both of the 
French armies and of the Spanishcorps. We 
learned, for example, that Soult had retllrned to 
Seville with the whole of his force, and that he 
had detached a division to oppose Blake, who had 
crossed the Guadiana, according to the precon~ 
certed plan, at Mertola. Instead, however, of 
pushing for Seville, Blake contented himself with 
making a night attack upon the castles of Puebla 
and Unebla, in which, as a matterof course, he 
failed; and now, on receiving intelligence of the 
march of Soul1's detachment against him, he with-
drew to Ayamonte, and emharked for Cadiz. 
Marmont, in the mean while, was stated to remain 
stationary at Merida and its vicinity; from whence 
his cavalry were sent to the front for the purpose 
of foraging, as often as necessity'req uired. Large 
reinforcements of stores and artillery were, at the 
. sametime, thrown into Badajoz; its works were 
thoroughly repaired, and its garrison was increased 
to the amount of five thousand mello But the 
most satisfactory piece of iutelligence which carne 
to us, was conveyed in a letter from Marmout him-' 
self; which, though addressed to Marshal Ber-
thier, fell, by great good fortune, ¡nto our hauds. 
The General had intrusted it to one of his aides-
de.-camp, whom he despatched, as a most coufi-
PENINSULA lt W A R. 177 
dential person, to París; and who, being inter-
cepted, as well as his communication, by a wan-
dering band of Spaniards, was sent in person to 
our campo As the letter was really a curious one, 
and as it served to convey a very correct idea of 
the state of the French army, as well as an ex-
tremely favourable notion of the judgment and 
good sense of its commander, it may not be amiss 
to repeat here a brief outline of its contents. 
Tbe letter in question was dated from Merida, 
at a period posterior to the relief of Badajoz, and 
the consequent retrogression of our divisions. It 
began by informing his Excellency the Prince of 
N eufchatel, that having succeeded, in conjunction 
with the Duke of Dalmatia, in raising the siege of 
Badajoz, the writer had since directed his undi~ 
vided attention to the re-organisation and re-esta-
blishment of discipline in the army of Portugal. 
The system of requisitions, and the irregularity of 
supply, had been carried, it was continued, to so 
great a height, that the army was become liUJe 
better than a rabble of banditti; nor could any 
thing be attempted with the slightest prospect of 
success, tiU the method should be entirely 
changed, and the troops provided and paid in such 
a manner, as to render them both contented and 
manageable. To, accomplish this, the Marshal 
was thEm devising plans ; and he earnestIy pressed 
for instructions and assistance froID the Emperor, 
VOL. Ir. l\f 
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in carrying them into execution. In the mean 
time, however, he meditated a removal to the right 
bank of the Tagus; whilst Soult, who had heard 
of succours being sent from Cadiz to Tarragona, 
and considered his presence in the south as indis-
pensable, was preparing to march thither without 
delay. With him the Marshal would leave the 
fifth corps of infantry as well as several battalions 
of cavalry, these being more immediately destined 
for the defence of Estremadura; but he added an 
earnest request, that they might thenceforth be 
attached to the army of Portugal, as an arrange-
ment not only natural, but necessary. 
The letter went on to state, that with his own 
corps, amounting to thirty-twothousand infantry, 
and from three to four thoúsand cavalry, the writer 
intended to place himself in sorne convenient camp 
between the Teitar and the Tagus, where he should 
be able more narrowly to watch the conduct of 
his troops, and improve their discipline. The only 
obstacle to this arrangement arose from the diffi.-
cultyof providing adequate supplies of food and 
forage; but though doubtless very great, Marmont 
expressed sanguine hopes that he should be able 
to surmount it. In tbis case, and supposing that two 
or three months' "repose were obtained, and that 
the remounts of horses, and re-equipments of va-
rious kinds promised should arrive, he entertained 
no doubt that the fine arrny of Portugal would 
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again become tres redoutable, and capable of exe-
cuting any service in which the Emperor might be 
pleased to employ it. He next proceeded to spe-
cify the position and supposed. strength of our 
army. He reported the departure of Blake's corps, 
and its embarkation for Cadiz, subsequent to the 
failure of its attack upon the casUe of Puebla, 
and entered into a variety of other particulars, 
which abundaritly testified that the channels of 
information possessed by the French, were at least 
as perfect and as open as those possessed by our-
selves. But of his own plans, Marmont said no-
thing more, ínasmuch as it was his design to re-
main wholly upon the defensive, till specific or-
ders shotild reach him from Paris. In- addition to 
this despatch from Marmont, a letter from General 
Tresion, chief of the staff, was likewise inter-
cepted ;but it contained little calculated to in-
terest, except an explicit dec1aration that the 
French troops were unable to cope with the Eng-
lish, and that their best chance of success lay in 
manreuvrmg. 
1 have reason to believe that the communica-
tions made in Marshal Marmont's despatch, com-
bined with other circumstances of less moment, 
determinedLord Wellington to forego, for the 
present, an offensive operations against the enemy 
in Spain. It was c1ear that against odds so tre-
mendous he could not, with his present strength, 
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hope to accompliah any object of importance, since 
Marmont's corpa alone was capable of offering to 
him a stout resistan ce ; and should it fall back 
upon that of Soult, its superiority would become at 
once overwhelming. He accordingly made up his 
mind to place his troops in temporary cantoll-
ments; and the divisions began, on the 21st, to 
break up from theiÍ" respective stations for that 
purpose. Two of these, the third and the sixth, 
were arde red to cross the Tagus, and to occupy 
CastelIo Branco, and the villages near; the se-
venth was directed to move upon Niza; the light 
to Campo Mayor; the first and fifth to Portalegre, 
whither the head-quarters likewlse removed; and 
the second and fourth to Evora and its adjacents. 
Thus was a very strong corps of infantry, sup-
ported by the whole of the cavalry, kept in Alen-
tejo; whilst the remainder of the army taking post 
in the vicinity of the Tagus, beame disposable 
towards any point which nlÍght chance to be 
threatened. 
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CHAPTER' VII. 
Amusements ofthe officers in quarters-Lord Wellington sud· 
denly moves towards _Rodrigo, and invests the place-Dispo--
sition of the' army in its new alignment-Description of the 
country round Ciudad Rodrigo-Reports oi' the preparations 
made by th!:' enemy to raise the siege of that city, and ar-
rangements entered into in consequence. 
IN the·preceding pages, rny narrative has been so 
completely confined to a detail of the great ope-
rations of the army, and of the results arising out 
of them, that 1 have as yet found no opportunity 
of making the reader acquainted with the general 
mode and style of living adopted at this time 
among the staff and other officers. 1 t may be 
sufficient to state here, that no set of persons could 
more industriously strive to unite mirth with hard-
ships, and relaxation with severe d~ty. For sorne 
. time, we contented ourselves with keeping pointers 
and greyhounds, and indulging, as often as oppor· 
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tunities offered, in the sports of shooting, coursing, 
and fishing; but now ataste for hunting began to 
prevail amongst us, and fox-hounds and harriers, 
more or less numerous and good, were established 
in the different divisions of the army. At head-
quarters we were fortunate enough to become pos-
sessed of an excellent pack, which afforded us 
much amusement, and occupied time which would 
have otherwise htmg heavily on our hands; and it 
is worthy of remark, that in such minor under-
takings, no man entered more heartily than our 
leader. It was during this summer that he -first 
instituted the custom, which he never afterwards 
laid aside, of throwing off at settled points on 
established days in every week, whilst the army 
was not in the field, and the incidents, replete with 
mirth, to which these meetings gave rise, are far 
too numerous to be recorded, though they will be 
long remembered. Then, in our quarters, we lived 
gaily and well. A spirit of good-fellowship and 
hospitality everywhere prevailed; and in the midst 
of war,-balls, private theatricals, and agreeable 
parties, were things of continual occurrence. It is 
lmnecessary to add that this system, whilst it de-
tracted in no de~ree from the discipline and effi-
ciency of the troops, spread abroad arnong those 
who carne under its influence the very best dispo-
sitio n and ternper; and aH men realIy learned to 
love their occupation, even at its most trying mo"' 
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ments, from a recollection of the many enjoyments 
of which it became the source. 
It has been stated that on the 21st of July the 
army broke up from its camps, (or the purpose of 
taking possession of a line of temporary canton-
ments on each side ofthe Tagus. AH was duly 
executed by the 23rd; and on that daythe whole 
of the divisions,' with the exception of the fifth 
aJone, which still kept the fieId at about a league's 
. distance from Portalegre, were comfortably housed 
at their respective destinations. The movement 
was hardly made, when we were joined by four 
regimentsof infantry and oue of cavalry, from En-
gland-. namely, by the 26th, 32nd, 68th,and 77th 
infantry, and the 12th light dragoons; aH of them 
strong in numbers, and extremely effective; whilst 
the arrival of General Graham at Lisbon, who 
carne as second in command from Cadiz, was offi-
cially announced to uso The latter piece of in-
telligence was received with much satisfaction; 
for. General Graham had seen a great deal of ser-
vice, and wherever employed, had proved himself 
always to be an officer of enterprise and talent; 
and his late success at Barossa, however much it 
may be supposed to have depended upon the 
valour of the troops engaged, certainly took not 
away from the reputation which their leader had 
previously acquired. 
We were scarcely settled in 
,.'--' 
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when a variety of rumours began to cireulate, most 
of them ealeulated to inspire apprehension, and 
very few of a eontrary tendeney. In the first 
place, a report was conveyed to us through certain 
Spanish offieers at head-quarters, that two sepa-
rate columns, consisting of thirty thousand men 
each, were on their mareh to reinforce the French 
armies in Spain; one froro the side of Dalmatia, 
and the other from an opposite direction. Nor 
could the numerous detaiJs with which we were 
favoured, of the formation of bands of guerillas, 
and of their daring enterprises, in any effectual 
degree lessen the impression which it had pro-
dueed. Much has been said of these guerillas, as 
well by the Spaniards themselves as by the histo-
rians of other countries, who have aerived their 
information chiefiy from S panish sources; but all 
who served in the Peninsula ean attest that a less 
efficient and more mischievous body of marauders 
never infested any country. It is not denied 
that they cut off, froro time to time, a small convoy, 
or an isolated detachment; but unfortunately 
they did not confine their operations to attacks 
upon the enemy. Whoever feH in their way, be 
he friendor foe, rarely escaped unplundered ; and 
the inhabitants of the smaller villages everywhere 
dreaded their appearance as much as that of the 
French. Yet were these the onIy portions of the 
population of Srain which could be said to be in 
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arms. In the country places, it is true that the 
people were generally disposed to favour the cause 
of independence; and that from the llttle ham\ets 
and solitary cottages, by far the larger proportion 
of recruits for the Spanish army was procured; 
but in the towns, one wish, and one alone, seemed 
to prevail-namely, that the repose of the inhabi.: 
tants might not be interrupted by the approach of 
any troops, whether French or British. Tran-
quillity at all hazards, and at any cost, was the 
boon for which the mass of the population of 
Spain now pined, till it became too apparent, that 
were we to withdraw from the Peninsula, the war 
would come to an end before the close of a single 
summer. Nor, in truth, was the existence ofthat 
feeling very greatly to be wondered ato The 
Spaniards possessed no force competent, at any 
point, to make head against ,the invaders; almost 
an their strong pIaces were in the hands of the 
French ; whilst discord the most atrocious and the. 
most palpable reigned in those very assemblies 
which ought to have guided the energies of the 
people, and directed their exertions. We heard, 
indeed, about this time, of the re-capture of 
Figueras, and it was one of the few rumours 
which served to keep alive anything like a hope 
that Spain might yet do something worthy of her 
ancient renown, and of the cause in which she 
was embarked; but neither this, nor a few trifling 
186 N ARRATIVE Ol!' THE 
successes near Astorga, nor even the triumphs of 
Don Julian, who was intercepting convoys, and 
making prisoners about Salamanca, was sufficient 
to inspire us with any great degree of confidence 
in the exertions of our allies. On the contrary, 
we felt that the British army was, and must con-
tinue" to be, the principal in this war of Peninsular 
independence; and hence it was not very easy 
even for the most sanguine amongst us to believe 
that, should Russia and the northern states persist 
in their pacific policy, Great Britain could possibly 
retíre from a contest so unequal, in triumph, and 
with honour. 
When the army first took up its liríe of can-
tonments, an opinion generally prevailed, that 
nothing further would be attempted, on our parts, 
till the sultry season should have passed away. 
With respect to the enemy, every thing appeared 
to indicate that, whatever might be done in other 
parts of the Peninsula, Portugal would be left 
undisturbed, till the arrival of the promised rein-
forcements from France, and other favourable cir-
cumstances, should authorise a fresh invasion. 
Marmont, it was ascertained, having withdrawn 
his troops into the vale of Plasencia, with the 
exception of one division only under General Foy, 
which was appointed to watch the left bank of the 
Tagus, had established his own head-quarters at 
Talavera de la Reyna. Soult was gone to the 
PENINSULAR WAR. 187 
south, with the intention, as was believed, of 
laying siege to Carthagena; and Suchet, to whom 
Tarragona had lately submitted, was preparing to 
push his conquests in Alicant and Catalonia. In 
the mean time, Bessieres was assembling oue 
considerable corps at Valladolid, aud Bonnet 
another at Leon aud Benavente; whilst Joseph, 
who had lately returned to Madrid, was amusing 
himself and his subjects with proclamations, as 
absurd in their language as they were nugatory in 
their effects. He was assuring them at once, of 
the increased love of the Emperor towards the 
Spaniards, and oí the march of sixty thousand 
fl'esh troops from France into Spain; and whilst 
he threatened the severest vengeance agaiust the 
bauds of plunderers by whom the. roads and 
passes were everywhere infested, he held out the 
brightest hopes to all sueh guerilla chiefs as chose 
to aecept rank in the imperial service. N ot a 
word, however, was said, either by him or his 
generals, of further attempts against Portugal or-
the English; and henee there were few amongst 
us who antieipated any other result, than that the 
line whieh we had now assumed would be main-
tained, at all events, throughout the dog-days, if 
not till the return of spring. . 
Whilst the rest of the army were thus indulging 
in dreams of q uiet . and repose, the ever-aetive 
mind of their leader was meditating an enterprise, 
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hazardous, no doubt, and at the best beset with 
diffieulties, but in the highest degree influential 
upon the general issue of the war. The possession 
of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz on one side of 
Spain, and of three out of the four principal for-
tresses on the other, gave to the enemy a faeility 
of movement, of whieh it was of the utmost con-
sequence to deprive them; and Lord Wellington's 
principal views had, in consequenee, been, for 
sorne time back, directed to the recovery of pIaces 
of the importanee of which every day brought 
proofsmore and more decided. How he failed ih 
his attempt upon one of these, the reader has al-
ready been informed, as well as of the eircum-
stanees whieh would have rendered a fresh effort, 
in the same q uarter, even more hopeless than the 
effort already made. But with respect to Ciudad 
Rodrigo, the case was somewhat different. Should 
Soult really embark in the siege of Carthagena, or in 
any other expedition calculated togive to his army 
fuIl oecupation, Ciudad Rodrigo must necessarily 
be left, in a great degree, to the protection of its 
own garrison; and with the garrison of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, even though it should be supported by 
the single eorps of Marmont, Lord Wellington be-
lieved himself fully adequate to cope. With the 
hope, therefore, th.at sorne such occurrence might 
fall out, stores and guns were quietly, but indus-
tl'iously, transported from Lisbon to Oporto, and 
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from Oporto to Lamego; and at the moment 
when, to all external appearance, "his undivided 
attentíon was bestowed upon recruiting the health 
of his troops, he was looking to their employment 
in a species of operations, for which, to confess 
the truth, the British army was, at this period, 
less prepared than any other army in Europe. 
1 have said that, at the period to which my pre-
sent narrative refers, the British army was, among 
all the armies of Europe, the least prepared to 
undertake the duties of a siege,-and for this ob-
vious reason, that it was, and long continued to be, 
deficient in those establishments, without which it 
is utterly impossible either to defend 01' attack forti-
fied places to advantage. In expressing myselfthus, 
it is very far froID my intention to cast the slightest 
stigma upon the corps of engineers. Our engineer 
officers were then, as they are now, equal1y able 
and scientific; but besides that, in the Península 
at least, they were few in number, the absence of _ 
all adequate support in the other departments of the 
army, rendered them quite incapable of applying 
the science to its legitimate ends, or causing it to 
produce its legitimate effects. Ours was, perhaps, 
the only army in Europe which possessed no corps 
of sappers and miners, nor any body of men pecu-
liarly trained to carry on the more intricate de-
" tails of a siege. We had~ it is true, what was 
termed the regiment of royal military artificers ; 
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that lS to say, a battalion of carpenters, black-
smiths, stonemasons, and other handicraftsmen; 
but not one of these had ever seen a mine; and as 
to a sap, they were probably incapable of under-
standing the very meaning of the word. In the 
regiments of the line again, there were hut few, 
even among the officers, who had ever bestowed 
much attention upon these important matters; 
whilst the men may be pronounced. without reser-
vation, to have been universally ignorant of them. 
N ow. when with such materials our engineers be-
gan the labours of a siege, how was it possible 
that they could carry them on either with rapidity 
{Ir success ? . These officers could not be present 
in a variety of pIaces at the same moment; and 
wherever they were not present, the probability 
was, that nothing was done as it ought to have 
be en done. Then, again, in all the materials 
requisite for sieges, we were greatly deficient. 
We had no pontoons norpontooneers; our b!"each,. 
ing artillery, chiefly of Portuguese manufacture, 
was both meagre and badIy supplied; and our in-
trenching tooIs consisted simply of the most com-
mon description of spades, bill-hooks, and pick-
axes. The truth is, that the British government, 
never having contemplated the possibility of its 
armies being engaged in a serious c,ontinental war, 
and feeling secure against invasion from the de-
cided superiority of its fleets, had never bestowed 
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attention upon the organisation of means, withoñt 
which the bravest troops in the world will be liable 
to disaster, as often as they find themselves op-
posed by ramparts and ditches; and hence the 
British army, in no single instance from the 
commencernent to the close of the Peninsular 
struggle, sat down before a fortified place but 
under disadvantages. Both the General and his 
followers were conscious that they possessed nei-
ther the physical nor moral elements for such en-
terprises, and they never entered upon themex-
cept when an irresistible necessity compelled. 
But though the case was so~ and though now, 
more perhaps than at subsequent periods, we felt 
our own inferiority in these respects, Lord Wel-
lington was not, on that account, disposed to per-
mit what appeared to be a favourable opportunity 
for the re-capture of Ciudad Rodrigo to pass un-
heeded. The divisions had taken up their canton-
ments but a few days, when an intercepted return 
of the provisions in that place fell ¡nto our hands, 
from which it appeared that the existing stock was 
scanty, and that the prospects of securing a fresh 
suppIy were both remote and contingento It 
instantly occurred to him, that were it practicable 
to invest Rodrigo previous to the arrival of a con-
voy, famine might be made to do the work of a 
siege, whilst, at all events, a knowledge that the 
fortress was in danger,. couId not but dishearten 
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Marmont, even if it should fail in alarming Soult 
in the midst of his southernoperations. The plan 
was no sooner conceived than carried ¡nto execu-
tion. Whilst the second British, and General 
Hamilton's Portuguese division of infantry, sup-
ported by two brigades of cavalry, received orders 
to remain at Estreroos and Portalegre, under Ge-
neral Hill, for the protection of Alentejo, the re-
roainder of the army, consisting of the dragoons, 
the light, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, 
was suddenly called into the field, and on the 
sixth day after it had taken up its cantonments, 
found itself in full march towards the north. 
On the 1St of August head-quarters reached 
Castello Branco, where a haIt of a single day oc-
curred. On the 8th, they were transferred to 
Sabugal; and on the 10th, Lord Wellington fixed 
his residence in the town of Fuente Guenaldo. 
A loose and extensive line was then taken up, 
froro Villa Vicosa on the right, to Gallegos on the 
left, along which the several divisions and brigades 
were distributed, the 1st occupying Penamacor, 
the 4th Pedrogao, the 5th Payo, near the pass of 
Perales, the 6th Gallegos, the 7th Alfayates and 
Villa Mayor, and the light Mortegao, on the op-
posite side- of the Agueda. With respect to the 
3rd division, it remained, with the bulk of the ar-
tillery, at Fuente Guenaldo; whilst the cavalry 
was scattered here and there in squadrons and 
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srnall parties, according as the nature of the ground 
rendered their presence desirable, or facility of ac-
cornmodation invited. 
Before 1 proceed to give any account of the 
operations to which these arrangements proved a 
prelude, it wiU be necessary to make the reader 
somewhat better acquainted with the real state 
aud local situation of the fortre8s, towards which 
our attention was now turned. 
Ciudad Rodrigo.is situated upon one of tluee 
hills, or rather eminences, which stand upon the 
right bank of the Agueda, and rise abruptly out of 
an extensive plain, in a state of high cultivation, 
and at this time covered with an abundant crop of 
corno The plain in question is bo;rdered on the 
north and west by a range of rugged mountains ; 
and on the south-east, by a similar range, still 
m.o.re rugged and impervious. The formerof these 
ranges consists of cliffs and ·crags, separated from 
one another here and there by wide passes, 
through which several excellent roads conduct to 
Salamanca and into Castile; the latter can boast 
only of the pass of Perales, a defile so precipitous, 
as to be perfectly useless in a military point of 
view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at 
th~ distance of man y miles from the walls, and 
hence both are equally unamiling for the purposes 
of a blockading force; whilst neither offers a posi-
VOL. JI. N 
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tion at all favourable or commodious to an army 
intended to cover the progress of a siege. 
It is rather singular, in a country like Spaio, 
that the whole flat should be deficient in springs 
and pools, and that the only source from which 
water can be procured by the inhabitants, is 
the Agueda. 1 need scarcely add that this 
circumstance alone, independently of all other 
considerations, gave to the projected siege no very 
favourable aspect, since it was manifest that, should 
it be undertaken, the mass of our troops must 
establish themselves at a distance from the river, 
and suffer serious inconvenience in a matter, not 
less important than any by which they were liable ' 
to be effected. But the difficulty which would thus 
be experienced in supplying the men with one of 
the most essential necessaries of life, was not the 
only, nor, perhaps, the greatest obstac1e, which 
stood in the way of our design on the present oc-
casion. Should we fairly embark in the siege, 
we must do so with the fuIl determination either 
of abandoning our whole train, or staking every-
thing upon the fate of a battle, in case the enemy 
should approach in force to the relief of the garri-
son; because the condition of the country in our 
rear was such, as to preclude all hope that heavy 
guns and stores, once brought up, could ever be 
removed hastily, and in the presence of a superior 
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force. In the first place, the roads in this part of 
the country are rarely suchas deserve to be termed 
good; during the dry season, they may, indeed, he 
traversed by carriages of aoy description; but 
after rain they are impervious to all except the 
lightest and best constructed. In the next place, 
the rivers which separate Rodrigo from Portugal, 
particularly the Agueda and the Coa, are not only 
difficult on account of the steep and rugged nature 
of their banks, but they are liable to sudden 
rises oí many feet, which will, in the course of a 
few hours, sweep away bridges, and render fords 
impassable. Supposing, therefore, that we should 
bring up our guns and stores unmolested, open our 
trenches, and establish our magazines, it would be· 
vain to speculate upon any other issue than suc-
cess; for retreat we could not, even if defeated, 
without abandoning all these to the enemy. There 
was not, either, as 1 have already hinted, a1'1y 
ground upon which a covering army could draw 
up to advantage. Were we to take possession oí 
the north-western ridges, our troops would be 
separated into numberless little bands, no two of 
which could co-operate well together, inasmuch as 
the heights are all a great deal too rugged in their 
faces to permit of easy communication from the 
one to the other; whilst we should be exposed to 
the risk of being forced at· sorne one point, and 
having the enemy in our rear, before we were 
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properly aware of their approach. To post our-
selves in the plain,. again, could be done only at 
the expense of prodigious labour and much time, 
since the plain'ought to be fortified before it could 
offer a position; and even then it would be ex-
posed to the hazard of turning, or being drawn out 
ti11 it became feeble from its very extent. In the 
outward appearances of nature, therefore, we saw 
nothing calculated to inspire us with confidence 
as to the issue of the intended operation; and no 
man can say our chief examined the ground super-
ficially. He spent an en tire week, from three 
o'clock in the morning till six in the evening of 
every day, onhorseback. 
If the nature of the country was not such as very 
strongly to encourage us in our designs, the infor-
mation which we received from a variety of quar-
ters, both as to thc state of the fortress, and the 
probabilities of its being relieved, were equally at 
variance with our wishes and expectations. It 
was soon discovered that the scarcity of provisions 
under which the garrison was reported to labour, 
had long ago been removed. A convoy of stores 
of every description had entered the place just 
before our arrival, and it was now victualled and 
provided for at least two months to come. Evi-
dence, likewise, was not wanting, that the French 
marshals were determined to hazard aH, rather 
than permit a post of so much importance to be 
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wrested from them; and hence, that our siege 
must be cornmenced, under the moral certainty of 
being attacked by all the disposable force in the 
country long before it could be brought to a con-
clusion. The following is a brief summary of the 
rumours which now prevailed, relative to the dis-
position and numbers of the enemy's troops; and 
by which, in the event of our embarking in the 
affair, we should, in aU"probability, be assailed. 
The corps of "Marshal Marmont, distributed 
through the vale of Plasencia, mustered in all 
thirty-five thousand men; there were at Bena-
vente, Toro, Valladolid, &c. about fifteen thousand 
more; whilst ten thousand fresh troops, from the 
reinforcements lately introduced into the country, 
were understood to be within a few marches of 
Salamanca. It was not difficult to foresee that, 
whenever Marmont should deem it expedient to 
take the field, he would do so at the head of these 
corps combined; or, in other words, with a force of 
not less than sixty thousand meno N ow, it unfor-
tunately happened that the allied army was suf-
fering at this moment more severely from sickness 
than it had done at almost any previous periodo 
There were in hospital, or unfit for duty, no fewer 
tban thirteen tbousand British, and five tbousand 
Portuguese-a fun tbousand of whom had broken 
down during the late march; and hence the ut-
most amount upon which it was possible forus to 
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calculate, e.xceeded not forty-two or forty-three 
thousand meno The matter to be decided accord-
ingly was~ whether, with such mean s, we should 
be justified in laying siege to a strong place, well 
supplied, well garrisoned, and covered by an army 
which, in point of numbers, surpassed our own by 
nearly one-third; more especially after our late 
failure at Badajoz, the impression of which had 
not yet departed from men's minds. There could 
be but one opinion as to the prudence or impru-
dence of the undertaking, and that opinion Lord 
Wellington immediately embraced. He found 
himself mistaken in the estímate which had been 
formed of tbe . defensibility of the place, and he 
now wisely abstained from a vain attempt to ac-
complish that for which his means were manifestly 
incompetent. Having placed Rodrigo in a state 
of blockade by drawing around it a chain of posts, 
he determined to await the result in the position 
which he had assumed; and he found comfort 
under a temporary derangement of his plan s, frOIn 
the conviction that his movement would at least 
operate as a powerful diversion in favour of othe. 
provinces and eities of Spain. 
Matters continued in this state, from day to 
day, and from week to week, without giving birth 
to any events worthy of record. The blockade 
was maintained with so much diligence, that tbe. 
garrison began at last to experience something like 
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distress, and the preparations for converting it into 
a siege, though not absolutely laid aside, went on 
slowly and with languor. Occasionally, too, an 
affair of posts would occur, in which, 1 regret to 
say, the enemy were not always unsuccessful; 
whilst rumours, as usual, came in to supply with 
subjects of speculation those who had little in their 
own immediate occupations or prospects to excite 
interest. One day brought intelligence of the for-
midable attitude assumed by the Spaniards in Ga-
licia; thenext furnished a detail of their overthrow 
and dispersion. Now we heard of Blake's arrival 
in Cadiz, and of the great deeds which he ex-
pected to perform in Andalusia; again, of the ra-
pidity with which Suchet and Sebastiani were 
completing the subjugation of the southern pro-
vinces; and the probability that Grenada and 
Carthagena would shortly be redueed: But it 
was not till towards the end of August, that eer-
tain indications of a movement on tbe part of 
Marmont, gave to our own situation its ordinary 
character of ¡nterest; and September was far ad-
vanced before we ]earned to believe that impor-
tant operations were realIy at hand. 
The first expectation of hostilities about to re-
commence, was excited by a report that Marmont 
had broken up from his cantonments, and that his 
columns were in march towards Castile. This 
carne in about the 24th óf August, and as it was 
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supposed tu rest upon tolerably good evidence. 
Lord Wellington made instant preparations to 
meet the threatened danger. The divisions which 
had hitherto occupied cantonments between Fu-
ente Guinaldo and the Tagus, closed up; the first 
and fourthpassing the Coa, and stationing them-
selves -at Nave d'Avel, Fuentes de Honor, Villa 
Formosa, ~nd ValdelamuIa; whilst the remainder 
took post on the heights of Pastores, at El Boden, 
at Montiago, Albergaria, and the places near. 
By this arrangement, the several brigade's of the 
allied army were so distributed, as that they couIJ, 
at a moment's notice, concentrate between the 
Agueda and the Coa; whilst all the principal de-
files of the mountains beyond being watched, the 
possibility of throwing a corps unobserved either 
into Rodrigo, 01' upon any link in our communica-
tions, was prevented. A point d'appui, likewise, 
for those in front, was eonstituted at Fuente Gui-
naIdo, where a position was marked out, and 
strengthened by respeetable' intrenehments; in a 
word, every precaution was taken which the eir-
cumstanees of the case appeared to demand, and 
whieh would enable Lord Wellington either to 
fight to advantage, should it be his poliey to risk 
a battle, 01', having kept out his advaneed eorps 
to the last moment, to fall back upon his re-
saurees. 
We werc thus situated, the expeetations of aH 
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being excited to a high degree. when there fell 
into our hands letters and other documents, which 
threw a good deal of light, as well upon the 
amount of the enemy's means, as. upon the plan s 
which he had be en lately devising, and the man-
ner in which he proposed to carry them into exe-
cution. Of the letters, one, and not the least in-
teresting, was addressed by General Foy, from his 
head-quarters at Almaraz, to General' Gerard, 
commandant of the 5th corps at Zafra. It bore 
date so long ago as the period of our first arrival 
in our present line, and informed the writer's cor-
respondent of the march of the British arrny to-
wards Ciudad Rodrigo; of Lord Wellington's 
designs upon that place; and of the measures 
which the. French were abóut to adopt, for the 
purpose of defeating them. General Foy, it ap-
peared, was under orders to join Marrnont at 
Plasencia, whilst Gerard was to move upon 
Almaraz and Truxillo; eight tbousand men were 
on their march from the anny of the centre; and 
their arrival at the Tagus might daily be expected; 
As soon as these should come up, Marmont was to 
push, with the whole of his army, through the 
pass of Baños, and to advance upon Ciudad Ro-
drigo frorn the side of Alba; whilst General D'Or-
senne, with as many troops as he might be able to 
collect, was to threaten the blockading force from 
Salamanca. Such was a general olltlinc of the 
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enemy's plan, as far at least as it couId be col-
leeted from the statements of General Foy j with 
respeet to the amount of resourees at his disposal, 
we possessed other and not less aeeurate means of 
information. Of the strength of Mannont's eorps, 
after it should have be en reinforeed by the pro-
mised divisions, little doubt could exist; we set it 
down, allowing for casualties and sickness, at 
forty-five thousand effectives; D'Orsenne's we 
were disposed to calculate at twenty-five or thirty 
thousand; and there were incIuded in it fifteen 
thousand infantry, and five hundred cavaIry orihe 
imperial guarda The latter faet we learned from a 
perusal of certain oflicial returns, whieh, together 
with the intereepted letters aboye alluded to, 
came into our possession; and we were the more 
inclined to place reliance on their accuracy, from 
private aceounts representing the division of guards 
as littIe short of thirty thousand. One of D'Or-
senne's generals, for example,in a private com-
munication full of the most extravagant bombast, 
informed the Governor of Rodrigo, that they were 
coming with twenty-five thousand guards; and 
then, added he, H Nous verrons si ces illustres 
Anglois nous attendront, ou si, comme a l'ordinaire, 
¡ls se retireront." This statement was, of course, 
treated as a gros s exaggeration; yet the amount of 
force known to be at Marmont's disposal was su eh 
as we could scarcely hope to fight to advantage¡ 
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and a~ Lord Wellington saw nothing in the exist-
ing state of affairs, which demanded that his pru-
dent counsels should be abandoned, he resolved 
not to hazard a general action at aH. On the con-
trary. it was his intention to retire leisurely across 
the Agueda, or even further, in case he should be 
hard pressed; and, from sorne other and better 
ground, to act offensively or otherwise, according 
as circumstances might direct. 
1 should try the patience of the reader beyond 
endurance, were 1 to repeat, in regular order. aH 
the demonstrations and trifling movements on the 
part both of the enerny and ourselves, which, up 
to the middle of September, served to keep alive 
the interest under which we now began again to 
labour. At one time, a corps of French cavalry 
was known to have threaded the pass of Baños, 
and aH were, in consequence, on the alert, as at 
the cornmencement of great undertakings. At 
another, the cavalry were stated to have with-
drawn; and a rumour prevailed, that Marroont 
was once more falling back upon Plasencia; and 
that the design of relieving Rodrigo was aban-
doneel. For this, a variety of causes were as-
signed. Soult had fought asevere action with 
Blake, and had suffered a defeat: he had returned 
to Llerena, and part of Marmont's troops were on 
their way to reinforce him. The Spaniards in the 
north, too, were acquiring fresh resolution, and 
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great things' might yet be expected from them. 
Thus were we amused, day after day, by state-
ments which at the best could be very imperfectIy 
relied upon, and which were not unfrequently 
devoid of all . foundation; till men cea sed in the 
end to turn their eyes, with the smallest interest, 
to any other part of the stage besides that imme-
diately before them. But matters were drawing 
gradual1y to a crisis; and proofs began by degrees 
to develope themselves, touching the real predica-
ment in which the belligerent parties stood; and 
the fate which, as a matter of course, might be ex-
pected to attend ourselves. . 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
Delay on the part of the enemy to commence operations-They 
advance to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; throw in a con-
voy, and pass the Agueda-Skirmishes along the front of the 
British line, which faUs back upon Fuente Guinaldo-
Display of French troops there-Lord Wellington retires to 
Alfayates-Partial actions during the movement-The 
enemy withdraw, and the British troops retire into canton-
ments behind the Coa-Ciudad Rodrigo observed by flying 
parties-Exploits of Don Julian. 
lT was now the middle of September, and the 
enerny's grand movement for the relief of Ciudad 
Rodrigo -was still deferrec1, though each successive 
day brought additional proofs that no great while 
would elapse ere it would receive its accomplish-
mento We lÍeard from various quarters that Mar-
mont's columns were in march towarc1s Tomames 
and Val de Fuentes, and that the imperial guards, 
with other troops to the number of twenty 01' 
twenty-five thousand men, were collected in and 
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about Salamanca. N ext carne intercepted cont· 
munications, which stated that a convoy would 
arrive near the place on the 20th or 21st at the 
Jatest; and that the force with which it was pro-
posed to cover its introduction, would render aH 
idea on our part of an attempt at molesting it, in-
admissible. Upwards of sixty thousand infantry. 
cavalry, and artillery, it was said, were prepared 
to raise the blockade; it was even hinted that a 
fresh irruption into Portugal was at hand, and 
that a campaign as active as had yet been per-
formed, and pregnant with results the most im-
portant, might be expected. Such reports and 
.surmises, from whatsoever quarter conveyed,or by 
whomsoever stated, were received with the liveliest 
interest by the army at large. The sun never 
rose without an expectation that great deeds 
would be accomplished, 01' at least begun, before 
his setting; and never set without producing a 
conviction, that when he rose again, it would be 
upon a scene of carnage and strife. AH, however, 
were prepared to bid that morning welcome, let it 
come when it might. The best dispositions which 
his circumstances would allow had already been 
made by Lord Wellington, and the best spirit pre-
vailed among the men; so that, if one feeling ap-
peared more conspicuous than another, it was of 
impatience that the game, so long anticipated, 
should be so tardy in its commencement. 
PENINSULA lt W A R. 207 
In the former chapter a general outline has be~n 
given of the order in which· the allied troops, from 
time to time, arranged themselves; it may not be 
amiss to give here in detail, the llature of the 
ground which theyoccupied at this criticaljuncture. 
There were two divisions, the fifth and the light, 
on the right bank of the Agueda; the one occupy-
ing Payo, the other Martiago. The latter com-
municated by its left, through Pastores, with the 
third division of El Boden; which, again, exten-
ding along the river Azava as far as Gallegos, 
united with the sixth, and thus leaned the left of 
the whole Jine upon the Agueda at Cesmiro. At 
the same time, Fuente Guinaldo, Nave d'Avel, 
and the posts in that direction, were held by the 
fourth and first divisions; whilst the cavalry were 
at Ituero, Espeja, Carpio, and along the plain 
which skirts the left of the high ground that runs 
parallel with the Agueda from Fuente Guinaldo to 
El Boden and Pastores, where it terminates in an 
abrupt fall towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The two 
lines of operations, again, which it was probable 
that the enemy would select, were either by Gal-
legos and Almeida, passing the Azava and Duos 
Casas rivers; or along the great road which leads 
to Fuente Guinaldo, turning the Azava, and 
making direct for Sabugal. . Now, as the country 
on the latter of these was in every point of view 
more defensible than that upon the former, Lord 
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Wellington earIy determined on making it the line 
of his retreat; and the divisions upon the more 
advanced chain accordingly received orders, in 
case of an attack, to retire, after having well dis-
puted their ground, towards Fuente Guinaldo. 
Here it was expected that a more ~esolute stand 
would be made, under cover of the redoubts and 
other works which had of late becn thrown up j 
whilst, in the event of further falling back, every-
thing was so settled, that themovement could be 
executed at any moment, and with comparative 
security. 
Such was the order oftheallied army, when, on 
the 24th of Septernber,a considerable body of the 
enemy showed themselves in the plain before 
Ciudad Rodrigo. They carne from the Salamanca 
and Tomames roads, and were accompanied by a 
countless number of waggons, cars, aneI loaded 
mules. Their progress was sIow, and apparently 
cautious; but towards evening the convoy began 
to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen 
squadrons of cavalry. which passed the Agueda, 
and a Iarge column of infantry, which h~lted upon 
the plain. Still no syrnptoms were manifested of 
a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt 
anything further than the object which was thus 
attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at 
dusk, and a11 bivouacked that night near the town. 
In the morning, ho\vever, as soon asobjects becam~ 
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discernible, on~ corps of cavalry, amounting to at 
least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a 
whole division of infantry, appeared in motion 
along the great road, whieh, leading from Ciudad 
Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Boden on the left ; 
whilst another, less numerous perhaps, but, like 
the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched 
direet upon. Espeja. They both moved with ad-
mirable steadiness and great reguIarity; and as 
the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear 
and beautiful, their appearanee was altogether very 
warlike, and extremely imposing. 
As it was not for sorne time ascertained whether 
strong reconnoissances only, or the advarice of the 
whole French army, were intended; and as Lord 
Wellington felt great reIuctance to abandon the 
heights of El Boden and Pastores, unless threat-
ened by numbers whieh it would have been use-
less to oppose, our troops neither shifted their 
ground, nor rnarle at first any general disposition 
to cover the points threatened by concentration. 
The enemy's columns, on the contrary, pushed on 
-not disregarded certainly, but as eertainly with-
out drawing us into any premature disclosure of 
our intentions; till the larger mass, which was 
rnoving towards Guinaldo, reached the base of 
sorne rising ground, which was heId by a portion 
of the third division. These troops instantly 
forrned; and though they consisted of no more 
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than one British brigade under General CoIvllle, 
and one Portuguese regiment of infantry-the 
ninth-some pieces of Portuguese artillery, and 
four squadrons of General Alten's cavalry, they 
contri ved to arrest, for a considerable space of 
time, the further advance of the assal1ants. Ii 
was my good fortune to be particularly mixed with 
this affair, and as one more brilliant has notoften 
been accomplished by a handful of British troops, 
l shall take the liberty of giving here a somewhat 
detailed account of it. 
1 have said that the enemy's column was per-
mitted to approach. almost to the base of the 
heights, before any disposition., was made, on our 
part, to harass or impede its progress. The guns, 
indeed, opened upon. his leading sq uadrons as soon 
as they arrived within range, and it wasconsola-
tory to observe that their fire was well directed; 
but the infantry continued in close columns of 
battalions behind the ridge, and the cavalry stood 
in similar order, each man with the bridle of his 
horse slung across his armo As soon, however, as 
it became distinctly manifest that an attack was 
in serious contemplation,. our troops prepared to 
meet it with their accustomed gallantry and cool-
ness. The infantry wheeled into line; the cával-
ry mounted, and made ready to move wherever 
their presence might be .required; whilst the ar-
tillery, redoubling their exertions, poured forth a 
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shower of grape and case shot, which exceedi~gly 
galled and irritated the enemy. These arrange-
ments were not lost upon the French; they too 
gave to their front a greater extent, as speedily as 
the nature of the ground would permit, and ad-
vanced forward. 
The attack was begun by a column of cavalry, 
which charged up the heights in gaHant style; 
cheering in the usual manner of the French, and 
making directly for the guns. Our artillery men 
stood their ground resoJutely, giving their fire to 
the last; but there being nothing immediately at 
hand to support them, they were at length com-
pelled to retire, and the guns fen, for a moment, 
into the hands of the assailants. But it was only 
for a moment; for the 5th regiment was ordet'ed 
instantIy to recover them. They marched up in 
line, and firing with great coolness; when at the 
distance of only a few paces from theiradversa-
saries, they brought their bayonets to the charging 
position, and rushed forward. 1 believe this is 
the first instance on record of a charge witIrthe 
bayonet being made upon cavalry by an infantry 
battalion in line; nor, perhaps, would it be pru-
dent to introduce the practice into general use;· 
but never was charge more successful. Posses;., 
sing the advantage of grotind, and keeping in close 
and compact array, the 5th literaUypushed their 
adversaries down the hill; they thenretook th·e~ 
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guns, and limbering them to the horses which had 
followed their advance, drew them off in safety. 
Whilst this was going on in one part of the field, 
repeated and impetuous attacks were made in ano-
ther upon the handful of cavalry, which, under 
General Alten's orders, manfully stood itsground. 
Columns of the enemy's squadrons pushed again 
and again upon the heights at different points, and 
under different leaders; but they were overthrown 
as regularly as tbey carne on, by sbort eharges 
fromour resolute troopers, who drove them down 
the deseent witb great slaughter, and still greater 
confusioll. It is worthy of remark that, onaU 
such occasions. the assailants outnumbered the 
defend-ersby at least four to -ene; and that, em'" 
boldened perhaps by their recent successes at the 
outposts, they carne on with tbe recklessbravery 
wbicb is exhibited only by men aecustomed to 
conquer; but nothing could exceed the steadiness 
of our cavalry; and tbeir excellenee became only 
the more apparent, on aceount of the great odds 
10 which they were opposed. There were present 
in this rencontre two squadrons of tbe 1st hussars 
of tbe King's German Legion, with a similar num-
Qer of the 11th ligbt dragoons; between whom it 
was impossible to' determine wbich performed 
feats of tbe greater gallantry; indeed 1 can per-
sonally attest tbat. the single souree of anxiety 
experieneed by the officers in. eommand. arose 
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from an apprehension lest these brave fellows 
should follow the broken multitudes down the cliffs 
and preci¡Jices into which they drove them. To 
hinder this were the efforts of. others and myself 
mainly directed; and it was not without conside~ 
rabIe exertions that we succeeded. 
The action had continued in this state ror sorne 
time, the enemy continually assaulting our front 
and left, and we as continually repulsing them, 
when Captain Dashwood, an active officer of tbe 
Adjutant-general's department, suddenly disco~ 
vered a heavy column moving towards the rear of 
our right, round which it had penetrated unob· 
served, and therefore unresisted. N ot a minute 
was to be lost, for even a rnoment's indecision 
would have enabled the French to accomplish their 
object of surrounding uso A retreat was accordw 
ingly ordered, and the heights were abandoned. 
It is scarcely necessary to add, that the peculiarity 
of our situation compelled us to look rather to the 
celerity with which this manreuvre could be exe-
cuted, than to anything besides, and that the re-
treat of the cavalry was, in consequence, more 
precipitate than orderly; but the brigade of in-
fantry, which consisted of the 77th, 83rd, and 5th, 
covered ¡t, and found fresh opportunities of exhiw 
biting their steadiness and high state of discipline. 
They formed into squares \n the plain in rear of the 
hussars, and when the French cavalry came oli in 
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overwbelming numbers, and at full speed, opened 
upon them a fire so destructive, tbat it completely 
checked them. This was the last effort oneither 
side. The enemy, overawed by the commanding 
attitude assumed by our infantry, drew back; and 
our troops continued their march upon Fuente 
Guinaldo, where they ar~ived, in due time, with-
out further molestation. 
Whilst the right of our line was thus employed, 
Jarge masses of the enemy's cavalry and infantry 
bore Jikewise upon our left, and drove back the 
advanced post s from .carpio, and the stations near. 
They were opposed chiefly by the 14th and 16th 
dragoons, which .charged with great gallantry as 
often as o:pportunities offered; but as it was highly 
improbable that demonstrations thus made in force 
llpon both flanks would not, sooner or later, end in 
anendeavour to bring on a general action, Lord 
Wellington early began to make his dispositions for 
the evento Fo!' this putpose, the light divisÍon was 
commanded to cross the -river, and hold the right 
of _ the line at Fuente Guinaldo; the thírd- and 
fourth divisions, with GeneralPack's brigade, took 
théir ground so as to be flaÍlked by the redoubts ; 
the seventh, which had hitherto been in reserve at 
Albergaría, :cIosed up; ·whilst the fifth remaíned 
still on the right bank of the Agueda, with a view 
of giving additional security to that flan k of the 
position. The cava1fy, again, were an moved into 
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the centre, and took post in front of the town. At 
the same time the sixth division defiled from Gal· 
legos and Espeja towardsits right; whilst Gen-eral 
Graham, who comínanded the ,force on the left of 
Ituero, and was, with the first division, at Nave 
d'A vel, received 'iHstructio~s, in case the right 
should be sorely pressed, to march at the shortest 
notice to ¡ts support. Every movement was made, 
and every object accomplished, on the night ofthe 
25th, without the slightest confusion or risk; in-
deed the only circumstances which befell during 
the progress of operations, at all deserving of 
record, occurred at Pastores, where the 74th and 
a battalion of the 60th regiments were posted. 
By sorne mistake or another, the orders for the 
retreat of these regiments did not arrive till all 
support had been withdrawn, and the enemy were 
seen in their rear; upon which Colonel Trench of 
the 74th, the senior and a very distinguished offi-
-cer, with great ju'dgment passed tbe Agueda, and 
made good his retreat by tbe right bank. He feH 
in, during his perilous journey, ~ith a party of 
.French cavalry, most of whom he succeeded in 
.making prisoners; and having re-crossed theriver, 
.overtook hisdivision about midníght, with the twó 
battalions unbroken and uninjured. 
The nigbt .of the 25th was spent by us as it is 
,customary f.or soldiers to spend á night upon 
which tbey have reason to expect that a day of 
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battle will rise; that is to say, tbe superior officers 
lay down in their cloaks upon the fioors of the 
houses, whilst the men slept on their arms, round 
large· fires~ which blazed along the range of the 
position. 
Long before dawn,. however, all were astir and 
in their places; and the different regiments looked 
anxiously for the moment which should behold the 
commencement of a game as desperate as any 
which they had been yet called upon to play. 
But, instead of indulgingour troops as they'ex-
pected, Marmont contented himself with making 
an exhibition of his force, and causing it to execute 
a variety oí manreuvres in our presence; and it . 
must be c~nfessed that a spectacle more striking. 
has rarely been seen. The large body of cavalry 
which followed lis to our position, and had bivou-· 
acked during the nigbt in the woods adjoining, 
were first drawn up in compact array, as if waiting 
for the signal to push on. By and by, nine batta-
lions of infantry,· attended by a proportionate 
quantity of artillery ~ made their appearance, and 
formed into columns, lines, echelons, and squares. 
Towards noon, twelve battalions of the imperial 
guard carne upon. the ground in one solid mass ; 
and as each soldier was decked out with feathers 
and shoulder-knots of a bloody hue, their appear-
ance was certainly imposing in no ordinary degree. 
The ~olid column, however, soon deployed into 
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columns of battalions-a movement which was 
executed with a degree of quickness and accuracy 
quite admirable; and then, after having performed 
several other evolutions with ~qual precision, the 
guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac. 
Next carne another division of infantry in real' of 
theguards, and then a fresh column of cavalry, 
till it was computed that the enemy hadcollected 
on thissingle point a force of not less than 25,000 
meno N or did the muster cease to go on, as long 
as daylight lasted. To the very latest moment, 
\re could observe men, horses, guns, carriages. 
tumbriIs, and ammunition-waggons, Hocking into 
the encampment; as if it were the design of the 
French general to bring his whole disposable 
force to bear against the position of Fuente 
Guinaldo. 
The position of Fuente Guinaldo was held at 
this time by three divisons only of the allied army, 
not one of which could bring into the field. so 
manyas 5000 bayonets. Our numerical inferiority 
was, therefore, very great; and as there was 
nothing in the nature of the ground calculated to 
mak~ up for a superiority in numbers so decided, 
Lord Wellington at once determined to abandon 
his works, and retire. In accordance witb this 
resolution, we began our retreat immediately after 
daI'k on the 26th; the right wing taking the two 
roads which lead, Olle by Castelhas dos Flores 
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and Furealhos, the other by Albergaria and Aldea 
de Ponte to Nave d'Avel, whilst the left feH baek 
upon Bismula, and behind the Villa-major river; 
andthe troops went ofl:' in sueh perfeet order, that 
not only were there no stragglers, but not au 
article of baggage, however valueless, was left 
behind. Our movements had, however, be en 
closely watehed by the enemy; for on the morn-
ing of the 27th they appeared in two eolumns, 
each consisting of twelve squadrons of cavalry, 
and a division of infantry, upon the two roads by 
which our right wing' was retiring. These eolumns 
mutualIy supported one another; and their great 
object appeared to be, notso much to overtake 
and force us to give battle, as to hurry us in our 
march; but they were in no single instance suc-
cessful. On the contrary, their obstinacy on two 
different occasions· enabled portions of our corps 
to beat them back with sorne 10ss, and with á. 
great deal more ofcohfusion. 
The enemy's force which marched by Furcal-
hos, was stopped at that place by the infantry of 
the light division. They had fallen in with the 
,cava1ry early in the day ~ which, retiring before 
thero, drew them to sorne broken ground, where 
fhe infantry was formed; .and a few discharges 
from the skirmishers served to convince them that 
here at least our line of maTch was not to be 
pressed. They therefore abstained from making 
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die attempt ;.but the corps which followed the 
Aldea de Ponte road seemed animated by a more 
daring spirit, and pushed vigorously to obtain 
possession of a range of heights which lead from 
that village to Nave d'Avel; and had they suc-
ceeded, the communication between the right and 
left wings of our army would have been destroyed. 
But Lord Wellington no sooner obset:ved their de-
sign than he took effectual me.asures to defeat it,. 
by cornmanding the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, 
with a considerable force of cavalry, to haH and 
concentrate upon the point threatened. The dis-
position was hardly effected, when our people 
were assailed by clouds ()f tirailleurs, which, as 
usual, covered the front of theFrench columns, 
and a very brisk skirmish ensued. Jt feH chieBy 
upon the 4th division, supported by General 
Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry; in ... 
deed, the brunt of it was borne by the fusileer bri-
gade under Colon el Packenham;· but though 
warm for the moment, it\Vas not of long -conti-
nuance.. The enemy were chased at once froro 
the high grounds which they had gained. They 
fied, rather than retired, -beyond Aldea de Ponte, 
and they were pursued with . the impetuosity 
which English soldiers generally exhibit, consider-
ably further than it had been intended to follow 
them. The consequence was, that our light 
troops were, in their turn, driven back by the 
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enemy's supporting column, which, roused by the 
sound of firing, had crossed over from the Furcal-
ho~ road, and were compelled to retire upon the 
divisions in posit-ion, which had not, sine e the 
commencement of the affair, once changed their 
order. 
An opinion now began to prevail, that it was 
Marmont's intention to push us across the Coa, 
with the rapidity of one who had already con-
quered, or was, at aH events, secure of conquest. 
Lord Wellington himself adopted the idea, and in-
dignant at the presumption which aH his adver-
sary's movements displayed, he resolved to render 
the proposed task somewhat more difficult of per-
formance than it appeared to be regarded by the 
French Marshal. There were some heights, or 
rather acclivities, about Rendoa· and Soito, which 
offered an extremely favourable position, the Coa 
covering both flanks, and a retiring angle oí the 
river forming their point d'appu1. Thither the 
army moved on the night of the 27th, and there it 
was proposed to fight a battle on the morrow, in 
case the French should persist in the design for 
which we gave them credit. With this view the 
fifth division received orders to pass the Agueda at 
Navas Freas, and to form the right of the line 
aboye Quadraseias. The fourth division was to 
draw up upon the left of the fifth ; the light above 
Soito; the third in· front of Pouca Tarenha; the 
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first. and sixth at Rendoa~ where the ground 
was peculiarly strong; and the seventh, with the-
cavalry, in a second line in the rearo There can-
not be a doubt that we should ~ave fought here 
with much greater security to ourselves than at 
Fuente Guinaldo; because the natural defCnces 
would have shielded our troops far more effec-
tively, whilst the approaches for the enemy were 
both difficult and exposed; yet there were objec-
tions even to this position, which the most s~­
guine found it difficult to overlook. There wa,g no 
secure retreat. With a river like the Coa in our 
rear, it would have been absolutely necessaryo-
either to repel, at all points~ the enemy's attacks, 
however formidable, or to perish; for the line, 
once broken, could not be withdrawn without suf-
fering a 10ss, which, in ou1' case, must have proved 
fatal. As it happened, however, the excellence 
of the position was not destined to be tried, for 
the enemy never approached it. Whether it was 
that Marmont's provisions failed him, 01' that he 
deemed it unwise to attack us upon ground so for-
midable, 1 know not; but on the morning of the 
28th, the strength of bis columns had disappeared, 
and only a rear-guard of cavalry remained to 
keep possession of Aldea de Ponte. 
N otwithstanding the apparent retreat of the 
enerny's columns, Lord Wellington did not con-
sider himself justified in abandoning the line 
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which he had taken up, till sorne more decisive 
proof should be afforded that immediate danger 
was at an end. About noon on the 28th, how-
ever, aH doubts on the subject were removed by 
the return of Major Gordon, brother to the Earl of 
Aberdeen, to head-quarters; who, so long ago as 
the 25th, had been sent to the French army as the 
bearcrof a flag of truce, and whom Marmont had 
very prudently detained during the progress of 
his,late operations. Major Gordon was, as might 
be expected, well stored with interesting anec-
dotes relative to the situation and feelings of the 
French army. He had received the most marked 
attention froro Marroout and others ofthe generals, 
with whom be lived on terms of familiarity, and 
who scrupled not to carry him along with them in 
their rides, and to give him the fullest insight into-
all their dispositions and arrangements. He spoke 
of the enemy's troops as being generally well ap-
pointed and equipped, especially the cavalry and 
imperial guards; and he estimated their numbers 
atfull 60,000, with 120 pieces of cannon. The 
French, it appeared, expressed themselves in 
terms ofthe highest respee! touching the military 
tal.ents of Lord Wellington, o{ which they con-
sidered his retreat from Fuente Guinaldo as fur-
nishing another brilliant specimen; for they had 
fully anticipated an action at that place, and all 
their plans were laid to secure a decisive victory. 
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The great bulk of their army, it appeared, was to 
have been directed against our right, partly forc-
ing and partly turning it; and whilst the cavalry, 
of which theybrought full six thousand into the 
field, amused and occupied the centre, our left 
also was to have been assailed. They were there-
fore not a little disappointed, when the dawn of 
the 27th displayed our works and position aban-
doned; and whilst they lamented the mischance 
which had thus wrested the laurel from their 
brows, they gave our chief full credit for the pru-
den ce which dictated his determination to fall 
back. Major Gordon further stated that the 
French, when they first passed the Agueda, enter-
tainednoother design than merely to reconnoitre 
OUT position, and to retire again; but that, irri-
tated by their cavalry 10ss, they pushed on, and' 
wer~ afterwards tempted, from a contemplation of 
our _extended alignment, to bring up, as they did 
on the 26th; the whole oftheir army. 
Now, however, the campaign was at an end., 
They were aU in full march towards Spain, for 
the purpose of separating into corps, and retiring 
to different quarters; that of General D'Orsenne 
into Galicia, where, after it should have received 
large reinforcements, and passed un del' the com-
mand of Oudinot, it was to become the army of 
thenorth; whilst that of Marmont, with its an-
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cient title of tlfe Army of Portugal, was to retura 
to its original station about Plasencia. 
The single circumstance of Major Gordon's re-
turn sufficed to convince us, that in the opinion 
which he had forrned relative tQ the future pro-
ceedings of the French arrny, he was not mis-
taken; since Marmont, had he ¡ntended to pro-
secute the invasion of Portugal any further, would 
have scarcely permitted him-first, to acquire so 
much accurate information-and then, to carry it 
over to the English General; and it ought he re to 
be recorded that the arrny possessed few more 
able, intelligent, and active officers, and perhaps 
none who móre largely possessed the confidence 
of Lord Wellington, than Major Gordon. lt be-
carne, therefore, evident enough, that, for the pre-
sent at least, the carnpaign was at an end. Dnder 
these circumstances, a question naturally arose, 
how was it probable that the allied troops would 
be disposed of?-in other words, would the close 
investment of Ciudad Rodrigo be resumed, or 
should we follow the example of the enemy, by 
withdrawing into temporary cantonments? Against 
the scheme of a renewed investrnent, there were 
many and powerful reasons to be urged. In the first 
place, every chance of reducing the place by fa-
mine was removed, the late convoys having amply 
supplied it with aH manner of stores; whilst to 
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the vigorous prosecution of a siege, the approach-
ing rain y season threatened to oppose obstacles> 
such as we could scarcely hope, even with means 
more ample than those actually.at our disposal, to 
surmount. But these, though sufficiently weighty, 
were not the only objections to which the under-
taking was liable. The enemy had already. given 
proof that they were disposed to make any sacri;. 
tices in other quarters, rather than permit a place 
so important to faH into oUt hands; and having 
once drawn their force to a head, it was very little 
probable that they would hesitate about doing so 
again, should similar reasons for the rnovement be 
he Id out to them. To sit down, however, before 
fortresses, only that he might be compelled to 
retire again, sll.ited not the policy of Lord Wel .. 
lington; he therefore determined, at least fol' the 
present, to suspend any attempt upon the place, 
and to give to his soldiers that rest of which their 
general exhaustion and increasing sickness stood 
so much in need. 
On the 29th of September the al1ied army broke 
up from its position in front of Alfayates, and 
leaving the light and fourth divisiolls to observe 
Rodrigo, and discharge the duty oftheoutposts, 
passed the Coa, and withdrew into cantonm:ents. 
By this arrangement, a Ene was taken up, which 
extended froID Penamacor, on the right, to Cele-
rico on the left; and head-quarters being estab-· 
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lished atFrenada, every disposition was made to 
pay attention to the sick, of which the numbers 
became every day nlore and more alarming. When 
we first established ourselves in Fuente Guinaldo, 
there· were, besides Portuguese, thirteen thousand 
British soIdiers in hospitaI,-when we retired be-
hind the Coa, that number had considerably in-
creased; and we had not inhabited our new 
quarters a week, before it swelled to the enormous 
amount of sixteen thousand men: The unhealthy 
season carne on, too; fevers and agues made rapid 
progre ss amongst us, till scarcely a regiment could 
muster upon parade two-thirds of ¡ts numerical 
strength; and the medical attendants almost sank 
beneath the fatigues which they were condemned 
to endure. To add to our present discomfort, the 
billets were, for the most part, extremely smaIl 
and incommodious. The rain, which feH in tor-
rents, soon penetrated the thin roofs of the cottages 
among which the troops were distributed; and 
even the Iarger mansions, or chateaux, of which 
the general and staff officers were put in possession, 
ceased, at last, to resist a deluge so incessant. 
Then, our out-of-doors occupation was destroyed. 
We could neither hunt nor shoot, nor folIowthe 
differentemployments which, in dry weather, COll-
tributed equally to our hea1th and amusement; 
whiIst a total abs~nce of books, with fare some-
what scanty and coarse, enabled:i\,ls to struggle 
"'} 
PENINSULAR WAR. 227 
with difficu1ty against en~~i. On the whole, 1 
have no hesitation in pointing to the period of our 
sojourn among the villages on the left bank of the 
Coa, as one of the least interest~ng throughout the 
Peninsular war, during which there occurred ab-
solutely nothing to individuals, calculated either 
to excite or amuse; and in which public events 
. were, with a few memorable exceptions, such as 
to depress, rather than elevate, the spirits of those 
who gave to them any grave or serious attention. 
Having premised thus much, 1 shall cease to· 
drag the reader through a detail of the petty 
actions which dístinguished one day from another 
in this tedious time of rest, but merely state the 
least unimportant; and as these happened to be 
neither numerous nDr very unusual in theirnature, 
a few words will suffice for the purpose. It is 
first, however, worthy - of remark, that· though 
driven by circiImstances into this state of tempo-
tary inaction, Lord Wellington ceased not for a 
moment to devise plans for the future, or to pre-
pare the means of carrying them into execution. 
Before the weather broke, serious thoughts were 
entertained of making an attempt up~n Ciudad 
Rodrigo by escalade; but the rising of the waters 
caused it to be abandoned, perhaps not unhappily 
for the credit of our arms. N ext, a scheme was 
devised for the commencement and p~secution of 
a síege, as soon as the aspect of affairs in La· 
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Mancha and Galicia might authorise the measure; 
and working parties were in consequence employed 
at Almeida, with the view of converting it into a 
place d'armes against the projected undertaking. 
Without absolutely investing it, flying parties 
passed contillually round Rodrigo, so as to in ter-
rupt the communications between the garrison, and 
the army in its rear; and these performed, on 
several occasions, services of considerable impor-
tance: the following may be taken as a specimen. 
Don Julian de Sanchez was one of the most en-
terprising and able of aH the guerilIa chiefs whom 
the progress of the war had called into active life. 
He commanded a small body of irregular horse, 
with which he repeatedly executed exploits such 
as few men besides himselfwould have attempted; 
till hisname became as famous in the rude songs 
of his countrymen, as it was dl'eaded and abhol'l'ed 
by his country's invaders. Don Julian had thrown 
himself into Ciudad Rodrigo, when Massená laid 
siege to it; and contributed not a little OOth by 
his example and personal exertions to the gallant 
defence which it offered; and when at last a sur-
render became indispensable, he cut his way, at 
the head of his troops, through the enemy's lines, 
and escaped. Since that period, he had harassed 
and destroyed numerous convoys in Asturias, Ga-
licia, and others of the nol'thern provinces; and 
llOW, having attached himself at length to oul' 
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army, he rendered himself exceedingly useful, by 
taking an active part in those patrolling expedí-
tions of which 1 have just spoken .. 
1 t was the custom of the French garrison to 
send out their cattle every morning beyond the 
waIls for the purpose of grazing, under the protec-
tíon of a guard, which at once tended them, and 
watched the movements of our partíes. Don 
J ulian determined, ir possible, to surprise the 
herd; for which purpose he concealed his people, 
day after day, among the broken ground on the 
bank of the river, not far from the town; but the 
guard proyed, for a time, so vigilant, that no op-
portunity occurred of effecting his designo At last, 
however, an accident occurred, which enabled him 
to accomplish, not only his original purpose, but 
one which he did not dream of accomplishing. It 
so happened, that on a certain day-on the l5th 
of October-General Regnaud, the governor ofthe 
place, rode out, attended by his staff and a slender 
escort, and ventured, somewhat incautiously, to 
pass the Agueda at the very spot where Don 
Julian's ambuscade lay concealed. He was in-
stantly surrounded by the Spauish cavalry, aud 
made prisouer; aud as if fortune had determined 
to reward the latter for their patienee, the cattle 
appeared at the same moment at a sufficient dis-
tance from the walls to authorise an attack. The 
attack was made with the most perfeet success. 
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and both Governor and cattle were conveyed in 
triumph to our head-quarters. In a native of any 
country except France, sucb an unlucky coinci-
dence would have produced a degree of gloom not 
to be sha,ken off; but by General Regnaud, bis 
misfortunes were borne with the utmost pbilosophy 
and good-humour. He became a frequent gl1est at 
Lord Wellington's table, and we found him an ex-
tremely entertaining as well as intelligent com-
panion. He talked very freely of the designs of 
his own superiors, and laid open to us much of the 
internal economy of the French armies, among the 
leaders of which it appeared, from his statements, 
that no great cordiality prevailed; and his reason-
ings on the general aspect of the war, though not 
always sound, were invariably speciaua, and al-
ways interesting. 
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CRAPTER IX. 
lncreasing jealousies among the Spaniards, and numerous 
disasters in the south, produce gloom in the British army-
It continues in its quarters, and makes preparations to be-
siege Ciudad Rodrigo-The French arroies suddenly with-
draw towards the south and east of Spain-Lord Wellington 
moves to the front, and invests Rodrigo-Progress of the 
siege-Storming and capture of the place. 
WHILs'r we were thus conductillg ourselves on 
the banks of the Coa, affairs gradually assumed" 
in other quarters of the Peninsula, an appearance 
less and less cheering. At Cadiz, discord the 
most ill-timed prevailed, both among the inhabi-
tants and the government;. whilst the troops in 
general, instead of improving in discipline and 
military skill, became more and more inefficient 
every day. AH c1asses, too, manifested towards 
their allies a degree of jealousy, for which no 
adequate cause could be assigned; they suspeded 
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every proposal, however disinterested in its nature, 
and threw impediments in the way of every de· 
sign, provided only the one chanced to originate 
with an English officer, and the other were to be 
carried into execution by English soldiers. Nor 
were matters in a condition many degrees superior 
to this eIsewhere. Madrid suhmitted quietly to, 
the domination of the usurper, and the whole 
country from thence to the Bidassoa was overrun. 
In Galicia, General Abadia was at the head of 
only 7,000 recruits, miserably clothed and fed, 
though sufficiently armed; whilst Castanos's ariny 
of Estremadura mig'ht muster perhaps 750 officers, 
and 2 or 300 men !! 1 t is true that in· Catalonia 
the Spaniards were reported to have obtained 
somesuccesses under Lacy; and that the Empe-
cinado and Mina were both actively employed as 
guerillas; but Suchet had already achieved so 
successful a campaign, that, with the exception 
of a few strong places, the southern provinces 
might be considered as subdued. AH this was 
discouraging enough; yet was it less discouraging 
than the paI pabIe proofs which every day pre-
sented themseIves of the exhausted patriotism of 
the Spanish peopIe, Men of all ranks spoke 
openly of the folly- of continuing a struggle so 
hopeless; and most of the higher orders hegan 
seriously to provide for their own safety, by giving 
in their suhmission ta the new dynasty. In a 
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word, the nation at large seemed weary of the 
war, and desirous of being relieved from its mise-
ríes at any cost and upon any terms; whilst the 
government appeared more anxious to recover the 
revolted colonies of South America, than to deliver 
the mother country from the presence of its in-
vaders. At the very moment when every exer-
tion ought to have been made to ¡ncrease the 
numbers of the army, and improve its discipline, 
the regency was sending its bes! regiments across 
the Atlantic for the purpose of keeping Mexico 
in obedience, and re-conquering tIle Caraccas, 
till the troops themselves refused at last to pro-
ceed. and mutiny threatened to fill up the mea-
sure of the calamities under which Spain laboured. 
With such prospects in the political horizon, 
.and an absence of comfort amongst ourselves, a 
spirit of dissatisfaction began to arise in the 
bosoms of many, as well as a powerful feeling 
that the cause had at length becomedesperate. 
The Portuguese, no doubt, were still true to them-
selves; thatis to say, the dissensions in the local 
government were rendered comparatively harmless 
by a decree from Rio Janeiro, which placed the 
resources of the country at the disposal of Lord 
Wellington and Marshal Beresford, and left tbem 
at liberty to act, in military matters, according to 
the dictates of their· own judgment. But there 
were few individuals attached to the army so 
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short-sighted as not to be aware that, should 
Spain finally submit to the power of France, any 
effort to maintain Portugal must be futile. Mul-
titudes accórdingly now began to turn their eyes 
e)sewhere, and to desire employment either in 
England or the colonies; and the numbers of 
those who actually requested and obtained leave 
to quit the country, were by no means inconsider-
able. Our chief alone appeared to retain his 
usual sanguine expectations; for he continued his 
preparations for a fresh caropaign with the same 
diligence and with the same composure, as if the . 
state of the Peninsula had been as favourable, as 
from the proclamations of the Cortes, and the 
statements in the English newspapers, it was re-
presented to be. 
We were thus situated, when the report of a 
brilliant enterprise, admirably conducted by Ge-
neral HilI, in Spanish Estremadura, came in to 
enliven uso When Marmont withdrew to his can-
tonments around Plasencia, he left a corps of his 
army, under General Gerard, at Merida, which 
subsequently returned to the vicinity ofZafra, 
where it took post. Gerard remained quietIy here 
for sorne time; but being ordered to levy contri-
butíons on the inhabitants of Caceres, he moved, 
about the middle of October, towards that place; 
thus endangering the depot of Castanos's corps, 
which had there lts head-quarters. To counteract 
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th.is movement, and defeat its object, General Hill 
was directed to take the field. He advanced from 
Portalegre on the 221id, and causing the enerny to 
evacuate Aleseda, of which they had recently pos-
sessed thernselves, he pursued them as far as AI-
cuerca, where he contrived, in a rnasterly and 
scientific rnanner, to surprise and disperse thero. 
The foHowing is a briefaccount of this splendid 
affair :~ 
General Hill passed the night of the 21st at 
Malpartida, where he obtained such inforrnation 
of the enemy's incaution, as induced hirn to en-
tertain a hope that they rnight, by dint of ex-
traordinary exertion on his part, be overtaken, and 
brought to action. With this view, he put his 
columns in march at an early hour on the morn~ 
ing of the 27th, and following certain by-paths, 
artived that evening, unobserved by Gerard, at 
Alcuerca. He was now within one short league 
of Arroyo del Molino, the village where Gerard's 
corps was to pass the night; so he prohibited aH . 
fires frorn being lighted, and took other necessary 
precautions to conceal his approach.. He was 
perfectly successful; for the enerny remained in. 
utter ignorance of his proximity, till they found 
thernselves attacked on the morning of the 28th" 
just as tbey were preparing to co~mence their 
marcho Thus taken by surprise, they offered, as 
might be expected, no very resolute resistan ce ;: 
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and the victory was such, that out of 2,500 in-' 
fantry, and 600 cavalry, of which the French 
corps originally consisted, seareely 500 made their 
escape; General Gerard himself being wounded, 
and his artillery taken. General Hill received, as 
he deserved, the highest encomiums for the ability 
with which his enterprise was eonducted; and 
the enterprise itself continued, for sorne time, to 
furnish the ehief topie of conversation at head-
quartets. 
In the mean while, however, Lord Wellington, 
with that unwearied diligence whieh so peculiarly 
distinguishes him, was applying all the powers of 
his mind to the removal of certain inconveniences, 
under which, both now and at former periods, his 
, army had painfully laboured. The two great evils of 
which we found principal cause to complain, were, 
the impoverished state of our military chest, and 
a very inadequate as well as uncertain supply of 
the means of military transport.· To obviate the 
former, our chief devised a scheme for the passing 
current through Spain and Portugal of exchequer 
bills; and to try how far tbe theory could be re-
duced 'to practice, be requestoo that a supply 
. should be remitted from England to tbe amount 
of 150,0001. For thé diminisbing the latter, he 
caused a number of cars to be fabricated after a: 
particular model, so that boys might be capable of 
managing them ; and arranging them ¡nto brigades, 
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composed ea eh of thirty-five carriages, he placed 
them, after the fasbion oí tbe commissariat mules, 
under their several capitaos or leaders. How far 
the fi1'st of these devices was found to answer its 
end, 1 take it not upon me to determine; but tbe 
last proved productive of the greatest advantages, 
and at once rendered us independerit of tbe ca-
price and jealousy which too frequently stood in 
the way of our most important undertakings. Un-
happily, however, out efforts to straiten the gar-
rison of Ciudad Rodrigo were not attended with 
the same beneficial results. In spite of our utmost 
diligence, the enemy contrived to tbrow convoy 
after convoy into the place, till in the end the 
investing force became infinitely more straitened 
for provisions, forage, and other necessaries, than 
the force whiqh it sought to inconvenience. The 
truth ¡s, tbat our troops were, at the present 
juncture, at too great a distance from the fort,· to 
watch it to any good purpose; whilst they were 
too far in front to find subsistence for themselves 
in a country which had so long and so frequently 
been the seat of active operations. It was in vain 
that one or more divisions moved up, from time to 
time, towards the Agueda, as often as a report 
carne in, that sorne fresh supplies were collecting, 
and sorne fresh convoys about to move upon Ro-
drigo. They arrived either to learn that the 
stores had already passed, or that the wholehad 
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been a false alarm; till both men and officers 
began to grow heartily tired of a species of war-
fare which harassed and fatigued themselves, 
without bringing the slightest inconvenience upon 
the enemy. At last the General determined upon 
withdrawing a portion of his army further to the 
rear; where the horses, which hadwasted away 
to mere skeletons onaccount of the scarcity of 
provender, might be enabled to· recover their 
strength, and to scatter the rest over a widet SUf-
face, wherever more convenient accommodations 
could be found for it. 
In accordance with this arrangement, the fifth 
and sixth divisions; with the whole of the cavalry 
except a single brigade, retired towards the Douro 
and theMondeg'o, where they occupied a range of 
villages infinitely more commodiou·s than any 
which had oflate been assigned to them. Head-
quarters, howevel\ continued, as before, at Fre-
nada; whilst the first division, under General 
Graham, took post at Pinhel on the left, the third 
and fourth in the centre, between the Agueda and 
the Coa, the seventh on the left, extending as far 
as Penamacor, and the light, under Crawford, con-
siderably inadvance, at Guinaldo, on the right 
barik of the Agueda. The good effects of these 
changes .were almost immediately feIt. Our sic k 
daily díminished, our horses gradually returnedto 
condition, arrd the spirits of all rose, as they felt 
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themselves becaming more and more efficient; 
whilst a blessed change in the weather, byenabling 
us to resume our ancient out-of-door occupations~ 
tended, in no slight degree, to r~store our primitive 
good-humour. 
In this channel affairs continued to flow, till 
the year 181] "came to a close. Our parties la-
bouring assiduously at Almeida. brought it, by 
degrees, to assume something like tbe appearance 
of a fortified place; whilst preparations ~ere bu-
sily made for throwing across tbe Agueda a bridge 
upon tressels, sufficiently durable to resist the in-
fluence of the stream. Stores and ammunition, 
with a considerable train of heavy artillery, were 
likewise moved towards the front; and the divi-
sions of infantry stationed tl1e1'e, busied them-
selves in the construction of gabions and fascines. 
Everytbing, in short, appeared to indicate that 
sooner or latter Ciudad Rodrigo would be regu-
larly besieged; and the first opportunity which 
offered for the purpose, was not permitted to pass 
unnoticed. 
During the last three months, the enemy's 
troops in the nortb and centre of Spain had 1'e-
mained "tolerably quiet, there being no force, with 
the exception of General Abadia's corps, to occu-
py their attention; whilst in the south, hostilities 
were carried on with increasing vigour. Master 
of Tarragona, and victorious over everything in the 
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field, Suchet sat down before Valencia, whilst 
Victor drove back Ballasteros under the walls of 
Gibraltar, and directed a considerable division of 
his corps against Tariffa. In the mean while, 
General Drouet, at the head of twelve thousand 
men, insured the subnüssion of Spanish Estrema-
dura; and Soult, whose head-quarters were under-
stood to be at Seville, kept that kingdom also in 
subjection. Thus were the -Spaniards pressed 
on every side by corps against which they could 
make no head; and it appeared as if the subjuga-
tion of all those important places, which up to the 
present moment had offered the most steady resist-
ance, were at hand. 
I have in former parts of this narrative taken 
occasion to observe, that whatever might have 
been their conduct in the field, the Spanish troops 
seldom failed to do their duty when employed in 
the defence of fortified places. The fortress of 
Murviedro, which Suchet found it necessary to 
subdue, as a preparatory step to the reduction of 
Valencia, cost him dear; and the same spirit 
which had animated the garrison of the one place, 
appeared to prevail among that which held the 
other. Tarifra, too, being happily occupied by a 
thousand English soldiers under Colonel Skerret, 
withstood and repelled all the efforts of the enemy 
to carry it; whilst bands of guerillas gathered 
round the rear of the French armies, and seriously 
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retarded . their progress. It beeame necessary, 
under these circumstances, to reinforee their 
strength from other provinees. The whole of the 
disposable regiments in the vicinity of Madrid 
were, in eonseq uence, moved to Toledo; and to-
wards the end of the year, Marmout himselfbroke 
up from his cantonments at Plasencia and Talave-
ra, and fell into the same lineo It so happened 
that D'Orsenne, with the army of the centre, took 
the road, about the same time, to Burgos; and 
we were left without any thing in our front, as 
weIl upon the side of Beira as in the direction 
of the Alentejo .. 
Lord Wellington was no sooner made acquainted 
with these several movements, than he hastened 
to avail himself ofthe opportunity whieh they pre-
sented, of effecting that end towards which his 
most anxious attention had been so long and so 
steadily turned. Directing General Hill to ad-
vanee upon Merida, as well with the view of 
alarrning Drouet as to effect a diversion in favour 
of the beleaguered plaees, and to draw off part of 
the enerny's force from Ballasteros, he himself 
made ready to invest Ciudad Rodrigo in form, and 
to wrest it, if possible, out of the hands of a garri-
son, now unavoidably left to its own resources. 
There were not wanting amongst us sorne who 
criticised this design, and would have greatly pre-
ferred a general inroad into Spain, bare as it was of ~~=E::':" 
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French armies up to the very walls of the capitat; 
hut Lord Wellington was too well aware of· the 
difficulties to which his troops must be exposed, 
were they, in the month of January, 1812, to pe-
Retrate into an exhausted country, to give to that 
suggestion one moment's consideration. Besides, 
his own honour, and the honour of his army, were 
in some degree staked' upon the recovery of the 
fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo; whilst the safety of 
the province of Beira might be said mainly to de-
pend upon it. Orders were accordingly issued 
fuI' the immediate advance of as many stores as it 
was possible to collect; whilst the divisions in 
front closedone upon another, and made ready to 
move upon the Agueda. 
Seldom has an army embarked on a business so 
arduous, under circumstances more unfavourable 
than those which attended us at presento In the 
first place, the situation of the place to be at-
tacked, standing, as 1 have already said, upon the 
brink of a rapid river, and surrounded by a vast 
plain destitute of positions, water, or even cover 
for the troops, rendered it impossible to establish 
ourselves permanently about it, without exposing 
the men to hardships which must soon prove fatal 
to their health. It would therefore be necessary, 
after driving the garrison within their lines, to 
carry on the siege by relays of divisions; in other 
words, to keep the main body in cantonments oa 
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the 1eft bank ofthe Agueda, whilst a certain num-
ber of brigades should push on the works on the 
right bank, the rest relieving them in that duty at 
the expiration of a certain space of time. N OW, 
tbough the Agueda be fordable in several places 
.during dry weather, it requires but a few hours 
of heavy rain to render the fords impassable ~ 
whilst the rain, which might chance to last for a 
few days, would inevitably sweep away the only 
bridge which we had found it practicable to 1ay 
down. At the present season of the year, how-
ever, such rains were not only of probable occur-
rence, but confidently to be apprehended; and 
therefore we set out with a: prospect before us, of 
continual interruptions, from causes which no 
exertionson our part would suffice to obviate. In 
the next place, the means at our disposal, whether 
of transport 01' attack, fell infinitely short of the 
very lowest calculation which the superintending 
engineer had been able to formo Instead of 1400 
cars, th~ amount demanded, we could muster no 
more than 450 j and our whole mate riel consisted 
of 38 twenty-four pounders, with 12 howitzers. 
We possessed not a single mortar, and our stock, 
bothof powder and she11s, was exceedingly scanty. 
There was, moreover, every reason to apprehend 
that, as soon as the enemy should be made aware 
of our design, they would hasten to defeat it, and 
a question naturally arose, whether, under a11 cir-
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cumstances, it would be possible for us to bring 
the undertaking to a fortunate termination. Now 
a repulse, in any case, would have been abun· 
dantly distressing.; had this been our first attempt 
of the kind, not to succeed in it would be infinitely 
more injurious than not to embark in it at all; but 
were we again thwarted, after all that had oc· 
curred already, it was hard to calculate upon the 
mischief which might be expected to ensue. Yet 
was it absolutely necessary that something should 
be done, as well for the gratification of the people 
of England, as to satisfy our allies that we were 
not indifferent to their calamities; and as the only 
choice submitted to him lay between the siege of 
Rodrigo, and an advance into the interior of Spain, 
Lord Wellington w1sely deterrnined on the former. 
On the 5th of January, the divisions in the rear 
began toclose up; on the 6th and 7th, the army 
assembled, and on the 8th we crossed the Agueda 
in force, and completed the investment. 
Of the general features of the country by which 
Ciudad Rodrigo is surrounded, a sufficiently ela-
borate account has been given already. 1 will not, 
therefore, repeat it here; but as little 01' no notice 
has yet been take!1 of the defences by which it 
was covered, it may not be amiss if 1 endeavour to 
make the reader acquainted with their nature, 
before 1 proceedto detail to him any circum-
stances--attending the siege. The following de-
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scription is extracted from Colonel Jones's Journal 
of Sieges; a work which every soldier would do 
wel1 to study, and which every eivilian may pe-
ruse with satisfaetion :-
" Ciudad Rodrigo is built on a rising ground, on 
the right bank of the Agueda ; it has a double en-
ceinte all round it; the interior wall is of an old 
construction, ofthe height of thirty-two feet, and 
is generally of bad masonry, without flanks, and 
with weak parapets and narrow ramparts; the ex-
terior enclosure is a modern fausse-braie, of a low 
profile, and is constructed so far down the slope of 
the hill, as to afford but Httle eover to the interior 
wall; and from the same cause of the rapid deseent 
of the hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imper-
fectly covered by its glacis. Onthe east and 
south sides, there are ravelines to the fausse-braie; 
but in no part is there a covered way, nor are there 
any counter-mines: without the town, at the dis-
tance of three hundred yards, are the suburbs; 
they are enclosed by abad earthern retrench-
ment, hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during 
the investment of the place in 1810; and the 
French, since they had been in possession of Ro-
drigo, had made strong posts of three convents-
one on either flank of the suburbs, and one in the 
centre; and they had also converted into an in-
fantry post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated 
just beyond the glacis on the north-west angle of 
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the place. The works of the suburbs, therefore, 
though contemptible in themselves, yet as sup-
ported by these convents, were considered as fully 
competent to resist a coup-de-main. 
"The ground without the place is generally 
flat, and the soil rocky,_ except on the n01'th side, 
where there are two hills, called the lesser and the 
greater Teson; the one, at 180 yards from the 
works, rises nearIy to the level of the ramparts, 
and the other, at 600 yards' distance, to the height 
of 13 feet above them.The soil on these hilIs is 
very stony, and during winter, water (usual1y) 
rises at the depth of six ¡nches below the surface : 
the French had erected a small redoubt on the 
highest hill, which, from its situation, prevented 
anyattack on that side ti11 it should be taken : this 
redoubt was supported by two guns, and a howit-
zer in battery, on the top of the fortified convent 
of Sto Francisco, at 400 yards from it, and a large 
proportion of the artillery of the· place, (particularIy 
mortars and howitzers placed behind the rampart 
of the fausse-braie,) was in battery to fire upon the 
approach from the hill." 
There were two points at which this place 
might be readi1y assaHed; one on the eastern and 
southern sides, where the ground was more flat, 
but the suburbs extensive; the other on the north, 
where the hill and redoubt just alluded to pro-
tected it from insulto Lord W~llington seemed. 
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át first disposed to make his approaehes from the 
former of these quarters; but, on mature delibe-
ration, it was found that the superior fire from the 
northern face would l}Ot present obstacles so seri-
ous as those which the rocky nature of the soü, 
and the resistance to be expected from the for-
tified convents and suburbs, would offer on the 
other. 1 t was known too, from the system of 
aítaek adopted,by Massena, that the walls on the 
northern front might be breached at a distance; 
whereas, on the southern and eastern fronts, it 
appeared doubtful, from the natural faH of the' 
ground, whether any impression could be made, 
exeept froID batterieserected on the erest of the 
glacis; and as the saving of time was to us a mat-
ter oC thefirst consideration, that which promised 
most speedily to lay open the body of the place, 
was pronouneed to be the best. For these, among 
other reasoris, our chief readily laid aside his first 
intentions, and having closely reconnoitred the 
eity in all its faces, he determined to act upon 
the second with as much promptitude as vigour. 
With this view he resolved that ground should. 
be broken on the night of the day in which the 
investment was effected; afid as it was~essential, 
as a preparatory measure, to obtairi possession oí 
the redoubt which crowned the greater Teson,' 
orders were issued that it should be attacked by a 
party of the light division, and earried by escalade. 
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Our troops, to whom no ladders had be en issued 
out, and who probably did not dream of requiring 
such implements thus early, immediately sat down 
to construct them, and the sides of a few Spanish 
cars which had conveyed intrenching tools from 
Almeida, supplied them with materiaIs. They 
tore them to pieces, and long before the appointed 
hour a sufficient quantity for the service in con-
templation was completed. Three hundred men 
of the 52nd and 95th regiments then prepared, 
under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Col-
bourne, to assault the outwork. They were to be 
supported by two firing. parties, which received 
instructions to keep up a warm discharge of mus-
ketry upon the opposite flanks, for the purpose of 
distracting the attention of the garrison; whilst 
the storming party, descending into the ditch, 
should cut away the palisades, and mount, with 
the assistance of their rude ladders, into the re-
doubt. Everything was done with the most ad-
mirable order and daring courage. At nine o'clock 
at night, the several detachments moved to the 
posts assigned them, and our brave fellows, find-
ing thatthe palisades were close to the outward 
side ofthe ditch, sprang over them, without paus-
ing to break them down. They then rushed pell-
mell into the redoubt, and taking the enemy com-
pletely by surprise, made themselves masters, not 
only of it, but of the entire garrison which had 
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been appointed to defend it.Two officers, forty 
men, and three pieces of cannon captured, were 
the fruits of their success; and it was purchased 
by the loss of only six men kilIed, three officers 
and sixteen men wounded. 
The way being thus cleared to ulterior opera-
tions, 700 men irnrnediately advanced towards 
the hilI, 300 of whom were to effect a lodgmelít 
close to the redoubt, whilst 400 should open the 
communication to it from the rearo They suc-
ceeded in both objects with wonderfully little 
los8; for the enerny, irritated by the fall of the 
outwork, directed all their flre upon it, and our 
people were in consequence enabled to pursue 
their tasks unmolested. When morning dawned, 
therefore, the cover was found to be such, that 
reliefs might, with perfect safety, be employed to 
complete by day what had be en so welI begun at 
night; and hence, within little more than twenty-
four hours from the investment of the place, 'our 
engineers found themselves in a situation to mark 
out the first parallel. That, again, was begun, 
and so far brought to perfection, between sunset 
on the 9th and sunrise on the ] Oth, as to afford 
excellent shelter to the workmen; indeed, so 
unremitting were the zeal of the superintendents 
and the activity of tÍle troops, that hefore noon on 
the 13th, not only was the first parallel completéd, 
but three batteries, capable of containing thirty-
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two 'pieces . of artillery, were erected. The guns 
were likewise brought up, the platforms laid, and 
an ample supply of ammunition lodged in the 
magazines ; . and we began already to talk of tbe 
opening of the batteries as an occurrence which 
might be hourly expected. 
We . were thus situated when intelligence ar-
riyed at head~quarters, which, without aIarming 
either Lord Wellington or his followers, increased 
the anxiety of all to bring the undertaking before 
them as speediIy as possible to an end. We 
learned that Marmont, after proceeding in the 
direction of Valencia as far as O~ana, had sud-
denly given out that his presence in the east was 
not required, and returning with four of his divi-
sions, had taken the route of the Guadarama pass 
towards Valladolid and Salamanca. His object 
was represented to he, a desire to throw supplies 
into Ciudad Rodrigo, of our operations against 
which, however, both he and D'Orsenne were 
said still to be in ignoran ce; indeed we ascer-
tained, upon what appeared to be good autbority~ 
that even at Salamanca, a distan ce of only sixteen 
leagues from our' trenches, not a rumour of the 
siege had, so Iately ~s the 12th, got abroad. A 
good deal of time had thus been gained by us, 
upon which, ai the commencement of the business, 
it wouId have been idIe to calculate; but it would 
have been: worse than idle to suppose tbat a 
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secresy, under any circumstances so remarkable, 
would long continue to screen our operations. 
On the contrary, it was but just to believe that 
the French generaIsmight, even whilst we were 
discussing their plans, be made acquainted with 
the perilous predicament in which Rodrigo stood ; 
and it was beyond a question, that whenever they 
díd aseertain that faet, they would make the 
utmost exertions to relieve i1. The matters, there-
fore, upon which alone we eonsidered it necessary 
to speeulate, were, the probable period at which 
they would be enabled to arrive, and the amount 
of force with which, within a given space of time, 
they could be in a condition to threaten our be-
slegmg army. 
With respect to the former of these conside-
rations, it was the opiníon of Lord Wellington, that 
were they to exert themselves as they might, suffi.., 
cient time would not be granted for a regular and 
scientifie prosecution of the siege to a close. He 
therefore directed that the batteries in the first 
parallel should be armed, and that they should 
open at once upon the body of the place, without 
pausing to silence the enemy's fire, or ruin his de';' 
fenees. By this means he hoped to effect a breach 
in the course of a few days at the furthest; -when 
he wouldeither storm with the counterscarp entire, 
or approaeh by the more secure but tedious process 
of sap, according as Marmont should, 01' should 
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not, sho\V a disposition to molest him. With re-
speet to the latter question at issue, it \Vas not so 
easy a matter to eome to any eertain eonclusion. 
Some time ago a rumour had prevailed that D'Or-
senne, with the division of guards, was recalled to 
Franee; but that was now aseertained to be desti-
tute of foundation. On the eontrary, that general 
was stated to be himself at Valladolid, with a 
portion of his corps; whilst the remainder were at 
Burgos, and in the country to the north of it. 
Now, were Marmont and D'Orsenne again to 
unite, their force would doubtless outnumber liS in 
the same proportion in whieh it outnumbered liS 
before; indeed the odds against us would be 
greater, inasmueh as \Ve could not now, with any 
honour, abandon our works, and must therefore 
separate our army into eovering and besieging 
corps. For the enemy to effect this junction, 
however, a larger space oftime would be required 
than would be necessary on our part to accomplish 
the reduction of the place, even by the most 
tedious process contemplated; and hence we felt 
no great apprehension that our labours would be 
interrupted by the united armies of Portugal and 
the centre. Still a very considerable force, per.-
haps forty thousand men, could, it was believed, 
be brought against us so early as the 27th 01' 28th; 
and even fo1'ty thousand men would oceasion no 
t1'iBing inconvenience to troops entangled, as we 
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were, round a strong place, and destitute of any 
favourable position from which to aet against them. 
With this prospect before him, Lord Wellington 
at once urged forward the siege by every means 
in his power, and took such steps as promised 
most effectually to secure those employed in it 
from interruption. Sorne of the divisions whieh 
had hitherto oeeupied eantonments eonsiderably in 
the rear, were moved up, and placed themselves 
in quarters, the: fifth at Albergaría, at Janea, and 
on the Coa; and the seventh at Payo. The 
cavalry, consisting of the brigades ofGenerals Slade 
and Anson, of the 1st hussars, of Alten's. of the 
3rd dragoons and 4th dragoon guards under Le 
Marchands wíth four troops of horse artillery, were 
at Ituero; and General Bradford's brigade of Por-
tuguese infantry at Barba del Puerco. General 
Híll, likewise, reeeived instructions to throw a 
couple of brigades across the Tagus at Villa Velha, 
for the purpose of giving additional support to our 
right; whilst he himself, in case of need, should 
faH back upon Portalegre and Niza. Thus it was 
ealculated that an arrny of 38,000 infantry and 
2500 cavalry could, within a few hours, be assem-
bled at any given point; and with 38,000 infantry 
and 2500 cavalry, it was felt that there existed but 
srnall ground of apprehension, let Marrnont take 
the field when he rnight. 
In the mean while, out' works before the town 
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were proceeding with the same diligence and 
vigour which had bitberto characterised them. 
There was a fortifiedconvent on the right of the 
captured redoubt, which commanded the very 
spot upon which it was proposed to form a second 
parallel. This it was considered necessary to re-
duce; and the service was performed on the night 
of the 13th, in the handsomest manner, by the 
light companies of guards, supported by Lord 
Blantyre's brigade. OUl' men approached the 
post wholly unobserved, and making their way 
within the barricade, found the garrison of fifty 
men collected round a large fire; and sound asleep. 
The enemy. roused thus awkwardly from tlíeir 
slumbers. fled in all directions, without making the 
fa¡ntest effort to defend thernselves; and as they 
left arrns, knapsacks. and every thing behind, they 
.easily leaped froin the windows, and effected their 
,escape; but the convent remained in' our posses-
sion, and it proved óf the utrnost utility in covering 
the progressof the sap, which was irnmediately 
.begun, and carried ón to the line of the projected 
parallel. . 
The enerny had hitherto confined their resist-
ance to a heavy ccmnónade frorn the walls; on the 
14th, they tried the fortune of a sortie, and for a 
moment or two their success was such as to 
threaten the most serious consequences. An ex-
ceedingly culpable custom prevailed among the 
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troops stationed for the defence of the tren ches, by 
which the old guard, as soon as the relief came in 
sight, began to move off; thus leaving the ad-
vanced line wholIy undefended fromany effort 
which the gal'rison might make to take possession 
o~ iL "From 'tn.e 'tops {)l tn.e \()Wel'll" ~\) wn.\ch ~'ffi.­
cers were constantIy stationed, this extreme negli-
gence on our part was repeatedly observed; and 
the Governor having ascertained that it was a mat-
ter of daily occurrence, resolved to take advantage 
of it. At eleven o'clock, therefore, in the forenoon 
of the 14th, about five companies sallied from the 
town, just as one of our guards had quitted the 
trenches, and the other was as yet at sorne dis-
tance from thern; and they pushed on with so 
much haste, that they arrived at the very waU oí 
the convent before they were stopped. The work ... 
men, unarmed and surprised, could only retire be-
fore them; but an alarrn being immediately given, 
Lord Blantyre's brigade, with a detachment of 
Germans, hastened to the spot, and with difficuIty 
threw themselves between the French troops and 
the point of attack. The latter were then driven 
back, and they fled within the town, having 
effected no other object besides upsetting most of 
the gabions which had been placed on the pre-
ceding night; neither they nor we suffering any 
serious 10ss in killed or wounded. 
There had been mounted, during the earlier 
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part of this morning, twenty-five heavy twenty-
four pounders in the batteries already constructed 
in the first parallel. With these a fire was 
directed to be opened, partly upon the point in-
tended to be breached, and partly upon the con-
yent of Sto Francisco, another fortified post which, 
from the left of the redoubt, enfiladed our pro-
jected communication between the first and second 
parallels. At four o'clock in the afternoon it be-
gan; and of a spectacle more strikingly magnifi~ 
cent, it has rarely been the good foríune even of a 
British soldier to be a witness. The evening 
chanced to be remarkably beautiful and still; 
there wasnot a cloud in the sky, nor a breath 
of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artil-
lery broke in upon its calmness, and volumes 
of smoke rose slowly from our batteries. These 
floating gently towards the town, soon enveloped 
the lower parts of the hill, and even the ramparts 
and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the towers 
and summits lifting their heads over the haze, 
showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial 
castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on 
a summer's day. The flashes from our guns, an-
swered as they promptly were from the artillery in 
the place, the roar of their thunder reverberating 
amongthe remote mountains ofthe Sierra de Fran-
cisca; these, with the rattle of the balls against the 
masonry, and the occasional crash as portions of 
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the wall gave way, proved, altogether, a se ene 
whieh, to be rightly understood, must be expe-
rienced. 1 eonfess that J have seldom been more 
powerfully and yet singularly affected, than 1 was 
by this magnificent combination of sights and 
sounds; and the chances are, that 1 shall nevel' 
again enjoy another opportunity of experiencing 
similar sensations. 
The point against which our present efforts 
were direeted, was that which the Freneh, during 
the siege of 1810, had breached, and which, ac-
cording to the opinion of our ablest engineers, had 
not yet obtained that solidity which time, and 
time only, bestows on masonry. It was, how-
ever, so well covered by the fausse-braie, that se-
rious doubts were entertained, whether it would 
be practicable to reach it with effect till after that 
should have .been blown in; whilst the distance 
at which our batteries were erected, fuIl 650 
yards from the crest of the glacis, rendered the 
practice less accurate, as well as less destructive, 
than it would have otherwise been. Both of these 
circumstances told against uS; but our guns, of 
English· manufacture, were excellen t of their kind, 
and our gunners skilful; and hence it was easy 
to perceive that the top, at least, of the rampart, 
crumbled rapidly before them, and that it required 
only a better position to enable our object to· be 
attained to ¡ts fullest extent. Preparations were 
VOL. n. It 
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accordingly rnade to advance our works further; 
and a sap, destined to crown the surnrnit of the 
lesser Teson, was begun. 
The guns, which were directed excIusively upon 
tbe convent of Sto Francisco, made of that post, 
after sorne hours of heavy firing, a heap of ruins ; 
and it, as well as the suburbs, were taken posses-
sion of by the 40th regiment 800n after' dusk on 
the 14th. Partieswere then sedulouslyemployed, 
as well in extending the second parallel, as in 
throwing up fresh batteries; and on the 17th, our 
trenches were advanced to the surnrnit of the 
nearest hill, within 180 yards of the body of 
the place. From the new batteries, likewise, so 
commanding a fire was brought to bear, both 
upon the main breach and upon an old tower, 
somewhat to the right of it, that the latter át length 
fell with a tremendous crash, and the former was 
pronounce4 practicable. Pits were next dug, here 
and there, along, the glacis, into which riflemen 
were introduced, with orders to fire unintermit-
tingly upon the embrasures; whilst a continued 
shower of grape and canister, thrown in both by 
night and day, kept the faces of the breaches 
. cIear, and hindered any attempts at repairing them. 
Such was the condition of Ciudad Rodrigo-
the fausse-braie shaken to a,toms, and two for-
midable breaches in its main wall; when Lord 
Wellington, wil1ing to spare the lives both of his 
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own troops and of the garrison, sent in to demand 
a surrender. The reply, though not such as could 
have been desired, was nevertheless one which all 
brave men must admire; and 1 give it in the 
words of the Governor, because these alone can 
do it full justice: .. Sa Majesté I'Empereur," 
said he, " m'a confié le commandement de 
Ciudad Rodrigo. Je ne puis pas le rendre. Au 
contraire, moi et la brave garnison que je com-
mande s'enseveliront dans ses ruines." 
N othiug therefore remained but to carry the 
place by assault; and to this end all our future 
exertions were turned. On the 18th the town 
was closely l'econnoitred by Majol' Sturgeon, of 
the staff corps, whose exertions and ability from 
the· commencément of the siege had been very 
conspicuous. He reported that on the enemy's 
left of the main breach there was a favourable 
point of entl'ance fol' a body oftroops, which might 
assist in flanking the appl'oach .of the column of 
attack in that qual'ter, whilst the lesser breach on 
the right was perfectly accessible; and Lord 
Wellington, satisfied by the declal'ation, detel'-
mined to defer the final struggle no longer. The 
night of the 19th was accordingly fixed upon as 
the proper period fol' commencing the assault; 
and in the mean while, aH the details of the plan 
upon which it was deemed advisable to condud it, 
were drawn up, and maturely considered. 
260 N AURA TIVE OF THE 
AH who know Lord Wellington are aware that, 
to the kind of influence by which other men are 
liable to be effected, he is and ever has be en an 
entire stranger. In all his undertakings, be they 
great or small, the single circumstance which had 
weight with him was, that yverything should be 
done correctly; and that the least possible incon-
venience should be experienced, not only by the 
persons immediately employed, but by the army 
in general. Acting upon this principIe, he issued 
orders that the attack should be made by the 
divisions, whatever they might chance to· be, 
which should happen to be on duty that day in 
the trenches; and as the light and third divisions 
enjoyed that good fortune, upon them the honour-
able task devolved of carrying Ciudad Rodrigo 
by assauIt. The third division, consisting of the 
. brigades of Major-general M'Kinnon and Lietlte-
nant-colon~l Campbell-that is to say, of the 
45th, 74th, 88th, and five companies of the 60th 
regiments on the one hand, and of the 5th, 77th, 
83rd, and 94th on the other-were to attack the 
main breach. They were to be preceded by the 
light companies, under Major Manners, as a 
storming party; as these, again, were to be 
headed by parties carrying wool-packs and lad-
ders; the former for the purpose of filling up the 
ditch, the latter to enable too assailants to mouot 
the wall. They were to form, General M'Kin-
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non's leading aud Colouel Campbell's supporting, 
in the second parallel; and they had as their re-
serve a Portuguese brigade, drawn up in order in 
the trenches. To aid this principal attack, a de-
monstratlon was to be made on our right by 
Major O'Toole of the 95th rifle corps, at the head 
of five companies of that regiment, and of the light 
companies of the S3rd aud 94th; aud the parti-
cular care of guiding this little column was as-
signed to Major Sturgeon, at whose suggestion it 
prepared to acto In the mean while the smaller 
breach on our left was to be stormed by the light 
divisiou, consisting of Major-general Vandeleur 
and Colonel Barnard's brigades-in other words, 
of two battalions of the 52nd, one of the 43rd, two 
of the 95th, and two of Ca~adores. The attack was 
to be. led by General Vandeleur's brigade, which 
issuing from the left of the convent Sto Francisco, 
was to descend into the ditch, and advauce, first 
upon the breach in the fausse-braie, and then upon 
that in the body of the place. As soon as they 
should succeed in gaining the summit of the 
fausse-braie, they were to detach to their right, 
for the purpose of communicating with General 
M' Kinnon's brigade, and flauking the assault of 
the principal wall; and whenever they had 
crowned the breach in that wall against which 
they were directed, they were in like manner to 
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tur~ to the right, and join the main aUack. This 
done, and a communicati0Il: between the tw~ 
columns being established, an effort was to be 
made to burst open the Salamanca gate, opposite 
to the convent of Sto Francisco; upon which the 
rest of the division, which up to that moment were 
to remain in reserve, would enter and se cure the 
eonquest of the place. Here, as at the greater 
breaeh, a select party of men were appointed to 
head their comrades; they consisted oí 300 volun-
teers under the eommand of Major N apier; and 
they, like the storming party elsewhere, were 
preceded by tbe bearers of bags, ladders, and 
the other engines of assault. Finally, the parties 
appointed to carry these necessary implemEmts 
were prohibited from taking with them their arms; 
arid the storming parties received positive instruc-
tions on no account whatever to tire a shot. 
Partly with a view to draw a portion of the 
enemy's attention from the breaches, and partly 
under the idea that, during the confusion, an en-
. trance might be obtained by escalade, General 
Pack's Portuguese brigade feceived instructions, 
as soon as the tiring should become general, to 
demonstrate against the outwork of Sto Jago, and 
the convent of La Caridad. They were to plant 
their ladders at the moment when their comrades 
issued from the trenches; and they were to ren-
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der the attack either a real or a false one, accord-
ing as circumstances should direcL The last 
clause in these instructions was not, perhaps, the 
least interesting to those affected by it; it was 
this :- "Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by as-
sault this evening at seven o'clock." 
As the preceding orders appeared at an early 
hour in the day, ample time was afforded for mak-
ing every preparation which the circumstances of 
the case required, and both men and officers were 
fullyand correctly apprised of the duties which 
they were expected severally to perform. They 
were not inattentive to these instructions, and ex-
actly at the moment specified, each column took 
its station, in readiness to obey the signal of ad-
vance. It would be no easy matter to describe 
the state of a soldier's Jeelings during the pause 
which ~nsued. The evening was calm and tran· 
quil, and the moon, in her first quarter, shed ayer 
the s.cene a feeble light, which, withouf disclosing 
the shape 01' form ofparticular objects, rendered 
their rude outline distinctly visible. There stood 
the fortress, a confused mas s of masonry, with its 
breaches like shadows cast upon the wall; whilst 
not a gun was fired from it, and allwithin was as 
still and mbtionless as if itwere already a ruin, 
or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On 
our side, again, the trenches crowded with armed 
men, among whom not so much as a whisper might 
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be beard, presented no unapt resemblance to a 
dark thunder-cloud, or to a volcano in tbat state 
of tremendous quiet which usualIy precedes its 
most violent eruptions. But the deJay was· 
not of long continuance; at a few minutes past 
seven o'clock, the word was quietly passed that all 
things were ready, and the troops poured forward 
with the coolness and impetuosity of which Bri-
tish soldiers alone are capable, and which nothing 
could successfully oppose. 
No piece of clock-work, however nicely ar-
ranged, couId obey the will of its maker more ac-
curately than the different columns obeyed that 
night the wishes of their chief; and his orders 
were, in consequence, executed at every point 
with the same precision and regularity as if he 
had been manrenvring so many battalions upon 
a revue plateau. General M'Kinnon's brigade, 
amidst showers of grape and musketry, rushed, 
without a check, to the foot of tbe great breach, 
and in spite of numerous obstac1es, and the most 
determined resistance, succeeded in gaining the 
summit. 
But a serious opposition awaited them there. 
The enemy, driven from the main wall, took shel-
ter behind aretrenchment, in front of which they 
.had dug a ditch of considerable width; and whilst 
our men were vainly endeavouring to pass it, a 
mine was 8uddenly sprung. The havoc oc-
PENINSULAR WAH. 26ñ 
casioned by that terrible explosion was prodigious, 
numbers of the bravest and most forward of the 
men being b]own up and destroyed. Unfortu-
nately for the army at Iarge, the galIant M'Kinnon 
was among them; but the rest, nothing daunted 
by the fate of their comrades, only redoubled 
their exertions, with a courage which seemed to 
rise in proportion to the difficulties opposed to it. 
They were thus situated, when Major Q'Toole's 
little column, which had acted under the guidance 
of Major Sturgeon upon the right, joined them; 
when finding that all their efforts were fruitless, 
and that it was impracticable to press further till 
the results of other attacks should be known, they 
established themselves among the ruins. 
In the mean while, both the light division under 
Crawford, and the Portuguese brigade under 
Pack, were following up with equal reso]ution the 
measures pointed out to them. The former is-
suing from the convent, made for the lesser breach, 
their brave chief leading as few like himself could 
haveled, when a musket-ball struckhim in the arm, 
and penetrating the side, lodged in his lungs. He 
feH to the ground, and was borne from the field in 
a dying state. Almost at the same moment, 
Major Napier commanding the storming party, 
Colonel Colbourne of the 52nd, and General Van-
deleur, all most distinguished and brave officers, 
received severe wounds, and the troops were left 
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to tbe guidance of accidental Jeaders, and tbeir 
own bravery; but neitber tbe one nor the otber 
were wanting. Tbe pause of a moment, and only 
of a moment, occurred, when, with a shout which 
was distinctly heard over the roar of musketry 
and cannon, they renewed the charge, and in five 
minutes had won tbe ascent. Then arose the cry 
of victory from every quarter; for General Pack's 
Portuguese had succeeded in their escalade, and 
tbe troops rushing along tbe ramparts, speedily 
opened the way to the third division, and the 
town was our own. The enemy fled in the utmost 
disorder. They were pursued from street to 
street, and froro house to house, with the fury 
which is irrepressible among roen flushed witb 
eonquest, and exasperated by the roemory of coro-
rades slaín; and all who continued to offer the 
slightest resistanee were iromediately put to the 
sword. To the honour of British soldiers, how-
ever, be it recorded, that not a single Jife was 
taken in wantonness. He who threw down his 
arms was spared by the very hand which had 
been uplifted to rlestroy him, and hence out of a 
garrison which consisted originally of 1800 com-
batants, full 1500 wel'e made prisoners. 
It were vain for .me to attempt any description 
of the .scenes of plunder and confusion which now 
presented themselves in every quarter of the town. 
The firing, which had eeased fol' a moment, be-
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cause the contest was at an end, was renewed, 
here and thel'e, in the extravagance of triumph; 
whilst shouts amI screams lllingled fearfully with 
the groans of the wounded, and the outcries of 
men in a state of intoxication. Many houses like-
wise, in different districts, burst forth into ftames, 
whether wantonly or accidentally excited it was 
impossibIe to determine; whiIst the churches were 
ransacked, the wine and spirit cellars emptied, and 
for several hoursevery species of enormity was 
perpetrated. AH these things occurring du~ing 
the night, the darkness of which being but imper-
fectly dispelled by the light from the burning edi-
fices, produced an effect which non e can desire to 
experience again. At length the drunken dropped 
gradually asleep; the wounded were removed to 
temporary hospitaIs; and though of the houses al-
ready on fire the greater proportion were burned 
to the ground, the further progress of the ftames 
was arrested; and by dawn on the following morn-
ing a degree of order was restored, such as few 
who beheld the condition of things immediately 
posterior to the assauIt couId ha.ve anticipated. 
The casualties among the allied forces, during 
the progress ofthis important siege, were, as might 
be expected, numerous; 9 officers and 217 men 
being killed, and 84 officers and 1000 men wound-
ed; and of these 6 officers and 140 men were 
killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded, 
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on the night of the assault alone. It is scarcely 
necessary to add, that the 108s of so many valuable 
lives was keenly felt, not only by private friends, 
but by the army in general; but among them aH, 
there fell not one more universally nor more justly 
lamented than Major-general Crawford. He was 
an officer of whom the highest expectations had 
been formed. and who, o~ every occasion, found 
an opportunity to prove, that had his life been 
spared, the fondest hopes of his country would not 
have been disappointed; and he was aman, to 
know whom in his profession without admiring 
was impossible. To me his death occasioned that 
void which· the removal of a sincere friend alone 
produces. From the moment of receiving his 
wound, he knew that all hope of recovery was 
idIe; he lingered on for several hours, and at last 
submitted to his fate with the magnanimity of a 
hero, and the resignation of a Christian.Poor 
Crawford !-whilst the memory of the brave and 
the skiIful shall continue to be cherished by Bri-
tish soldiers, thou wilt not be forgotten; and the 
hand which scrawIs this humble tribute to thy 
worth must be cold as thine own, ere the mind 
which dictates it shall cease to think of thee with 
affection and regret. 
The task does not devolve on me, as 1 have al-
ready more than once expressed, to enumerate 
those who, on the present occasion, peculiarly dis-
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tinguished themselves. AH díd their duty, and 
beyond this a British soldier knows not how to 
proceed; because, when in the presence of an 
enemy, a British soldier consiq,ers his utmost ex-
ertions as called for, and therefore gives them. 
To the talents of Colonel Fletcher, chief engineer ; 
of Major Dixon, director of the artillery; and of 
Major Sturgeon, of the staff corps, the highest 
praises were given by our illustrious chief; whilst 
to the ·bravery of Lieutenant Gurwood of the 52nd 
regiment, who, after leading the forlorn hope~ 
escaped unhurt, he bore th~ most decided tes-
timony, by presenting him with the sword of the 
captured governor. The fruitsof the victory were, 
as 1 have already stated, 1500. prisoners, a ver y 
large quantity of ammunition and military stores, 
and no fewer than 321 pie ces of cannon, of different 
calibr~s, but almost all serviceable. 
Thus fell the important fortress of Ciudad 
Rodrigo. Its conqueror lost no time in putting 
the works once more in a state of defence; and 
long before Marmont, who was exerting himself 
to relieve it, could bring his troops into the field, 
the British army wasin full march towards other 
and no less memorable triumphs. 
1 have nowarrived at that period of the war in 
the Peninsula, when 1 am necessarily compelled 
to take leave of my readers. 
Asevere fever, caught on the banks of the 
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Guadiana, increased by fatigue and anxiety of 
mind, compelled me to solicit, when our army 
removed to the south, Lord Wellington's leave of 
absence to return to England for the recovery 
of my health. 
To abler and more competent pens will the 
task be hereafter assigned, of giving to posterity 
the full and perfect details of the great events of 
this war, and especially of its glorious conclusion, 
of which these sheets are only, and that up to a 
certain period, a very weak outline. If, however,. 
my humble undertaking should call into play the 
greater talents and abilities of others, it wiU not 
have been made in vain; and if 1 should be so 
fortunate as to carry the ¡nterest of my brother 
oflicers along with me in the précis of events, of 
which my qescription must now close, 1 will, next 
year, venture to submit to them, in a similar 
shape, my military recollections of the campaigns 
of 1813 and 1814 with the allied armies on the 
continent, where it was my fortune to proceed, 
under the gracious commands of my Sovereign, 
after 1 lefr the Peninsular army in 1812; first as 
Minister to the court of Berlin, and afterwards as 
Ambassador at the court of Austria. 
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SI NCE the publication of the first edition of tbis 
Narrative, the Author has received communications from 
sorne of bis brotber oflicers; and he deems it but justice 
to them to give these letters, with bis answers, to the 
public, in this Appendix. For bimself, the Author must 
again repeat what he stated in his Advertisement, 
"That tbe defiCiency of the work is at once acknow-
ledged; and he hopes, under the circumstances in wbich 
it was written, it will meet with indulgence." 
v. L. 
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Copy of a Letter f1'om Lieutenant-general Inglis to tite 
Marquis of LondonderJ'Y .. 
Brighton, 2nd uf May, 1828. 
My Lord, 
It is with great regret 1 observe in your History of the 
Peninsular War, that your Lordship mentions that the 
57th regiment lost their colours at the battle of Albuera, 
and, in the same paragraph, that many prisoners were made 
by the enerny. 
My being in co:mmand of the 57th regiment un that day 
will be sufficient apólogy for my addressing you on this 
subject, which your Lordship will admit my feelings as a 
soldier are naturaIly most deeply interested in. 
I take the Jiberty to annex a copy of the paragraph 
aUuded to, with one or two remarks. 
Lieutenant-general, 
I have the honour to be, 
My Lord, 
y our most obedient servant, 
Wl\-L ING LIS, 
Lieutenaut-general. 
The Marquis of Londonderry, 
&c. &c. &0. 
COPY.-Page 535. Quarto Edition. 
" At this moment we had 10st a whole brigade of ar-
" tillery, a large number ofprisoners l and eight stand of 
278 APPENDIX 
''''colours beJooging to tbe huffs, the 66th, tba 48th, and 
.. the 57th regiments." 
REMARKS. 
The 57th rf'giment brought into tbe field on the 16th 
of May, 1811, at the battle of Albuera, 579 rank and 
file, out of which llumber 415 were killed and wouaded ; 
the remaining 164 were marched off the field by Lieute-
nant-adjutant Mann, who was only the fourteeuth officer 
in rank at the commencement of tbe action. The colours 
are in my possession, and not one man was missing. 
WM. INGLIS, 
Lieutenant-general •. 
Copy of a Letter from the Marquis of Londonderry tu 
Lieutenant-generallnglis. 
Holdernesse House, May 9th, 1828. 
Sir, 
On my arrÍval froDÍ Paris yesterday, 1 receÍved 
your letter of tbe 2nd instant. 1 much' regret tbat 
there should have been any inaccutacy on my part in my 
allusion to the 57th regimento My information as to the 
events of the battle of Albuera was collected hastily at 
the moment~ and 1 was not a· personal observer in the 
fieId. 
The passage you alIude to mentions, "at one moment 
.. we had lost a whole brigade of artillery, a large number 
" of prisoners belonging to several different corps;" but 
tbere is no specitication of any number of prisoners par-
ticularly to tbe 57th regiment; and out of 415 killed and 
wounded, it is not surprising if, amongst these, prisoners 
~'ere stated to exist. With regard to the colours, sorne 
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were at one moment taken, as 1 was informed; but your 
own knowledge c1early proves the standards of tbe 57th 
were not taken; and if tbere is a second edition,· 1 sball 
be very glad to rectify an error by construction, whicb, 
however, permit me to say, 1 consider as reflecting not in 
tbe smallest degree upon the corps who so gallantly and 
gloriously triumpbed at the conclusion of that memorable 
battle; and 1 hope you will permit me to add, from the 
various opportunities which 1 had of remarking tbe 57th, 
tbey do not possess many more sincere admirers than 
myself. 
(Signed) 
Lieutenant-General 
1 bave the honor to be, 
&c. &c. &c. 
V.L. 
Sir W m. Inglis, K. C. B. 
SecondLetter from Generallnglis, lo Lord Londonderry. 
Brighton, 18th July, 1828. 
My Lord, 
1 am extremely sorry to observe in the 2nd edition of 
your Lordship's N arrative of the Peninsular War. it still 
appears that the 57th regiment lost their colours at the 
batde of Albuera on the 16th May, 1811; and tbat it 
likewise appears in too N aval and Military Magazine as 
an extract from your Llrdsbip's bistory. 
1 beg to refer your Lordship to my former letter on this 
subject, with your Lordship's reply, dated 9th May, 1828. 
Considering tbe high authority of your Lordship, holding 
the first otticial situation in tbat army at the period, 1 trust 
you will allow me to express myself, fecling it an impe-
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rious duty to defend the honour of my old friends, as theÍr 
commander, besides my very long service witb them, having 
entered the service as ensign in the 67th regiment in the 
year 1779. 
Lieutenant-genernf, 
1 hal'e the honoor to be, 
My Lord, 
y our Lordship's most obedient 
Humble servant, 
WM. INGLlS. 
The Most Noble The Marquis of Londonderry, 
&c. &c. &c. 
Answe'r to 2nd Letter from General Inglis. 
J uly 21st, 1828. 
Sir, 
1 am honoured witb your second letter, in date the 18th 
JuIy. relative to the error in my book as to the 57th regi-
mento In the next edítion your Ietters to me, and my 
answers, will appear in the Appendix. and 1 am entirely 
ready to admit your more accurate knowledge and infor-
mation relative to the corps commanded by yourself. 
1 have the bonour to be, 
y our obedient 
VANE LoNDONDERRY. 
OF CORRESPONDENCE. 281 
Copy oj a Lelter jrom General .Lord Howden fo the 
Marquis of Londonderry. 
May 14th, 1828. 
My Dear Lord, 
There are spots in the sun without impairing its splen~ 
dour-so is a very small error in the beautiful composition 
of your book. 
In my humble case, page 245, (Quarto Eclition). there 
is a paragraph that wiII misIead tha ordinary reader, and 
in it there is not the justice 1 feel due to me. It could 
only proceed from mis-information, and therefore 1 will 
venture to correct it. 1 will transcribe tbe passage;-
" He reached Lumiar on the 6th April; wbere Sir 
"John Ctadock had fixed his head-quarters, and found 
" him making such dispositions as díd not indicate offeu~ 
"sive measures. General HiII, it was said, at this time 
" suggested bolder measures. and he was aided by Bere~ 
" ford's eouncil; and it was agreed that, instead of con-
" tinuing preparations for a retreat, the 'combined Bl'itish 
" and Portuguese armies sbould move forward. The ene-
" my were at tbis time in a state of perfeet ¡naetion." 
Lumiar is but two or three miles from Lisbon, and 
therefore no preparations for retreat could be made tbere, 
as, undoubtedly, if the idea of retreat, or rather say em-
barkation. was tbe least in contemplation, it would have 
taken place in Lisbon itself. 1 suppose Leiria must 
have been meant, whicb is above eighty miles from Lisbon 
011 the road to Oporto, to which place the army, such as 
it was, had moved under my command ; and it may at once 
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be asked, why proceed so far? For no otber purpose, 
than to retreat? For tbe enemy had no! made any for-
ward movement, from Oporto, of consequence. 
General Hill never suggested to me " bolder" measures, 
and 1 do not recollect tbat Marsbal Bercsford urged any 
movement of a more positive nature than those already 
adopted. 
1 believe it must be allowed that the security of Lisbon, 
the object upon which every thing turned both then and 
thereafter, couId never, for a moment, be out of the 
thoughts of the officer who commanded in chief; and 
until sorne light appeared as to the intentions of Soult, 
who commanded in the north, and Victor in the south, 
a rapid and thoughtless march from Lisbon would have 
been deemedunjustifiable rashness, not to be iedeemed by 
attractivc "boldness." Had those French generals joined 
in common uníon, and made a simultaneo lIS movement, 
notbing could have given a chance of saving Lisbon, but 
a determined reslstance in and about the town of Lisbon 
'¡tself. Why they did not act in concert must remain an 
impenetrable mystery, or be ascribed to the worst of pas-
sions, and most destructive jealousy on their parto 
1 will, some time or other, lay before you intercepted 
letters, to prove that the united march to Lisbon was tbe 
original intention between these two generaIs, as also a 
copy of my orders-that, notwithstanding the very weak 
and defective state of the army 1 had (one' reginient of 
cavalry, the 14th, only) until the arrival of aH your gal-
lant and glorious band from England, it never was my 
intention to retreat or embark; and my letters io govern-
ment will evince that we should have made a stand to 
tbe last moment at Lisbon, in a more contracted Jine than 
Torres Yedras, with sucb powers and defellces aswe 
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could array. Tbis resolotion may. be viewed as one of 
temerity, but still it was so determined. 
Now. my dear lord, forgive the shadow of a reproach to 
you, and from my pen too, which,. sllVe this Httle expla-
nation, with my voice is always employed in unbounded 
admiration of your eloquent and lucid work. 
Ever most truly yours, 
HOWDEN. 
Copy of a Lelter from Lord Londonderry to General 
. Lord Howden. 
H oldernesse House, May 16th, 1828. 
My Dear Lord, 
I lose no time in replying to your leUer of the 14th 
instant; and aUow me to assure you, if 1 endeavoured to 
avoid one thing more than another in my imperfect book, 
it was the .giving offence to any one. Above an 1 must 
deplore having, 'however inadvertently: expressed my-
self in a manDer of your position and services which might 
mislead; because, my dear Lord, there are few men whom 
1 respect publicly, and value privately, more than your 
Lordship. 
An extreme desire to avoid delicate questíons, the who]e 
bearings of which I was not officially and properly in 
possession of, added to tbe caution that was imposed 
upon me by knowing tbe secret thougbts ofmy brother, 
induced me to confine myself in my Narrative as near to 
simple factsas the several cases would admito But as you 
can upon me for a more accurate explanation, 1 can have 
no difficulty in transcribing from my manuscript the part 
1 omitted in reference to yom situation and intenti~ns. 
Under date of the 23rd April, 1809. I write as follows. 
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from Lisbou. Previous to General Hill's arrital, whieh 
bappened OD tbe 6th, Cradoek, from tbe inadequ3ey oí his 
force, had determined most properly not to advance from 
Lumiar, and had every tlting prtparedfor tIte worst, But 
when HiII came, and he heard other eorps were following, 
(and being also pressed by Beresford,) be took. the resolu-
tion of advancing, and it was settled that a combined move-
ment both of the British and Portuguese army towards the 
north, should be made, &c. This day, 'THE 23RD' the 
British troops are to assembJe at Leiria. 
The former certainly with prudence, previous to IIill's 
arriva], resisted an advance, while the laUer, perhaps with 
too little precaution in the judgment of some, was urging 
it. From Mr. Villiers' general tone about Cradock up 
to the present moment, he has aeted most judieiously 
in every r.espeet. As to his feelings, it is in vain to 
deny he was deeply wounded, the orders coming the 
very moment he hád determined to advance the army. 
His first wish and impression was to returo home, but 
afterwards gallantly resisted this impulse, and deeided 
to go to Gibraltar, exerting himself to the utmost to 
stop any murmurs that might be amongst the indivi-
duals most attached to him7 so that} upon the whole, 
this difficult and delicate arrangemellt has beeo earried 
into effect as well as the circumstances of tbe case would 
allow. Mr. Villiershas aeted with much judgment in an 
the business here, beloved by the army, whom he takes 
great notice of, keepipg tbe generals together, respected 
highly by the people of Lisbon, and enjoying the confidence 
of tbe government. Wellesley has written to Cradock and 
Beresford, announcing his arrivaI and intentions, and 
begged them to come here; so we loo k out for them to-
'morrow, when some general determinatioo will be taken. 
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Under date of the 21th April, 1 write as follows, froRt 
Lisboll. 
1 have just seen Cradock, with whom 1 have had a long 
conversation. Jt is impossible not to admire the gooa 
sense whieh sooms to actaate bis conducto The Ietter he 
wtote to yousufficientfy marks his feelings ; but he assured. 
me, upon his honor, white he, personally, must suffer, that 
he thought the gov-ernment were right to do what tbey 
tbought most judicious. At thesame time, a righ.t mea-
sure often brougbt on itldi'Viduals unmerited misfortunes. 
He aeemed quite sure to receive fr{)m the government 
tbosemarks of approbation ror his conduct, 'Which under 
critical circumstances be trusted he had merited. In 
deciding .on goiug to England ultimately, aOO resigning 
Gibraltar, wben anotber lJetson can be appointed, he says 
be has been led by what is the feeling oí tbe army, as 
many general officers may look upon Wellesley's employ-
mertt in the active army of the cou-ntry as tbeit bemg laid 
aside; and he might incur aU their dísapprobatiGn, if he 
1lilemly sat down uoder the arrangement proposed. 1 
replied that no man was to sacrifice himself on a supposed 
tmblic feeling. He asked me ihen, upon my honour, what 
1 shollld do in a similar predicament, as to the offerof 
Gibraltar; and 1 said tbat, if 1 wouId have Recepted 
Gibraltar when in England as a €ommand tbat was agree-
aMe to me, 1 should go there now,more especialIy if 1 
thought, in so doing, 1 was additionaHy promoting the 
king's service. 1 tbink Cradock 1S satisMed of yonr 
friendly feelings iowards him; and oue canDot éOntem-
pInte his sitnation without pain. 
Uuder date of the 1st Muy, 1 write as follows from 
Lisbon. 
1 s1ated that {)radoCk had determilled not to ad\'ance 
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previous to HiIl's arrival; and Villiers sbowed me 11 letter 
from Cradock, in which there was no fixed intention of 
moving mentioned, which were the grounds of the opinion 
1 gave in my letter of the 23rd April. Jt appears, how-
ever, since, that on the Saturday before Cradock could 
know we were landed, he met Beresford half-way between 
Leiria and Thomar, and settled an aavance upon Coimbra, 
but no operation was actualIy commenced. 
1 have now, my dear lord, copied my original manu-
script letters, where they relate to you, your conduct, and 
your determinations, nearly verbatim. But rather than 
give this long detail in my book, which in some parts 
embraced delicate points, 1 simply said as follows:-
"General Hill rcached Lumiar on the 6th April, where 
Sir J. Cradock had flxed bis head-quarters; and found 
him making such dispositions as did not indicate offensive 
measures." 
Allow me just to observe, tbat yoo must know if your 
bead-quarters were 00 the 6th at Lumiar, which my 
leHers assert; and if so, and if, previous to General Hill's 
arrival, no fixed plan of advance had been ordered, 1 hope 
you will agree, tbis part of tbe paragraph is not incor. 
recto 
Permit me, however, to observe, 1 only state a general 
J' on dit," for the truth of which 1 canDot Dor do not 
vouch, but which wu'J probably excited by Hill's arrival 
witb a corps eager for battle; and that preparatwns for 
the WOfl'st (viz. emba:rkation,) which might have been 
necessary, if you had been aUacked by a joint operation of 
the enemy from north and soutb, before your reinforcements 
arrived, were no longer so necessary. 
This, my dear lord, is the Resumé of my impressions a.t 
the time, connected witb my leUers; and allow me to hope 
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that all your reasoning justifies the tine that seems tó have 
been taken so properly 'at the time, upon which, however, 
1 have not presumed to express my individual opinion. 
In conclusion, 1 have only to add, that it will afford me 
the greatest pleasure to give publicity to any or every 
part of this explanation you think tit; or to afford further 
information, as far as my documents or memory serve, on 
every part of the subject. 
Ever yours, my dear Lord, 
Mos! sineerely and affectionately, 
VANE LONDONDERRY. 
Second Letter from General Lord Howden to 
Lord Londonderry. 
lt:lth May, 1828. 
My Dear Lord, 
1 only write a word to return my warmest thanks for the 
Ietter of yesterday, alld the other communications, that 
must have given you so much trouble to annex. 
Could any thing make me more attached to you, it 
would be the generous feeling, so strongly displayed in 
your letters to LordCastlereagb, towards me, at the pe-
riod 1 endured the most distressing circumstance that ever 
fell to the lot of a Commander-in-chief-his supercession 
in command, almost in view of the enemy. and at the same 
time receiving the united praise and approbatioD of aH his 
measures from his king and government. 
The painful remembrances can never be obliterated from 
my mind; but the lapse of nearly twenty years afforded 
the usual lenitive of time; they therefore slumbered, but 
still are awakened by the luminous records of your work. 
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1 am lookiog over sorne papers, and among tbem 1 find 
leUers to you, in office, of tbe 3d and 5th of April,l809, 
from Lumiar, wbich hear strongly upon the situution of af-
fairs in Portugal at that period, and show the well-
grout1ded apprehension of un united attack from Sonlt and 
Victor in the soutb, who had advanced within a few 
leagues of Badajoz. 
Lumiar, which gives rise to the Jittle point between us, 
being but two miles from Lisbon, crea tes aH the mistake. 
" Head-quarters there" is, in fact, Lisbon itself, and the 
idea of any retreat from thence, would only he immediate 
em harkation. 
Ever most truly yours, 
HOWDEN. 
Lord Londonderry merely acknowledged the receipt of 
the ahoye Ietter, and expressed his readiness to act upon 
this correspondence in any manner Lord Howden pointed 
mtt. 
May 28, 1828. 
Thil'd Le.tte1·from General Lord Howden to tite Marquis 
of LondondernJ. 
Hereford Street, 21st May, 1828. 
My Dear Lord, 
1 r~i'Ved your note this morning, and shall say Jittle 
more, tban fbat you are very gODd, and it is like yourself, 
to think further of me. 
Without boubling you with more particulars, 1 believe 
1 have laid before yOu sufficient materiaIs to do away the 
little paragraph in y{)l:Ir excellent work, tbat has given 
mepain, and (lid ñot, as 1 conceived, do me justice-how it 
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is to he repaired, 1 sbalI leave toyour kindness; for 1 
cannot enter into ally controversywith you. 
It was my unbappy lot to be debarred from any par-
ticipation in aH the glories of Portugal and Spain that 
followed my supercession; but 1 may be alIowed to main-
tain that all that was possíble, und.er very critical circllm-
stances, was done before the arrival of the reinforcements 
from England, and that no one false step took place; foro 
if any one error had been committed, the transcendent 
triumphs that succeeded, and the brightest annals in 
English history, migbt and would have been lost to the 
world; to this alone 1 lay claim. 
The warmest and repeated thallks of his Majesty, and 
the British government through Lord Castlereagh, to the 
very close of my command, were the gratifying but sol e 
reward. 
Tbe. Marquis of Londonderry. 
&c. &c. &c. 
Ever yours, 
Most truly, 
HOWDEN. 
(Copy) Before the arrival of General HilI with tbe rein-
forcements from England, the 6th April, 1809. 
General Order by SIR JOUN CRADOCK. 
Lumiar, 29th March, 1809. 
The several arrangements for the troops to en ter upou 
the campaign will take place immediately. 
The Deputy Commissary-general will distribute, with 
tbe least possible delay, to the several corps, and the beads 
of departments, the allotted means of transport; and a re-
VOL. n. T 
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turn will be made to tbe Adjutant-general of tbe aetual 
equipment, or of tbe defieieney, jf any arises. 
Lieutenaut-eolonel Robe wiIl exeeute aU the arrange-
ments andorders be may baye already receiyed about tba 
artillery, and report tbe conclusion to the Commander of 
the Forces. Especial care is to be taken by tbe command-
ing officers of the cayalry aOO artillery, andtbe Deputy 
Commissary-general, tbat a sufficient quantity of spare 
sboes be seeured for tbe lengtb of marcb tbey may be 
engaged. The Commander of tbe Forces desires, in tbe 
most urgent manner, tbat tbe greatest care and attention 
be paid to the preservation of tbe mules, &c. as no de-
ficiency can be supplied. 
LeUer from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock. 
Downing Street, 16th February, 1809. 
Sir, 
y our dispatches of the 19th, 21st, and 31st uIt. and of 
tbe 2d inst., bave been received and laid before the King. 
His Majesty has commanded me to express his high 
approbation of the line of conductyou haye pursued, and 
entertains a conyiction that tbe same good sense, temper, 
and steadiness. which seem to guide your decisions,. will 
be persevered in, and will finaIly oyercome any unpleasant 
difficulties that may arise. 1 haye nothing to add to my 
despatches ofyesterday. 
Lieutenan t- General 
1 haye the honour, 
&C. &c. &c. 
CAS'fLEREAGH. 
Sir J oho Cradock, K. B. 
01' COHRESPONDENCE. 
L:tract from Lord Castlereagh's letter lo 
Sir John Cradock. 
Downing Street, Mareh the 30th, 1809. 
" Y ou must believe me sincere when 1 assure you tbat, 
witb respeet to yourself, in addition to mueh personal eon-
fidenee, the government feel very strongly, indeed, with 
respeet to the whole of your eonduet io Portugal, whieh, 
io times and under circumstanees ofpeeuliar diffieu1ty, has, 
io every instanee, met with their unqualified approbation, 
and, 1 can truly say, fulfilled every wish and expeetation 
1 had, or eould have formed, when you were seleeted for 
the eommand." 
Copy oj a Letter jro'fn Sir John Cradoclc to 
Viscount Castlereagh. 
Lumiar, 1st April, 1809. 
My Lord, 
1 lose not a moment, as thevessel is under weigh, to 
state that tbe aeeouot has arrived tbat Oporto has sur-
rendered to the enemy. 1 lament that 1 eannot send to 
your Lordship the partieulars. 1 learo, however, that the 
Bishop is on his way to LisboD. 
From the very imperfeet information that is eurrent,¡t 
appears that no resistanee was made. It would be too 
sanguine to expeet mueh any. where, eonstítuted as the 
'Portuguese troops are, and from the general iosubordina-
tiOD that prevails. 
1 am not in possession of any furtber aeeounts from tbe 
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French and Spanish armies in Estremadura, nor of the pro-
ceedings of the Salamanca corps, since they invested 
Ciudad Rodrigo. 
Our movements will be either to advanva to Leyria, as 
the best mode of forming a junction with the Portuguesa 
troops in the neighbourhood of Thomar, or it may be ne-
cessary to retir"l tbence still nearer to Lisbon, to protect, as 
well as our means will permit, tbe capital, which compre-
hends, in aB probability, all that is really an object to the 
cnemy. 
Viscount Castlereagh. 
1 have the honour, 
&c. &c. 
J. C-RADo.CK. 
Copies 01 Letters from Sir Jo/m Cradoclc lo 
B. General Stewart. 
(By the Isis, Captain Towers.) 
(Prívate.) 
N.B. 'fhese letters passed B. Generat Stewart on his way 
out from England. 
Head-Quarters, Lumiar, 3rd April, 1809. 
My Dear General, 
Though an opportunity offers, 1 do not write to Lord 
Castlereagh, as 1 really have nothing to submit to his 
Lordship in an official shape. AH my ideas and reasonings 
are before him, andwe now seem just approaching to the 
crisis to put them in execution. The total defeat of Cuesta 
will allow the enemyto do what he pleases upon our most 
vulnerable quarter; and General Beresford told me last 
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night, that a division was within a league of Badajoz, 
the inhabitants of which were imploríng our assistance. 
1 cannot yet send you the particulars of the miserable 
resistan ce made at Oporto, hut it teaches us to expect the 
same in every place where the British army is noto The 
enemy, 1 learo, has pushed on a small advanced guard 
beyond the Douro. The Salamanca division, after show-
ing themselves before Ciudad Rodrigo, has moved to 
San Felice to execute their ultimate designs.. We have no 
reason to alter the former estimates of the numbers of the 
enemy: the Oporto. division from 20 to 15,000; San 
Felice from 12 to 9,000; and the Estremadura, deduct-
ing what they may have lost in the late action with Gene-
ral Cuesta, from 35 to 33,000. 
y ou may guess how unpleasant are my feelings, not to 
move the British forces, small as they are, against General 
Soult, or the enemy in possession of any part of Portugal; 
but 1 do notbelieve there is any person in the army who 
would encourage sncb an idea. 
Prepared as we are on aH sides, we bave no choice but 
to rémain in the best po sitian tbat can be fOlind, (and aH 
are bad,) to cover Lisbon and tbe Tagus, and wait the 
reinforcements that must be sent, if we are to maintain 
Portugal. lt is unnecessaryto repeat that no dependence 
whatever can be placed, 5n their present state, upon the 
Portuguese troops; if 1 said that the whole were ready 
to mutiny and revolt, 1 believe 1 speak General Beres-
ford's real sentiments, They will not be commanded by 
their own officers, and they do just as they please. 1 have 
given an tbe British officers that General Beresford has 
asked foro To quit the defence of Lisbon, and march the 
British troQPs to join such people as these, was impos-
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sible. Tbe best of tbem will come to join us, and tbey are 
to have our flank at Sacavem under Genera) Beresford. 
y ou know how unequal our force is, to extend to the left 
-properly to Belem. We have no intelligence of the 
approach of General HilI with his troops •. 
Had we sufficient force, even under the pressure tbat 
surrounds us, we might strike a blow at Soult, or the 
Salamanca corps; but, a~ we are, nothing can be done. 
Your's most truly, 
J. F. CRADOCK. 
The Honourable B. General Stewart . 
.,er Sarah. 
Head-quarters, Lumiar, 5th April, 1809. 
My Lord, 
I.have the honor to inform you of the arrival of tbe 
force under the orders of General HilI, with the exception 
of one transport, containing about 300 men, which parted 
company during the voyage. Tbe. packet is under weigh, 
which prevents my giving your Lordsbip any further parti-
culars. The position of tbe enemy, 1 may say, remains 
almost the same as when 1 wrote on the 3rd instant to 
General Stewart. The closer approacb to Badajoz, how-
ever, must more mark tbe intention to invade Portugal 
with the powerful force from tbat qllarter. 
U nless upon sure· grounds, 1 will not move the Btitisb 
force so far from Lisbon as to expose this valuable station 
(in any point of view) to more than tbe common danger ; 
buí, since the present accession of strength, it may be 
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advisable to make a movement to Leiria, there awaiting 
and acting upon the events of the dáy. 
1 have tbe honor, 
&c. &c. &c. 
J. CRADOCK. 
The Viscount CastIereagh, 
&c. &c. &c. 
P. S. 1 bave the honor to annE'X tbe report of Captain 
Rose, just come in from Elvas. 
(Prívate.) 
Lumiar, April 6th, 1809. 
M Y Dear General, 
N othing material has occurred since my lctter of yester-
day to Lord Castlereagb. We sban move on Saturday 
and Sunday to Leiria; but 1 shaIl nothing adventure 
from the protection of Lisbon and the Tagus, without being 
somewhat ascertained of tbe movements and intention of 
General Victor, now apparently tbreatening Badajoz; 
and prepared, if it be bis design, to enter the Alentejo, 
in the line of the Tagus. 
1 send you our order of battle. 1 hear the ellemy is par-
ticularly strong in cavalry at Oporto; in this we are very 
deficient. 
y our's most truly, 
J. CRADOCI'-
The Honourable B. General Stewart. 
&c. &c. &c. 
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CopY of a Letter from Sir Joltn Cradock lo 
Marshal Beresford. 
Caldao, 20th April, 1809, twelve o'clock. 
My dear Beresford, 
I have this instant received your letter of the 19th. 1 
was upon the point of writing to you, to state I had made 
sorne alterations in the disposition of the British force, froID 
the arrangement I lately sent to you. 1 shaIl now concentre 
the whole at Leiria and Batalha for the sake of accom-
modation, with an advance corps in front. The army will 
march to-rnorrow and reach Leiria, as soon as it is predica-
ble. Mr. Commissary Rawlings must be severely checked 
for his totalIy unfounded representations of supplies, 
which were only calculated to mislead every one concerned, 
in the most dangerous manner. AH the recommendations 
you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the 
coasts, have been ever since acted upon to the utmost of 
my exertiolls; but the difficulties started by the admiral 
and the commissary were so great, that 1 cannot say 1 have 
any dependence upon immediate aid. 
My dear general, 1 have only to repeat that it is the 
first wish of' my mind to reach General Soult, or any part 
of his force; but nothing can persuade me to commit the 
British army, either from the want of suppIies or ammu-
nition. 1 will never allow them to be in any state but 
a formidable one; alld 1 wilI not depart from the established 
principIe and instructions of government. 1 alone am re-
sponsible. If false and ill-judged steps are taken, the 
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weigbt of blame will fall upon me. It will give me tbe 
greatest pleasure to see you. 1 shall be at Leiria on Satur-
dayabout noon. 1 will either go to Overna on Sunday, or 
meet you at any other place. Let me know by your next 
communication. 
Yours most sincerely, 
J. F. CRAVOCK. 
Marshal Beresford. 
Copy of a LeUer from Lord Castlereagh lo 
Sir John Cradoclc. 
Downing Street, J une 2d, 1809. 
My Dear Cradock, 
1 have delayed my answer to your letter written to me 
on your departure from Lisbon, till 1 coutd be assured it 
would find you atGibraltar. Yonr wish to return has been 
80 strongly conveyed to me by your friends here, tbat 1 
can have no desire tban to fulfil your request. You have 
do~e everything tbat honour and duty could require from 
you towards the service and government in the most ex· 
emplary manner. What i8 most satisfactory to your OWll 
feelings, it can only be necessary for roe to be assured of, 
to fee! it incumbent on me to promote ; and, in this sense 
1 most cheeJ'fulIy advised the' King to leave your return 
in your OWll hands. If 1 have not entered into tbe extent to 
which some of your friends (whose judgement upon such 
a point may be more correct than mine) have felt upon the 
nature of your command at Gibraltar, 1 am sure you will 
believe it has not proceeded froro any indifference to your 
military character or reputation. For both 1 must always 
feel the utmost solicitude, and shaIl be happy to avail 
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myself of any oecasion of markiug it. As we shall probablj 
800n meet, 1 shall only assure you of the same regard and 
esteem with which 1 am, 
Lieutenant-general, 
Dear Ctadoek, 
y ours most sincerely, 
CASTLERHAGH. 
Sir Joho Cradock, K. B. 
Gibraltar. 
Oopy 01 a' Letter Irom Sir J. Cradock to General Robe. 
Lisbon, December 30th, 1808. 
My Dear Sir, 
I very sensibly feel the want of horses and mules you 
represent for the service of the artillery; and the more &1, 
as all the efforts to make up the deficieney, sioce my ar-
rival io Lisboo, have not had any effect with the Regeney. 
As it is my intention to take up a position at sorne 
distance without deJay, 1 am to request th~t you will 
this day see the commissary-general on the subjeet, and 
report to me what can be don~ upon this mostimportant 
poiot. Every exertion must be made. 
General Robe, 
Commanding artillery, 
Lisbon. 
I have the honour, 
&c. &e. &e. 
J. CRADOCK. 
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From Sir J. CradocTc to P. Rawlings, Esq. 
Lisbon, December 3Otb, 1808. 
Dear Sir, 
1 lose no time in commuDicatiDg to you my intentioD to 
take up a position at Sacavem for most of the British 
force left in Portugal, exclusive oftbe garrisoDs at Almeida 
and Elvas. 1 cannot as yet point out the Dumbers, Dor for 
what exact time the provision should be made; but it 
may assist your arrangements to te11 you that you may, in 
a great measure, draw back tbe supplies at SaDtarem, 
Abrantes, and Castel Branco, on]y leaving sufficient for 
those corps in Colovera. 
Stc. Stc. Stc. 
J. CRADOCK. 
P. Rawlings, Esq. 
Commissary-general. 
Alter Orders. 
Lisbon, December 30th, 1808. 
The several corps in Lisbon and the vicinity will hold 
themselves in readiness to march out of the town. The 
_ details will be arranged in the course of to-rnorrow. 
The quarter-master-general wi11 irnmediately take the 
necessary measures for the embarkation of the sick. 
U pon returns being seDt to Commodore Halket, the 
proper number of transports will be provided. 
Major-general Mackenzie will take upon himself the 
command of the troops to be p1aced in advance, aud will 
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give such general directions as he sball tbink necessary. 
The Commander of the Forces directs tbat tbe troops 
about to take the field, sbould regulate themselves upon 
the equipment presented by General Moore; with the 
addition, that each man shullId take his hlanket. 
J. CRADOCK. 
l-eUer from General Robe to Sir John Cradock. 
Lishon, December 31st, 1808. 
Sir. 
In ohedience to your orders, 1 have seen tbe commissary-
general, who is using every exertion; hut from the want 
of co-operation by tbe Regency. he can do littleor nothing. 
He can only procure ten mules to-night, and be is pro-
mised twenty to-morrow. He says he will he able to let 
your Excellency know, by to-morrow, the utmost of his 
ability in that way. 
His Excellency, 
Sir John Cradock. 
1 have the honour, 
&c. &c. &c. 
WM. ROBE, 
Commanding Artillery. 
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Extract of a Letter* from Sir John Cradock lo 
Mr. Hookham Frere. 
February 17th, 1809 . 
.. 1 fear your Excellency is led to entertain a more 
favourable Dotioo of the efficiency of the Portuguese army, 
than in any shape they are entitled to; in short, in my 
opioion, they want every thiog that co~stitutes a respect-
able force. Except about 10,000 English arms, they have 
no other. Many of the regiments of cavalry are without 
horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are 
not half clothed; aod as to subsistence, they live at free 
quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To 
take the field with effect, or assurance of food, seems to 
me out of the question. Sioce the first moment of my 
artival in Portugal, 1 wished to produce the advance of a 
small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has beeo im-
possible. 
1 t is a matter of serious lamentation, that such mis-
representations of the Portuguese force should go home, 
or reach your Excellency; for it appears absolutely neces-
sary tbat, at tbe present crisis of the war, the foreign as-
sistance tbat we bave to depend upon, should be duly 
estimated, and brought into close calculation." 
lO This ¡eUar was founded upon the report oí Brigadier-general Cotton, 
who inspected the Portuguese cavalry. The verbatim repolt is. mislaid, Ol 
probably sent to England.-H. 
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Before the arrival of General HiIl with the re-inforce-
ments from England, the state of the British forces in 
Portugal were as follows :-
10,225, including every man in Portugal; occupying 
Lisbon, Almeida, Elvas, the forts on the Tagus, &c. &c. 
5221 being every disposable man, capable of marching, 
ioc1udiog convalescents. 
From the adjutaot-general's reporto 
Copy 01 a Letter Irom Major-general Sir N. TrallJ; 
to Lord Londonderry. 
My Lord, 
No. 7, Hertford Sreet, May Fair, 
19th .JuIy, 1828. 
Haviog been absent upoo the continent when your 
Lordship's Narrative of the Peninsular War made its 
appearance, 1 have had no opportunity uotil this day of 
noticing one.or two passages which you have introduce? 
ioto it, wherein roy name is mentiooed in reference to the 
movemeots of a corps of militia which had served under 
roy orders during Massena's invasion of Portugal in 1810; 
and as those passages appear to have been writtenunder 
an erroneous impression, 1 coosider it to be my duty to 
replace the facts with which they are cOl:lDected in a more 
accurate point of view than your Lordship has represented 
ibem; but 1 would assure you, that in resolving to address 
this letter to you for that purpose, 1 have been influenced 
by no other feeling tban tbat wbicb would attribute wbat 
you bave stated to tbe imperfect information which had 
reacbed you; and which you had 00 reason to discredit 
wheo you accepted it as your authority. 
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In page 443 of your book, (first edition of it,) after com~ 
menting upon the want of penetration which had been 
manifested by MasselJa in having attacked the position of 
Busaco on the 27th of September, instead of resorting at 
once to the measure which he subsequently adopted, of 
turning it by its left, your Lordship remarks as folIows :-
" It is true that at this time Colonel Trant, with his corpa, 
. ought to have taken post at Sardao: be had been ordered 
to proceed thitber witb a view to strengtben our left; aod 
it may be tbat tbe enemy had been led to think of him as 
already in that position; but had tbe case been so, it 
requires no depth of discernment to discover tbat aU the 
resistance wbich it was in bis power to offer would bave 
availed bim notbing against tbree French corps; and more 
especialIywheo it is considered that tbere are numerou~ 
passes into the Oporto road by the Vouga, whicb Trant 
had oeither meaos nor force adequate to watcb." And 
agaio, in the folIowing page, your Lordship observes, tha! 
"when Lord W ellington's army abandoned the ground of 
Busaco, be did so, not because Trant had failed in reach-
ing bis aUotted station, but because tbe ground in itself 
was indefensible." 
Now. my Lord, abstracted from the error wbich your 
Lordship was under, in supposing me, throughout the aboye 
observations, to have been absent from Sardao at the 
period to which the last quoted paragraph in particular has 
alIuded, 1 should only have to acknowledge myself in-
debted to you for the pubJic expression of an opinion wbicb 
would so effectually contradict tbe very absurd assertions of 
one or two other writers upon the same event, and whe 
would pretend that my absence frQm Sardao, (as presumcd 
also by them,) had been the principal cause of Lord Wel-
Iington's refreat from Busaco; as if it wasto be expecfed 
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that the undisciplined corps of Portuguese militia whieh 
1 then eommanded, who were embodied and 'armed only 
within the preceding nine or ten months, reduced in 
number to barely 1,500 men, through causes which 1 shall 
hereafter explain, and who, in faet, should only have been 
considered as little else than a eollection of armed pea-
santry, could possibly, and however well disposed in other 
respects, have arrested the progress of an army of veterans, 
consisting of 650r 70,000 men, headed by their numerODS 
cavalry, and marching in a single column upon the given 
point whieh these writers would have allotted to me to de~ 
fend; the idea is altogether too ridiculous, and 1 have 
therefore never thought it worth my attention to refuje h. 
But as what your Lordship has written upon this sub-
ject, and for which 1 would again avow myself under obli-
gation to you, has been grounded npon the mistaken 
notion that 1 did not reach the post which 1 had been 
instrueted to oecupy, before the enemy had effeeted his 
operation, and consequently before Lord Wellington had 
commenced his retrograde movement, 1 believe that the 
following explanatiQIl will leave no doubt upon yonf mind, 
that upon this point your Lordship had been misin. 
formed. 
Sardao was in faet the only place mentioned as my 
destÍnation in the order which directed IDy removal to the 
Lower Vouga ; and as my corps did absolutely arrive there 
before Massena crossed the Serra de Caramula, that 
order, it must be allowed, was to all intents and purposes 
put into execntion, .as far as it was possible for me to 
understand tbe intention of it, where no more specific 
object had been annexed to it. 
It had reaehed me on the 23rd September, when we 
were in tbe vicinity of Moimento da Beira, moving upon 
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Lamego; and as we had marched in the three or four 
preceding days about seventy miles, your Lor~ship wouId 
perceive, on consulting a map of the country, that we 
had marched a distance of two hundred miles in nine 
or ten successive days, as calculated by the route through 
Oporto, that by which 1 was directed to move,' and 
to which 1 had not myseIf given a preference; and it 
cannot be doubted for one moment, that where the 
roads are so generally in abad state, as they are 
throughout Portugal, w~ must have made extraordinary 
efforts to arrive at Sardao on the 28th September, the day 
on which my militia entered it, ann as early in that day 
as from twelve to two o'c!ocI., P. 1\I. The first French 
troops that arriveu at Boyalva, where the passage of the 
Caramula was effected, and which is four miles distant 
from Sardao, only entered that village at five in the after-
naon of the same day, aecording to un official intimation 
which was transmitted to me by Sir Stapleton Cotton, who 
commanded the British cavalry upon my right, and with 
whom 1 was then in free communieation. 
But, my Lord, if you were, as 1 presume was the case, 
present at this crisis at head-quarters, possibly you may 
recollect that 1 had an interview with Lord \-Vellington in 
the forenoon of the 28th, upon the heights of Busaco, 
having pushed forwanl in advance of my troops, in order 
to receive his J .. ordship's eommands; and 1 now request 
your particular attention to what passed upon that oeca-
sion, as it forms the most essential eircumstanee conveyed 
in tltis explanation, as f¡jr as my own proeeedings are con-
cerned in it. 
'- c. 
Ris Lordship, after enquirillg in what position 1 had 
left my militia, and on being informed that 1 hourly ex-
pected it at Sardao, thrn, (and for the first time that 1 ~oo:;¡,,_.~~: 
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bad beard the village mentioned in any form) pointed out 
Boyalva as the ground upon wbich be was desirous to see 
me posted. 1 instantIy proposed to bi's Lordship to follow 
up bis suggestion, and 1 was stiU in time to act upon it, as 
two hours would have sufficed to have carried me back to 
my corps, and another would have removed it to its new 
position; but this offer was declined; and as his Lordship 
then expressed himself, because be considered my militia, 
under aH its disadvantages, as incompetent to offer resist-
ance. 1 would bere observe that 1 found, through my 
observations at a later period, that in reality (but which 
Lord Wellington was not aware of) the village of Hoyalva 
was altogether useless as a point of defence-lst, because 
it is situated upon the western slope of the Caramula, and 
does not protect the summ.it of it, or the approaches from 
the eastward; 2dly, because it is in itselfentirely open; 
and 3rdly, because there are to my own knowledge, passes 
practicable for cavaIry 011 either flank of it. 
From what 1 have just now mentioned, it would natu-
rally appear that Lord Wellington at this moment, having 
ascertained what were M¡:¡ssena's intentions, had aIready 
made up bis mind to retire upon his lines: he could only 
have defended the passes of the CaramuIa by detaching 
several thousands of his more efficient troops in that direc-
tion, and his front would, in this case, have been too ex-
tended not to have rendered it vulnerable in some one 
point, if attacked, according to Buonaparte's tacties, byan 
overpowering mass of the enemy's best troops. He 
would thus, perhaps, have saerificed aH the advalltages 
whieh he had just "then acquired by his recent victory, as 
the Portuguese troops; who were only in the iofancy 
of their experience, might have lost their eonfidellee in their 
allies as well as in tbemseIves; and, in short, the fate of 
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Portugal, as well as of Europe, might have been unfavor-
ably decided by any other measure than that which he 
adopted at this critical momento It is in this reasoning 
alone that the real motive of his Lordship's retreat from 
Busaco is to be found, and certainly not in attaching any 
degree of credit to the very unfounded imputatioo which 
has beeo attempted to be thrown upon the corps of militia 
meo which was uoder my orders. 
Inthe course of your nanative, your Lordship has esti-
mated the strel!gth of my corps at five thousand ; but at no 
time did it exceed three thousand five hundred io effec-
tives durillg this campaign: the mean may have be en two 
thousand five hundred. Two of my regiments were em-
ployed upon the lines of Torres Vedras, and the others 
. were never completed to their complement, in conse-
quence of the rigorous system of recruiting which had be en 
exerdsed in order to supply the deficiencies of the regular 
battalions. 
When 00 our march to Sardao, wc had traversed the 
districts in which the militia had been levied, and as very 
many of the men had, notwithstanding my precautions, 
availed themselves of the opportuníty of revisítíng theír 
families, this. circumstance, joined to extreme fatigue, had 
reduced our numbers, as 1 have above described it. 
Had not my communication with the army been inter-
cepted by the enemy's movement upon the night of the 
28th, no possible doubt could have arisen in regard to my 
arrival at Sardao; as Lord Wellington would have beeo 
more thoroughly acquainted with my precise situation 
. , 
since 1 oot only held possession of that post 00 the 28th, 
but duriog the entire of the 29th; 011 the eveoing of which 
day, the Freoch, after cutting off one of mypatrols, posted 
a piquet at one extremity of the village, whilst mine oc-
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cupied the other, and our respective videttes were in pre-
sen ce in the centre of it. It was, indeed, only at day-
break on the 30th, that, when 1 became assured of the 
complete evacuation of Busaco, 1 determined to shelter 
my corps behind the Vouga, about six miles in my rearo 
But as this measure could not pass unnoticed by the ene-
my, my rear-guard was penetrated by a charge of his ca-
valry, and it lost an officer and twenty-five meno 
This affair in itself was in other respects of no impor-
tanee; and if 1 have brought it under your Lordship's no-
tice, it is only to explain what must have been hitherto 
mysterious even to Lord \Vellington himself,-the extra-
ordinary allnsion which M"assena made to it in úne of his 
reports oC that epoch: here are nearIy his words : 
.. General La Croix, when scouring the country widl 
his cavalry, feH in with a British division, which he com-
pelled to retire across the Douro, after destroying several 
hundreds of its number, and capturing six hundred." The 
fact is, that after the charge 1 mentioned, La Croix recon-
noitred the defensive position which 1 took up at the Vouga 
Bridge, and not having any infantry to support hÍl,n, made 
no attempt to force it, hut quietly fell back upon his army. 
In olle of the passages which 1 have already quoted, 
your Lordship seems to imagine, that if Massena did not 
tum fhe Busaco position on the 27th, it was probably be-
cause he conceived me to have arrived at Sardao. But 
besides that circumstances had already made him ac-
quainted with my small number, he had been enubled also 
to trace my motions up to the 23d of September, when his 
army was between m"e and the vmage yon mention, and 
that 1 was then moving in an opposite direction. 
1 had made an attack upon the escort of his heavy artil-
lery on the 20th, at aplace called Raanz or Rantz, on the 
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road from Trancoso to Viseu, and 1 subsequentIy moved 
upon Moimento da Beira, and towards Lamego. 
Upon the occasion 1 alIude to, we captured two officers 
and one hundred men; but, although:.r was disappointed in 
my principal object, that of seizing upon the park of artil-
lery, which 1 am persuaded might have been effected had 
1 been accompanied by a detachment of British dragoons, 
the atrair was in so far fortunate, that according to the 
aceount given ofit by General Pampalona, who was then in 
l\Iassena's army, and has sínce published a memoir of this 
eampaign, it essentialIy eontributed to the defeat of the 
enemy on the 27th. The eseort was obliged to faH baek a 
day's mareh upon Trancoso ; Massena's ad vanee was by this 
mean s delayed during two days; and it was preeisely in this 
interval that Lord Wellington was enabled to pass his 
army from the left to the right of the Mondego, and with-
out molestation to oecupy the position of Bnsaco. 
It was after tbis affair that 1 was ordered by General 
Bareelar, who commanded in the north ofPortngal, to march 
to Sardao by Oporto, rather than by the more direct but 
more diflicult route ofPedro do Sul-an error which Lord 
Wellington publicly animad verted upon, but in which he 
was aware that 1 had not in any degree participated. Bar-
celar, in fact, conceived the intention of the order he re-
eeived tobe for the protection of Oporto; and for the first 
time of his life perhaps, for he was conscientiously obe-
dient, he took upon his responsibility to act upon his own 
prívate opinion. 
As a matter secondary to that whieh had induced me to 
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trouble your Lordship with this very protracted communi~ 
cation, 1 beg leave to observe to you, that in your mention 
of the recapture of Coimbra, you made the following mis~ 
takes: 
1st, That event took place on the 7th, not the 9th of 
October. 2dly, General MilIer's corps was not present in 
the attack-it only arrived on the following day, and mine 
alone had been engaged upon the occasion. And, 3rdly, 
Thcre were very nearly five thousand prisoners taken, in-
cluding one hundred and fifty-seven officers-not four thou-
sand as you have stated. 
1 would here conclude this long letter, by requesting your 
Lordship to make every allowance for the anxiety which 
had induced me to address it to you; but on reading it 
over, 1 findit incumbent upon me to devote a few lines, at 
its termination, as a tribute due from me in recollection of 
the intrinsic good qualities of the militili. soldiers who were 
under my command during the war in the Península. It 
has happened that the· mention 1 have already made 
of them, has represented them, as a body, in unfavor~ 
able colours; and such only was the picture 1 could draw 
of them at the period then before me; but from my gene-
ral experience of the individual characters of the men who 
composed my corps during the several campaigns that J 
eommanded it, 1 do not hesitate in my opinion, that 
no better material s could be found to form excellent sol-
diers: they were patient when under great privations; 
temperate in their habits ;-obedient to their superiors;-
and they possessed at once a constitutiollal bravery, which 
only required adequate discipline to be usefully called into 
action; and as much, if not more, perhaps, of genuine 
OF CORltESPONDENCE. 3] 1 
patriotism than the natives of any other country in Europe, 
with the exception only of our own. 
1 have the honour to remain, my Lord, your Lordship's 
mo¡;;t obedient humbIe servant, 
.N. TRANT, 
l\fajor-generaI in the Portuguese ser vice, 
and late Lieut.-Colone! British. 
Letler ¡roin Lord Londonderry io Major-General 
Sir N. Trant. 
Holdernesse House, July 21st, 1828. 
Sir, 
1 am honoured with your Ietter of this day's date, and 
1 am entirely ready to acknowledge that your statements 
of the facis you describe may be more authentic than the 
information 1 have detailed in the part of my book to which 
you have alluded, as regards the conduct and services of 
yourself and corps under your command. 
In great military operations, various views will be taken, 
and different opinions formed; and it is difficuIt to com-
bine the sentiments of officers on abstraet details. 
My object has been, without wishing to give offence tú 
any of my brother officers, to eoUeet a general precis for 
future historians of those eampaigns which 1 witnessed; 
and 1 eoneeive 1 can in no better way answer the object 
your commullication has in view, as bearing upon my 
History of the Peninsular War, than by publishing the 
same, together with this answer, in the Appendix to thc 
next edition of my work. 
1 have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
&e. &e. &e. 
(Sip;ned) VANE LONDONDERRY. 
3]2 APl'ENDlX 
FrulIl Lieutenallt-General Sir H. Fane to {lle ltlarquis 
of Londonderry. 
Avon-Ringwood, 14th August, 1828. 
My dear Lord Londonderry, 
1 have only recently found leisure for reading your 
" N arrative of the Peninsular 'Var." 
Taking for granted that, where the proceedings of named 
individuals are detailed, you will be desirous of having auy 
material errors pointed out, 1 take the libel'ty of addressing 
you; and of calliug your atteution to the following quoted 
passage in the .said work, relative to me. 
At page 465, 466, Quarto Editi.ou, you write as follows : 
" General Fane, with a brigade ofPortuguese cava1ry, ac-
companied by several guns and a howitzer, had been passcd 
over the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march along 
the southern bank of the ríver, and to destroy, if possible, 
any boats which he might observe in progress cf prepa-
mtion at Santarem, 01' elsewhere. He had obeyed theso 
orders, and kept up a long and warm cannonade on the 
enemy's incipient flotilla; but his howitzer having been 
disabled, his round-shot proved of little utility; and, as no 
attempt teas made wít/¡ the Congreve rockets, which now 
for the first time migltt ltave been brollght inlo play, the 
enemy succeeded in completing the task which thcy had 
begun, and in furnishing themselves with ample mean.'> 
to cross the river at pleasure." 
1 bcg leave to trouble your Lordship with copies of parts 
of tltrf'c dispatches 01' mille, dated the 8th., 12th, alle! lGth 
of No\'('rnber, 1810. 
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Almeirim, 8th November. 
My Lord, 
1 am just returued to this place after having reconnoitred 
thc whole river as hig'h as the mouth of the Zezere. 
The number of boats we have been able to discover is as 
follows: 
1st, Below Santarem, in a creek 2 
At Santarem 3 
&c. &c. &c. 
To Lord Wellington, &c. &c. 
Almeirim, 12th N ovember, 1810. 
My Lord, 
From a spy sent over the river, by my desire, by Colo-
nel Mestre, and from a peasant who escaped from San-
tarem last night by swimming the river, 1 learn that there 
certainly is a large quantity of rnaferials collected in the 
Pra~a. He states himself to have been made to work 
daily, and that he was employed in the Pra~a three days 
ag'o; that he saw as many as twelve boats at least, and 
a great quantity of plank, poles, &c. which, he says, are 
piled as high as the roofs of the houses. 
As the attempt t'o destroy these will be attended with 
the destruction of the Iower town, 1 shall take no step 
until 1 receive your Lordship's further instructions. The 
materials cannot be made use of in the present sta~e of 
the river; therefore no ill consequence can arise from my 
delaying, &c. &c. &c. 
'1'0 Lord W clling'ton, &c. &t:. 
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The reply to this last dispatch, was a desire tbat 1 should 
try what could be done; and on the 16th of November 1 
wrote as follows : 
Almeirim, 16th N ovember, 1810. 
My Lord, 
I have to make known to you that 1, this morning, ac-
cording to your wishes, endeavoured to set fire to the ma-
terials collected by the enemy in Santarem. 
We fired forty- two 32-pounder carcass rockets; four or 
five of which only, (I think) feH into the town; alld wbich 
did not appear to me to do any damage. At any rate, 
they elltirely failed in effecting my object. 
Four of them burst almost immediate\y after leaving tbe 
frame, but fortunately did no injury to any one. 
The range of these weapons appears to me to be too 
wild to be of service, employed as we employed them; for 
a town no larger than tbe lower town of Santarem, is too 
small an object to be hit with any certainty, as our ex- . 
perience of this morning proved. Fired into a large city 
fuH of combustible materials, or amongst crowded shipping, 
they certainly must have a most terrific effect; particularly 
if fired in tlights of 30 or 40 together. Going, however, 
into a town in the state Portuguese towns 1l0W are, with 
little but the waUs and roof of any house remaining, I 
think they will do no good." &c. &c. &c. 
To Lord Wellington. 
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From these extracts, your Lordship will perceive, 
1st, That only 5 boats could be seell at Santarem; and 
tbat what others migbt have been there, were in the midst 
of the town. 
2ndly, That the reason why the rockets were not tried 
hnmediately upon rny having the power of trying thern, 
was, an apprehension tbat 1 rnight not meet the appro-
bation of the Commander of the Forces, if 1 burned the 
town of Santarem. 
And, 3rdly, that as soon as 1 received his sanction for 
the attempt, 1 díd make it; and did "bring into play the 
Congreve rockets;" and made a very fuH report to the 
Cornmander of the Forces of rny having so done, and of 
. my opinion relative to tbese missiles. 
The rockets were under the control of Lieutenant Lind-
sey, of the Royal Artillery; who was the officer specially 
appointedfor their management. 
U nder these circumstances, 1 am at a loss to imagine 
how your Lordship's statemellt, that" no attempt was made 
with tbe Congreve rockets, when they mighthave been 
brought into play," can have been inserted in your Nar-
rative; and 1 cannot but tbink that. you will desire to cor-
rect tbis statement, should anotber edition of your work 
be called foro 
1 am, rny dear Lord Londollderry, 
Very faithfully yours, 
To the Marquess of Londonderry, 
&c. &c. &c. 
H. FANE. 
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-
Answer from Lord Londonderry io Lieulenant-General 
Sir H. Fane. 
Wynyard Park, August 17,1828. 
M Y Dear Sir Henry, 
1 ha ve to acknowledge the receipt of your Ietter of the 
14th instant. 
In my advertisement you will observe that the defi-
ciency of my narrative is at once admiUed; and under 
these circumstances, I had hoped it would meet with in-
, dulgence, especialIy from my friends and brother officers. 
1 am anxious, you may be assured, to correct every 
error t~at is pointed out, especialIy where the proceedings 
of named individuaIs are detailed; and 1 shall send you!" 
commnnications togethel' with this answel', to be inserted 
in the Appendix to the 3rd edition, 8vo. which is just 
coming out. 
. 'Vithout entering into discussion, 1 shall only say, I 
wrote from the best information 1 could procure at the 
time, entircly unauthorised ol' unassisted by any body in 
the army. 1 seldom or ever saw communications ad· 
dressed by general officers direct to the Commander of the 
Forces; and the impression at the moment at head-quarters 
was, that the enemy did avail themselves of the means of 
crossing the river; and it was in general report, that the. 
Congreve rockets had not been brought into play. How-
ever, from your statement, this must be erroneous, and 1 
shall have much pIe asure in placing your letter in my hum-
ble record before the publico 
Bclieve me, my dea)' Sir Henry, 
y our's very faithflllly, 
VANF. LONDONIllWRY. 
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Leiter Irom Ml's. E. Mattlzews to tlze Mat'quis 01 Lon-
donderry. 
7, Cecil Street, Margate, September 14th, 1828. 
My Loro, 
Dnder the most proud though painful feelings, 1 take 
tile liberty oi' addressing you, ano 1 am sure your Lordship 
will pardon the intrusion when 1 explain the motive. 
Having been informed that your Lordship had lately pub-
lished an admirable work on the War in the Peninsula, 1 
felt "ery desirous to peruse it, but could not procure a copy 
from any of the libraries of this place; but on taking up 
the Kent Herald of the 28th of August last, the first ar-
ticle that met my notice was an extract from that part of 
your Lordship's publication which treated of the Battle of 
Albut<ra, the impressive description ofwhich renewed again 
in my breast painful feelings, which time had in sorne mea-
sure softened, though not healed. The subject to which 1 
allude, is the notice your Lordship has been pleased to par-
ticularly take of the gallant conduct of my nephew, Ensign 
Thomás of the Bnffs, who feH in that battle, bravely de-
fending acolour of his regimento The little hero was bom 
in Jamaica, and being an orphan, was committed to my 
care at the age of four years, and was,edncaíed and pro-
vided for by my husband Doctor Matthews, who was tnen 
surgeon of the same regimento The extract, as 1 read it, 
with respect to his endeavouring to preserve the colour by 
the forfeiture of his life, was not the only act of heroism 
performed by him on that memorable day, and which your 
Lordship probably 1I0t being aware of, 1 will take the 
liberty ofmentioning. He had, previously to his regiment's 
being broken by the French cavalry, taken the commano of 
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Captain Stevens' company, there being no other subaltern 
but himself attached to the company, and the Captain being 
wounded ot the commencement of the battle, The circum-
stances are detailed by Captain Stevens in a leUer he wrote 
Doctor Matthews from Olivenza four days after the action, 
which letter 1 have now before me, and beg leave to trans-
cribe an extract from it for your Lordship' s inforrnation, under 
the impression that it might not be displeasing to you, as 
tbe Author of tbe History of a War which terminated so 
gloriously to the British name, to be made acquainted with 
anyadditional minutia which your Lordship might in sorne 
fnture edition thillk of sufficient value to be recorded. 
The extract runs thus: "1 cannot refrain from tears, 
while 1 relate the determined bravery of your gallant little· 
subaltern, who feIl on the 16th instant, covered with gIory; 
and it must in some measure alleviate the grief 1 know you 
will feel at his 10SB, to know that he felllike a hero. He 
rallied my company after 1 was wounded and taken pri-
soner, crying out, ' Rally on me, men, 1 will be your pivot.' 
Such glorious conduet must surely meet its reward in 
that world where a11 troubles cease, and aU grief is at an 
end. He was buried witb all the care possible, by a ser-
jeant and private, the only two survivors out ,of my com-
pany. which consisted of sixty-three when taken into 
action." The colours he died in protecting, it appears he 
took possession of at the moment the officer who held 
them was killed, his company being dispersed. This 
gaUant little fellow was not sixteen years of age, when 
he so bravely sacrificed his life for the honour of his 
King and country. His 10ss was, and is still most painfully 
felt by me, for he was as truly amiable in his private life, 
as he was gallant and brave in performing his duty to his 
King and coulltry as a.soldier. With mally apologíes for the 
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liberty 1 have taken, which 1 am sure your Lordship will 
excuse as the effusion of grateful . feeJings for the kind 
manner in which you was pleased to call to notice the re-
membrance of one so near and dear to me, 
I havethe honour to be, 
My Lord, 
y our Lordship's Most obedient, 
Humble servan,t, 
ELIZ. A. MATTHEWS. 
To the Right Honourable 
The Marquis of Londonderry, 
&c. &c. &e. 
Letler from M1·S. Craufurd, widow of General Roberl 
Craufurd, to Lord Londonderry; and Answer. 
My Lord, 
1 have lately fead, with strongly awakened feelings, 
your Lordship's account of the Peninsular War. It has 
brought before me the observations and opinions upon it 1 
was used to hear, in a remarkable degree, and placed me 
where 1 was when listening to them. 
The tribute to the memory of him from whom 1 heard 
them has called forth the deepest emotion.-At the close 
of the book, 1 am led to address a few words to your 
Lordship, not that 1 would presume to trespass on yon 
with a detail of the feelings of an individual almost un-
known to you, and after the lapse of a number of years, 
since the onJy link between us was broken, but because 1 
am anxions to beg as a favour of your Lordship, that you 
will have the goodness to direet the publisher in any 
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future editions of the work to correct the spelling of the 
name; which, being peculiar to the Craufurds, to whom 
my husband belonged, is often 1pistaken, and is so in your 
Lordship's work. It is a point of no great moment on 
most occasions, but very important to myself and to my 
family on this. 
\Vith every grateful and gratified sentiment, 
J have the honour to be, 
My Lord, 
y our Lordship's 
Obliged Servant, 
M. F. CRAUFURO. 
Dawlish, 16th Octoher, 1828. 
Dear Madam, 
J. am hOlJoured with your letter. J feel much flut-
tered that my humble testimony to your husband's glori-
ous career should have met your approbution. Those who 
knew him onlyas an officer, appreciated, as they deserved, 
his science, skill, and matchless bravery ;those who re-
garded him also as a friend, (as J did,) never can forget 
him. 1 shall send your note and this answer to m y pub-
lisher, as the best way of having your wishes complied 
with. 
I have the honour to be, &c. 
VANE LONDONDERRY. 
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Major-General Sir J. Wilson to the 
Marquis of Londonderry. 
321 
2, Somerset Street, Portman Square, 3rd Dec. 1828. 
My Lord, 
Having only very recently had an .opportunity of peru-
sing your Lordsbip's work entitled " Narrative of the War 
in Spain and Portugal," I have noticed an error or two 
respecting myself which 1 feel extremely anxiolls to have 
corrected; and as I now find that the third edition is on 
the eve of publication, 1 take the liberty of addressing 
your Lordship with this view ere the new edition meet the 
public eye. 1 am quite contident from your Lordship's 
high mílitary feeling and sen se of justice, that you will 
readily concur in the correction of a paragraph, which 
1 cannot doubt upon your Lordship's pemsal of the fol-
lowing explanation will appear to require it. The pa-
ragraph in question, p. 481, is as follows: " In the mean-
while, Trant and Ba~ellar were on the alert at Coimbra; 
and Wilson, retreating from Espinhel, thr~w himself 
with his corps on the other side of the Mondego. The 
lattet movement was indeed, on one account, a subject of 
regret to us, inasmuch as it deprived us of our readiest 
and surest source of intelligence, which could henceforth 
be obtained only by circuitous routes; but it was made 
under the impression that a further continuance in Espin-
hel would be hazardous, and could not be risked." The 
facts were plainly these: In December, 1810, 1 occupied 
Espinhel and other small villages on the Thomar road, 
with about 1500 mili tia and a' detachment of Portuguese 
cavalry, the enemy being strongly posted in my front at 
Cabac;os, from. which point he had lately compelled me to 
faH back after two sharp attacks upon my isolated corps, 
VOL. JI. x 
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being then full thirty miles or more from Coimbra, the 
nearest support. At this time .Drouet's reinforcement to 
MasseDa's army entered Portugal, taking the Ponte de 
Marcella road; aDd as the enemy progressively closed 
iD upon my rear, those in my front moved to give their 
hands to him. It now became imperative upon me, iD order 
either to avoid being hemmed in by an overwhelming force 
approachiDg iD my froDt and rear, or being cut off from 
GeDeral Ba~ellar's army, of which my divisioD formed tbe 
advanced guard, to throw myself across the Mondego j but 
as soon as the enemy presented his flaDk, 1 re-crossed the 
river, and at Corvo, not far from Espinhel, had an affair 
with his rear guard, makiDg Dear a hundred prisoDers, and 
posting myself as near as 1 could to the latter village, 
where Dr~~et's corps halted sorne days, thus recoveriDg 
. the former !ine of commUltication with the grand army by 
the Zezere and Abrantes; (for these movements 1 refer to 
Lord WelliDgton's dispatches of January 1811;) but my 
subsequent removal from this line of country a few 
days afterwards, was whoUy independent of what was 
occurring near me, to the south of the Mondego; it was 
the result of other causes, which were these: In the mean 
time Silveira's movements had brought Claparede's divi-
sion UpOD him, and the enemy meeting with no serious 
resistance in his advance, entered Lamego without oppo-
sition, Silveira retiring to the right bank of the Douro. 
The enemy's rapid advaDce upon Lamego necessarily gave 
General Ba~ellar considerable alarm for the safety of 
Oporto and the lipe of the Douro, the defence ofwhich 
was one of the principal objects committed to his charge. 
He, therefore, ordered Miller's division and mine tI} hasteD 
to Silveira's supp~rt, expecting that some stand would 
be made in a country ful! of pl}sitions, in order to cover 
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Lamego, and enable us to eo-operate with him; but before 
we eould arrive, he had erossed the Douro at Pezo de 
Regoa with preeipitation. 
From this simple statement of faets it will appear evi-
dent-
1st, That when 1 threw myself aeross the Mondego, 
it was to avoid being erushed by a superior force closing 
upon me in front and rear, and that it was not then, the 
ineonvenience alluded tO\ by your Lordship eould have 
been felt; for having immediately afterwards re-erossed 
the river, the former eommunieation with head-quarters 
was presently restored. 
2ndly, That when sorne days after tbis, my distant 
removal from the south of the Mondego to tbe Douro took 
. place, thereby suspending the more direet eommunieation 
witb head-quarters, it was tbe eonsequenee of positive 
orders 1 -reeeived to move in an opposite direetion against 
the enemy, wbo was t.hen seriously rnenacing the line of 
tbe Lower Douro, and to whom the glove bad hastily been 
thrown down in that quarter, without any adequate exer-
tion -having beeo made to redeem it. In neither the one 
case nor the other did I then aet from any impression of 
my own; but from an unavoidable necessity eaused by the 
movements of the enerny, as well as in eonformity with 
the orders 1 received ; and if in this there was any thing 
that formed a subject of regret to the army, it is to the 
causes 1 have just endeavoured to explain, and to these 
aloue they ought to be attributed. 
1 have the honor to be, 
y our Lordship's most obedient, 
Humble Servant, 
JOHN WU.SON, 
Major-General. 
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The Marquis of Londonderry lo Major-General 
Sir J. Wilson. 
Wyoyard Park, Dec.15th, 1828. 
Sir, 
1 am honored with your letter, and shall have much 
satisfaction in inserting it in the Appendix of the 3rd 
edition of my work which is now coming out. 
1 had much rather give your fuH explanation, than pro-
ceed to any partial correction of my own. My wish has 
been only to record events as far as 1 was acquainted 
with them, and 1 feel much pleasure in any explanation or 
elucidation being afforded by the parties concerned. 
1 have the honor to be, 
y our obedient Servant, 
VANE LONDONDERRY. 
END OF THE CORRESPONDENCE. 
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No. I. 
State of the Forees in Portugal under the eommand of Lieutenant-gencral Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. 
Head-quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1S0t). 
General Officers 
commanding 
Brigades. 
Stations. Regiments. 
I 
l · D ' Alterations since las! 'O 
I SerJeants. rumrs. Rank and File. R " ,,; elurn. "'"t:I 
, • ~ ~ g'., 
~ 2 ~ . 4 4' ..¿,.¿ C':S"C 
" ." .. >-. "t:I"t:I 'O ",. .,...:. P:;CQ ~2. a ~ w E~ ~ ~.! § ~ § ... ~~bDt~~ ~~ ~ j ~ 'g 2 ~ • 2 ~ ~ s ffi • E 2 . $3 -: a) ~ ~ ..¿ ~ "E .~ ~ o ~ '-g ~ 
.3 .~ ~ g '00 ~ ~ u ~ ..:sa s ~.!:I:I E ~ .!;( S .5 ~"'3 ~ C'd ~ <n ~ § § 'Tj Q) Q) 
Officers. 
j j ~ Ó j ~ cñ &0 ~ J3:5 ~ J1:3 ~ Ji 8 ~ ~;;;E ~ o Ci o ~ ~ ~ cC ~ ~ 
------11--11:--------11 ------- --:--- ---------1-----------
B. G. Fane { 
M. G. Colton { 
B. G; H. camPbel{ 
M. G. Hill { 
M. G. Tilson r 
B. G. A. Campbcll f 
B. G. Cameron r I 
B. G. R. Stewart { 
B. G. Sontag r 
M. G .lVl'Kenzie r 
B. G. Langworth { 
5 3rd Dn. Guards , 1 2 ¡ 10 5 5 4 3fi ., .. 8 ... , 045 10. . 655: 60~" l1304 
t 4th Dragoons . 2 2 S 9 (j 6 6 37 .... b .... (;59 13.. 6721 702.. 5 
(14th Lt. Do. . 2 2 7 15 1 4 6 3, ... 2 8.... 579 21 71 6711 506.. } 
, 20th Lt. Do. . ..] 1 4. . 1 2 14 1 3 3 l.. :l18 4 60 2821 188,. 1 1 1463 
) Srd Do. K. G. L. . .. " 2 ].. 2 6 ., 4 .... 1 49 2 72 ]2~1 61., 
{" 16th Lt. Do. . l 1 6 15 ].1 6 6 3h.. 1 8 .... 617 20 34 671 665 .. 
( 1st Bn. Coldm. Gds. , b.. 10 .• 14: 5 69 5 2 22.... 1102 75 1 11"8 1 .. ~ 
~ 1st Bn. 3rd Gds. 1 Ú 1 12 .. 14 5 6~ 2 2 16 4.. 1133 73 ti 1212 ~2292 
l 1 Co. En. 60th o o ••• o 1 ]. . . , 3 1 'o 1... . S7 3, . (]O o. • •• , ., J 
"3rd or Buft's o.. 1 7 14 (j 2 33 ;¡ '2 18 2.. 668 99 3~ 805 .. .. .... 4.. } 
, (j6t.h Fo"t 2nd Bn. . '" o 1 g 14 10 6 311 2 1 1& 1 .. a1ó 38 9 662 1 ,. 2001 
) 48th Do. Do. .. 1 2 7 13 !! 4 3u z.. ]4 2.. 667 48.. 715 
{" 1 Co. 5th Bn. 60th o o ••• , 1 1. . . . 3 l.. 1... . 67 3. . 60 f 5th Co. Do. .... 2 3 3 6 2 19 .. " 8 .... 'rT7 32 l! 311 ") 
) 88th Foot, 1st Bn. . o • o 2 8 15 5 4 S!, .. " 15 .. ' . ~50 143 28 721 ¡1439 
{ 87th Do. 2nd Bn. "" 2 G 17 8 5 38 .... 14.... 6]2 88 1 701 .J 
f7thDo.2ndBn. .. 1 .. 817 .. 5 21¡ 4 2 13 .... 515 46 , 572 ~ 
) 53rd Do. 2nd Bn. .. 1 2 5 6 9 6 36 1 1 16 1.. 635 571 2 691 (1206 
t.. 1 Cn. 5 th Bn. 60th .... 1 1 1 1 2 {j .." 2 .. .. 56 11 1 61; .J 
(9th Foot, 2nd Bn. .. .. 1 6 11; 2 5 3~ lU ~ 9 7.. ~9!; 21U! 20 728 J ! 8Srd Do. Do. .. 1 1 !.< 17 12 5 46 2 1 19.,., 163 7I! 22 856 1316 
L 1 Co. 5th Bn. 60th o o • o •• 1 l. . . . 4 .' .. 1 .. ,. 55 31 1 59 
5 1st Bn. Dts. I 1 5 15 f. 5 48 9 4 9 2.. 14] 157 20 918 12 ., 4 .. 1 1 , 1290 
~ 29th Regl. .. I 1 ti 15 3 6 2(; ¡; 2 15 3.. 549 7ti 5 630 ~ S 2nd Bn. Dts. .. 1 , 7 17 !J 4 SO 9 ~ ]0 1 o 133 211 14 958 3.. J 
:1 97th Regl. .. 1 2 6 8 5 4 3~ 4 ~ 19... SI: 70 17 604 1 .. 1307 
ti Co. 5th Hn. 60th o o o o •• •• 2. o •• :1 2.. 1." 51 4.. (jI 
(27th Foot, Srd Bn. o 1 3 U 10 8 4 42 ... , 22.,. 658 134 2 794 ~ ! 45th 1st Ditto lIS 6 Il 4 34 .. .. 18.. . 615 125 27 767 S( 1980 
L 31 s t 2nd Do. o.. 1 7 11 b 4 37 2 2 17". 107 97 4 808 
{
5th Bn. K. G. L. o .. ] 7 12 8 4 31 b 1 14 1" ~71 92 11 774 1 1 1 
7t
o
h Do. Do. o '. 2 Ii 10 4 5 SI; ., 1 14 2.. 631 81 9 721 2 .. 2 ., 2769 
2nd Do. Do. J 2 7 15 7 6 37 :1 1 15." . 146 49 8 803 1 
1st Do. Do. . o 2 10 19 3 2 32 4 J 12' 3.. 121 11 ¡; 8 847 ........ 
2~th Foot. 2nd Bn. '2 5 7 3 2" ... o 22, o •• 100 26 3 72!l 
30th Do. Do. 1 '. 2 6 5 6 29 2 é 14 2" 398 4ó 189 632 .. 1 
rndts. Co. K. G. L. ¡~.... 1 2.. .. 4 . o •• l ... '1 30 14 4 48 
Total"I a 32~~m; M/ll93 137 24 1097;¡; ~ 42332 1 mo1238g ~90 22580, -28-1-.(' ..... -<. 'c-I-E .... 2-·-. -1. -13"7'] -;] 
I : 
No. n. 
State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, and Royal Engineers, 
Head Quarters Coimbra, 6th May, 1809. 
Oflieers. Serjeants. 
.; 
]1'1 ~ "O 'T.. ._ ::.J S .'~ ~ 
':¡::s U 
~ g ~ 
~ ~ ~ .¿ 
ce :::::l ';::::;->.. ~ .&~J5~.S 
~ ~ ~ ~ ..::.= 8 ~~~~~8 
Drumrs. 
El.! 1 ~ ~ ~ 
;lo W U 
~ 
~ 
Rank and File. 
.,; 
'"' 00 
.,; 
§ 
a 
a 
o 
U 
'E 
o 
.; 
~ 
'" ::c: 
.; 
'" :;
~ 
Alterations 
.inee lasto 
-d .r;; 
'" ." ~1'1~] ] !l) "'O.l:: 1004 rn 
.S ffi .~ ~ ~ '::::<::<::<~ 
Civil Braneh. 
." . 
<1 ~ 
.. ... .... 
o o ~..: ~ ~ 
~t;'031~ 
"ss.:.gi ª S>.¡"'=~·...t 8~ G 8~ !í E-< 
-------!l-I-I--'--I-II_II __ '_' __ II_I_I __ II __ ' __ ' __ '__ II __ '__ 11_1_1_1_1_11 __ '_' __ ' __ 
t Artillery British Drivers 
f Artillery 
German .) 
\.. Drivers 
Engineers 
Wn. Tn. attaehed lo Artillery 
Waggon Train 
31 .. 1 10 
.. ,11 5 
1, .. 3 
11 15 " .. 8 11 5 
61' '11 4 12 1 •• 
6 7 , .. 
7 , .. 1) 
•• ,"'1 •• 1 , •. 
8 1"11.' 2, .. 1 •• 
21 .. 111 5 14 5 
2 "'11 •• 3 11 1) 
22 2 161 12 l •.. 
911
283 
1 244 
5912861 628 
311 2111921457115291146" .. ,., •. , •. ,." 
3111 2 179 2711021 308 •• I 1, .. l. o" • 
14\ 61 24117111 182 5111. o¡ •• , •• 1. O," 
25 26 
56 14 771247 
62 20 12 94 lO, •• , .• J • .o". 
Total •• 1I4111-;-~~I-;II~II33l;;l2~11712IuI1990 IMsIW31193Illmlmll¡-;;I7I~I~IJI-2 16r¡;-I~-
No. lB. 
Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Battle of Oporto, 10th, 11th, and 12th May, 1809, under the command of 
Lieutenunt-general Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
KiIled. Wounded. lVIi;sing. Total. 
!Í oi iI:i .j, oi lI:i .; 'ti oi '" .~~ '" 00 ~ tl ~ al := tl .; . f "ó Corps. ti) .<: .., e ~ 
-= ~ ~ ....... If~ . -= . 2 ...... en E-< • <l " . ~ ~ )j '" ~ El )j en '" S )j • i':l " . ~ El .'d -= en e rñ ~ .: ~ al -= o: ;: ¡:: ca -= ~ e ~ 'a 
" " ';; ~ OJ., ~ ... ... .~ " 
,.. ~ -c; '" ~ 
- "" 
¡'j "E ..>4 
'" ~ ¡:¡ ..>4 Q) o '" - ",,'" 6 ..>4 " .., ct ~ ¡:¡ .... '" o .., .~ 'g ~~ .~ .~ !3 .~ '" o .., .~ ~ 'P 2 ª -= . .." " " ~ .~. f/l ¡:;. E á " ~ª" " ~ 'f ¡:; " " '" '" ... '" '" '" ~ '" '" ¿s8 ........ J]~Q:; ;,:¡;;'¡ ú~ " '" ;::¡~ ;,:¡::a )::1 a; ;::¡o:: (.;) ;.:3>2 if.!;::¡ o:: (.;) ....en .... if.! u
-.-
-
1 
.I.:¡:rr· 1 .. 1 .. 31 35 1 .. 49 50 11" 1 .. 16 17 
. .. o, o, .. 4 4 
1 .. .. .... 
" 
10 
J 1 
1 1 
21 2 
~ >, Royal Engineers 
.: :E 14 th Light Dragaons .. 12 1 1 18 
() .c Srd Foot, 1st Batt. 7 12 
~~. 48th D". 2nd Do. 3 1. I~ 
~ '" ~ 60th Do. 5th Do. 4 
~ ~ ~ 66th Do. 2nd Do. 1 1 7 
- o 18t Batt. Detachments l' . 
Jfo 1st Line Batt.K.G.L. 1" 
:.§ Rifle Companies .. , .. ,. '1"""""'1 .. " .. 1 •• 1 .. 1 .. 1 •• 1 •• 1 •• 1 :1 
-< ;::¡ General and Staft' Officers ...... .. .. .. .. .. 2 
21' 'l"l"l"!""'" '11 2 -.-.-.-,-,-,-,-,,-,-,- -,-,-,-,-,-,,-,-,-1-1-1-1-1-;\\--; -; -; -; -:-.riT~ U2 l23 General Total. .11 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1~3112 1 3 121 3 l .. 11 l .. 18711 .. 1 •• 1 •• , .. 
N ames of Officers killed and wounded. Remarks. 
RECAPITULATION. 
16th Lt. Dragoons, Major L. Stallhope 
Do. Lientenant Tomkinson 
1St Bn. Detach. Capto Ovens (38th Regt.) 
Do. Do. Lieutenant Woodgate (52nd Do.) 
1st En. K.G.L. Capto Detinerillg 
2nd Do. Do. Capto Lan!(hren 
Rifle COSo Do. Lieutenant Lodders 
Staft', Lient. Gen. The Han. E. Paget { 
Do. Capto Hill, A.D.C. to Majar Gen. Hill 
Slightly 
Severely 
Slightly 
Do. 
Killed 
Slightly 
Severely 
Lost his right arm, 
doillg well 
Slightly 
lI:i 
'" Dates. 11'15 
'" .. 
" 
" '" ;,:¡
-. 
Killed. 
,¡ 
'" ~ . ri ~ 
.; 
" . 
m <tJ 
. " " en <: El )j ~ '§ .8 So ~ El ~ 
'-' .:>. '" .- '~;:I ¡::: 
'" '" 
'" ~ ... .. '" 2~ ~~ J5~~ 
- --
----
Wonnded. Missing. 
lI:i m ~ lI:i 
'" 
tl '" ti) ~ . f .;::¡ 00 a 
"" 
if.! 
. .; ~ ~ a ., " ~ rñ " ¡:: .'d E iJ o: ¡:: en .., ... ,.. .~ " '; ~ 
" " 
" o " ~ ~.~ ; ~ '" S en '" o: . .." .., " " . .." 0..::: 00 .~ 
'" '" 
.:>.'" ~~~ '" '" '" c3~ -= ... '" '-;,:¡¿S u .... o:: ;,:¡;; ¡
.... Jl 
-
- -
-
--. 
-
- -- - -
-
,¡ 
a;:;; 
..."" 
8.'d 
¡:¡ .... 
" a ... ..
;::¡~ 
--
14th Light Dragoons, Majar Harvey { 10th May, 180911 ............ _ ... .. 1 •• o- o. _. o- 3 .. •• o • o. o. o.· •.. 
Total. 
'ti 
f! e . ~ rQ § . 5 5 
f cti .S ~ e 2 6 
Q,) ti ~ .- .~ el) E § .~ ~ g ~ .~ e 
(.;);;'¡'-1;.:3¡;.]Jlo 
-- - --
.. 1 •• o, o ••• .. 
,¡ 
~ 
.'d 
.... 
'" ¡; 'O~ E-< 
-
3 
" Do. Captain Hawker 
Do. Lient. Knif'e 
Lost his rigbt arm, 
doing well 
Slightly 
Do. Uth Do. Do. . d. dI 1. .111 .. 1 .. 11911 .. 1 .. 12141 .. 131 .. 1 6311· -l .. 1 .. 1 •. 1..1 .. 1211411 .. 1 .. 13141113121 9611109 
3rd Foot, or Buft's, Lieut. Monaghan 
48th Fo"t, Majar Er,kine 
66th Do. l\I8j<Jr l\Inrray 
Do. Capto Benning 
Royal Engineers, Lieut. Geo. Hamilton 
~ Lient. ----Portuguese .. E . ( nslgn----
Do. 
Slightly 
Severely 
Slightly 
Severely 
Wonnded 
KiIled 
12th Do. Do. ~¡~l" U· 'IJ' '1~11~1~12'~1' 'I~ I"I~:I" '1' '!j' '1~1~1~1~¡1~1~1~1~¡~¡~1~1~~11~23 
.... ~1..~ .. r. 42 2 " 417 14t 153 [1 .. [ .... 2 16 2 4 5 7 I " 2211 236 
I ~c 
No. LV. 
State of the Forces in Spaill and Portugal, under the commalld of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. 
Head Quarters Placencia, 15th July, 1809. 
- ¡; 
Drmrs·!1 
Alterations. 
.:i Offieers. Serjeants. Rank and File. Horses. ~ .~ ~ lI1en. Horses. i~' ~ IV rz _:~ .S a ---1 ----... o General Officers 
ro 
:;.¡ 
. 1 
i. l • .e;'""'Oü~ I'l.- commauding Regiments. Stations. o; ro 'O 
'"" ·1"8 '" -"" " '" ..¿ ..¿ ..¿ ..¿ ~cdc:..r~ '" I;r~ <=: ;; 
'"" 
""O r~ '" h~ Brigades. ro o ro 00 -n " " " § ~i~ " "'C 2l g ~~~O) ~ e E 
" I " '" "' ' .... '" 'O ro '0; " ;;:: • El I ;:¡ ..¿ ....:I~ t::~ o " a a: ~ ;:; :;.¡ ... oh :;g " & ~ ~ ;ji E ¡, S " ... ..¿ . '" .:2., ;:;., " 'en ~ ..; ~ g El ..; § ~Iii ~ e a; u " : § p::; .:e!' " 'O '" '" <lo r.:l :;, u t: ~ J1 o t: .;:: '0 ~I~ O~ o ~ " p:¡ :;.¡ ;¡ :2 U ~ iñ W U ¡:.. cnu U E-< o... if) (; -, ¿; p::; ;::::; ~ U-
--- ----
B. G. Falle S 3rd Du. Guards Camp Placencia .. 1 2 ti 9 5 4 4 30 4 2 7 .... 5:19 67 ¡¡g t;(J5 582 .. o. o. o' o. o • o ••• o. 8 1 :! .. 
} 1081 ~ . " t 4th Dragaolls Do. :! 2 8 10 ~ ti 5 28 2 7 8 .... 552 54 5~ 6¡¡4 055 3 .... 0= .. 
11 
•• o. .... •• o. o, o. o •• , ~ S 14th Lt. ])ns. Do. 2 1 6 14 1, ti 211 4 
" 
7 1 411:i 54 110 ¡¡4!1 fíO(; .. 1 .. 1 .. .. 9 .... 
} 1014 S 304 ~~ M. G. eotton .. "1 • , o. .- .. t 16th Do. Do. Do. .. .. 1 7 14 3 4 (j 32 1 4 H .. .. 519 73 62 654 líO'¡ .. ,. o. o • o ••• .. .. o- •• 4 .... 
B. G. Anson ~ 23rd Do. Do. Do. .. 2 1 8 14 11 5 4 33 .. 1 !) .. 
"1 41:)0 45 3 52~ fi:!1 •• o. o. , . o. o. o. o. o. o, 5 .... } 952 - t 1st Do. K. G. L. Do. 1 1 6 8 51 4 (j :!5 3 5 Ü .. ,172 75 20 5()7 587 1 .. 3 .... .. 
. ~I •• o. .. o. o. o, o • .. S 1st lIn. Coldm. Gds. Do. .. 8 .. 10 I 121 4 .. 62 8 3 20 2 986 118 .10 1184 .. o •• _ 1 1 .. o. o, •• " o. o- ... ~ 1 ~ B. G. H. Campbell Do. 1 ,í 1 7 .. .1.:11 3 .. 55 11 4 19 1 "li 1025 lGl 13 1200 .. :; t 1st Do. 3rd Do. I 1 .. :: 52068 ~ 1 Ca. ¡¡Oth Do. •• o- .. 1 .. . . .. 4 .. 1 .... ' 5¡¡ 1 1 58 .. S" 6bt Foot. 1st Bn. l\1arching to jo;n .. 1 2 7 17 7 :; .. 40 4 1 I 18 2 I 1I S~O 5U 13 883 .. 
.. ¡l4"r .ll B. G. Cameron t !:I3rd Do. 2nd Do. Camp PlacencÍa .. 1 1 8 22 (Ji fi 3fi 5 1:1 15 4 .. ' 537 26~ 31 850 .. .. 1 fIl . 1 Ca. 60th Oo. .... .. J 1 I "3 4 .. 1 .. .. 1 51 4 4 5U .. O B.G.Low ~ 5th Ln. Bn. K. G. L. Camp Galistia •• lo 1 5 II 7 32 8 2 13 
2 "1' 60fi 142 26 774 .. .. 3 .. l1151 ..¡ l 7th Do. Do. Do. o, •• 2 4 10 5 5 .. 38 4 2 14 .. 545 158 25 72H .. 
.. ~ f 1st Do. Do. Do. .... 2 7 l() (j 4 .. 211 4 ¡¡ 11 4.. 506 110 7 713 .. 
:: 1m6 1-- B. G. Langworth t 2nd Do. Do. Do. .. 1 2 7 15 6 (j .. 37 3 1 14 1 .. I 67!J 97 14 790 .. 1st aud 2nd Ln. Do. ])0. " -, .. 4 4 2 1 .. 6 a 1 1 .. .. 101 39 2 142 .. $ 53rd .Fo"t 1 st lIn. Camp Placencia .. 1 1 8 1;, 5 2 .. 39 fi 10 16 5 .. 727 178 132 937 .. o. o. o. o. o, o. o- o. o- o, o ••• 
:: (19"} M.G.Tilso~ 66th Do. 2nd Do. Do. o, •• .. 8 13 8 4 .. 2H 2 3 13 4 .. 543 88 28 650 .. .. 1 ci { 48th 2nd Do. D". .. 1 1 5 10 7 3 .. 31 5 2 10 4 .. 591 110 2 703 .. .. J 
:: j 394 ~ 1 Ca. 60th Do. ., , . .. 1 1 .. .. .. 4 .. .. 1 .. .. 52 6 1 5!! .. .. 1 flstBn. Dls. Do. .. 1 1 4 1:¡ 2 2 .. 43 8 9 7 4 .. 609 277 47 933 .. 
:: }2034 
B. G. R. Stewart t 48th Foot 1 st Bn. Do. .. 1 1 9 20 2 4 .. 46 3 1 17 2 .. 8:15 60 .. 885 .. '--- 20th Do. Do. Do. 1 1 ti 14 5 (j .• 30 9 3 1'; 2 500 123 H 731 .. ci·~ .. .. f 45th Vo. ])0. V cnta da liase goua .. 1 1 9 8 6 a .. 35 4 ~I ~i.3 .. 752 107 97 956 .. o, o. o ••• 2 .. .. .. o. o- o • o, ,. ~2244 .5 M. G. l\1'Kenzie t :nst Do. 2nd do. Do. .... 1 7 7 !J 3 .. 32 3 737 (;6 17 820 .. 1 .. ~tt4 24th Do. Do. ))0. .. 1 2 9 9 7 2 .. 4~ I I 22 1 75~) 1I7 22 894 .. 
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General Officers 
commanding 
Brigades. 
Regimenta. Stations • 
No. V. 
CONTINUATION. 
.... S . D l' d "1 I AlteratiOJlS. J .¡ Officers. ..!::: elJeants. rmrs. ..ank an ]< 1 e. Horses. ---1\-i I H . o ~ 'en. ürsps. 1 ~.:~ 
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M.G. 1I IIf5 Coso 60th Camp Malperteda 
~ U .~ -[ ~ .;;1 ~ ~ ~ .:< § % ~ S 3:i ~ S ~ ~.J! S ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ E.g 5] ~ ~ ~] 
o ...! ~ ro .~ ¡:: jg ~ ~ .~ o 2::.::! o ~ .~ o o ~.~ " .. 0 ·0 w ..... C) f¡ 2 ~ '" v ~ ~ .~ 
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1 41 7 5 3 21 2 2 8 1 1 268 S6 10 S14 
M'KeDz;e Col. Donkin t 88th Foot 1st Bn. 
87th Do. 2nd Do. 
<ti I r 7th Do. Do. 
. -'" n. G. A. C=Pb·1l1 t ,,'" Do. " •. O"" 1 Co. 60th S ... f 2nd En. Detach. ¡:C;u 
<ti C 1 K' 97th Foot, 1 Bn. O • emmlS { 40th Do. Do. 
1 Co. 60th r 43rd j.'oot, 1st En. 
B. G. R. Crawfordll t 52nd Do. Do. lI;¡th Do. Do. 
{5tl. Do. 2nd Do. 
• . 28th Do. Do. 
M. G. Llghtbournell .12nd Do. Do. 
88th Do. 2nd Do. r 34th Do. Do. 
B. G. C. Crawfurd (S9th Do. Do. 
68th Do. Do. 
Lt. Col. l\1'Lean 27th Do. Srd Do. 
Major Dundas Royal 8taft' Corps 
Captain Plate l. G. Co. K. G. L. 
IJo. 
1)0. 
Camp !'Iacencia 
Do . 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
])0. 
Marching to join 
Do. 
Do. 
Camp near Eelem 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Lisbon 
Placcncia 
Santarem 
'fotal" 
- - !I !J 20 4 6 32 8 5 13 3 1 606 10H 61 776 
"'''11 6 In II 5 37 6 4 16 1 _. 618 188 22 828 
1" 5 12 5 20 11 4 12 1 _. 414 144 5 56S 
1 .. 2 5 4 H 4 28 5 3 13 4 537 131 22 6110 
1 2 4 1 1 l.. 6·t 6. . 70 
11
1 
 2 
1 1 
8 25 1 3 25 11 3 11... . 627 301 1l 9311 
3 H 3 4 32 4 2 lb.. 1 506 106 23 635 
7 2\ 6 6 39 10 5 17 4 _. 753 142 21 916 
2 4 1 1 .. _ _ 56 41" 60 
1 2 9 20 6 6 5:1 23 .. .. !J9S. . • • 993 
1 2 8 20 7 5 55 ]!J _." 1001" " 1001 
1 2 10 27 6 Ü 55 19 _. .. 1023" _ _ 1023 
1 2 9 12 8 6 40 20 .. .. 562 39 .. 601 
1 2 6 13 9 6 40 3 19 1 .. 575 70 .. 645 
1 3 9 5 10 6.. 31 l!J 2.. 615 35 .. 650 
1 2 8 5 12 5 33 2 20 ... _ 613 S!J .• 652 
1 .. 5 8 6 6 39 1 \2 .. 10 629 S9 47 715 
1 2 6 5 4 4 21 16 .. .. 644 30
1 
1 675 
2 5 8 4 5 32 1 18 .. .. 522 14'. . 536 
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No. VI. 
State of the Royal British and German Artillery, Drivers, Royal Engineers, &c. 
Hea(l Quarters Placencia, 15th J uly, 180lJ. 
--. __ ._._~._-•• _----' 11 seJjts.11 Drmrs. II Rank and .File. Officcrs. 
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" o ~ o ,¿ ~ 
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Alterations. 
.¿ ,.Q 
'¿I'I~]~~] ~~-5&~=-5 
'S v .~ =lJ ~ 2 ~ 
.. QQQ':;il<~ 
Civil Branch. 
r-: iJ. 
..... '" ~ 3 . ~ 00 ~ 
"'.... o 
§ ~ ~ 
''>: 't:> E'" <::1 
o ~ o 
U U U 
;i 
1:: 
:s ;:: 
<t1 
-------,11-1-1-1-1-11-11-1-1-11-1-1-11--1--1--1--11_11 __ 11-1-1-1-1-1-1-11-1-1--1--f Artillery 
British ) 
t. Drivers 
f Artillery 
German~) 
t. Drivers 
Engineers 
Wn. Tn. attached to the Artillcry 
Waggon Train 
31..1101121 511 .. 1112111111 4111511 33tll 6912201627 3181 17 I 49 
21 61 111 4 II! 01. .1 2 11 51 .. 1..11 3491 381 651 45211 49tJ11 81 
5112 912 3111211 1821 251 1011 308 
111 1511 31 101 17011 19611 36 
11 .. 1 4112, .. :!, .. 24 3 27 
1 1 3 1 71 3112 1123, .. ~I. ~ 2371 131 411 29111 139 
-.-.-.-.--.,-11-1-1-11-1-1-11--'-_'--'--11--'1--11-1-1-1-1-1-1-11-1-1--,--
Total..1141212*91IO/l61I,171414111412171112871151143711815/18201111111 .. 1..1 .. 1..1..1 .. 1 .. 11318111149 
No. VII. 
Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. 
in action with the French Army, commanded by J oseph Buonaparte in person, in front of the town of Talavera de la Reyna, 
on the 27th July, 1809. 
Regimenta. 
14th Light Dragoons 
1st Do. Do. K. G. L. 
Royal British Artillery 
Do. ~~ngineers 
1st Bn. Coldstm. Guards 
2nd Bn. 24th Regt. 
1st Bn. 29th Do. 
211d Bn. 31st Do. 
1st Bn. 45th Do. 
1st Bn. 48th Do. 
2nd Do. Do. 
5th Do. 60th Do. 
Ist Do. 61st Do. 
2nd Do. 87th Do. 
1st Do. 88th Do. 
Ist Bn. Detachments 
1st Line Bn. K. G. L. 
lstand 2nd Lt. 130. Do. 
Killed. 
.' ~ E l.i 
'I:l = . :;.l .-
m o ~ <..,.. • ~ 
oom8 rñ~. ~rñ~ ~ ~ • ~ ,§ B ~ ~ § § ~ .3 g ~ E. ~ 'Cñ ~ ~ ,~, § ~j~~ú:.3~w5Jj~ 
---------
1 
1 
1"'''''' 
:0.1 •• 1 •• 2 
1 "1" 
'g l' ~ ~ .-"1 "
" ... 
" o ~ ;r: 
"1 9 2 7 
1
1
" 
10 .. 
22
1
" 
4 .. 
3 .. 
3 .. 
26 .. 
7 .. 
13 .. 
2 .. 
4 .. 
2nd Lt; Hattll. Do. 1," 
5th Do. Do. 
Wounded. Missing. Total. 
00 ~. 00 
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~ 
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'11 m 
~ '" .~~ ~ <i S ~ S ~I~ ~~~oo~=oo ri~~ ~ .--;~ü !i:; ~ .; 8 .~ ~ s.o • ;2 ~ S .!t gs ~ .: ..; a~vl ~~il.IC .-~U.~'" ~ I ~ & 51 . ..:: 2 a m ~ e ~ ~ ~ 'a ~ .~ ::l ~ ~ ~ ... ... 
,,"[l)O' Jí~ 
.-"1 " 
" ~ .. o
~ ::r: ~ ~ .~ .~ ª".~ 'a ~ ~ .; 8 a ~ ~ -a .~ v:;.l-l:iE:;.l-l:;ilwO'JíCi ~::r: ~:;.l-l 
~ c. :s 'tij >t:: ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~.E: ;::I.~"'P... !:) 
.5l c:l ~ ~ E "'" 1ü .... cd o a,¡ o ~ ~ CI:l ,~ 
-=- =-:.. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ =- =- =- =- -=- =- =-1-1-1-1-
"1" . ... 
.. 1 
1 
112 
21513 
111 
1
1
" 
1 ti 
2 .. 
2 1\11 413 
2 .. 
2........................ . ... 1 ........ 1 ...... 2 .. 
6.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 ........................ 12 .• 
42 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. l............ l ...•...... 53 •• 
31 .. 1 85 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.......... 2 l 2 .......• 109 ., 
13.. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... 7 ...... 1 ................ ~4 •• 
~ :: :: :. :: :: : :1:: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :::: ::: 
4 ............ 1 .......... 1 lb ........•. 1 .......... 1 25 .. 
3.. .. ................... .. .... 1 .............. 6 .. 
3 .. 124 ......... , .......... I .. 33 ........•. 2 5 4 .. .. 4 •. 183 •• 
2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. I ., •• •• •• •• •• 30.. .. .. .. .. .. 2.......... 62 .• 
í! .. 38.. .. .. .. .. 211 ., .. .. .. .. 13.. .. .. .. .. 2 2...... 3.. 64 .. 
7 ....... , .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. .................... 9 .. 
2 .. 23.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5.......... 1 l...... 2.. 49 •• 
3.. .. .... .. ...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 .. 
61" .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.. 32.. . .... , .. .. .. .. .. 11.. ., .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.. 49 .• 
.. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. :; 1 43.. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. 1 7 G .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 5 2 138 •• T"t'l"':~~~; ~ ~ ;kt 1~1~ - -;-~ ~~ ~ ; ::~~ t~,;' •••• "" ". ;; •••••• ";"., 2 ::: ~ ;; ~ ~ ~; 7~ "; 7th Do. Do. General Staff 
VIII. 
N ames of Officers Killed, W ounded, and Missing, 'falavera de la Reyna, 27th J uly, 1809. 
Killed. Wounded. Missing. 
Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rernarks. Rank and N ames. Regiments. 
Capto Fordyce,D. A.A. G. 8Ist Regiment. Lient. Hembruck 1st Lt. Dns. K. G. L. Severely Capto Poole { 1st Bn. Detachts. 52d Hegiment 
Lient. Col. Ross Coldstream Guards Capl. Boothby Royal Engineers. Do. Walsb 91s1 Hegiment 
Capto Lodge 31st Regt. 2d Bn. Capto and Adjt. Bryan 1st Bil. Coldstr. Gds. Do. Lieut. Cameron 79th Do. 
Lient. Graydon 88th Do. 1st Do. Lient. Popham 29th Reg. Do. 
l\1-Carthy Do. Do. Capto Coleman 31st Do. 2d Bn. Do. 
Lieut. George Beamish Do. Do. 
lWDougall 91s1 Regt. Ensign Gamble Do. Slightly 
Ensign La Serra 87th Do. 2d Do. Soden Do. Do. 
Lient. Col. Gnard 45th Do. 1st Bn. Severely 
Capto Woolf 60th Do. 5th Do. Do. 
Major Coghlan 6lst Do. 1st Do. Do. 
Capto M-Crea 87th Do. 2d Do. Do. 
Sorncrsall Do. Sligbtly 
Lient. Kavcnagh Do. Do. 
Bamall Do. Severely 
Kingston Do. Do. 
Johnsoa Do. Do. 
Carrol Do. Do. 
Ensign Moore Do. Slightly 
Knox Do. Severely 
Bntler Do. Do. 
Capto Dnring Rifle Corps, K. G. L. Slightly 
Lient. Holle Do. Sevrrely 
Adjt. Deliris 7th Line Bn. K. G. L. Do. 
b 
1\0. IX. 
Return of Killed, 'Vounded, and Missillg, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-gelleral Sir Arthur W ellesley, K. B. in action with the 
French Army, commanded by J oseph Buonaparte in person, at 'falavera de la Reyna, on the 28th J uly, 1809. 
11 
Killed. _~~,~n~~d. __ .__ JlJissíllg. 11 ________ Tota~ 
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. 9 ' l' 1', I 1, l' 1 , General Staff 1 . . , .. .. .. .. l' . . ·1" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. 13. ·1" ....... . 
3rd Dragoull Guards . :.! l ........ ¡ .. ,.. L, "1" .... "," .... "1.. 1 "1
1
,, "l'· .. l ... 1.. ~ a 
.1th Dragaoll' ~ 9 . '1' . 2.. 71 4 . ..,... . ........ 1 .... , .... l. ... i .. ~ . . 10 13 
Uth Light Dragoolls "¡"I" ~ 2i 2 3 ...... [ .. "1 61. 3. ..' .. ,,, .. 1 .. 1.. .. •• 1:; ' .. "jl .. ¡ 2 :1'." .. 31 
16th Do. Do. .. .. .. (j :.!I ··1 1 ...... 1 .. •• :,: 2 ··; .. '1· .. ···· 2 2 ........ 11 .. ··.. 13 25 
23rd Do. Do. .. 21.. 3 .. 44 70 3' .. 1 .... ¡ 2,1, 43,:.!i ..... :.! 1 7 :l 9ül2U ...... 5 ;': 1.. 12 3 18~224 
1st Do. Do. K.G.L. .. 1 .. 1.. . ""1" .. 1 32, .. 1 1 .. 1 .. : 11 2: :!!l27 ...... ·1·· 2 5 .. , .... " 1'11 "1'" 1:1 3164 
Hayal. Brítísh Artillery .......... ¡ 1 .. .. .. :? .j0l .. ·· 1 ...... , .. : .... 1 ~~I" .... 1 .. "1" .. "1" .. 1 .. :.!I J •· ".'. 2h 4() Do.~ermaDDo. ..1 .. ··1·... ..:!~ 11 .. ·· ...... 1 ... 3 .. 1 :jll" .. 1.. ......... . ............. ,. 4 .. 30 
Do. hllglll~ers l" .. l .... ¡ .. I .. "1 .......... J.... .... .. .. . ....... I .... J. 
D". Statf COT!,' 1 l.... .,.. .. .. .. .. ' .. i . . I 1 
Colrbtrealll Guardo, 1st lIn. 3;~:.I 5 .. 1 ..... : 1111, 2:1!1 .. , .... ,.. 21" :, .. 2." I1 1 27!< 31'11 Do. 1st ])0. .. 4.. 4" .. 1 I 1··I:l .. 1 •• 1 111 1, 2.1!)! .. I .. 1 i¡ 4.. 4 l.. 1:¡ 1 :W5 
3rd Hogt. Jioot, 1st Do. 1 .. :'!'j .. 1 1 ........ ' .. ' ;" .. ' lO:.!' .. !.. 1I ¡l.... ü .. 134 
7th Va. :.!Ile! Do. I .. ü .... 21 .. 1 .. : ~I~: ;il: .. :.. 1 .. l .. 1 .. ;1 .. ti.. 1 2 5~ 
24th Do.:.!ne!Do. 2 .. 42 ," :JI 1'¡4 1 .. : 1.11"12;'.;, .. ,.. :!I l' 12. I 11 .. I~ .. 31b 
20th Do. 1st Do. 1 .. '2:, l·· .. :!14 .... '. ". "f \1:.. .. .. "'l" :j .... ;!: 11" .... l .. 12:; 
., 1 t D .) J 1) 1 "0' I ') " '1 \ 1 . .. 1'''/ 
.) ~ O. _11 o. .. '" _ .. .. . '. . . 4 .• •• •. o' ,. • •• •• ' :.::...... u. . ~_ 
40th 1)0. IstlJo. 7 1.. .. 1,.... 2,..·17 .. 1.. .. .. '.. ..1.. . ... 1,........ ;! .. 55 
45th Do. ht Va. !J' .. [1.. .I! .. 1:\0'.. 11' JIj l JJ :1'" .. 5' 14[; 
4Hth Do. 1st Do. 2:! .. I I,:j 5 1 ':\' .. 1:\2'.. .. .. ~, :; 1.. 3 .. 15', 
·1Sth Do. :lile! Do. 11 .. :.. 1 1 .. , :\'.. 50' .. 1 !.. ". . ..1 1 i 1 .. 4.. {l] 
5:I,d Do.2nd])o. .. .... 1.. (j;.. 1111.... .., Ji .. ¡ :10i.. '.... I! .. !.... 1 .. 3(j 
(iOth [)o.:,th Do. ..!.. t: '.. .. 1i 3 J .. , 11"1 :11:.. 2: .. 1(0 :! .;11.. :¡ 1 40 
Oht ])0. 1st ])0. '1" 1 1 i 1 ·12 .. ' 4i .tl] "I IO J .. Pi::.. .., .. \l. ;" ~i 1 ¡ ]0 I :.!41 
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87th Do. 2nd Do. 11... "'.. ti .. ; .... ' .. 1; .. 11 .... · 3 •. 411.. ..1 .. " .. I 1 .... el .. 53 
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'!ndLine Bu.K.G.L. ...... .......... ~ ... ;il ... '11 J :11.1,4" ,,' I~ :¡ 271:.... .. .... '"...... :14 .... 1 1 1 :\1 5' 4 .... U'I 3 3:;:¿ 
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Regirnents. 
Wúunded. 
Hank and N ames. Regiment8. 
-------------
Captain Goodman 6lst Regiment 1st Bn. 
Hartley Do. 
Lieutenant J\1' Lean Do. 
Trench Do. 
Collins Do. 
Givill Do. 
Emign Brackenbury Do. 
Adjutant Drew Do. 
Capta;n Kelly Gr.th Do. 2nd Do. 
Ste",ar! Va. 
Adams Bt. LI. Col. Do. 
Lientenant Morris Do. 
Dudgcon ])0. 
Hnmbly Do. 
Steele Do. 
Shewbridge Do. 
Morgan ])0. 
Ensign Cotter Do. 
M'CaTthy Do. 
Captain Summerfield IS3rd Do. 2nd Do. 
Reynolds Do. 
J~ieutenant N icholson Do. 
Balowyn Do. 
Johnsoll Do. 
Abell Do. 
Pyne Do. 
Ensign Boggie Do. 
Carey Do. 
Lertoller Do. 
Adjutant Brahan Do. 
Major Gongh 87th Do. 2nd Do. 
Lieutenant Rogers Do. 
Ensign Pepper Do. 
Captain Brown 8l:itb Do. ] st Do. 
Lieutenant Whittle Do. 
EIIsign Whitelaw Do. 
!\Iajor Hoss 
"'" n'g;moo' l Captain 1\1 'Pherson 35th Do. '" 
Bradby t~lb Do. _" !l 
Chancellor ;ISth Do. "5 ¡¡ 
Lieutenant Gilbert I ~Hlh Do. d § 
M'lleth 1""" no_ J ~ ., Fullerton I~HthDo. ::; ~ 
l\1unroe 1421111 Do. >=1 i 
Brown 43rd Do. i 
No. Xl. 
CO NT [NUATIO N. 
-1 ltemarks. I~k and N ames. 
----------
Slightly }!ojor 1I0dl'cker 
Do_ Captain Marshall 
Do. Captain Salt'e 
Do. Petersdorft 
Severely Lieutenant Go',ben Senior 
Slightly Ern. H odenberg 
Va. Fk. Hodenberg 
Severely SaJfe 
Slightly Schlutter Senior 
SevereJy Ensign Allen 
Do. Lieutenant Col'mel Dranns 
Do. ,Majar Helleville 
])0. ICaptain BreJman 
Do. Heldrill 
])0. Sharnl'oust 
Do. Lientenan! Buerman 
Do. Wcnckstern 
Do. Wessell 
SlightIy Wick 
Do. Holle 
Leg ampu!ated I Ensign Tineh 
¡';everely ¡';chllliat 
Slighlly I llilleb I ])0. I Elumenhagen 
Sever~ly eaptain Hamelberg 
Slightly Gerber 
Severely Lieutenant Linsingen 
Do. During 
Slightly Ensign Brandfs 
Vo. Kohler 
Severdy Majar Berger 
Slightly Lieuteuant Volger 
Do. Freytag 
Severely Ensign Offen 
Do. Captain AlIen 
Do. Jhake 
Do. Lieulenant An.Ierson 
Do. Captain Leckey 13. Major 
Sligbtly EIlsign Reeves 
1)0. Lieutenant Shipley 
Severely 
])0. 
Sligbtly 
no. 
])0. 
Wounded. 
1 
Regiments. I 
----------------
1st Line Dn. K. G. L. I Do. 
1st Line HIl. K. G. L. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
.1;". 
Do. 
Do. 
2nd Line Bn. K. G. L. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
])0. 
5th Line En. K. G. L. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
7th Line Bn. K. G. L. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
23rd Lt. Dragoons ~1 Do. 
Do. S 
45th Foot 1 st Bn. t 48th Do. 2nd ])0. 11 
197th Do. Do. 1
1 
I 
Hetllark: s. 
Iy 
Y 
Iy 
y 
y 
y 
Iy 
Y 
Iy 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
Iy 
Missing 
No. X. 
Names of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, Talavcrade la Reyna, 2t!th July, 1809. 
Killed. Wounded. WOllllded. 
Rank and Nallles. Regiments. ,Rank and, Names. Regiments. ~emarks. ~k al:d Na~1 ~egiments. Hem~ 
}lajor Gen. l\i'Kenzie M~.Jor ~eneral IhU t>hghtly Lieutenant Klrwan 7th Foot :lnd Bn. Severely 
Br. Gen. Langworth Bngr. Gen. A. Campbell Do. ,Muter Do. Do. 
Captain Reckett (Bde. Ms.) Coldstream Guards H. Campbell Severely not dangerous A dJatant Page Do. Slightly 
Gardner Do. 4:~rd Fool ,Capto Whittingham 13th LI. Dns. D. A. Q. N. G. Slightly Liellt. Cul. Drummond 24th Do. 2nd Do. Severcly 
Lient. King 23rd LI. Dragoons i Blair !lb! Regiment Brigad" Majar Severely :\-Iajor Popham Do. Do. 
Power Do.' Bouverie Cold. Gds. ~ A. D. Cam~s to Lieut. Gen. ~ srd tI ICaptain Callis Do. 1)0. 
Wyatt Sritish Artillery Burgh !l2nd Re~t. i Sir A. Welle.ley S ' 1" I Y Evans Do. Do. 
Ensign Parker Coldstream Guards Z,er~sell ~st Le. Bn. A.D. C. tO,B. ,G. Langworlh Se~erely ~ie~tena?t Vardy Do. Slightly 
eaplain Walker 1st Bn. 3rd Guards ~ra1~ (SlClhan ltt.) Do. lo Lt., GI. Sherbrooke Shghtly "nslgn ~rant Do. Severely 
Buehanan Do. Captam Enee 3rd nn. Guards. Severely Skeene Do. Do. 
Dalrymple Do. IColonel Ha"ker 14th Lt. Dragooll" t>li~htIy Johnson Do. Do. 
Ensign Ram Do. I'Captain Chapman Do. Severely JesBamin Do. Do. 
Adjutant Irby Do~, Hawk~r Do. (Jo. ~djut~nt Topp ]).0' SlightIy 
Lieutenant Beaufoy 2nd Do. 7th F oot Lleutenant Elh. Do. Do. CaptaJ.n G auntlett :l9th Reglment Severely 
Majar F. Orpen tilst Do. 1st Bn. I Wainman Do. Slightly Newbold 1)0. Slightly 
Capt.in H. James Do. ¡ SlIlith Do. Do. Lieutenant Stan~ns 1)0. Severely 
Lieutenant IIemus 1)0.: Bellee 16th Do. Do. Do. Leshe Do. Do. 
Lieut. Col. Gordon H3rd Do. ':lnd Bn. Capto Howard 23rd 1)0. Du. Severely Stanhope Do. Do. 
Lieutenant D.hman (Jo. Frankland Do. Do. Nicholson Do. Slightly 
Montgomery Do. Lord W. Russell Do. Slightly ,Captain Niehnols 318tDo. :lnd Do. Do. 
Hood Do. Cornet Dudwell (Ju. Do. Lieutenant Girrllestone Do. Do. 
Captain Blake 88th Do. 1st. Do. Lieutenant Polen 1st Do. K. G. L Sevl'rely A. Beamish Do. SevereIy 
Wersabe 1st Line Bn. K. G. L. Cornet Tueto Do. t>lightly Captain CoIquhoun ~lOth Du. 1st Do. Sligbtly 
Lieut. Hy. Hodenburg . Do. Lient,. C.o!ollel Framingham Royal British Artillery Do. i\~ajor Gwynn 45th Do. Do. Severely 
}~vert 5th Lme Bn. K. G. 1. Captam 1 ay lar Do. Do. Lleutenant Cale Do. Do. 
Dachenhausen Do. Baylles Do. ])0. I Liellt. Col. Donelan 18th Do. Do. Do. 
Hemelman Do. ,Lientenant Stanway Royal Engineers Do. :\lajor Marston Do. Slightly 
Captain Todd Royal Stalf Corps Do. Captain Wood Du. Do. 
Lientenant Shanahan . Do. Do. FreJlch Do. Do. 
Lieut. Col. Stibbert Severely Lieutenant Dronght Do. Sevcrely 
. Sir W. Sheridan Do. Do. Page Do. Do. 
Captain ¡'lilhnan Do. Do. Cheslyn Do. Do. 
Christie Do. Do. Gill Do. Slightly 
Collier Slightly Cuthbertsoll Do. Do. 
\Vood Do. Do. Ensign Vandermeulen Do. Severely 
Jenkinson SevereIy Lieutenant Johnson 48th Do. 2nd Du. Slightly 
Ensign Sandilallds Do. not dangerons EJlsign RenIly Do. S~verely 
Li~ut. Col. Gorrlon 18tl~n. 3rd Guards t>lightly :\Iajor Kingscote 53rd Do. 2nd Do. Sli~htly 
!\lajor F'otheringham Do. 1)0. Captain Stowell Do. Do. 
,Captain Giels Do. Do. Garlifte U.Major 60th Do. 5th Do. Do. 
Emign Aitchison Do. Do. Andrew Do. Do. 
I 
Towers ])0. Do. Lieutenant Zuhlke Do. SevereIy 
Seolt Do. Do. Ritter Do. Do. 
Lient. Col. l\Iuler :~rd Foot or Hnlfa Severely Mitchell Do. Do. 
!
:\lajor Drummond (Bt. Lt. Col.) Do. t>lightly Ensign Altenstein Do. Do. 
'aptai:J Furllaee 6lat Do. 1st Do. Slightly 
Laing Do. 1)0. 
No. XV. 
Return of KiIled, W ounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-
general Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. OIl the Advance of the French Army towards the 
Position of Busaco, OIl the 25th and 26th September, 1810. 
KilIed. 'Nounded. Missing. Total. 
Regiments. 
¡ ~. ~. ~ I .. ~. 
'-> ~ • ü ~ . U ¿¡ . U ~;~ ~ I~ cA ~ ~ "'::: i ~ ~ 1.- • ~ ~ ... tñ ~ 
:: O.$.o"'d .Q '-' .. M"O • .:: O.~":l .= OOh"O 
é ~ ~ i: ~ S ; rñ .8 a ~ ~ g E 2 ai 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ e § ~ .S ~ ~ ~ ~ s § ~ 
g 1" ,~!ti ;:;; ~ El ~ ~ fl ~ ':!'!ti ;;; ~ El "á ~ ~ ':í ,';f!ti ;;;¡ ~ El"", ~ 5 ~ ,';f!ti;:S ~ E ~ ~ g- ;:: d ~ ~ ¡:;-- Z ('j s ª'".~ ~ Ctf ;..: ¡:-> E ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ s..: ¡:""l 2 ~ o ~.2:: = ~ ~ ~ E d ~ 
Ü ...:¡ ;.; ;5 P' .Jj :::=< ~ :::: '->...:¡ ;iI :ñ 01 )] :::=< ;::; :::: ü --' ;.; r7í 01 Ji :::=<1;::; :::: '-> ...:¡ ;iI :ñ 01 :Jj :::=< ;::; ¡::c: 
~.:::;:~:~:...o",I~~~::·-~I~~ :.~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~II~III~I~ ------ --
16th Do. Do. I . . .. .. .. 2 .. " 4 3 
11 .. 15[12 
4[ 9 
.. l·· 
Total British Lass. "']~[']]]]]~li]]~[[I-~[[I~I[I=!=[[[i]~I~il~[I~[[I~[I~127 
1st Hussars, K. G. L. 2 31 4 11 .. 1 3[ 6 
+HF ~~,: ~~i ••. ~ :,I~:ldl-I:I+I+II~dI:,+I~I+F.I~~I~ Portuguese Arllly General Total .. 
Captain Hoey, 99th Regiment, D. A. A. G. severely l wounded. 
Comet Keating, 16th Light Dragaons, slightly S 
d 
,· ..... l ~, 
No. XVI. 
Retllrn of Killed, W oundcd, and Missing. of the Army under thc Command of His Execllcncy J.ieutenant-general Lord 
Viscollnt 'Vellington, K. B., in Action with the French Anuy, Ilnder the Commaml of Marshal Massella, Prince oi' 
Esling, in the Position of Busaco, on the 27th September, 1810. 
K~]Jcd., . . wounde~. . Missing•. 1I Total.. 
~~ ~ '* -~ 2 ~ : ~ I ~ I r~ ~ 
<1 • I U ;- " • '-' ;;: " • U ;- 1" . U .-o ¡n '- .... o .e ..... .,..... o ~ ~ • ~ o ~ '- . ~ 
"O .;: O.¿~"'C 0"0 .¡:: O.,;~"'O .0 .::: o .~"C ....... • ¡:: o.~ "C 
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-; .~ ~ ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ § 8 ~ .~ ~ ~.~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ § ~ 1-3 .~ '~' ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ '~. e ~ ~ 1-3 .E '~. ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ 'C-O e § a 
G"",¡ swr I~. ~f ~~~ -': ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ :' ~' ~ ~ "-,:~~,, " =,' ~~'. ~~ ~;~ ~ ~~ ~~: ~ <, ~ ~ ~ :' ~ ~. A " " 
British Horse Artillery l" .. .. .. 2. . 1 .. .. " .. 2 
Do. Foot Do. .. .• .. ] .. 1 .. 4. . . .1. . .. •• .. •. .. ].. 5 
German Do. Do. .. .. .. 3.. ..," .... "1" .. 3 
3rd Foot 1st Bn. 1" 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. 2 
5th Do. 2nd Do... 1 .. 1.. 1i .. 1..' ." '1" ,," 1 .. , 7, .. 
7th Do. 1st Do... I .. 1 .. 22 .. ' .. .. 1.. .. l.... 2:3' 
9th Do. l~t Do. r, .. l" 1 .. 1 .. 17.. .. .. .. l.... 1 .. 22 
24th Do. 2nd Do. .. "," 1 .. " .. 1·· . '1" l ...... 
3!'thDo.2ndDo. 1 .. 4 .. '.. .. 1.... 17.. ' '...... I .. ¡.. 1 .. 21 
42nd Do. 2nd Do. .. .. l.. .. .. .. .. 2 1 3. . ' ..' . l! 1 3 
Corps. 
43rd Do. 1st Do. .. .. 1" 1 .. 7. . ' .... 1. . 1 .. 7
1 
, 
45th Do. 1st Do. .. 1 21 .. l" :1 . . 3 .. 101i .. 12 .. . . i 2 1 4.. 4 .. 13!J 
50th Do. 1st Do. .. .. .. .. . .' 1 ., . '1" .. 
52ndDo.lstDo. 3.. 11.. lO.. 11 .... ' ...... 13 
60th Do. 5th Do. 3·· 1 3.. lli .. 5 .. !.. 1 3.. .. .. .. .. 24 
74th Do. Ii .. 1 .. 1.. 20.. .. .. i .. 2.. .. .. 1 1 .... 1.. 21' 
711th Do. 1st Do. 7.. 41.. .. .. 1 .... 1.... ti.. .. 2...... .. 1 .. 54 
83rd Do. 2nd Do. 1 . . .. 1 3. . . " . . .. "1 .. .. l.. '" '. 1 3 
88th Do. 1st Do. I ., 29.. 2 3 l! 1 2 .. 92.. ' I .. ¡'.. 2 3 3 1 3'.. 122 
95th Do. 1st Do. 9 . . 4 I 27.. . ... 11 • • •• •• •• •• 4 1 1 36 
1st Line Bn. K. G. L. :1 •. 1 .. I .. 4. . 1 .. 1 .. 7 
1st Light Do. Do. ..1.. 1 .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 10.. 2 .. "1" 3.. 12 
2nd ])0. Do. Do. I .. .. .. 11.. 11" 5.. ..!.... ..,.... 1.. 1 .. Ii 
2nd Lino ])0. Do. 1 .. 2. . ] I .... ", .• , . . Ii. . . " I .. . '1 1 1.. 9 
5th Do. Do. Do. 1 .. '" ., .... ' .. i . . 11. . ¡'. " . . . ... I •• • • .1.. .. .., . I .. 1I 
7th Do. Do. Do. .. ..... .. .. .. 1 i. . b .. ' . . . ....... ¡ ........ i •. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. 1.. l' 
------1-1----- -- ' ---1-- -------'--------'-----1--:---'-- ---I_~ __ 
Total1ossBritish ...... 1 1 2 1 .... 5 .. 97 .. : .. 1315 1Ol() II .... :JI :)4311 .. ' ...... 1 1 .... 1 .... 1 .. 12g .... 31 (j 1218 21 .... :J7 :1 .jIJ5'1" 
Do. Portngnese .. ~.:..:..:..:.~ ___ .;..:. .... ~~_~':":'I.~j~~~ I~.:..:..:..:.-=.'.:.~~~~ ___ ~~ ':":'':'':'--~':'':'.'.:L·· '!'.Ij~t' ____ I,! ~I~ -=~ ~I':":'I~' 12 1!~~_._. 
Total. ·1 .... i 1 .1 2 31·'~r~ Ii 1 179 "I! 1 316 1521 141 .... 30 :l 11I17 .. 1 .. 1.. .. 1 .. \ .. / .. "13 1 .. /.17 .. ¡ 1 3 7 :.n¡23 17¡ .... :l9 41143 .. 
1\'1 
e 
L 
E 
L 
B 
4 
6 
6 
Killed. 
Rank and N ames. 
.jor Smith 
ptain Urquhart 
eutenan! Ouselcy 
!Sign Williams 
eutenant lIenry John80n 
itish 
'. Foot Captain W. l\'l'Intosh 
Do. De 80uza 
th Foot ])0. Charles Fax 
ndDo. Do. Sali,bury 
Eusign Castes 
Das N ovas Franei 
No. XVII. 
Names of Ofllcers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810. 
'Vounded. Woullded. 
ltegiments. I Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. Rank and Names. Regimeuts. Remarks, 
45th Foot 1st Hu. ¡Lieutenallt Colonel Barclay 52nd }'oul SJightly ¡ Major Prior . 1st Regt. Ports. Slightly 
Do. I C. Campbell 70th Du. A. A. G. Do. I Ensign J. M. de Pantos Do. Do. 
Do. eaptain Ld. Fitz Somerset 43rd Do. A.D.C. lo Ld. Wellington, Do. I B. de Senio Do. Do. 
74th Do. G. Preston 40th Do. Do. to Sir B. Speneer Do. : Captain F. Auzabis 8th Do. Do. Do. 
8t:!th Do. 1 st Bn. Lieutenant Majr 7th Do. 1st Bn. Do. ! Lieutenant V. Matthias Do. Do. 
Liudesay 9th Do. Lst Do. Severely I Ensign Jno. A. Rodrigo Do. Do. 
Captain Meaeham t4th Do. 2nd ])0. SJightly Manuel Pedro Do. ])0. 
Lieutcnant Miller 3~th Do. 2nd Do. Do. I J. Manuel ])0. Do. 
;\lajor Gwynn 45th Do. 1st Do. Severely l Felix Antonio 9th Do. Do. Do. 
Lieutenant Harris Do. Do. ¡Captain P. Jose 16th Do. Do. Do. 
Tyler Do. Do. ,'Ensign J. Maria Do. Do. 
Anderson Do. Slightly , Lientenan! J. Galderio 19th Do. Do. 
Majar Napier 50th Do. 1st Do. Severely Colonel Champion 21st Do. Do. 
Captain G. Napier ;,2nd Do. 1 st ])0. Slightly Captain S, Hurgess Do. Do. 
Lieutenant C. 'Vood Do. Do. Lieutenant J .. Maehell Do. Do. 
Lieutenant Col. Williams 60th Do. Do. Ensign J. Montero Do. Do. 
Captain Andrews Do. Do. J. Alberto Do. Do. 
Lieutenant J oice Do. Severely Botello Cas 3rd Cassidores Do. 
Eberstein Do. Do. Segurada Do. Do. 
Franhein Do. Slightly J. Chrostimo Do. Do. 
Cargill 74th Do. Severely Captain J. Bernardo 4th Do. Do. 
Captain Douglas 70th Do. 1st Do. Do. Lieutenailt A. Queroz Do. Do. 
1st Regt. Portugllese Lieutenant Colthurst 83rd Do. 2nd Do. Slíghtly J. D. Vasconeella Do. Do. 
8th Do. Do. Major Sil ver 88th Do. 1st Do. Severdy (siuee dead) Ensign }'eliziamo Do. Do. 
16th Do. Do. J\l'Gregor Do. Do. Captaiu L. Homm íith Do. ])0. Do. 
21st Do. Do. Captain J\I' Ut'rmott Do. Do. 
Dansey Do. Slightly 
4th Cassidore. Bury Un. Do. 
Lieutenant }'itzpatrick Do. Sev('rely 
Nickle ])0. ])0. 
E",ign Leonard Do. SeveTely 
Lieutenant During 1st Line Hn. K. G. L. Slightly 
i"Uajor Wurmb Do. Do. 
. Lieutenant Stoltc Det. 2nd Lt. Do. Severoly 
!Captain J. Cameron 79th Regiment 1st Bn. Missing 
Killed. 
-
Rank and N ames. 
Majar Smith 
Captain Urquhart 
Lieutcnant Ouseley 
Ensign Williams 
Lieutenant Henry Johnson 
I 
British 
4th Fool Cap!~in W.l\f'Intosh 
Do. De 80uza 
66th Foot Do. Charle, Fox 
ü2nd Do. Do. Sali,bury 
Enoigu Caste.s 
Das N ovas Franci 
No. XVII. 
Names of OfficeJ's Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 27th September, 1810. 
I 
I Hegiments. I Rank and N ames. 
45th Foot lst Bn. LieuteJl:mt Colonel Ilarclay 
Do. C. Campbell 
Do. Captain Ld. Filz Somerset 
14th Do. G. Prestan 
88th Do. 1st Bn. Lieutenant Mair 
Lindes.y 
Captaio Meaeham 
Lieutenant ~Iiller 
Majar Gwynn 
Lieutenant Harris 
Tylcr 
Anderson 
¡Majar N apier 
¡Capt.in G. Napier 
iLieutenant C. Wuod 
\ Lieutenant Col. Williams 
'CaptalIl }\ndrews 
Lieutenant Joice 
Eberstein 
Franhein 
Clirgill 
Captain Douglas 
1st Regt. Portuguese Lieutenant Colthnrst 
8th Do. Do. Major Sil ver 
16th Do. Do. l\I'Gregor 
21st Do. Do. Captain l\l' ])ermott 
4th Cassidores 
Dansey 
Bury 
Lieutenant }'itzpatrick 
Nickle 
En,ign Leonard 
Lieutcnant j)uring 
,Uajor Wurmb 
Lieutenant Slolte 
ICaptain J. Cameron 
w, Jlluded. 1
1 
Wounded. 
Regi ments. Remarks'!1 Rank and Names. llegiments. 
52nd Foo' 
70th Do. 
'13rd Do. 
40th Do. 
1th Do. 1: 
mh Do. 1: 
24th Do. : 
3tith Do .. 
45th Do. 
50th Do •. 
• 2nd Do. 
60th Do. 
74th Do. 
7!Jth Do. 
83rd Do.' 
88th Do. 
1st Line . 
Det. 2nd 
19th H~g: 
Slightly '1 ~,faj~lr Prior' ls! Regt. Ports. 
. A. G. Do. ,Enslgn .l, M. de Pantos Do. 
A.D.C. to Ld. Wellington, Do. I B. de Senio Do. 
Bn. 
Do. 
Id Do. 
nd Do. 
sI Do. 
)0. 
Do. 
Do. 
1])0. 
st ])0. 
Do. 
Do. 
)0. 
)0. 
Do. 
st Do. 
Id Do. 
st Do. 
)0. 
:)0. 
Do. 
)0. 
Do. 
Do. 
)0. 
n. K. G. L. 
)0. 
.1. Do. 
,nen! 1st Dn. 
Do. to Sir B. Speneer Do. Captain F. Auzabis 8th Do. Do. 
Do. Lieutenant V. l\latthias Do. 
Severely Eusign Jno. A. Hodrigo Do. 
Slightly Manuel Pedro Do. 
Do. J. Manuel Do. 
Severely Felix Antonio 9th Do. Do. 
Do. Captain P • .lose 16th Do. Do. 
Do. Ensign J. Maria Do. 
Slightly Lieutenant J. Galderio 19th Do. 
Severely Colonel Champion 21st Do. 
Slightly Captain S. Burgess Do. 
Do. Lieutenant J. MacheIl Do. 
& ~~L~~ ~ 
Do. J. Alberto Do. 
Severely Botella Ca. 3rd Cassidores 
Do. Segurada Do. 
Slightly J. Chroslimo Do. 
Severely Captain J. Bernardo 4th Do. 
Do. Lieuteflallt A. Queroz Do. 
Slightly J. D. VasconceIla Do. 
Severcly (since dead) Ensign Feliziamo Do. 
Do. Captain L. Homm Gth Do. Do. 
Do. . 
SliglitIy 
Do. 
Severely 
Do. 
Severely 
Slightly 
Do. 
Severelv 
Missing 
Remarks. 
Slightly 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do • 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
No. XVIII. 
// 
/. 
.~ 
Return of Killed, W ounded, and Missing. of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general 
Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in skirmishing with the Enemy's Advance on the 4th, 
5th, 8th, and 9th October, 1810. 
Regiments. 
3rd Dragoon Guards 
1st or Royal Dragoons 
14th Light Dragoons 
16th Do. Do. 
1st Hussars K. G. L. 
]st or Royal Dragoons 
16th Light Dragoons 
1st Hussars K. G. L. 
Wounde'l. ,1 ___ ~l\Iiss~~_ Total. 
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•.. , .. .. •• . ...••..•. 1
1
" I l. ___ .1 .. . ....... 1 
" .J. 
", .. ,1 1 "1.1
1
",,,,,,,,, 
.. ,11 1315, . '1 .. 
5 5 Ili .. ,,,, .. 
21 1"1"""" 
31311,,,, .. , .. 
Killed. 
I ~ ~ ~~ :01 • ~ -~I~"; ~~= . .~ "Sb ~"" ~ ~ .§~ ] ~ ~ I~ I~ I ~:,)....::~·'LJ'fl~~ -~ 
81 !JI 7 
111 1 3112 
4 
5 
12 
2 
~12Illlrl"l"n 3 3 2 4
1
4 ti 2 ... oO ....... 16 1824 
5 () 3 
41 4 4 " .. .... .. 1 .. 4 5 lO 
4
1
4 4 .. .. .• .. .. .... 8 810 
11 .. IH:17 42 ........ 2 .. 252923 
Total. .11 •• 1 .. 1. ·1 .. 1 .. 1· .13131;;112r~I~I~I-·· 121~1281;I;¡¡rlll~n-·· l-¡n;oI;I;1141~TT~I-.. 13D;;Jlfi;l; 
16th Light Dragoons, 
Do. 
lst HIlSS:lI'S, K. G. L. 
Captain lHurray. slightly. 
Sweetenham, sevorely. 
Aly, slightly. 
Linsingen, Do. 
1,t or Royal Draf!:oom-, Lielltenant Carden (mi~sing.) 
No. XIX. 
Return of Killed, W oUl1ded, ul1d Missil1g, of the Arrny undt>r the Command of Lieutenant-general 
Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. in an affair with the Enemy near Sobral, 14th October, 1810. 
Killeel. 11 \Vounded. l\lissing. Total. 
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R .. giments. 
ü ,...:¡ :.:¡ 'lJ 3'ü 'lJ ~ ;:¡:; >-< I,ü ,...:¡ ~ 'lJ 3'ü rn ~ ~ >-< ü H :.:¡ 'lJ 3'ü lfJ e :>:: >-< ü >-1 ;.;¡ lfJ O'ü rn ;:::: :>:: >-< 
GeneralStaff I~~~~-.. ~~-"I'i--¡-:-:~~-" ~~-.. ~I~'~'~'-" ,~,~,-.. --------
2Hh Foot 2nd Bn. i '.... .. .. , .. , .. , 
, I 
11 . . 1_ ., •• 
1 
11 .. , .. 
7 11
1
:: 
2 11 .. 1 
50th Do. l,t Do. 
60th Do. 5th Do. 
7lst Do. 1st Do. 
Dets. 95th Do. 3rd Do. 
1st Line Bn. K. G. L. 
2 
¡ 
6
1
",,, 
41 .. 1 23 .. , .. 
I 
7 
1 
2 
4 10 
4 30 
... } 9 
1 
2nd Do. Do. 
5th Do. Do. 
1 .. 
11 
4 'j' _lo. 
I 
"J" 4 
...1 
7th Do. Do. 
Total .. ::H+IH·I~::ii~~l ~~~ .: ::::I+~I+r. ~I~ +~~:i;'-
General Staff, Captain 1Jouglass Mercer, arel 11001 Uuarus, acting A. D. C. to Lt. Gl. Sir B. Spenccr, slightly. 
!)iith Foot, 3rd Battalioll. LieuteIlant}~eles, severely. 
"lh Line B"llalioJl, K.(;.L. .\Iuller. Do. 
No. XX. 
Heturn oI' Killed, W ounded, and Missing,of a Division of the Army under the command of His Excellency Lientenant-general Lord Visconnt 
Wellillgton, K. B. in action with the Frcnch Army near Almeida, on the 24th J uly, 18] O, Head-quarters Alverca, 25th J uly, 1810. 
Regiments. 
General Staff 
Royal Horse Artillery 
14th Light Dragoons 
16th Do. Do. 
1st Hussars, K. G. L. 
43rd Foot, 1st Bn. 
52nd Do. 1st Do. 
15th Do. 1st Do. 
Total British Loss .. 
1st Bn. Cassidores 
3rd Do. Do. 
Total Portuguese Loss .. 
Grand Total. . 
. ~~~~~~d. J Missing.~! Total.: 
.!'l I ~ ¿ ~ ¿ I·~ I . I ~ 1 ..'!! ~ ~ ~.i! ;;. W 
KilIed • 
al CJ _ rr..... c....: Q) V ~ 00 ....: a;¡ ,r, -::.:n ~ C) U ~ ~ ¡::: .,..,. '+-O ;: ~ I ..... ¡...¡ 'Io.i c:: • ...... .~ J- 4-i;:. ..... H 
o oi ...... ~o \"1:0 ~I ~ • ~ o dO ~ I+-t .~o ~o rn. ....... ~ o I ~ ~ rñ .5 ~ é ~ E S ~ ~ rñ ~ ::J 00 .S ffi ~ ~ ~ I a § I:!: '" 1 ';j u J, .S \j rJ Z!" S :;; 'en J, ~ U W .S "rJ ¡';" s ;a .., w :o ~ 1:i. ~ rñ 5 -= :e ci2 :5 ro §. ~ al ~ ""O '~ W -O rñ §. ~ cA ~.~ ~ :n:o rñ §. ~ w t ""d ;:::; ~ ...; 8 .5 .8 b(¡ •• :E g3 e,.!tl ~ ~ t.; o .5 -;:: b.I:., ~ ~ I E ..:.d (!.I ~ ~ .:; S 5 ~ .~., ~ gS a..:.:: ~ ~ t:: ~ t:: s B b.O • :2 ~ ;::: .!:4 H ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ g .~ ~ ;.: .~ E § ~ 8 ~.~.~ §'.; .~ ] ~ '~I E ~ ~ a I ~ .~ 3 ~.~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ 2 ~ ~ t: S ~ ~ ~ ~ '§ ~ ~ .~ 2 ~ y ~ ~ ~ ~i~e.I='~~~ =-~~~ ~I=-~~=-ei~~~=--=-~~I,:::.=- -=-~ ~ ~ w ~'=-,- ~ =-=-=- a ~~~~ ~ ~~~:"-=-I~=-
...... 1 .. ··1" .. .. .. .. .. .... 1" "1" "1"1" .. ··ji" .. '·1 .. 
.. , .. , .. , .. ,.. .. l ............ 1.. .. 21.. .. 2.. .. .. , 211 3 
11 .. 14j....I.. l' 1 .. 4 •• 1 •• 1 1 .. 1 .. li .. 
! 
o.' •• 
i 
11 .. 1 .• 1 .. 121"1131' '1"11"1"1'.1 41 (j,., 
.. , .. , .. , .. , .. 1, ........ 1 1 .. 1 .. 
!l11 
3'.. "l'. 3 
21 .. 13... .... 2 .. 4 
771 .. 1 .. 11··, .. 1 114, .. 1 5171 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1101:.! 1104, .. , .. 
• _l •• 1 •• t •• 1 •• 1" -l' -l' -1 31 •. 11 .. [ .. 41 •• 1 •• 
~~.I':'·-H~'~~~~ ~i~~ ~II~ ~~I~- ~1~lj~ ..!.~~I~ ~.:.' .:--.~~ j~I~I~I~~~ ~j.~ ~~~":'~~~~-=I~I~Cj~ 
-- '1-r ' ¡ -- - - -- , --1'" " 1, -- , , ,'-- ---- "' ''',- -" --------1 ' 1- - - - -- , '" --1- - , , , , >ti - - - - - - '" '"'1' " ~~[[IT~~~~·:-~'~~~~~'~~~~ ~--::~[ ~,~~~. II~~ ~ ~:~I~ ~~~~: . ~~~~::~.: I~. 
;~~t[;IJ;;1 ~;~~:~~~~~ ,::~;I=l;--I[;~~ :'::[; ;; ;o~:--=;: ~ ,::;~ 
No. XXI. 
Returo of OfIicers Killed, Wounded, amI Missing, on the 24th July, 1810. 
Killed. Wounded. I 1\Iissing. 
Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. I Rank and N ames. Regiments. Remarks. 
Lient. Col. Edward HuI! 43rd Foot 1 st Bn. Lieut. Shaw 43rd ltt. A. D. C. ~ 
,------------------
Slightly ¡Lt. J. 1\I'Culloch 9"th Regt. 1st Bn. taken prisoner Captain E; Cameron Do. to B. General Crawford S 
Lieutenant J "bn N asan Do. Lieutenant B1atchford 14 tll J"ight Dragoons Severely 
D.lH'Leod 95th Do. 1st Do. Captain P. Deshon 43rd Regut. 1st Bn. Slightly 
'fhomas Lloyd Do. Do. 
W. F. 1:'. Napier Do. Do. 
J. W. Hull Do. Severely 
Lieutenant George Johnstone Do. Sligbtly 
J. P. Hopkins Do. Severely 
H. Harvest Do. Slightly 
James I\I'Dearmid Do. Severely 
J ohn Stephenson Do. Do. 
Roger Frederick Do. Do. 
Majar Hcnry Hidewood 52nd Do. 1st Do. Slightly 
Captain R. Campbell Do. Do. 
James Creagh 95th Do. 1st Do. Severely (sínce dead) 
Samuel l\Iitcbell Do. Do. 
1st Lient. H. G. Smith Do. Slightly 
Mathias Pratt Do. Severely 
Reilly Do. Do. 
Coane Do. Do. 
T. Smitb Do. Do. 
2nd Lient. George Simmons Do. ])0. 
3rd Cassidores ~ One Officer, rank t and name unknowll 
:, 
.~~:' 
No. XXII. 
State of the Royal British and German Artillery Drivers, Engineers, &c. 
Head-quarters, Cartaxo, 15th February, 1811. 
Officcrs, Serjeants, Drurnmers. Rank and File. Alterations sinee last, I 
Civil 
---~-----c----~ Branch. 
" Siek. l~ Siek.¡ 1:: I Sick, ~ Men. Horses. I~ ~ ~ ~ ¡ 1::: '"' - ::: '"'1 :::: ,,¡, I .. I.~ ,S ' 
..,.J CI:l .Oc .o¡;: .O!=l ""'d "'O .. '"dl ..... ~wcn
.... • ¡:: Q.l -o 1.... "'C I ''''' "'o..... <l) • c.J"¿ • '"O Q) ro. M· 
2 i .S ~ ~ ~ ~ .; § E:g ~ .: ~ fJ ¡ ~ .~ ~ ...: ...! § ~.~ ..... I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ E 1 ~ ~ 'O ~ t 
1m 
a: 
p ;... ('C <U T.. ¡:: ¡::l ::: ;:: ¡::H ¡:: e ¡:: :::'~ ...... 1::: ::: ¡:: ~:::"::;:! ~ rI> ""O .. ~ t: ~ o u I~" o:.¡... el ~ <Il ~ t.J ~o ....... ""'~ ..... <l.>~-o~lc..::.....¡,-or-!. c:J <l.J (jJ ,.., OF-l""': C) QJ""O ..... Q)"'s;::s ..... "'Cl·:r. ¡::¡Cl..!:ld~--= 
........ '" ;:j ~ ~ ifJ JJ 1Jl ;:: 'Il q) T.J 00 a. 1> '1' 'n 00 E rJ). ro: ~ ~ ¡::; c:; :..:. !.Il el - u ~ ~ e S" 1- ¡:: '.;:s 
...: ! ;;.~ ;:; ~ ¡:; E ~ i5 ~ "'O I ¡.; ~ -=- o c: '"d ~ ~ ~ o'C "'O 'O o ::l ...... CJ ;!l <l) f :2 ~ V IV a f o ~ ~ o .... 
H '" ~ ...:¡ en :Ií ;:.., ;:.., --1 ;,);:.. ;; ¡Ii: :lo. --1 U ,:lo.:'l il< il< < U ¡¡,,:'l ¡..., =: ;;::¡ ~ ~ ~ :::¡ ;.- ;:.., ~ i~ ;l U;'- U il< U u <1 
J
' {Horse l~rtiJlery - -: ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ --, -; ~ ~ --,-- -H/-l -; 29 ~3 -,-,- -2-7-0 -·-·-r~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -.-,-,~,~,~ 
Do, Duvers 6 ]26 <1 20 42 1921420 I 9 .. ,," 9," 
_ B, FootA~tillery 3" 1122 5 16 .. 1 2 7 .. 2 3 63022,62 97 12 823 .' 1"1" 1 .. 11 1 .. " .. ,,11 4 118118147 
~ Do. DrIvers 2 7 1; fi :! 17 5 .. 4 :;07 11 5334fi 7 724 5791230 .. " . ,l .. 1" ,. Iv:; 5 3, .. 
P:; lG'f Do. Artillery 5 12 2 .7 5 .. . 229 10 13 25:;, ' 
t. Do, Drivers 1 " 120 4 11 1 136 1881 78 
Engineers 10 12 .. 3 .. 16 " 17 ,.! 
Waggon Train 1 1 615 3 2:l0 .. " 16 1 4 ... , 1 " 1
232 
.. 28196 3 45!11 2!1.. ............ 
9
1
3 1"''''1'''' '" 'l" Total,,1~2 :W~IM WI ;g2~;-3~!~1~1;; ~218-. '-!~I;;:!J4 738 -;;- 287411480 317. ~3~~11, ;9~~ -6-;;;41 
, , 1 ; l' • 1 ¡ 
314,,, 2 
No. XXV. 
Rcturo of Killed, W oundcd, and .M:issing, of thc Army under the Command of Lieutenant-
general Lord Viscount W cllington, K.B. in Action with the French Army froro the 6th 
to the 15th March, 1811. Head-quarters Lousao. 
Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 
~. ~. ~. ~. 
00 ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ui ~ .~ ~ O'~"'Ci .~ o.¿.-o .~ ,o.~'"Cl .~ O.~'"d 
(/lCfl. ~CIJ(1)~ cnco:: • • r,:¡". __ Ulct:.oOOa,..= ¡flcc· '~vs:: ~ .s ~ ~ ..::;;¡ a ..: rñ ,ñ ~ S ~ !: ~ S ~ :ti 00 S S ~ ~ ~ S ~ cñ rñ.S s: ~ E e El d 00 ~i~~~~.~§~~ 2.a.~~L~~~~"á ~ ~~~1~~~~;~~ ~~~ftc:~~8~ ~ 
..! ctl.~ ~ .5 t.. t; ;.. ~ o ~ ce I'~ :: ::.. ..... :; l-o ~ :: I~ :'ti .~ 1 ¡:; i1 :... t ... ;'1: :;:¡ ~ C':l .~ ¡:; .5 '"' ~ ¡..., ~ o 
"" U -l ;:.< en O' en :::¡ ::c ;:: "" U -l ;,;¡ "fj O' "f) :::¡ ~ ~ 1'" U -l ~ W O' :f] :::¡ ~ ;:¡; "" U ....:: ;:.< W O' :f] :::¡ ~ ::c: 
8th March 18111[~~~~~·~~~ 1 ~~I~~~~~~~-~~ ~~j~~~~~-;-; ~~~~~~~1~---;;10 
9th Do. • .,. ·1· ., •• , •• , •• , •• 11 1 
10th Do. 
¡ 
.01 •• , •• 1 •• 1' .1 •• 1211 .. 211 213 
11th Do. •• I •• I.ol •• I··! 1 ........ 1 o. •• •• •• 4 .. 5,·· 
""'j" .......... 8 3 5 1 .. 5 .. 106 4 ................ 5 .... 1 5 .. 5 .. 11917 
..1 .. l .......... l~ .. ,1 531 .. 10 .. 93 .................. 4 .. 541 .. 10 .. 109, .. 
l .... 2 1 .. 6 .. 1 ..•. 1 1 .. " l.. 57,. ., , .•.. , ..... , ,. .. .. .. ,. 3 1 ., ., 2.. 631~ 
12th Do. 
14th Do. 
15th Do. 
------~--,- ---------- --1------- -----.-----
British 1
1
" .. 3 .. .. .. 1 .. 27 (j: 1 6 !JI I .. lü .. 264 ~ .. .. .. .. .. .. I(j 8 1 ti 12 4 1 .. 17 .. 307 :,21 
Portuguese ¡ ................ 21 .. 11" 21 1 3 .... 6 .. 80.. .. ...... ~ .. !J.. 2 1 3 .... 7 .. llol~ 
Grand Total .. II~~3~~~-¡~:u;-;;-II-¡-;1~7-¡~;-:-:- 344 7 ~~-:-:F~~ 1 ~;;-; l--;137\~~;~ 417 121 
f 
(Signed) 
E.1\'[, Pakenham, 
Col. D. A. G. 
No. XXVI. 
"l\ ames 01' thc Otlicers Killed aud W oUllded 
from the 6th to 15th March, lS11. 
Date. Rallk alld Names. !I Regiments. 
'1 
Uth March, l~ll 
I 
Lielltenant 'fhomas Gifford 1: i;2nd Foot 1st En. 
Sawatzky 60th Do. 5th Do. 
15th Mareh Hepenstall 1 88th Do. 1st Du. 
WOllnded. 
11th March, 18U Lientenant Hopwood 9i\tb Regt. 1st En. 
I En,ign Jose Joaquim Figeo 3rd Caeadores Lientenant Clark 5th Foot, 2nd Bn. March 45th Do. 1st Do. Cross ¡¡2nd Do. 1st Do. Ensign Lifford Do. Do. I;!lh Do. Adjutant Winterbottom Do. Do. 
< Lientenant lIippenstall 8!lth ])0. Do. 
I Captain Rogne 94th Do. Lientellant Beckwith 95th Do. 1st Do. Captain Chaproan (15th 1st Caeadores Waldron 27th II th of the Line Ensign Jase Felicissimo 4th Cacadores Jose P. de Carto 6th Do. 
Captain Napier 43rd F 001 ] st En. 
DalyeIl Do. 
Ensign Carroll Do. 
Captain George Napier 52nd 1)0. 1st Do. 
William Mien Do. 
14lh Do. < William Jone! Do. Lientenant Wynne 60th ])0. 5th Do. 
Crabb 74th ])0. 
!I 
]'IJajor Sle"ar! 95th Do. ht En. 
Lieutenant Strode Do. \'1 Joa'luim Manuel I bt Cacadores ~ 1
I I.t LiclItellant l\1'ClIlIoc!t ;, U5th .1)0. bt Bu. 1 ;¡(It Do. t I tlld ])0. Kincaid ])u. 
I Remarks. 
Severely 
Do. 
Slightly 
Slightly 
Severely 
Scverely 
Slighlly 
Severely 
Do. 
Slightly 
Scverely 
Sli~htly 
Do. 
Severely 
Vo. 
Severely 
:'Ii¡;htly 
-.... 
el) 
,.... 
~ ;;;: 
1: 
'" 
No. XXVII. 
Return of Killed, W ounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of His ExceIlencv Field-marshal the 
Marquess of 'Vellington, K. B., in the Affair at Fuente Honore. • 
11 ' ~ :ill"~. ¡ ~ !111 ' d 1, "':~d. ~ I III I l. t"ij"1 i~ I I 1I . . . T."I . 
:-0: " ;:: 0::" - S ~ o ~ I "' _ ,," ;; El '" 00 - "' " ¡; "1 1" :: ~ ,,; , ,n.,," ~ 10:: I e 1;;,3 ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ t 5 ~ ~ ~ -; ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ § ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ '$JC ~ ~ E ~ "'ª & 1 ~ 5 ~ ~ § . ~ E 
1": ..e ~.~ e .3 i: e ,.:;: I ~ .3 .~ ..:s _~ .~ ,~ !'E I ~ ~ d o c.~ ~ ~.;:; -:: E ';:;> ¡: 2 "3 o . .:: S ;;.§ é ~ ~ 2 
_____________ II=__-=-=-=__:.. ~Cf]_=_=_I=-=- =-:=..:::..=-~~~=--=--~ ::: =--=-~ =-'"'-~! ~=-~ ::; =-:=..:.J.=-=--~!=_, __ , __ _ 
/ Royal Horse Artillcry ].. . '1" I .. . .1
1
" ... _¡l .......... 1 .. 
I·lth Light Dragoons l' . 1, 1 1 .. .. .. 1 1 .. ...... I 1 1 .. 
16th Do. Do. .. .. ] .. 1
1
,,, "1" "1" "1" ...... .. 
1st HlI;;,ars K. G. L. .. o • • • .[.. 1 .. .. .. 4 5 5 .. .. .. .. .. . .. . 
5th }'not 2nd 13attalion .. 1. . .. , .. "1 .. . ·1" 4 4 .. 
24th Do. 2nd Do. .. .. ..l·· .. .. ..1.... 2 2.. "l" 
4¡!nd Do. 2nd Do. ..1.. 1:. 1.. .. 1.. 5 7.. .. .. 111 
45th Do. ht Do. ..1.. .. "1-' .. 2 :2 .. 
50th Do. 15tDo. ..¡ .. I.. 1 1 ... ¡.... :¡ 5.. .. .. 
fiOth Do. 5th Do. 3 :l.. J •. " •• .• !J 11. . 1>1 1-1 •• 
7lst Do. 1st Do. h ~.. :2 I 1 2.. 31 3H. . 61 6 .. 
74th Do. Do. .. .. 1 l.. .. .. .. .. 9 9 . . . ... 
79th Do. 1 sI Battalion I 1.. 4 5 .. 1.. ..1 1.. 1 í 20 .. 
8:{rd Do. 2nd Do. . ·1· . H 9 . . :¡ :l .. 
88th Do. 1st Do. o • '11.. 2 .. 3 5 .. 2 .. 
8!lth Do. 2nd Do. .. . (¡ b . . 6 6 •• 
92nd Do. 1st Do. !I 10.. 1 .. 9 10 •• 
1111 .. 1 1, .. 
•• 11"
'
" Jo •• 
11 .. 1 .. 1 .. 11, •• 
1, .. 11 1 ~ ';1'1 ¡- 31:: 
1 
:1 3 3 
1 
4 5 5 
4 4 .• 
2 2 .. 
7 !I .. 
2 2 .. 
3 5 .. 
20 22 ... 
43 52 .. 
10 10 .• 
21 25 .. 
12 12 •• 
3 5 •• 
..!l ¡;:; 
.." 
~ I I ~"'" . '" ¡::: "(; ~ ~:i: 
94th Do. Do. 2 :1 • • 1 •. 2 3 .• 
95th Do. 3rd Battalion 1 .. !I 10 .• i . . 1 .. 9 10 .• 
1st Jjght 13attalion K. G. L. 2 2 .. o 5 5 "1 .. 7 7 .. 
2nd Do. Do. . .1 1 .. I •• 3 3 .. .. . ... i. . 4 4 .• 
1st Line Do. Do. . . l' . :2 4 .. ' . . . .'. . . .. '1" 1 1 2 4 .. 
2nd ])0. ])0. <1 4 .. 1 . . . .1. . .. .. .. 4 4 .' 
\ 5th Do. ])0. l. . . .1.· .. i. . l .. 3 4 •• 1 .• . .•. " .. 1 . . 3 4 •• 
7th Do. Do. 1,,:,,-,_":"-'1":"-' _______ 1 ______ 1 __ ~..:..-.~_1_:I ..:..-.1..:..-. __________ I]..:..-.~· ..:..-...:..-. __ ~ ._. ~_2 __ 3..:..-. 
~:t~~'~~~~~~se ~~~IL~~L~~~~~IL'~ii,l_!11,L l~~ 1;~~!:~~~:~~~ 1 ::~~í!~I!L~~)~_~~~~ 1~~ 2!:~ 
GeneralTotal ... " II] .. ··:! .. :12:¡¡;4Il .. 4101521111111701 :W4/G¡ .. I ...... -... 1 .. 21221
1
1 1 .. 5lJ 5:2 1,1122326211 
:No. XXVIII. 
Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded on the 3rd of May, 1811. 
--------
Rank and N ames. Regiments. Rank and Narries. llegimen Is. Remarks. 
Killed. Woundeu. 
Lieutenan t Cowsell 7lst Regt. 1st Bn. Captain Krauchenberg 1st Hus.ars, K. G. L. Slightly 
Captain Imlach 19th Do. 1st Do. l\1'Donald 42nd Regt. 2nd Bn. Severely 
Lieutenant Rudkin 50th Do. 1st Do. Slightly 
Ensign Gran! Do. Do. 
Lt. Col. Williams 60th Do. 5th Do. Severely 
Duchestaletle Do. Slighlly 
Captain lWlntyre 7lst Do. 1st Do. Severcly 
Lieutenant Fox Do. Do. 
M'Crea Do. Sligbtly 
Ensign Kearns Do. Dangerou"ly 
Adjutant Law Do. Slightly 
Lientenant Calder 19th Do. 1 st Do. Do. 
Ensign Brown Do. Severely 
Lieutenant Hill 92nd Do. 1st Do. Do. 
Uniacke 95th Do. 3rd Do. 
Captain de Barros 6th Cacadares 
Lientenant de Moratto Do. 
Manuel J oaquim Do. 
J. de Sto Anna Do. 
Eusign F. de Roxa Do. 
Antonio Pinto Do. 
Adjulant B. de l\Iagelhomes Do. 
-.... 
No. XXIX. 
Retllrn of Killed, WOlluded, and Missing', of the Arrny under the Cornrnand of His Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B. 
Oll the 5th Muy, 1S11. 
Killed. ----------vVounded. Missing. Total. 
,l. . 1 . 'l' I i ,S'. ~ . í I • I i 1 1 <::i'1 '1 . i i~1 \ iI:i' • • -l· . ~ I ~ ~ r.ti • ~ w. .:; rñ ~-t • 1, ~ .!!:. ~ • ~ rñ ZJ rÍJ ~.... • e '~ rñ .:!: 00 !!!.;.... • ;s .!! lOO • r~. • !:.:::: 
I ro <J.) -;::tl.~ rñ ¡::I ¡::: H ~ rIJ. i en ~ ~ IJ'J ..... .;, ¡::::¡ :::... ~ IJ'J :f] ~ -- en.= . ¡:: ¡:: t! ;...:., rn 'l1 :¡" ...... :r..~ • m =?l ~ tT.I 
: Uí 8 j :s %. ;; '~I<::i ¡j El 0 .;;¡ 'Ji i ' <i 8 ::..;J ~.s ;; .=.L <::i ¡; S 0 ~ 'Ji 1 -' 'l 8 :s 5 § .;.r <::i ::; \ El ,~ .;;¡ :l? ,.: 88 S. .':; tJ S. <::i ~ S 0 -.; g¡ 
! ~ 'O ~ ';i' ¡t¡5 .~ ~ I!S '5"' ~ ~ <5 ~! ~ 'O ...; ~. ;-.~ ~ 5 'P 2.,:.; a s I (U "'§ ...; '~. ª"'.~ ~ ~ .~ e ~ o ~ ¡:"O: _' ~ ~I ~ ';¡j ~ 'c:;; 2 ~ 'O s I ~=-'::'~~::' :';I-'=-~I:",~~_=J~"=-=-~'I=-=-='~~=- '" ... ~J::.. ~~=-~=-I::.=-~~!:..~ .. ~J:.I~=-I.=-,=-~I~ ~0..~=-~...':-.-1 =: 
\ 
1 , " ,_ 
IGelleralStajf i·· .. ·· .... ·· .............. 1 :! .... ··1;·1............ 2 .................... 1 ........ 2 .. ¡ •.•••• 1.......... 2 
Horse Artillery : . . " " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 3
1
.... .. , "1 .. 1" .. .. ". •• 1 I 3 .. ,.... .. ...... i .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. '.. .. "1" .. .. .. 2 2 6 
E'ootDo. ...•...... l .. 4 5!J .... "]"1 112 .. 18 2121 ' ........ ' .... 12 .... 1 .. 2226 30 
1st Hoyal Dragoons ¡ .. .. .. .. 4 418 ...... · ... 1 J .. 36 37 ~4, .. .. .. .. .. "' .. 1.... 40 41 42 
14th Light Do. , ' •.. " .. .. 3 3 5 .• .. .. .. 21:! l.. {¡.. 21 32211...... 3 3 3 .. 1 2, 2 l.. 6.. 27 38 30 
lGth Do. Do. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7 41.... .. .. 2 ........ 1(¡ 18 5 1.. .. 1 .. 2 2 11 2 .... 1.. 33 27 11 1st lIussar. ~. G. L. l· .. ·...... 1 :! 61 .... I 1. ... ~ .. 3~ 4:11:!0.............., 111 .... 3 2 37 ~? 26 
ColdstreamGds. IstBn., •• "1" .. .. 4 ·1 "1" .. 1 1.... 2 .. 4/ 50 .............. 1.. 7 8.. 1 11 .. 1 .. 2 .. 58 02 
3rdFootGuards,lstDo.: .......... 1 .... ;; 6 .......... 11···· 3 .. 4953 ...... 1........ 1213 .... l .. l .. l .. 3 .. 6672 
1st Fo"t, 3rd Do. I " •• •• •• • .,.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. b 9 .. 1" .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1.. 8 9 
5th Do. 2nd Do. 1 .... " .. .. .. .. ...... .. . ... '. .. .. 3 3 .. ' .... " .. .. .. .. .. ., ...... " .. .. 3 3 
9th Do. 1st Do. " ., " .......... " . ·1.. .. .. .... 4 4 .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 4 
24th Do. 2nd Do. . ......... 1.. 45 .................. ~ .. 17 l!J .. I ........ 1 ........ 45.. 1 l. ... 2 .. 2529 
30th Do. 2nd Do. .• .• •. . ... \ ...... 1.. 3 4.......... .. ...... 1.. 3 4 
42nd Do. 2ud Do. .. 1.. 2.. .. ........ 1 .. 22 23.......... ..,.... .. ...... 2.. 23 25 
44th Do. 2nd Do. .. " .... " .. 4 4......... . _ .. 1. . . ... " " .. 4 4 
Regimenta. 
45th Do. 1st Do. 3,3.. •.······ .... 1 l .. , .......... l ..•... 4 u .... 1 ................ 4 4 
50th Do. 1st Do. 1 .... ,...... .. 3 :1 .. 
1 
.............. ~ .. 1921..................... .. ...... 1 .... 2 .. 2629 
51st Do. .. .. '.. .. .. .... ...... '.. ...... 5 5...................... 1 1.. .......... .. .. .... 5 5 
.;..' 60th Do. 5th Bn. .. .. 1.. .... . ... , .... 1.. .. "1" 1. ... 1 .. II 14 ............ 2 .... 12 1 34,39.. .. ...... l .... 1.. 12 15 ~ l1lst Do. 1st Do. . ... " .. .. :! ..•. I 1 .. 10 13.. ., l.... ~ 1 (j 1 64 74...................... . .. '1·" I 4 2 1 9 2 108 126 
-:: 74th Do. " •• •. .. .. 1 2 3. . 2 •.. ' I l.. 52 56................. . .. .. .. .. 2 l.. 1 l.. 54 5\' 
00 
.... 
~ 79th Do. 1st Do. I .. 2(j 27.. 1 ., 2 5 1.. 5 .. 121 135.. " ........... " .. 2.. 92 94.. .. .. l.. 2 5 l.. 8.. 239 2.56 
83rd Do. 2nd Do. . ......... 1 .... 11 3.. 1 .... 2 .. 2ti 2!J .... ' ............•... \.. .. .. \ .... 2 .... 31 26 32 
85th Do. .. ........ 1 ...... 1213 ...... li2' .... 313:! 39 .. 1 ................ 2140431 .......... 3 .... 528492 
88th Do. 1st Bn. . ....... 1.. 1 2.. .. .... 1 1 1 .. 1 1 45 49...................... 1 1.......... 1 1 .. 1 1 47 52 
!J2nd Do. 1st Do. . •. '1" .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7.. .. "I··t 1 .... 2 .. 32 3ti ...... ·· ........... '1" 1 2.. 39 43 
!J4thDo. ..••.............. . ..... 1·.······ ...• 44 ... ,...... .... 44 
!J.,th Do. 1st Bn. .. " " .. " .. .. .. .. ' .... ' ... " .. l.. (j 7. ......... . .. .. 1 .. 6 7 
!J5th 2nd Do. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "1" .. .. .... 1 l. .. .. 1 1 
95th 3rd Do. . ......... 1........ 1 .. .. .. ..... .. .. .... 2 2 ....... ·.... 11.. 1 2.. .. 1 .... 1.. 1I 5 
ChasscUIs Brittaniquo ...•.•.... .. 2.. 28 30.. .. " 21' 1 1.. 2 .. 15 21... . ..... 7 7.. .. 2 1 1.. 4.. 30 58 
lstLightBn.K.G.L............. ........ 22 .. , .. 1............ 11 .. 1 .................... 33 
2nd Do. Do. Do. . .. '1" .. '. .. .• .. . • .. 1 1 .. \.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 .. í.. .. .. .. .. .. .... .... 2 2 
1st LineDo.Do. .. .. ,........ .. l ......... 3 .. 14 1~.. ................ 1 1 .. !.. 1 ........ 3 .. 15 19 
2nd Do. Do. Do. .. ...... 2,2... ... , 21" ........ 11 la .. ".............. 2 2 .. 1.. 2 .......... 15 17 
5th Do. Do. Do. . ..• ¡.. .. . .\.. .. 1 ........ i .... i. ... .... 8 ~ .. 1
1
" .. .. .. .. .... .. .... 3 :~.. .. " .. .. .. .... 11 11 
7th Do. Do. Do. .. .. ; .. " .."...... 1 J .. ," .. ' .... :..... 1.. J.. 4 (j.... ........ "........ 2 2...."........ 1.. 1.. 7 9 Brun~~i~o~:I:ritiSh .. ~ ~i~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~!~~ 141.~ }I'~I~I~ ~¡I,~¡i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ -;~ ~,I ~ ~ ~I~ ~¡~ ~ ~ ~.~ 2~ 2:: ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~lli~~i.~ ,,:: ":l:' 
Do. Portuguese •.. "," .. ' ... "1" J 11 44 50 .... " l. '1": 2 4 .• 11 .. 140 l;,I> ... , .. " .........• 117143 51 .... " 1 .... 2 4 .. 17 8 22/ 2J!J .. 
Grand Tutal .. ~~I~~""-I71~"t;3[~3W8 4;r2!-:-:-24:¡;I23112~4 9061030;M1 ~~1~2a 1~!;!;26!J 294 '5 2~13418 ;-;132831613481522145 
.'1 
No. XXX. 
CasuaIties which have occurred in the Trenches and Batteries before Badajoz, 
betwecn the 15th and 18th May, 1811. 
\ Killeu. 1 WOllnued. ,Misoing• Tot.1. 
11 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ i i ~ I~ i iJ J. ~ 
1 
o rñ ¡:: ,;; f..., "'O e . e & .... "O 1:3 . el ,; ¡..,"-o ""::: • e rñ ~ ""O U ~...¡..l (l.o::: ::..) 7l.:t::. !J Q,l o ,::..) (/1 ttI· ...... Q) Q .'; ~:.: c' -+-':¡". ¡::: 
. w.: ~ ~ ;:: S co:: i .g § 'a o:: co:I ,;..s ~ g: o a I cd - ~~ .~ ~ ~ ~ s '" 
\
-'-' 13 .5 ..... ~ .• m El ~....:: ....:. ~ ::: ...., bJ) • ro El ~ -.:: ~ 5 :o: ~ 1M.· ~ El I~ ~ ~ Él 5 -- ;:1 .• ~ ;: ..!.:: \ ~ .~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ ; 1';-- ~ .. ~ '§ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ I ~ .~ ~ ~ II"§ ~ .~ 2 ~ ~ ! ~ .~ ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ § § -S --------II=-~~~~ ~~=_~==_ ~I;;; ~~~~:!=__=__~'=--I~~~~I=-~~=-~==- ==-~~~~Icñ ~=-~-~ 
Royal Engineers 1 1 l.. 2 2 2 .. " ... '1" .. 3 1 .. [". ".. 4 
27th Regl. 3rd Do. .. I .. 4 ¡¡ 2 ti 1 52 6·1 ..... , ] .... 2 " .. 9 1 56 69 
34th Do. 2nd Do. .. " " 1 
40th Do. 1st Do. 10 lO 2 1 11; 2\ 2 1 "... .. 28 31 
Regiments. 
60th Do. 5th Do. .. .. .. •. 1 
91th Regimeol 7 71" 1!J 19 ...... " 26 26 
2nd Lt. Bn. K. G. L. i' • ., •• l.. .. .. .' ... .. " ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 
I! I 
Total Dritish LOSS"II~-----~~~~I~~-:-~--~I~ 921091........ --~~~ -l-~:-:-- -~-~~ 133 
Portuguese Los8 .. 1 ... , .. 1 1 .• 2 .. 4014 , ...... I l.. 4 1 88!J5 ...... 1 ...... " ~2 23 1" 3 2 .. 6 1 150162 
1_-________ 1_1 _________ --- ,--------- -1-.--.-------
General L08s"ll .... 1 2 ] " 3 ,,6168 1 .. 4 4 1 " 122 18012041 .... " 1 " .... "¡22¡2311 1 .. 5 7 21 .. lo 21 263 2!J5 
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.,J;¡ ~ 
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XXXI. 
Return of Killed, 'Voullded, and Missing, of the Army ullder tho Command of his Excellency Field-marshal 
the M arquess of Wellingtoll, K. B. Commander of the Forces at the Siege of Badajoz. 
,; Killed. . 1 lo Woundcd. . 1,; l\IiSSing..,; - Total. • 
- "'1 - " - '" - '" ~ cñ .~ I~ r.r: .r:!~ w .~ ~ 'J~ .~ ~ ...., rn e :: rn o ...... oc. o ...... ;r¡ 
~ 00 ~. i ~ ~ 1:0 w ~. 2 ~ ~ ~ rñ ~. ~ ~ -g :o 00 ~. $ t -g ~ al .9 ~ P ~ § ~ . 1~ ~ :: g ~ e = :o: • --: rñ .~ § ~ ¡:; S c;l .:~ ~ .:= S ~ ;:; S ~ • 
:; .§.. ~ ~ .~D ~ ~ ; .; ~ I -; .~ ~ ',; '~:b .~ § ~ ~ -;.~ ~ I'~ ,:1) t¿ ~. ; -2 3 I ~ .2., á :; .~ í:ti .~. ; ~ ] 
~ ;2 j I~ ~ 33 ~% ~ ~ ~ :.~ ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :J; o J ~ 6 ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~:~ ~ ~ J :3 ~ ~ ~ ;:S ~ ~ 
-7th Fllsileers, lstH~~----- ----------~ II~---------- -----,------- - ----------;-1 
40th l<'oot, 1st Do. 1 .. 1 1 
48th Do. :!nd Do. .. l" 1 1 
51st Do. .. .. 4 4 
66th Do. 2nd Do. 11·· I 1 1 
1<11" Do. 1 1" "1" 1 ~ 1 .. 23 83rd Do. 2nd Do. .. .. 3 3 . . 3 3 
85th Do. .. l.. .. .. 1 1 . . .• .. 1 1 
Chasscurs Britannique _ 3 :: 1.. ..1.. 4 4 "1" "1" 9 9 
Detadt: 1 st and :!nd 1t. Bn. h_.G.L. . '1" 1 1 "1" " " .. 1 1 
Brunswlck üels . '1" " .. 4 4 •• .. 2 2 .. 4 4 
----------------------------------------
TotaIBritish10SS .. II ..I"I .. I"" .. " .. 6 6¡ .. "" .... " 1,,~021 ...... " "1"1"1 .. 121211 .. 1"1"~.I .. I .. lll"12812!l 
Do. Porlugucsc. '1 ~ ~ ~.2 ~ ~ ~ ~ -= ~ ¡.2.2 ~ ~ -= ~.2.2 ~ ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~_ -= -= .2.2 ~ ~ -= ~.2.2 ~:~ ~ 
General Total.. . ..... I 1 .. .. .. .. (5 161] l.... ~.. ~ 1 ,,3 1;(1 ........... [.. •• •• 4 4 l l.. 1 2.. ~ 1 72 80 
[
5th ltegiment :!n,l Bn. 
'" Chasseurs Britannique 
'" .;; Total British .. 
'g Do. Portuguesc .. 
·1 .. i["11 .. " ...... 11" ........ ,,! .... "1 .. 1" .... 1 ...... 1 .. "1" .. l .... 1 .......... 1 
.. .......... " " .............. " .... 1 1 .................... "," ............ 1 1 
_' ___________________ ,_ 1---------- -1--- _-_'-__ -_-
~~~14~~~~·~ ~.~ .... p~ •• ~i~~~~~ ~~ •. ~H·4 ~~ .• 1~ J "" General Total. . 
No. XXXII. 
Contiuuation of the Siege of Badujoz. 
w Killed. \ -:-__ . WOl1nde~~ __ . __ 1 ;. .l\Iissing. 
~ i ~ ~ w ~ ~ 
§ ~ .~ g ~ .~ 5 ~ ~~ § ~ 
:o rJi~. ~~"'C ~ oo~. ~~]:O ~~. ¿~""O e <7:§ 
::.,¡ 'OI,,~ OlE" ::.,¡.·"OI~ '"E" ::.,¡ '''"en "E;; ::.,¡ ."" ~ .~.~ ~ .~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ 'ª ~ .~ ~ ~ § ~ ~ :; i'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ [. ~ ; ~~j~~~~d~~3~3~&~~~~~~~jJ~~jd~~3~~~ 
Total. 
en 
~Iiti 'fii .:a
" ~ ;:il:n 
I~ .:.. '~'"d ~ ~¡' ¡¡l' 83 S ~ ce .~ E ; ~ 
:1l~~E-4 
·-------11---,-,-- _. - - - - - - - -- - - --'- - - - - -. - - ---- - -.- - - ---,-,.-,-,-,-,-. 
f39th Fool, ~nd Bn. 51st Do. " 51th Do. 1s1 Do. § 85th Do. 
i\ 
, 
11 •• 
1 r •• 
11 1 
2: ~ 
li 1 
11 2 ) 1 
------ --- --I-=I-r----I-I---------- ------
21
2 
1 l 
1 ~ 
2 2 
Total British.. .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 .. .. .. .. 11·....· 5 ni.. .. .. .. .. .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. l...... 6 1 
lJo.rortuguese •. \I~~.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:._=_= .:..:..:..:. ... ~. ':":'I.:..:.~~j-=¡.:..:..:..:..:..:. ... -..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:..:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:. ... .:..:..:..:..:..:.~~ 
General TotaL. i ........ " ..... .:...- 3 __ 3 .... l·· .. '1...... 7 1 El "_~ _ .. _. :_. '" .. .. ........ 1 ...... lO 11 
(
Royal Artillery 
48th Foot, Ist'J3n. 
74th Do. 
o 83rd Do. 2nd Bn. 
~ § 85th Do. 
~ ~rD'. 
............ 1 .. 1·· .... ' ................. J' 1 .. ' ........ ' ........ ·.:'1·· .. ·· .... 1 ...... 1 1 
. .1..1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .................. ' ..... 1 1¡ .................. "1" ........ l·· .... i 1 
:: :: :::: :: :: :J~ :~ :~ Ili ., •.•..• : .. ¡ 11 " .•.• : •• : : ••• '. ·f •...•••.•. ' .. ¡ ¡ 
l· I " , . . 1- - -- - - -1---,--------------------11'-- - -1- -1-----; fotal Bnbsh .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1 ] .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. 7 8 ................ " .. , .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.. 1; [) 
Do. Portuguese. ·I.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~~ ___ ~i~ ~.:..:.-..:..2..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:. ~~I~.:..:..:..:. -..:..:..:.-..:. .:..:.~.:..:..:..:.'.:..:..:..:. -..:.¡.2..:..:..:..:..:..:. .:..:.~~ 
General TotaL. I ............. .!.. 515 .. .... ,1.... 1 .. 21 23 . ·1·· ................ 11 .... ··1 ) .. i" 1 .. ~6 28 
Royal Artillery .... 1.... .. 1:.. .. .... 11 JI ...... 1.. .. .. 11 .. ····.. 2 
7th Fusileers, 1st HIl. .. .. .. .. .• 1 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 
5th Regt. 2nd Bn. 3 3'1" .. 1.. 3 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... 1.. (j 7 
45th Regl. 1st Du. .. ... " " .. .. 2 2 ...... " .... " .. 2 2 
51st Do. .. .... , .... 1.. .. <1 4 .. 1 .... ,.. .. .. 1 .... "l" 4 4 
~ I 66th Do. 2nd Do. . . i 1 1 ..•. l. • . .•••• ! •• ' •••• 1 ••••• , •• " 1 1 
..; 74th Do. .. ·.1.... ........ .. 22 ........ .. ...... ~ 2 
.::; \88th Do. 1st En. . ....•.... " .. •. I l .•.. I •• •. .•.••• 1 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ..... .. .. .. 2 2 
>r.> 94th Do. .. .. " .. .. .. .. •. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. " .. .. 1 1 .. " .. .. .. .. " .. I •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 1 1 
--- ------- ------.---- -----------1----------
Total British ...... " l·· ...... 5 6 ...... " .. " 1 .. 1516 .... " " ........ " ........ 11.... 1 .. ;l0 22 
Do. Portuguese .. . ... .:..:. .~.:..:. "- .. 4' .2..1 . .:..:..:..:..:.:. .. .:..:. .. .:..:. ~ -=..: ~.:..:. .. r .:..:.,.:..:. .. .:..:. .. ~I.:..:. .. .:..:. ~I.:..:. .-..:..:..:. .. ~ ~ 
GeneralTotal ........ 1 ........ fl 7 .... ! ........ 1 .. 24125 .... "," .. ; ................ 1, .... 1 .. 3032 
. ' 1 1 I i I 1 I 
.\0. XXXIlf. 
COl! tillllatioll 01' t1w Sieg·t· of lJadajoz. 
1 KilJed. WOUlléit-d. l\1issing. Total. 
1-1; --1 ¡411-- ·I-;-I~--¡ I'~I-;--l- ~I~,I-'-i ·--I--I~ -
1 . \ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ I ~ I~' I . ~ ~,~ I ;3 i ~ ~: l. ~ ~ [.; i ~ ':g 1 ' .1 f ~"~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 
I ~ lE 1; I.~I~ ~ i 6 ~ I~ 1, 5 B j ~: ªIft I ~ § -~ ¡~ i ~ j ~ i ~. - m § .: '~ ~:'3 ~ I.~ •• ~ sI'; lo¿ 
':1 ~I.~ I ~ lE 1 ~ 2 (~, ~ i ~-, ;-Ij ¡ ~ .e f ~ 181 ~ 13'1~! ~ I ~ I~ .~ 81 § le ~I ~¡ § 1 ~ 'B ¡ f' ~ ~ 'O 
_________ . ____ I:,::,!~!'" i~.I:J) 'f2 ,=i~ ,-=-",", ,=-;=_~;';:~ 1'" :~ ::::: ,-:1 ~i--- !"'I~ 0_ if1 =-I=- f-< ~'::..I==-l~,~ 1(j)_I=-_::::: 1'::..' 
Hoyal EII¡únpprs 1 .. / .. 1 .. 1 .. 11 ...... 1 .. ' ..... l: . .¡..¡ .... ' .. 1 '1 ,'",,,',,1·, .. "1··1·· .. 1 .. 1 J, ... I .. ! .... 1 J ()o.SUdl'Corl" .... 1 .. ; ...... j ••••.• 11 ' .. ¡ 1\ .. : ..... 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .......... I..i .. ' '1 .. 1 .. 1 .. : .... I 1 
~th Ltl'gllnrnt:!m\Hu. "1" ··1' .... ,,,1 1' 11:" .. : .... 1 .. · ' .. J ] "'''' ""1" "1"1"" 1 .. , .. 1· .. · .-: .. 2 l' ~ 
I tb Do. . .. ·1·· "l·· . ·1· . , .. , . ',' ·1········· 1 1 .. .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. '1" .... "," J, 1 
45th Do. 1>t Jlu. 1 ...... ' .. i"· .. 1 l' 1,1. ..1 .. '...... , :! ~. .. .' ...... 1 .. 1... .............. 31 3 
';Ist])o. 11., .... '·'1'····' ~"·· .. Il .... 11 .. :11 .. ' .. I .......... 13~ .. ' .. ¡I .... 1, .. 101 42 
ro ,74th Do. ¡"'" .. ; .. ' ...... J 11,.... .. ... "'11 1 .. 1 .. 1 .......... 1 ..... 1 .. , ........ , .. ~I 2 
": 83rd !Jo. 2nd Bn. .. .... ' .. ; .......... 1,· .... 1 .... 11 .... 1 .. 1 ., .. , ........ 1 ...... ' .. 1 ...... 11 ... , 1 
;g 8.'tll])0. ··1···· ··'··1··,···· .. ¡, ... ::1"'" 1'''1 51 ~ ,.¡ .. I .. I .... " .......... ,2 .... 1, .. 51 8 
';/SSth])o.[stlln. ..1 .. ' ...... 1 .. ' .... "11 "l' "," .. , .. ;;,:~ ... '1'.' ........ 1 ........ 1 .. 
1 
...... 1 .. 31 :; ~ '¡ (lC1l 1h Do:, l' ·t· . ""1,, . 1
1
"!'" ., .. ;" 1
1
" ," : "1'" .... ::1' ~l'" I ", .' "1" .. "1" .. "1" . '1" .. ,,!.. 4:\' 31 
.a"ScUlo ,n .fllll'lue ... , .... "1" ........ ,' '1" .... " "1 el e .. "1" .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. e ~ [)etach.lstOilld~IldLt.Bn.K.U.L. .... I·T·:"I·~" [ 1 .. ¡ .... i .. "''''''1 1 l' .. i .... , .. " .. "1"1" .. 1 .. 1 .... ! .... 1 .. ~ :l ~ !Juke of IllullSWlCk ~:~al BIitish,. -:-~I~:~~I~:IH::'~I:~I~ ~¡J~:< 1: l;:~II~~ ~ i~:h:t~< ~~:~II"~ I'~II;~'II~~ ~:II~-: <i~-li:'~: 
Do.l'orlllguese .. ~~I~:" ~~~I~!~~~_!J J~,~~I~J-=~:l~::I~~I"I~~,.:...:.~~j~~,.:...:.~~~ ~j:..:.~~I-~ 
(ieneraITotal.. ·T·! .. I .... ¡! .. l.;,lIi ,,1 11;.: ¡1 .. 151 .. 82!14[ .. ; ... \ ........ 1 3 31/ .. 11" 1 .. 61 .. )00113 
f
=!"=th=lte=gi--I!le=llt--b ...... IB=n· .......... --:\~'II ... .' .. , .. I·Tel"1lJll.I .. "l' .  1· ..1.-. l;-ll¡.J~:· ' .. 1
1
" · .. ·I .. I· .. ¡I.~I .... ··I··~ ,,1 1; 1 
.,[,tDo. 1" .... "1"1" ...... 1 .. · .... " .... ",,, " ............ 1 )' .. " .. "1" .... 1, 1 
701th])o. .., ........ "'1" ]1 1 \" .. i .... 1 .... " 11 1 :. ' .. , ... " ... 1 •• 1 ............ •• .. 1 21 ~ 
;g 83nlllo.2no Do. '\ .. ,,, ........... , ...... 1··\ .. " .. , . ::,2"":"1'" .. 1 ...... ' .. 1 .. : ....... .' ...... ~I ~ 
" .' l'!8th Do. lst ])0. 1'" .... ·[ .. 1" .. ' .. 1 .. 1. r .. , .... , . 1[ 1 .. 1" ... -¡-. .. .. .. ", ... ..........1 1 1 ~ 1 '1' tI I3 't' 1 --1-'1- '--)-1\: '---I-I-·I-,-~I-=-:I--:--! -------1 -ll---'-I--'-I-~11-7 t::. O a n l~ l. '1 .. ... .... ," \. _ .... '1" ., I •• I . n ¡ ni .. '"1 .• , " •• .. \ ., .•• , •• •• •• •• ~ [):e~:::::~I~:;:~:::\<'" ::1:'1::1:' :::1 J. ::j~I-:-+~ :¡-~\·i·f~-~~~~I'::~I~l~II~:I~··~~:I·.~·~ ~~I-l::-¡: 
1 1 ' ,1 1, I ,1 !,' ., : 
It 
f
45th Regiment 1st Bn. 
SBth Do. 1st Do. 
~ !)4th Do. 
:; Chasseurs Britannique 
00 l Total British .. 
Do. Portugnese .. 
General Total.. 
Royal Engineers 
52nd Regiment 2nd Bn. 
29th Do. 
51st Do. 
'" , 57th Do. 1st Do. 
~ ~ B3rd Do. 2nd Do. 
¡=¡ ..:; / 85th Do. 
.<=: ¡Chasseurs Britannique ó> Duke of Brunswick Oels 
Total British .. 
Do. Portuguese .. 
General Total .. 
'" (7th Fusileers 
XXXIV. 
Continuatioll 01' the Siege of Badujoz. 
Killed. I WOlJuded. --~1~"----'------'-'---Total. 
-, , ,--, ,¡--- :-- I '1 
. 1 " v -
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"1,, " " .. 1 ] .""""" 00 .. , .... " " " .. " " " " " " " " " .... 1 1 
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'
1' ¡ l' -
11" " .. " 00 1['" 1 "," ........ 1 .. " .. " " .... " .. " 1 1" " " .. " i! 
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,1" " .. " " "!,, " " " " "" 1 1 .. " " " " ........ " " " .. " .. .. 1 
1 .....•.. 23 24, .. 1 1.... 2 .. 29 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 2.. .. 2.. 52 51 
.. " ,,' " " .......... 1 1 " .... J ........ 1 ...... 1"".. 1 
.. " "1" " "1" ...... 1 1 .... " " .............. " .... 1 1 
11.. .. .... 6 7 ,," 1.... 2.. B 11 .. J .. ""...... 1 .. 1 2.. .. 2.. 14 1!1 
"1" .. 1 1 .. 7 8, .... 1 ........ 1314 " 00 .. " " .... 2 2 .... 1 .... l .. 22 24 -,-,~~"~'~~~~I~~ .!:I~~.~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~,.!:~~.!:~~-':: 
.. , .. ¡3'.... 1 .. 38421 .. 2 4".. 6: .. ,,668.. 1.. 1 ...... 2 4 .. 31 7 1.. 7 .. 96 114 
.... 21 .... 1 .. 913:, .... 1 .... 1'1 .. 1517 .. 1 ............ 11113 .... 2 .. 2431 
1" , 
-:-:-,-:-:-'~-:-:--:-:-2-:-:-47~F2~1-:-:--:-:-7-:-:-nl85 -:-:-2-:-:-1-:-:--:-:--:-:-2--;-1141 0 1-:-:-
1
9-:-:- 1201-~ 
a 'Portuguese Los. 
ii General 'l'otal"II"I"I"¡"I"¡"I"I"I"'I."¡"¡"I"I·+H 21211"1':~'J"I"I"I"I", " , , , , , ' , , General 21 i! -'-'-'-1-1-1-1-1-· 
]," 1
11
" 
1 1 .. 
1 
1 
" SBritiSh Artillery a Portuguese Do. 
~i General Total. . 
"I"¡"¡"I':I"I'J" "1" .......... " 2 2 ........ " .... " .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 2 2 
.. .. .. '" .. .. .. 6 fj •• 1 l........ 28 30 •. .. .. .. .. •. .. .. .. ". 1 l.. .. .. .. 34 36 
------ ---- --------- ---------.- -----1---- ---
6 ül.. 1 1 .. ". .. .. 30 32 .. . "l" .. .. .. .. .. .. " 1 l........ 36 31l 
I ! ,1 '"' 
.\xxv. 
Namns 01' the Otti('ül'S al Badajoz, frolll tlw :lOth May lo 11th J une. 
Killed. -------.--.--¡----l[~~=--:~:=~ ___ :--=~;~~~-~.-- =~~~==-
!tclllarks.¡I¡ ltank and Numes. 
---1-----
1I 30th l\lay. 
30th Mayj .. Lt. R. de Mello 2nd Portuguese Line I¡Lieut. Col. Oliv('[ t.1th Portuguese 
2nd June .Lieut. ;':"dgwick 5th Regt. 2nd HIl. MaJor (jomes 21st Vo. 
5th ])0. i K J lawker H. B. F. Arti!l"ry i En"gn Jose Vlcente UD. 
Jlunt ltoval J.:llgiueers :lrd June 
Westropp lil;t Regillleut : Ensign Leslic 57th Foot 1st Rn. 
Jlog¡( 8:¡th Do. ! 4th June 
J. l'c;reira 7th of the Une ¡Lieut. J. B. <1" Lo¡wz Portuguese Artillery 
'Majo!' 1\1'(;,,"chy 17th Do. l 5th JUlle 
.Léut . .I. ,le lUeneara HJth Do. ¡Lil'u!. Furs!er Royal Engineers 
I I Westmacott Royal Stall' Cur!,s 
Heal'dsley ,)1 s! Rt'gt. 
i GamUlell 85th Do. 
l Grant Do. 
[
'Cal'taill l\Iaxwell 17th l.tcgt.of the Linc 
IErl'ign J. E. ]\ugu"se ])0. 
1
, (H!t June 
'Captain Patton Hoyal Enginecrs 
Hank and N ames. Regiments. l{egÍlnen ts. 
I Smcllie 5!,t Fuot 
¡Licut. Hicks : D,.. I 
Mortan Id5th !Jo. 
Dnfief ChasseursBritannir¡ue 
Lewzcllew,ky L. B. Lt. Lllfmltry 
Jose Forlis 17th of the Line 
, 11th Jnne 
,Captain V. J~arricros 31'(1 J)ortuguü¡;C 
¡Lient. Bal" Lo!,,,,, I ])0. 
I 1 
Hemark,. 
Scverely 
S"VNe!y (sinee al'a,,)¡, 
Do. i 
Do. :¡ 
Sligbtly 1: 
])0. 11 
Severely 11 
Do. 1 
Severely 
Do. 
Do. 
SligbtJy 
Severely 
Slightly 
Sli~htJy 
Se"crcly 
1
1 
I 
r¡ 
:1 
11 
I! 
Rank ana Names. 
Ensign Leslie 
Cuptain Nixon 
Budd 
Missing. 
Regimcnts. i ltcmnrks, 
!Jlh JUIlC 
57th Foot 1st Bn. 
)l5th Ho. 
l!Jth of the Linc 
No. XXXVI. 
Ueturu of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of thc Army under the Command of his Excellcncy Field-marshal the Marquess of WeJlington, K. B. 
Commander of the Forces at the Siege of the Fortress oi' Ciudad Rodrigo. 
Killed. l. Wounded. . l\'Iissing. Total. 
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'Royal Engineers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "," .. .. .. .. 1 l.. .. .• .. 2 4.. .. .. .. .. .. .. '. •. .• •. .. •. .. .. •. .. •• I l.....·.. 2 4 .. 
\ 
7th Foot 1st Bn. " ...................... i.. . ........ , .. .. .. .. .. 3 3.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. .. .. •. .. .. •. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. •. .. 3 3 .• 
;g 40th Do. 1st Do. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •. ].. .. 1.. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. .. l .. ¡ :J 4.. . .•...•...• , '. .. .. .. •. .. •• .. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. 2.. 3 5 .• 23rd Do. 1st Do. . ................... 1 11" .................... , 7 7 "1" ............................................ 8 8 .• 
.; 48th no. 1st Do. . .... , .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. :¿ 2.. . ........... " .. .. .. .. .. .. . ...•... '. .. •. .. .. .. 3 3 •• 
..::: II Duke uf Brunswick Oels ....... , .. .. •• .. .. .. 1 l.. . ............. " .... 11 l............................. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. .. .... 1 ] .. 
- Tutal British. ................ l.. 2 3.. .. .. .. .. 1 l.. .. ] .. lA 21 .. 1 .. .. .. .. •. .. .. •• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 l.... 2 .. 20 24 .. 
"' ______ ---_ -----------.~ -1---1 ------ - ~ ----- - ---- - - -- - - --
~ Do. l'ortuguese.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. l.. 7 8.. . ...... , .• l ........ 33 34 . '1' .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1.... 1 .. 41 43 .. 
¡ ----------------------~----- ------ ----------------
Ci General Total. ................. 2 .. 911 .......... 12 .... 1 .. !5155 .. 1 .... ~ ............ ~· .... · ........ 1 2 .... S .. til67 1 .. 
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§ 
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.s 
::; 
Royal Artillery 
Do. Engineers 
5th FODt 2nd fin. 
45th Do. 1 st Do • 
74th Do. 
88th Do. 1st Do . 
.. "1" .................. ~I" -2 2.. ..1 .. - "1"- .f"'j" .. 1 .. ~.' 2-;~ 
.......................... 1 1 3.. .. .... "1" .. .. 1 1 3 .. 
.......... 22.............. 23.. .............. 45 .. 
. ......... 22.............. 89.. ..1 .......... ·· 1011 .. 
.......................... 1 ........ 6 7.. .. ............ ," .... .. .. .. 1 .. 6 7 .. 
--~'~-~.:..:.~~~-=-.:~. ~~~~~-~~~~I~~~~ ~.:..:.~I.:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.I.:..:..:..:..:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.!..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~~.:..:. 
Total Britisb.. .. .. .. .. .• .. .• .. .. .. 7 7.. .. •. .. .. 1 4 J.. 11" 32 39 .. . ... " " .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 4 l.. l .. ;1946 .. 
Uo. portuguese. ~'':'':'':'':'.~ ~~.:..:.C~-~.:..:.!.!..:..:. ~~.:..:..:..:..:..:.~.:..:.~. ~ .. .:..:..:..:. _~-=.:..:. .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:.~ ~.:..:.~ ~~.:..:..:..:.~~.:..:. ,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,,:,~,:,,:,,:,,:,~~._~~,:,,:, 
(;eneral Total ...................... !J 9 .......... 1, 4 1 .. 1 .. 3542 .................................... 1 4 1.. 1 .. 4552 .. 
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No. XXXVIf. 
Con1 inllation of tIJe Sieg'c of Ci lldad Rodl"igo. 
Killed. Wounded. Missing. 1 Total. 
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;: -O .~ ~ ~ ~ .~ I~ :'F ~ ª ~ e ~ -3 ~ I ~ ~ 2 ~ ~ E' 2 ~ 'O ~ t '3 .~ g' ~.§ ~ ~ f'l ~ 3 ~ 8;1 ~ i I'~ .~ ~.~ ~ ~ .~ E § ~ o 1'" ü ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,:ñ:oo ~ Xi ~ =::: ~ ...J ....:¡ I~ ~ ...:: I~ ·ñ 'f2 :::: ~ ~ - :) :,.) ...J ~ ~ ~ ~ Cf) Ti o ~ ~ :t i::..:J ..) H ;:; lÜ ~ ~ cf] 'T.1 :::¡ ::: ~ ~ 
---,-. ,---'----------------1-------1-- ---- ------ ----_._.------
Royal Engmeers l.. .. I 1 .. ," .. .. 61 ti.. 7 7 " 
13r<l FOOl, 1st Bn. l' .. ;, 5.. 5 5 .. 
52nd Do. 1st Do. . . 3 3.. 3 3 .. 
52nd Do. 2nd Do. . . 1 ] 3 3.. " 4 .. 
H.egilllents. 
95th Do. 1st Do. j •••• "1'" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 2.. 2 2 .. 
95th Do. 2nd Do. ¡ •••••••• ",' _ " •• •. •• 2 ~ .. . ..... [ ................ "1" 2 2 .• 
: , I I Do~~;~;t~:~t!::~:: [~~1~1:~~~1=,~~4~~ ~ ~1~11~~~I~~~~~~i~ ~~~~~~~~I~'=~~~I~ ~=,=~c~~~r 
General Total. . ..1 ............ 1 .. 1" ;, ~.. .. .. 1 ........ ," ...... 3232:" .............. "," ...... "1" .... 1 .. : o. .. \ o. .. o. .. :n 37¡ .. 
Royal Artillery .......................... 1 ...... ~.. li .. l1112 .. .. .... 1 .. 1.. .. "1..r.~I~I" .. .. .... 1 .. IJ 1:1 .. 
Cold,tream Glla. rds, 1st Bn. . ..........• " .......... "1 ..•...... ·1·· ... , .. \0. 2 2 .......... "l' .,.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 :.! .. 
~~~hFf)o~.~:d~:.j)o. ::::.::::: .~.: ::1:: .......... :::::::: ~ ~:: :::::::::::::: ...... :::::::: o. .... ~ ~:: 
42nd Do. 2nd Do. . .. '1" ...... o. o. o. .... 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ••• '1" 5 5.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ..........;, 5 .. 
60th Do. 5th Do. .. .. .. .. . ..... 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 2.. ...• .. .. .. .• .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 í .. 
IstLineEn.K.G.L. .......... 11 .• 1 ..............•..•.. 1212 ....••.............••....... j.. ..1313 .. 
;~~d~~·to~· : :~.~.~~~~~~.~~J~J_~~!:~~~ ~~d~~~~ ~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ 
Total British.. . ..........• " •... ¡I.. 7 7 .. ; ....•..... 1.. .. •. 1 .. 57 ;';8 ., ! .••••••• '. .• •• •• •• •• • •••• _l' . '.. .. .. .. .. .. .. l .. 64 ti5 .• 
Do. Portuguese.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 ;-¡ .. I.. .. .. .... 1.... .... 4 '; "1" .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1........ 7 8 .• 
1 ______ ------- _________ 1 _____ ---------------~;---- ----- - ------
General Total..: .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . -1-. 10 10 1" i .. .. .. .. .. ].... l' 6\ 63.. .. .. .. .. ..1.. .. .. .. .. .. .. l·· '.. .. .. .. .. 1.... 1 .. 71 73 .. 
----- "-- ---------..-.-..-
fRoY",IArtillery ¡-\ ...... \~: .................. -\I..~"" "1" 5 7 .. ¡ ...... \ ...... ·T' .. 11...... .. .. 2 .......... () fi .. ;~I;/ ~~~, 1Is~\~:: 1 :: .. :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ; ~::! : : :: :: :: :: ~ ;:::: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: 1 :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: ! ::: 
"i 48th Do. 1st Do. 1·.····1 .......... ·· .. 1 1 ... ' .................. 1 .. ] 1 .. : ................... 1 .......................... 33 .. ~ 60th Do. 5th Do. j .•••• , .. .. .. .• •. •• •• 2 2 .. 1.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ] 1 "1" .. .. .. ... .. o. ...... o. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 1 J .. 
I ~ ----
-g; Total British .. 1 ¡-:-:- ~ -:-:-I~ -:-:-j~ ~ ~ ~ -:-:- --; --; -:-:- 1-:-:- ~. ~ ~ '2 -:-:- ~ -:-:- ~ -:-: ~ lo. " .1:: ~ ~ -:-: ~ ~ ~.r~ ~ ~.- ~ ~ -:-:- ~ ~ ~ ~ .-;; ~.' ~. ~ .... 22 24 ~ 
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. ------k: -=- =-:::. =-=-=:'I~ ~r2-!=- ':...:... ~::.=-:=.:::.. =- =-:". - ,~:-' - t-. ~~~ ::.!:'..:::.. =-¡=-~ :::"1'" ::.'=-:. :-' =_ =-1"" :::.. =- =- ~.:"- -=.i=- .=J:... Gcneral.St~ff 111 ........ ··1 .. :···· .. , .. "1 ¡ 3 ......... : ...... ¡ .... "1 ~L .. '"I"I .. I·y·· .. 1·1·· .... 41 ......... .J ....... 1
1 
.... ~ ~~~~tlC~::l~~ncer~ :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: :::::::::: i::::: r :: :: 1 ~II: : 1:: :.;:: : t : 1:: :: :: I J: :: :: :: :: :: :: :: i::::::::,::" i 
5th Foot,:llldHn ... ', .... ¡ ........ 11 .. 32134 •..... 1 1411 "1 <l ••• 19, (i°ll .. ¡ .... 1 .... 1 ........ 1' ........ ! ...... [ :1 4111 .. 41" 81 9c! 
43rd Do. I sl Bn.1 .... " " .......... 1 .. (¡ 7··...... I :1.. .. .. 4 1 :lfi 3,j,,, .... , .. "!" .......... " ... :.. .. .... I 2...... 5 1 :\2 41 
C'1l4;¡thDo.htJ)O, ........ 1 :1 ...... IIIl~ 17 .. 2 :l ...... JI :':;¡!:\I ...... 1 ........... ·1 .. · , ............ 341 ...... 2,237 ·1tl 
:;; 5:lnd Do. 1 sI Do. .. .. .... I ... o ...... 1.. 2 a .... 1 1 .. .. .. .... 1.. :.::.: 25 ................ "1" .. .. .. .. .. 1 I 1 .... · .. 11·· 24 28 
,..., Do.J)o.2ndDo ............ o ..... o .... 1 1 1 ...... 1 ~ .. ;:¡ H .................. 1 .... 1 .............. 1 .. · .. 2
1
" ti !) 
i- (iOlh])o.5th])0 ................... 1 .... l·· .... ,. 1 .... ·· ..... , ::1 4!' ................. 1 .. ..1.· ........ l .... 1 .. 1··· .. 11" 3 5 
Sl 74th])0. .. .................... 4 4 ........ 2 1 j .... ~ .• 11
1 
1i,: ............ I .. ¡ .. ··1 .... 2 :! "1" .. ," 2 1I I .... :.: .. 17 23 
:;J' 7:th Du. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. 13 .!........ ;¡ 1 1 I .. :.:.. ~~I 3hll"' ....• ' ... '·1 .......... 1 ••• ' •••••• :.. :\ I 1 1 .. :\.. 41 50 :;1!l·~rdJ)o.2ndDO'"'''''''''''''''''''' 1, l .. ···o .... '; .. "1" , .... ,.'! .~! ................ "1" .... ,; '.; "," "1"" ··1·········· .? .5 ~ H~thDo.lstDo ....... , ............... 71 ' ............ , .......... -.1 -." ," , .. " ............ 1 .... ~ " ...... ' .. '.' ~i""""" 3.\ 37 
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.5 !Ji;thDo •• l stuo·I ............ ¡ .......... 11 J ...... ' .. 1 :l ....... 1 .. ll.jl'l~;."I· .. · ........... ··' ........ 1' ........ 1 " ....... 1 .. ](i 2~ 
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i\o. XXXiX, 
Retul'n 01' Killed, 'Voumletl, and Missing, of the Army under the Commnnd of His Excellcl1cy l"ield-marshal tho Marquís oi' 
'VeIlington, K. B. at the Battle of Albuera. 
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General ~t~fr, 1 ....•. ' .........• ,. .. 1.. 7 .... ' .. "," .. .. .. ., . . 71,··· .. 1 .. ' ...... , ....... , .. .. .. t. '1' .. " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 .• 
RoyalBntlshArtillery .................... 3 3!1 ...... ·· 1
1 
.......... 10 111'10 ...... 1 .............. 1 11 ..... ,. 1 .... ,. .... H 15;0 
Do. German Do. ........24 .... ,1 Hí 17 .... ·· .. 1 .... ] 2!J 3110 ..... ,. .. 2 .. ,. 45 48 34 
3rd Dragooll Guards '!J 10 l) .. 1.. !J H ú .. .. .. •. .. .. 1 ) 14 .... ',... 1 .. · . ) H 20 l!) 
4 th Dragootls 2 3 11 l' I 1 1 1 15 20 1 10 ..••..•. 2 .. 2 4 2 " '1" •• :l 1., I 2 1 19 :!í 2a 
13th Lt. Dragoons .. .. .. .. 1 l.," ..... , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. , .. '1" ,. .. .. ,. ,. ) 1 1 
3rdFoot htlln. ..1 12' .. 4 .. t082lU.. 41 ~ l .. 11 1 222 248 ........ 1 ... , 2 1511 HiI17!J.· ! ..... " ,,112 :¡" 30 2 5!JI ti43 
7th Do. 1st Do. . .•..... 1," 2., ti3 6.';., .. :;',11"/,, 14, .. 263 29t.. ........ ,.1 ...... ,. ~ ... I ,. 3111 .. ,. ]ti,. 321; 357 
7th Do. 2nd 1)0. . . '11 1 "1" ].. 4(j .19.. 1 3, (j.. 1 1 (¡ 1 2(j(i :lOO.. .. .. .. .. .. .. :' "," 1 ·1 10" 1 17 1 315 34\1 ~3nl D". !"t Do. .. 1 .. 1, .. 1 .. n llJ ,. .. 3! 4 3 1 Il! 1 23~ 25~ .... " .. .. 1 .. 5 1;··.··· 1 ,. 41 4 4 1 14 1 :HO 33!) 
27th Do. :lrd Do. .. 1 1 2, . . ... ,.. •. .. 5" . , ......... , 1 ., .. ¡; 8 
28th Do. 2nd Do. .. 1 2fi 27.. :.oi 3 1.. 8 .. 123 137.. , .... ",. 2 3 1 t) 1 14f1 ](;4 
2!Jth Do. .. 1 I 3 2 .. 73 80.. 1 3, 4 :1 1 12.. 220 245.. . '1" II 11 ...... 1 ,1:, fi 1 14.. 304 3:3(j 
31st Do. 20d Do. 2 1 26 2!).. ' 2: 3 2 .. 4,. nfJ lt(;.. .. .. :.1 :1 ~ •. (j 1 141 155 
34th Do. 2nd Do. .. 1 1 I 3 .. 27 33.. 21 2 .. .. ().. !l5 \151" :\ 3 1.. !J.. 112 128 
39th Do. 2nd Do. 1 .. .. 14 15.. 1; 2 1.. 4,. 73 81.. 2 ~..... .. . 1 1.. 4. . 8!J !J1l 
40th Do.lst Do. 3 3.. ., .. .. .. 8 8.. . ... \.. ..1...... II 11 
48th Do. 1st Do. .. 1 2 .... (¡.. 58 67 .. 5: 7 1 1 !J 183 2071.. Il fi ..... : 1 5i \! 1 1 15 1 247 280 
48th Do.tlld Do. 3 I .. 4 .. 40 4~ ...... '.," 4: 4, 2 .. :1 1 S~ !l6:.. 125 ~ 71751!l0 ... , .... 1 U,'I12 ,1 .. 1~ 8 2!l71:\43 
57th Do. 1 st Do. 1 1 3 I 8:1 ~!J.. •. 1 I (ji 11 ~.. 11 ¡¡ 304 33!J.. " .. 1 2 7 II ::.. 14 4 387 4:!H 
60th Do. 5th Do. 1.. 1 2.. ..' 1 .. .. :!.. 16 H,'.. .,.. .. .... 1 .. ·· 3.. 171 21 
6tith Do. 2nd ])0. 1 1 .. 1 1 50 5;' .. 11 ~ 3 .. 13.. !lI Ilfil.. 4 1 96101 .......... :! !J 4., 1101 2 237 212 
97th Do. .. .. .. .. 'l" .. .. ) 1. . .. 1 ) 
1 st Lt. Do. K. G. L. " .. .• .. .. 4 4. . .... 1 1 1 1 1 3, . 55 63. ' 2 2..:"... 1 1 1 1 1 3 . . ()) 6!) 
2nd Do.])o. _______ ~ ,:_:.I.:_: . .:..:..:..:.~_~~ .:..:~~~.2:.:..: ~':":_:.:_·L~~~ ~~~.:..:.~:. ~~~ -':'C ~ _~ ____ ~~~~ .. ~~ .2.:..:.~_:~ 32 ~ __ 
DO~'~!~~!ul~~t!:~::li~j~ .. ~~~ ?J~.I~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~: _:I~:;i~~!~¡ J;2~i~2;~7:~ ~~~~~~~j~:~ ~ ~~I~~I~ 1!1~,~i~~~~ll~:; ~:J;~r~~~ l~ 
General Total.·1 I • _1 1 I I ti 13 lI! 1 133 4 !J13 !l84 ti:; I ti 1 .. I ;¡! 51 1S:ti6 22 7 146 IOj2656 :.!!l9· 35j ...... i 1 4 H J 1 .. :!8 11 51715701171IOj· ·1 ti \ 7 5U 10732 8 207~5 408H 45017 115 
RegilIwutS. 
No. XI,. 
N ames of tite omcers Killetl, \Voullded, amI }[issing', at Albuera, 1Gth May. 
--~-"-- --~-~--- _._---~---
Killed. WoulIued. 
British. Regimcnts• Portuguese. ltegimen ts., Driti,h. llegimcnts. Remarks. 
-~ 
----, ----~~"----~----~ ----~----- ------~~--
Maj. Gen. D. Boghton Staff-surgeon Boolman ~Iaj. Gen. (he lIon. U. L. Cale Sli,,;lltly 
Lieutenant Fox :lrd Dn. Guards J. P. J. Jase I\lontro I Hon. W. Stewart Do. 
Captaill BUl'ke 3rd 1<'oot, ,,,¡ Bn. Capto J.:gerloll 34th Rpgt. Do. 
Lieutenant Herbert Do. \Valler I03rd ])0. Severely 
Ensi¡;:n Chadwick Vo. Houveria, A .D. C. to Major Gen. 1 Sici]ian Hegt. Do. Thomas Do. the Hon. G. L. Cole ~. 
Captain Erek 7th Do. IstBn. Warle l:lllll Do. Do. 
Lieutcnant Archie Do. : Baring,A.D.C.toMaj.Gen.Altcn 1st Lt. Bn. K. G. L. Slightly 
Captain MOlltague 23rd ])0. 1 st Do. I Capto Hawkcr ¡{oyal Artillny Do. 
2nd Lieutenant Hall Do. Lient. Thiele Do. Ger. ])0. Severely 
Captain Humphrey 20th Do. Capto Holmes Hit Dragoons Slightly 
J~ielltenant D uguid Do. Lieut. Wildman ])0. Do. 
Ensign Killg Do. Adjt. Chantry Do. D". 
.Furnace Do. Capto Marley :3rd }'oot, 1st Bn. Do. 
·Vanee Do. Gordon Do. Severely 
Captain GibboflS :14th Do. 2nd Bn. Rtevens Do. Do. 
Lit"utenant C. Caslle Do. Camerun 1)0. Do. and taken prisoller 
Ensign Sarsfidd Do. Lieut. Juxon Do. 
Lieutenant Beard 30th Do. 1st Do. Shepherd Do. Slightly 
Lient. Col. Duckwartb !8th Do. 1st Do. Hooper Do. ])0. 
.. 
Lieutenant Page Du. Latham Do. Do. 
Ansaldo Do. Wright ])0. Do. 
Lieutenant IJiddon t8th Do. 2nd Bn. Woods Do. 
Loft ])0. Hougltton Do. Se\<rely 
Drew Do. Titlow Do. Do. 
Ensign Rothwell Do. O'Donn"ll Do. Do. 
Major Seotl nth Do. 1st Bn. Ensign Walsh Do. Slightly 
Captain'Fawcett Do. Lielltenant-eolonel Sir vV. l\Iyers Bn. 7th Do. 1st Do. Severely (,ince dead.) 
BelJnin~ 56th Do. 2nd Bn. Capto Cholwick Do. Slightly 
Lientellant Shewbridge ])0. Singer Do. Do. 
Ensign Coulter Do. Crowder Do. Do. 
Lieutenant Whitney Lieut. Provost Do. Severely 
IHaultry ])u. Do. 
ElIis Do. Du. 
S. B. J ohnstonc Do. Do. (since dead.) 
Jl.lullens Do. Severely 
H('nry Do. Slightly 
Joncs Do. Severely 
;\lor~an nu. Do, • 
No. XLI. 
Continuation of the N ames of Killed aml Wounded at Albuera. 
Wounded. 
Hauk aud Names. HegiIllents. Remarks. Rank and Namcs. IlegillJents. 
------I------I-C-·-----II- -·-----1-----·---
Lient. R. J ohnson 
Gibbons 
Moses 
Br. Lt. Col. lllakeney 
Capto M'Ginncs 
Orr 
Tarlctoll 
-LiBul, Erwin 
Healy 
Wray 
Orr 
Seaton 
Penrice 
Loreutz 
Holden 
Fraser 
Acting Adjt. l\k'gher 
Lieu!. Col. Elli, 
Capto H urfor" 
M'Donald 
Stainforth 
I sI Lieut. Ilarrison 
Booker 
Treeve 
Thurpc 
2nd Lieut. C"stl,," 
HarJis 
Ledwith 
Adjl. M'Lean 
Capt.Gale 
Carroll 
Lieut. Crulllmer 
Cottingharn 
Sheltuu 
Ensign lngraJ~L 
Lieut. Col. White 
Major Way 
Capto Hod~e 
Todd 
Nestnl" 
Lient. Stall11u<j 
Brocke 
7th }'usiIeers, 1st B", Slightly 
llo. Do.' 
Do. Sevcrely (sinee de?d) 
7th Do, 2nd Hn. Sevcrely 
])0. Left arm amputated 
])0, Severely 
Do. Slightly 
])0. Severely 
Do. 
Do. 
Do, 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
])", 
Do. 
Do, 
23nl Do. bt nu. 
Do. 
Du. 
Do. 
Do, 
!Jo. 
Do_ 
llo. 
Du. 
Do. 
D". 
])0. 
i8th Do. ) ,t Bu. 
Do. 
Do. 
llo. 
¡¡o, 
Do, 
29th Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Ilo, 
lIo. 
Uo. 
Do, 
Severely 
Sp.verely 
Slightly 
Do, 
D", 
Do. 
Do. 
Slightly 
])0. 
Scvl'rely 
Slightly 
Severely 
Sli~htly 
Do. 
Do. 
Slightly 
Se\-erely 
!
SlightlY 
~liO'htlv 
t :-. "' 
"-P""l'i'l y' 
I 
Lieut. Popham 
Briggs 
Rnsign Lovelot'k 
Kearney 
Lovelock 
Adjt. Wil!! 
Capto },lemming 
K¡.ox 
Lient. Bntler 
(ipthin 
Cashell 
Ensign \Vilson 
Nicholson 
Capto Weddringtoll 
Wyatt 
Lieut. Hay 
Walsh 
Capto Brine 
Lieut. Ha)'t 
Pollard 
Ensign Cox 
Capto Wilson 
Freuch 
Bell 
Morrisot 
i Parsons 
I Lient. Crawlcy 
I f'terrj"g 
! Vfrigllt 
! O'DollOgllUe 
Duke 
M'Intosh 
Vincent 
Ensi~n Collins 
\ djt. Sleele 
Capt. Watkins 
1
- Wangh 
Droughl 
I Wood 
, Lient. John:-;nn 
\' a!'LkrHlf~ 111111 
Sh"il 
~9th Fusileers 
llo. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
:\ 1 st Do. 2nd 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
])0. 
Do. 
IDo. 
¡.14th Do. 2nd 
t Do. 
IDo. 
I Do. :l:lth Do. 1st 
1 Do. 
'1 Do. 
])0. 
!18th Do. 1st 
1 Do. 
I 
llo, 
Do. 
I ])0. 
Do. 
))0. 
Do, 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
IDo. 
i ])0. 
I
Do. 
·l~th Do. 2n(1 
Do. 
Do. 
Ilo, 
Do. 
n". 
llo. 
j . 
. , 
Remarks. 
5efereIy 
Slightly 
Seferely 
SeTerely 
Do. 
Slightly I ])0. 
Do. 
])0. 
Se~erely 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Slight1y 
])0. 
Slightly 
Serercly 
Slightly 
Slightly 
llo. 
Do. 
Do. 
])0. 
])0. 
Do, 
])0. 
])0. 
Slit111ly 
])0. 
No. XLII, 
N ames 01' Olliccrs Continuccl. Killed aud 'VOllllded aL Alhuera, 
'Vounded. Woundcd. 
--------.,--.------ --------,-------:------
Rank and ]\"ames. n"giments. Hcmarks. H.ank and i\ ames. ltegÍments. Hemarks. 
------------'---------------------,,----------.--'----------,------
I,icutenant Sharp 
Ensign N orman 
lII'Dougall 
Lieutenant Col. Inglis 
MajoT Spring 
Captain Shadforth 
M'C1ih/¡OIl 
Jermyn 
::;tainforth 
ndy 
Kirby 
],ieutenant Evatt 
Bax!er : 
M'Larhlane! 
J\l'Farlane 11 
Dix 
Patter!"on ¡ 
Hughes 
SheridaTI 
Virtch 
lIIyers 
M'Dougall 
Ensign Torrens 
Jackson 
Lieutenant lngerleben 
Captain Fcrns 
'Licutenant lIiclen 
Hervey 
1,'Estrang0 
Chamher. 
J\I'Carthy 
Cort.! 
Hane! 
Crompton I 
18th .Foot 2nd Bn. 
])0. 
])0. 
,7th Do. 1 st Do, 
Do. 
llo. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
1)0. 
])0. 
Uo. 
Do. 
Do, 
Do. 
Do. 
¡Ot\¡ Do. 5th Do, 
';¡¡th Do. 2nd Do. 
Ellsign Walker 
Hay 
Mack 
,\I ajur H artwig 
Ensigll Srnalkenson 
Adjutant Tapie 
Captain L lJ rrsc 
Ilst Lt. Bn. K, G, L 
I lnd Do. Vo. 
Slightly 
Sevr'rely 
])0. 
Slightly 
Do. 
Slightly 
Scvprely 
~¡ightly 
Slightly 
Do. 
Sliglttly 
Slightly 
::-ievercly 
~everclv 
~lig)¡IJy 
P ortn {1Ut':-;C. 
Colonel Collins ~ 
.\rljutant Jose de Mello 
Ensign P. Broquet 
Captain Jose de Mattos 
James Jolmsoll 
Lieutenant J ose Miranda 
Ensign J. S. Yascoucellas 
Lieutcnant J. 1'. de Carvalhos 
n. de N "pules 
Captain A. P. D, Aragas 
Lielltl'nant-colonelllawkshaw 
Majar .J. Paes 
Captain F . .r acob 
.T. P. HoeaJo 
Lieut, Ant. Carlos 
. t\nJrcw Camaeho 
LO?lilJON 
1"DI-:-"Ij",l) 11'1. .\, J. \AI.l'}, .l:~J.:,1) J,Jo.' {o)l'fll, UhJ..'1 ::-IULLL 
2nd Rr>giment 
Hit ])0. 
ith Do. 
lJo. 
Do, 
Do. 
11th ])0. 
Do. 
23rrl Do, 
1st Bu. L. L L, 
Do. 
}Jo. 
V". 
no. 
llo" 
tí ¡ir: 
~ '~~; 
"\ '~t 
, .... ~", 
'/ /J; 
